DEMILITARISING THE MOUNTAIN KINGDOM: AN ACTION RESEARCH PROJECT IN LESOTHO

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration – Peace Studies

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April 2018
DECLARATION

I Tlohang Willie Letsie declare that

a. The research reported in this thesis is my original research.

b. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

c. All data, pictures, graphs or other information sourced from other sources have been acknowledged accordingly – both in-text and in the References sections.

d. In the cases where other written sources have been quoted, then:

   1. The quoted words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced:

   2. Where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside quotation marks and duly referenced.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I sincerely express my gratitude and appreciation towards all the people who contributed in different ways towards this project. Special gratitude goes to the following individuals:

I will always be indebted to my supervisor, Prof. Geoffrey Harris for his professional yet friendly guidance and mentorship. Words cannot adequately describe his dedication to his work. I have learnt a lot from him, both academically and how to live in peace.

Members of my advisory group who despite their busy schedules managed to create time to assist me.

My whole family who endured long periods without a husband, father, son and brother, also deserve special thanks.
Lesotho is a politically unstable country that is characterised by all kinds of violence – physical, structural and cultural. The country established an army in 1979 and since then the army has contributed in various ways to perpetuating this violence. Annually, Lesotho spends around 5 per cent of its budget on the Ministry of Defence and National Security, with over 80 per cent of this allocation going to the army. The huge expenditure on the army is questionable considering Lesotho’s geographical location. The contribution of the Lesotho army to political conflict and poverty calls for research on ways to address this unenviable situation. Demilitarisation (disbanding the Lesotho Defence Force) appears to be the most viable solution.

Using an action research approach, this research engaged in various activities to teach the public about the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation. Literature shows that there are demilitarised countries and that these countries have generally higher living standards than their militarised counterparts. Some of the non-militarised countries rely on police forces for their security while some have got into security pacts with their stronger neighbours. An examination of the Lesotho’s situation shows the likelihood of considerable resistance to the demilitarisation process. It would therefore be necessary, in the case Lesotho eventually decides to disband its army, that the country comes up with a detailed plan of execution before implementing the demilitarisation process. Various case studies of demilitarised countries provide a good guideline of the changes that would need to be adopted, and the pitfalls that would need to be avoided to achieve demilitarisation.

The incumbent prime minister has on a number of occasions voiced his desire to see a non-militarised Lesotho where the tasks currently performed by the army would be taken over by a highly-specialised police force. Lesotho is currently enjoying a lot of international support in its attempts to reform its security sector, in response to recent developments that have seen the army intrude in civilian politics, as well as numerous criminal acts committed by the members of the LDF. The vision of the incumbent prime minister, coupled with the above-stated international support, render this the appropriate time for Lesotho to demilitarise and undergo a fundamental transformation of the national security sector.
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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

1. **ABC** All Basotho Convention  
2. **AD** Alliance of Democrats  
3. **BCP** Basutoland Congress Party  
4. **BDF** Botswana Defence Force  
5. **BNP** Basotho National Party  
6. **BMP** Basutoland Mounted Police  
7. **CAB** Community Advisory Board  
8. **CAR** Central African Republic  
9. **CID** Crime Investigation Division  
10. **COSC** Cambridge Overseas School Certificate  
11. **CSOs** Civil Society Organisations  
12. **DC** Democratic Congress  
13. **DMA** Disaster Management Authority  
14. **DPE** Development for Peace Education  
15. **DUT** Durban University of Technology  
16. **EU** European Union  
17. **FMLN** Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front  
18. **GDP** Gross Domestic Product  
19. **GNI** Gross National Income  
20. **GPI** Global Peace Index  
21. **HDI** Human Development Index  
22. **IATT** Indian Army Training Team  
23. **IEMS** Institute of Extra Mural Studies  
24. **IMF** International Monetary Fund  
25. **LCD** Lesotho Congress for Democracy  
26. **LCS** Lesotho Correctional Services  
27. **LDF** Lesotho Defence Force  
28. **LLA** Lesotho Liberation Army  
29. **LMP** Lesotho Mounted Police  
30. **LMPS** Lesotho Mounted Police Services  
31. **LNDC** Lesotho National Development Corporation  
32. **LPF** Lesotho Para-military Force
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<td>MPs</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Maseru Security Accord</td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>MUNUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Congo</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>NATO</td>
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<td>40.</td>
<td>NSRI</td>
<td>National Sea Rescue Institute</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Services</td>
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<td>42.</td>
<td>NUL</td>
<td>National University of Lesotho</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<td>44.</td>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participatory Action Research</td>
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<td>45.</td>
<td>PC FM</td>
<td>People’s Choice FM</td>
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<td>46.</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Progressive Democrats</td>
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<td>PEMS</td>
<td>Paris Evangelical Missionary Society</td>
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<td>48.</td>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Police Mobile Unit</td>
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<td>49.</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Panamanian Public Forces</td>
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<td>50.</td>
<td>PNC</td>
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<td>51.</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Principal Secretary</td>
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<td>52.</td>
<td>RLDF</td>
<td>Royal Lesotho Defence Force</td>
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<td>53.</td>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern Africa Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>59.</td>
<td>SMF</td>
<td>Special Mobile Force</td>
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<td>60.</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>Special Operations Unit</td>
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<td>61.</td>
<td>TIAR</td>
<td>Inter-American Reciprocal Defence Treaty</td>
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<td>Thaha-Khube FM</td>
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<td>63.</td>
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<td>Transformation Resource Centre</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1 Introduction

Lesotho is completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa and borders the latter’s three provinces namely Free State, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal. Lesotho is home to about 1.9 million people (Lesotho Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Known as Basutoland during the colonial days, Lesotho was a protectorate of the Great Britain from 1868 until it attained political independence in October 1966. At independence Lesotho adopted the political system modelled on that of Great Britain. The country is a constitutional monarchy with the hereditary traditional King as the head of state, while an elected prime minister becomes head of government. Just like Britain, Lesotho maintains a bicameral parliamentary system consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate.

Since attaining independence, Lesotho has never enjoyed a prolonged period of political stability. The immediate post-independence period saw the government having to deal with on the one hand with King Moshoeshoe II, who was dissatisfied with his position as a constitutional monarch, and on the other, with the opposition that was not pleased with its narrow electoral defeat by the Basotho National Party (BNP). Things took a turn for the worse when in 1970 the BNP leader and prime minister, Leabua Jonathan annulled the elections, declared a state of emergency, and suspended the constitution. This paved the way for the BNP’s 16 years of authoritarian rule that was ended by a military coup in 1986. A modernised army had been established earlier in 1979 out of the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), which was the riot squad of the Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP).

The military junta lasted for seven years until 1993 when democratic rule was restored. However, the return to democracy did not ensure political stability as the country was shaken by a succession of upheavals, ranging from political party disputes over election results, temporary disbanding of the government by King Letsie III in 1994, clashes between the army and the police, internal fights within the army, and bloody foreign military intervention by the South African Defence Force under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1998. Now more than two decades after returning to democratic rule, Lesotho still remains politically unstable.
In April 1980 Lesotho was a founding member of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), together with eight other Southern African states. The organisation was to later be renamed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. Lesotho is also a member of the African Union, Commonwealth, United Nations and other international conventions. These organisations – particularly SADC, AU and the Commonwealth - have over the years remained central in the search for solutions to Lesotho’s seemingly endless political instability.

At independence, the newly-elected Lesotho government inherited a very poor economy attributable among other reasons to colonial neglect because of the ever-present possibility that Lesotho would eventually be incorporated into South Africa (Pule 2002: 216). It is now over 50 years since Lesotho attained independence but the country’s economy remains very weak. Lesotho has for a long time depended on migrant labour with the bulk of the migrants working in South African mines, while the rest worked as farm labourers, domestic and industrial workers. The number of Basotho working in the South African mines has, however, declined dramatically since the 1980s. Currently, the largest employers in Lesotho are the government and the fragile textile industry. Apart from the royalties paid by South Africa for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Lesotho has the South African Customs Union (SACU) as a reliable source of income. The country is also a recipient of foreign aid from various international development partners.

1.2 Background and outline of the problem

Lesotho maintains an army of around 3500 personnel across all the ranks. This is despite the country being completely surrounded by South Africa, one of Africa’s military superpowers. The main reason why countries keep armies is to ensure national security – “safeguarding of the state sovereignty over the territory and population within its borders” (Kincaid 2001: 40). This implies mainly dealing with external threats and assisting the police with maintenance of order only when the latter is overwhelmed. Lesotho’s geographical position, however, implies that practically, the country has no possible external threat that it can successfully deal with militarily. Lesotho’s only potential external threat is its only neighbour, South Africa, which Lesotho can hardly engage militarily because of the former’s vastly greater superiority.

As Heywood (2007: 402) notes, an army is supposed to be “a tightly organised and highly disciplined body, characterised by a hierarchy of ranks and a culture of strict obedience”. In democratic systems, armies are supposed to be subordinated to civilian rule. This, however, is not
the case with the Lesotho’s army which has a history of mutinies, resistance of civilian control, and involvement in what amounts to political coups. In some cases these conflicts have claimed numerous lives and have negated the image of a peaceful pastoral community that Lesotho has enjoyed. The army has been involved in many human rights violations, including murders, assassination of leaders, and violent coups. This is in direct contrast to what an army is expected to do – provide security to its people.

When the army handed over power in 1993, the country’s return to civilian rule did not bring an end to the military’s intervention in politics. Two examples of the many cases of army interference are the detention of cabinet members and subsequent assassination of the then Deputy Prime Minister Selometsi Baholo in 1994. In August 2014, the then Prime Minister Motsoahae Thabane survived what looked like an assassination attempt and attempted coup when the army stormed his official residence only to find that he had fled to South Africa following a tip off. Thabane came back to Lesotho few days later and remained under guard of South African security personnel, against his own forces, until he left office following his party’s loss in the February 2015 general election.

Lesotho is a poor country whose revenue is derived largely from external sources such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). However, in spite of its precarious situation, Lesotho spends a substantial percentage of its annual budget on the military. In the 2013/14 and 2014/15 fiscal years, the country allocated 4.7 and 4.4% respectively of its budget to the Ministry of Defence and National Security (Ketso2014). This is unwise spending for a poor country like Lesotho for as Dunne (2011) warns, military spending has significant negative effects on economic growth in poor countries. Money spent on the army could be better be used for development-oriented purposes. The existence of a costly army which is also, contrary to its mandate, involved in violent and oppressive interventions, poses a very serious problem for Lesotho. The question that begs an answer is therefore: Can demilitarisation not provide a solution to Lesotho’s security and economic problems? This study is directed at finding some answers to this question.
1.3 Research objectives

The overall aim of the study was to design and implement an action research project that would advance the demilitarisation of Lesotho.

1.3.1 Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

1. Examining the case for demilitarisation globally.
2. Comparing potential costs and benefits of a military establishment, using a cost effectiveness approach.
3. Demonstrate the feasibility of demilitarisation by showing that demilitarised countries are progressing more than those that don’t.
4. Make the case for the demilitarisation of Lesotho.
5. Use the cost effectiveness approach to compare the costs and benefits of Lesotho’s military.
6. With the aid of an advisory group, design and implement and action research plan aimed at demilitarising Lesotho.

1.4 Scope and limits of the study

This study was carried out over a period of two years and covered activities only within Maseru and immediately adjacent districts. The participants outside Maseru were drawn from neighbouring districts covered by the Maseru-based private radio stations that I visited as part of my research. This implies that the findings of this research may not reflect the views of the larger Basotho nation.

1.5 Limitations of the study

This study took place within a politically charged and intimidating environment. Access to secret military-related information was also a serious challenge. These factors have no doubt had some effect on the findings of the study.
1.6 Theoretical framework

Peacebuilding was used as theoretical framework to guide the research, with a focus on bringing about positive social change. It is premised on two hypotheses, namely that military expenditure constrains economic growth, and the second that demilitarisation promotes structures of peace. The first premise is based on economic considerations and sees military expenditure as crowding out investment and consumption (Yildrim and Ocal 2014) which are central to economic growth. The second premise derives from multi-disciplinary sources and views demilitarisation as an attempt to deconstruct the ideological and institutional structures of militarism and reassert civil control over the organs of the state and the economy.

It also implies that a new normative framework is needed for conceptualising and reforming security in both a national and regional context. It involves concerted effort to exert civilian authority over the military, to increase openness and transparency in all areas of defence and security decision making, and to redefine the country's security doctrine from one based exclusively on military notions of security, to a broad-based definition which places human security and development at the centre of the country's security discourse (Willet 2007: 413). I use these theories with the understanding that by demilitarising, Lesotho would be working to promote economic growth that reduces poverty, which in turn is seen as an aspect of structural violence. In a similar way demilitarisation would reduce use of physical violence as a conflict resolution mechanism hence strengthen peace building.

1.7 Research design

This study used both an exploratory and a participatory action research (PAR) design. The exploratory component involved both a review of relevant literature and the collection of qualitative data from a sample of informants at various forums. Participatory action research was used because of the need to offer the participants not only the opportunity to reflect on the problems associated with Lesotho’s army, but also to gain an active stake in promoting real peace and security. Participatory action research aims to produce knowledge in an active partnership with those affected by that knowledge, and for the express purpose of improving their social, educational and material conditions (Blanche et al 2016). According to Jacobs (2016: 198), “PAR is to be used when studying social issues that constrain individual lives. Collaboration with participants is imperative and the focus is on taking action that will lead to changes in the lives of the participants”. Detailed description of PAR is found in section 8.2 of this thesis.
This study is qualitative in nature because it aims to get an in-depth understanding of the problem, in the terms of the local’s own beliefs, history and context. Sarantakos (2005: 45) writes that a qualitative research “focuses on contextuality, with the aim of gaining an impression of the context, its logic, its arrangements, its explicit/implicit rules. Use of qualitative methods therefore provides researchers an elaborated and richer understanding of the case within which they are working. This richer and elaborated understanding is vital because experiences are highly subjective and need to be placed in contexts in which meanings are constituted.”

1.8 Utilised data collection methods

Qualitative data was gathered by means of various methods that include observation, interviews and discussion. Interviews were conducted with purposively selected individuals on the basis of their familiarity with the issues being researched. The discussions took different forms such as group discussions, radio shows, conferences, seminars and workshops. The advantage of qualitative data is that it is “a source of well-grounded rich descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts … findings of qualitative data have a quality of undeniability…” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 1).

The views of the participants were used in devising and implementing an action research plan. A group of five members assisted in advising on the action aspects, which included an education campaign to try and convince the public that demilitarisation was feasible and beneficial. A part of the exercise was conducted under the auspices of Development for Peace Education (DPE), a non-governmental organisation whose main aim is to “empower communities to transform their own world” (Shale, 2015).

1.9 Research plan

The diagram below illustrates the steps followed in the execution of the research. It has to be noted, however, that as in the real nature of a PAR project which is cyclical and overlapping, the actual research process was more complex than the diagram suggests.

```
Selection of members of the Advisory Group
```

7
Meeting of the Advisory Group and working out the plan of action

Education on the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation

Reflecting on what had been learnt

Concluding on factors that should be included in the demilitarisation plan

1.10 Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into 13 chapters. In the first chapter I discuss considerations that motivated me in carrying out the research, which is the belief that demilitarisation is necessary to ensure that there is peace in Lesotho. The objectives of my research, the theoretical framework guiding it, as well as the methodology and research design of the study are discussed. I conclude with a diagram of my research plan.

Chapter 2 argues that Lesotho’s political problems can be solved if the country develops a culture of peace. The chapter therefore deals with the various interrelated concepts associated with a culture of peace.

Chapter 3 examines and defines concepts that are central to this study such as security, the military, and militarisation. It takes a broad and holistic approach to the peacebuilding context, since peace is multi-dimensional and needs to be understood from a political, economic and social viewpoint.

Chapter 4 provides a more detailed examination of the concept demilitarisation. It discusses various definitions of the concept, types of demilitarisation, as well as showing why the process of demilitarisation is desirable, particularly within sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter 5 provides examples of stable societies that exist without militaries, such as non-militarised traditional communities, also known as peaceful societies, and non-militarised states of the contemporary era.
Chapter 6 assesses the peace and security situation in Lesotho. It briefly reviews previous peace initiatives in building the Basotho nation, and symbols of peace found within contemporary Lesotho. The chapter also looks at the role that the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) has played in peace-threatening conflicts and other situations. Finally, it compares the country’s annual budget for defence to what it provides for education and health.

Chapter 7 makes a case for the demilitarisation of Lesotho by arguing that the expenditure on the Lesotho Defence Force is tantamount to waste. It highlights some of the opportunity costs of the country’s military expenditure, questioning the involvement of the Lesotho army in civilian matters and the maintenance of law and order, as well as suggesting alternative ways of ensuring security in Lesotho.

Chapter 8 provides a detailed discussion of Action Research which is the method that I chose for this study.

Chapter 9 provides a justification of the research design for the demilitarisation action research employed. It provides a rationale for the choice of Participatory Action Research (PAR) and also sets out the research plan.

Chapter 10 presents a detailed account of the research carried out between April 2016 and May 2017. Public education concerning the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation was carried out during this period.

Chapter 11 concerns itself with data analysis and the findings of the study.

Chapter 12 draws on the analysis in Chapter 11 to discuss the things which would have to be included as part of the demilitarisation plan if and when Lesotho reaches that point.

1.11 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the purpose and aims of the research. It has also discussed the research approach, theoretical framework, and data collection methods utilised, as well as offering
a justification for the research. In chapter 2 I turn to discussing the peace concepts that are associated with a culture of peace.
CHAPTER 2
PEACE CONCEPTS

2.1 Introduction

I identified the problems facing Lesotho in the previous chapter. These problems range from a poor economy to the persistence of political conflict. The contribution of Lesotho’s army to these problems was highlighted. Here I identify a potential solution to Lesotho’s problems and a workable way of addressing it, which is the creation of the culture of peace. The chapter therefore discusses various related concepts associated with peace building, which include conflict, peace, violence, peacebuilding, culture of peace, and ministries of peacebuilding.

2.2 Conflict

Any discussion of peace is incomplete without the mention of the term conflict. Like other social science concepts, the meaning of conflict remains nebulous and elusive. The concept has been defined differently by many different authors to suit particular settings in which it has been used. For instance conflict can denote the incompatibility of interests, choices, goals and ideas over the distribution of power and scarce resources among many actors (Matlosa 1999: 165; Gong and Ren 2013: 1). Similarly, Peace Studies views conflict as differences of needs and wants between people, and takes it to be inevitable (Harris 2011: 123). Ramsbotham et al (2012: 10) note that a conflict can be viewed as a triangle consisting of three components namely contradiction, attitude and behaviour. Contradiction, according to them, refers to “the underlying conflict situation which includes actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between the conflict parties generated by a mis-match between social values and social structure”.

A summary of the three components of conflict shows that a contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. Attitude includes the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts, parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitude covers emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (desire will) elements. Behaviour involves cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterised by threats, coercion and destructive attacks (Ramsbotham et al 2012: 10-1).
Noteworthy about the definitions of conflict is that they all recognise the fact that conflict involves a relationship of more than one person or groups, and that it involves competition. Another point of similarity between all authors who have defined conflict is an admission that conflict is part and parcel of societal life and cannot be wished away. Furthermore, all the authors are in agreement that conflict is not always bad, but it becomes a liability to the society if it reaches certain proportions where it becomes unmanageable.

Conflict can have undesirable consequences for societies depending on how the members of such societies respond to it. It is therefore, important for members of different societies to appreciate the inevitability of conflict and as a result never attempt to eradicate it, but to respond positively and find proper ways of dealing with it. Any efforts of dealing with conflict need to be based on dialogue. Three ways of dealing with conflict which are proposed by Peace Studies include conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. Conflict management is the most basic level of dealing with conflict and involves keeping the conflicting parties apart from each other. Vital as it is, conflict management has limitations in that it only leads to separation of the belligerent parties so as to prevent violence in the hope that time or other interventions will result in a diminishing the conflict (Harris 2011: 123). It is clear therefore, that conflict management is transitional and can at best lead to a negative peace.

Conflict resolution on the other hand involves a search for a ‘win-win’ solution by bringing together the conflicting sides through a third party (mediator). As a way of reaching a common ground, and subsequently an amicable solution characterised by compromises, each of the conflicting parties is called to provide a view of the conflict from its own perspective. Resolving a conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes that mean de-escalation of conflict behaviour, a change in attitudes, and a transformation of relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure (Ramsbotham et al 2012: 11).

Conflict resolution should involve an overhaul of the structure and if there are injustices which disadvantage one group over another, these need to be redressed. If so, the result is ‘positive peace’ where the causes of the conflict are dealt with and a sustainable resolution is distinctly possible (Harris 2011: 124). The third and most sustainable way of dealing with conflict is through conflict transformation. This strategy focuses on the relationship between parties and aims to restore a good relationship that existed between the conflicting parties before (if any), or develop some degree of mutual trust where none had existed before. As stated in the above paragraphs, it is
worth reiterating that conflict is inevitable and always part of life. Conflict transformation should therefore, never be equated to the ending of conflict.

2.3 Violence

In everyday language, violence relates to physical aggression that people wage on others as a way of dealing with conflict. This violence resembles fraught and destructive strategies of engaging in conflict in that it frames conflict in terms of zero sum gains. In the process violence prohibits working towards constructive ends and greatly diminishes the ability of the conflict parties to identify shared interests and thus to develop solutions with mutual benefits. The presence of violence thus implies the absence of peace. It is important to note that much as conflict is inevitable, violence is a choice that people make ahead of alternative nonviolent means of dealing with conflict.

In different societies there are various beliefs that promote the use of violence. One of such beliefs takes violence to be the only ‘remedy’ that can work on the conflicting partner. For instance, during the independence struggle, this belief was popularised by philosophers such as Frantz Fanon who would argue that ‘violence was the only language that the colonizers understood’. Where such beliefs are strong, recourse to violence is usually romanticised and people ready to engage in violent deeds are celebrated (Millar and Kriesberg 2009: 17). Use of violence is destructive, costly and never sustainable as ‘violence breeds more violence’. Its use thus has to be avoided at all costs in search for peaceful societies.

Apart from physical aggression, there are two other types of violence. The two were added by Johan Galtung into his definition of peace as the absence of violence in all its forms. He thus talked of three typologies of violence namely direct, structural and cultural violence. Direct violence amounts to physical aggression discussed above and is “manifested in various forms of intentional bodily harm, including killing, maiming, siege, and any other form of force to the body that causes harm and affront to basic human needs” (Cromwel and Vogele 2009: 233).

Structural violence on the other hand manifests itself in the presence of social structures that promote exploitation and repression. Structural violence can be seen in social structures such as politics, education, religion and media. It usually enables some actors in society to benefit from the unequal exchange and the plight of the disadvantaged (ibid). Structural violence amongst others involves “the slow death from hunger, preventable diseases and other suffering caused by
unjust structures of society” (Fischer 2007: 188). Cultural violence relates to an existence of any aspect of culture that can be used to justify, or legitimise direct or structural violence (Galtung & Fischer 2013: 41). It makes the acts perpetrated as a result of structural and direct violence to seem normal. Cultural violence can be manifested in the form of religion and ideology, or language and art amongst many ways.

2.4 Peace

Like democracy in political studies, peace is one of the most promiscuous concepts. In a similar way that even the most authoritarian rulers want to be associated with democracy, every human being wants to be associated with peace. In fact it is rare to find people who openly advocate war, poverty, oppression or prejudice. Interestingly, even those that keep weapons of violence and use them to inflict harm on others still want to be associated with peace. They justify their violent acts as a means of achieving peace. What then is this peace, exactly?

Various authors in different fields have defined the concept of peace in different ways. Authors in political science for instance, have for a long time defined peace at the macro level as simply ‘an absence of war’. For political scientists inclined to liberalism specifically, achieving peace or avoiding war, implied shifting to democracy. The theory of democratic peace as coined by these scholars argues that peace would be realised and wars minimised (at international level) by shifting to democratic rule, because ‘democratic states’ rarely fight each other. In support of this assertion, Stassen (2013: 143) looks at the history of conflicts at the international level and posits that “the spread of human rights has led to the spread of democracy, and during the entire twentieth century, not one democracy with human rights made war on another democracy”.

The definition of peace as simply the absence of war has however been challenged as too narrow and hence as inadequate. Due to the limitations identified in the political scientists’ definition of war as merely ‘absence of war’, a new discipline of peace thinking emerged around the 1960s and coined a broader definition of peace. One of the prominent founding members of this peace thinking field was Johan Galtung. In providing a broader definition of peace, Galtung emphasised that peace involves much more than just the absence of war. He brought more variables into his definition and defined it as the absence of violence in all of its forms and the presence of mutually beneficial cooperation and mutual learning (Galtung & Fischer 2013; Fischer 2007: 188).

Galtung came up with two typologies of peace – positive and negative peace. He defined negative peace as the ‘absence of war, absence of violence’ and positive peace as the ‘integration of human
society’ (Tilahun 2015: 251). According to Galtung, true peace can only be said to prevail when the three types of violence discussed in the previous paragraph are averted and human needs are realised. Human needs on the other hand include survival, economic well-being, freedom, and liberty. The opposite of these – which implies lack of peace – include death, misery, oppression, and alienation respectively (Fischer 2007: 188). The realisation of human needs can be achieved under the conditions of positive peace which when broadly defined implies a social condition in which exploitation is minimized or eliminated and in which there is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying structural violence. It denotes the continuing presence of an equitable and just social order as well as ecological harmony (Hence et al cited in Tilahun 2015: 252).

It is worth noting that peace like any other aspect of life, exists at various levels of society and can be understood in different contexts in line with each level. These levels can be summed up as personal, national and international. Symonides and Singh (1996: 14) point out that “in international affairs, peace is employed to denote relations between states. At national level it is associated with internal conditions in a country, in a society, between groups, organizations and social structures, or between man and his environment. In ethics or morality, the word peace is used to characterise human relationships and attitudes, or to determine an individual’s frame of mind, often expressed as inner peace” (see also Tilahun 2015: 252).

2.5 Peacebuilding

There are two main aspects of ‘peacebuilding’. The first aspect implies the preventive strategies while the second implies treatment/recovery strategies. The former strategies are concerned with actions undertaken before a conflict becomes violent. In this case “preventive peacebuilding efforts - such as diplomatic, economic, development, social, educational, health, legal, and security sector reform programmes – address potential sources of instability and violence” (Schirch 2013: 7). The latter, on the other hand, imply the processes that take place during the conflict, or after it has occurred. The latter strategies are the most dominant and have been used frequently by international peacebuilding organisations who have mostly been involved in conflict-ridden societies. As a way of qualification, the process is usually referred to as ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’.

In international organization and governmental circles the term peacebuilding gained prominence in the 1990s. Conceptually and practically, the concept provided a response to the rise of
protracted armed conflict that has been taking place in many countries around the world, and the number of peace-making attempts to end those wars. In this sense the term has “roots in the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s understanding of the concept as a post conflict activity or action to identify and support structure (sic) which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Charbonneau and Parent 2012: 5; Ryan 2013: 26). Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s successor Kofi Annan came to define peacebuilding as “actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation” (Charbonneau and Parent 2012).

However, strictly defining peacebuilding as a post-conflict phenomenon weakens the concept and leaves out some important considerations of what peacebuilding proposes to address. The reality is that no society is ‘post-conflict’ since conflict is ubiquitous (Ryan 2013: 28). The weakness of restricting the definition of peacebuilding to ‘post-conflict’ is observed by Lederach and Lederach (2014: 36) who write that “widely understood, peacebuilding includes activities and initiatives to reduce violence and increase justice through peaceful means prior to, during and after open and often sustained periods of armed conflict”.

Understood in this way, peacebuilding becomes broader and it is this meaning that has been adopted in our study, implying working towards the achievement of the culture of peace. The discussion of how to build a culture of peace follows in the next sub-sections. There are various issues that need to be borne in mind whenever peacebuilding is discussed. These include the fact that peacebuilding is a goal-oriented, long-term process, involves multiple actors, requires certain conditions, and it is not free of challenges.

2.5.1 Peacebuilding: a search for specific goal

As a process, peacebuilding is premised on the understanding that the peacebuilders know what they want to achieve. This implies that the process of peacebuilding has to be guided by specific objectives. This is a vital consideration, for as the saying goes, ‘if we do not know where we are going it is difficult to get there’. Peacebuilding has to aim at the achievement of a desirable future characterised by amongst others sustainable development, self-sufficiency, equitable social structures that meet basic needs, and respectful, interdependent relationships (Laderach 2008: 77; Schirch 2013: 9).
When successful, peacebuilding will lead to the culture of peace whose characteristics have been identified by Harris (2011) as seen in Table 2 in Section 2.6 of this chapter. To realise its objectives, peacebuilding has to be guided by an underlying spirit, which is to

- promote the apprenticeship and practice of a culture of peace, both in the formal and non-formal education process and in all the activities of daily life;
- build and strengthen democracy as a key to a just and peaceful negotiated settlement of disputes;
- strive towards a form of human development which, with the participation of the entire population, values the social capabilities and the human potential of all members of society;
- give pride of place to cultural contacts, exchanges and creativity, at national and international levels, as a means of encouraging recognition of respect for others and the ways in which they differ;
- strengthen international co-operation to remove the socio-economic causes of armed conflicts and wars, thereby permitting the building of a better world for humankind as a whole (Symonides and Singh 1996: 11).

2.5.2 Peacebuilding is a long-term process

Peacebuilding and building the culture of peace needs to be understood as a multifaceted endeavour that varies significantly from one setting to another. It is a long and delicate process that needs to be handled with utmost care and patience. Failure to observe this can lead to an unrealistic expectation of instant results. The process needs to be understood in terms of its multiple levels that lead from one to the other. Pursuit for peace needs to be handled in a similar fashion with a search for a cure of an illness in human beings. This analogy comes from the pioneer of peace studies, Johan Galtung, who compared peace studies to health studies, concluding that medical concepts of diagnosis-prognosis therapy can also apply in peace studies. According to him, in peace studies “diagnosis involves analysis of violence and their conditions, followed by prognosis that involves checking the system’s ability for self-restoration or the need for intervention followed by therapy” (Tilahun 2015: 252, see also Fischer 2007: 187).

Like a correct diagnosis, a thorough analysis of a conflict situation should create and sustain transformation and the movement toward restructured relationships. This should result in the adoption of proper policies and subsequently increase the chance of sustaining the restructured
relationship. A hurried diagnosis conversely, can lead to wrong policies which would in most cases only exacerbate the conflict. As Symonides and Singh (1996: 29) show, “the replacement of the existing culture of violence by a culture of peace, human rights and democracy, can only be achieved in a longer term perspective”. Peacebuilding should not only be focusing on the immediate intervention in a conflict, but also develop a vision of the post-conflict situation. In order to show the timeframe needed in peacebuilding, Lederach came up with the following table.

Table 1: The time dimension in peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Intervention</th>
<th>Preparation and training</th>
<th>Design of Social Change</th>
<th>Desired Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Action (2-6 months)</td>
<td>Short-range Planning (1-2 years)</td>
<td>Decade Thinking (5-10 years)</td>
<td>Generational Vision (20+ years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lederach (2008: 77)

While the timeframes in actual conflicts may vary according to the levels and intensity of particular peacebuilding situations, the nested paradigm in Table 1 above provides a picture of the stages to be followed over time to achieve the desired objective. The first stage – crisis intervention – refers to immediate action that needs to be taken. For instance, in a violent conflict this may imply stopping the violence and achieving a cease-fire between the conflicting parties. Emergency relief and humanitarian aid is usually also required.

The second stage – preparation and training – implies the need for peacebuilders to prepare themselves to respond more effectively to the conflict. It is concerned with the identification and familiarisation of approaches and skills that are needed to better assess and deal with crises resulting from the conflict. The third stage is concerned with bringing about social change by linking the immediate experience with a hope for a better future in which such a crisis would not recur. The fourth stage seeks to prevent conflict and promote a vision of a more peaceful and socially harmonious future. The frame indicates that in their efforts, peacebuilders should also think about future generations.

2.5.3 Peacebuilding involves multiple actors

In order to build a culture of peace, there is a need for a global partnership. A culture of peace can only be achieved when all potential partners are fully engaged and committed to its realisation. There are at least five major potential contributors to international peacebuilding, namely the
United Nations with its organs and agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, states, the intellectual community and different global religions (Newman 2013: 312-317; Symonides and Singh, 1996). The United Nations (UN) was formed with the main purpose of maintaining peace and security at international level. Since its establishment in 1945, the UN has undertaken, and continues to undertake, numerous activities aimed at ensuring international security and peace. The UN has drafted various conventions that serve as guidelines for countries to maintain peace between and within themselves.

By virtue of being closest to their respective societies, the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations better understand the dynamics within their own areas. They are therefore better placed to help domesticate and harmonise the UN peace blue-prints in line with the conditions existing within their societies. Despite many of them actually failing to deliver on such obligations, the main purpose for the existence of states is to ensure a peaceful life among their citizens. All the policies that the states come up with have to be aimed at creating the conditions for a culture of peace.

Sadly, however, many violent conflicts have resulted, and continue to do so, from bad decisions made by political leaders on behalf of the people who voted them into power. These are the leaders who either directly benefit from violence, or are too aloof to be personally affected by the consequences of their bad decisions. This problem is clearly captured by Fischer (2007: 194) who notes Oscar Morgenstern’s point that “if those who make decisions about war or peace had to fight at the front-line in case of war, there would be fewer wars. Top military and political leaders usually protect themselves far behind the front-line, sending instead young people to their deaths”.

It is vital for the states to recognize the importance of the intellectual community in peacebuilding efforts. By virtue of exposure to their research into different situations, the intellectual community can provide valuable input to peacebuilding in their respective societies. By their very nature, religious associations and communities are best equipped to contribute to the peacebuilding process since they exercise a great influence in their members’ lives and that can be harnessed to preach the culture of peace. All religions teach the value of non-violence in one way or another.

Having identified the potential stakeholders in peacebuilding, it is important to always remember that peacebuilding needs to be viewed and approached as a concerted effort in which each member of society has a role to play. Peace is not a matter for individuals, but must rather be a collective pursuit. This implies that people and communities should never stand by and watch as injustice is
done to fellow human beings. An injury to one should be seen as an injury to all. The following statement of regret by Martin Niemoller, a Protestant pastor in wartime Germany, illustrates the results of lack of civil courage to stop injustices perpetrated on fellow human beings. It is only when similar regrets are pre-empted that a culture of peace can be achieved. He lamented:

[W]hen the Nazis arrested the Communists, I said nothing; after all, I was not a Communist. When they locked up the Social Democrats, I said nothing; after all I was not a Social Democrat. When they arrested the trade unionists, I said nothing; after all, I was not a trade unionist. When they arrested the Jews, I said nothing; after all I was not a Jew. When they arrested me, there was no longer anyone who could protest (Fischer 2007: 200).

2.5.4 Conditions necessary for peacebuilding

As noted earlier, peacebuilding is a complex process that ideally needs to have full support of all the stakeholders. It goes without saying therefore, that peacebuilding can only be effectively implemented under certain specific conditions. One such basic condition is the availability of resources. The resources are needed to support, implement, and sustain the building of an infrastructure for peace over a long period of time. Lederach (2008) categorises resources needed for peacebuilding into two – socioeconomic and socio-cultural resources.

Socioeconomic resources play a critical role in peacebuilding by helping people, organizations and institutions to comprehend, acquire an appreciation for, and create ways of thinking about action related to peacebuilding and to see these strategies as legitimate and valid for all sectors of society during all phases in the progression of a conflict (Lederach 2008: 88). It is only when the people recognise the process as legitimate that it can have an impact on them. It is therefore important that the stakeholders, whether governments or any other organisations, make funds available to support the processes of peacebuilding.

Socio-cultural resources on the other hand relate to people and their cultures. A peacebuilding effort is meant for the people of a particular society who in most cases have their own unique cultures. This is a very important consideration that peacebuilders need to take into account if they hope to succeed in their programmes. History has shown that different interventions have failed to yield desired results because such interventions failed to appreciate the uniqueness of situations. Usually the interventions would involve a top-down approach that views local communities
simply as recipients of the decisions and policies made at the top, without taken into consideration the dynamics on the ground.

Such set and largely unsuccessful interventions are common with the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite their noble intensions of contributing to peacebuilding by trying to improve the economic condition of Third World countries, the WB and IMF have hardly achieved success largely due to policies that do not fit the Third World. Stiglitz (2002) has noted that, “the failed remedy of cutting public spending, even for child nutrition and other essential services, despite very high levels of unemployment, is still practiced in poor countries today at the insistence of the International Monetary Fund” (cited in Fischer (2007:189).

In order to enhance the chances of success for peacebuilding initiatives, peacebuilders need to build a ‘peace constituency’ within the targeted society. This necessitates citizenbased peacebuilding efforts that involve the local people and use them as a resource, not mere recipients. Lederach (2008: 94-7) identifies three conditions necessary for the building of a successful ‘peace constituency’. He notes first it is important for peacebuilders to identify and work with people who envision themselves as playing the role of peacemakers within the conflict setting. He maintains that irrespective of the magnitude of the conflict, there will always be people who have a vision of peace.

Secondly he notes that it is important for peacebuilders to help the local ‘middle-range’ actors to identify and have contact with like-minded individuals on the other side of the conflict. This is important because both sides of the conflict need to play their part for it to be successfully transformed. The third important condition is that the external peacebuilders recognise the local actors as valid and pivotal actors. This will provide these actors the necessary legitimacy and help them to develop their potential as peacebuilders.

### 2.5.5 Challenges to peacebuilding

It has to be always borne in mind that despite its nobleness, peacebuilding is never an easy and wholly-accepted process. There will always be challenges that peacebuilders have to face. Peacebuilding involves resolving conflict and removing all forms of violence. To end direct violence there is a need to change conflict behaviour. Structural violence on the other hand can only be removed by changing structural contradictions and injustices, and removing cultural
violence calls for a change of attitudes (Ramsbotham et al 2011: 11). Call for change usually attracts severe resistance. Ironically, the resistance does not only come from the people who benefit from the status quo, but sometimes it comes from the same people that the peacebuilders take to be the victims of the violence contained within the structures in question.

We now look at some of these challenges starting with the possible objections to the suggestion of the establishment of peace. There is no single country today that has a ministry specifically created to deal with peacebuilding. Responsibility for peacebuilding issues is usually scattered among various ministries and they do not receive the priority they deserve. Because of the lack of a precedent of the existence of a ministry of peacebuilding anywhere, any call for the establishment of such a ministry is likely to be rejected as utopian. This, however, should not discourage peacebuilders from pushing for the establishment of such a ministry in their own country. They should always bear in mind that ‘there is always the first time’ and that some of the things existing today were also at one time or another viewed as utopian. Present examples are the ministries of environment and women that were hardly known a few decades ago (Harris 2011: 129; Suter 2004: 175). These two ministries now form part of most national cabinets today.

A proposal that a ministry of peacebuilding be established may also be rejected on the grounds that it will overlap with other ministries and civil society organisations and duplicate their functions. Harris (2011: 130) observes that “many existing ministries – Defence, Foreign Affairs, Education, Police and others – are involved in various aspects of the attempts to build a more peaceful society”. He, however, notes that the efforts of these ministries are limited by the many other functions in which they engage. This, according to him should be the response to any objection that a ministry of peacebuilding would overlap with other ministries.

While appreciating that there are civil society organisations with similar aims to those of a proposed ministry of peacebuilding, such a ministry could serve as an important link between the government and civil society. Civil society organisations could offer skills required for peacebuilding, while the government offers resources. By funding activities of these organisations the government would help in promoting a culture of peace countrywide. A first task of such a ministry might be to initiate the process of demilitarisation. This is one area that would in all likelihood meet a lot of resistance. The military are part of the state in nearly all countries. They have become so institutionalised that the majority of the people are not aware there are countries that do not have an army. They would be quick to argue that it is not possible for a country to do
without the military. However, as will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study, there are countries that manage without the military, and that alternatives do exist.

The goal of peacebuilding is the achievement of positive peace. The concept ‘positive peace’ itself involves the two key ideas of legitimacy and injustice. Achievement of positive peace implies that the injustices have to be addressed at all levels of life in all their different forms. This may at international level be unjust economic relations between the developed countries and their developing or developed counterparts; at national level it can be unjust political relations between groups of all kinds; and individual behaviour that results in injustice toward other persons. It is clear that the concept ‘injustice’ is central to the idea of peace building. However, the concept of injustice is controversial and renders the idea of positive peace problematic. Ramsbotham et al (2011: 12) warn that what is called ‘injustice’ usually amounts to ‘perceived injustice’. This implies that what is perceived as unjust by one side in a conflict might not necessarily be perceived as such by the other.

A situation of a violent conflict provides a classical example of the contested meaning of ‘injustice’. An interrogation of opposing sides in any violent conflict will reveal that each of them sees itself as a victim of injustice and its fight as a legitimate quest for ‘justice’. What is more problematic is that each of these sides may be using violence to further their cause (ibid). Peacebuilding becomes even more complicated in situations where injustice is highly institutionalised and culturally and psychologically internalised.

Under such circumstances the peace activists may well be faced with suspicion and rejection from the very people they hope to free from injustices. For these people, the injustices have become part of their daily lives and they cannot think of any other life than the one they are living. Marxists refer to such a state of mind as ‘false consciousness’. This might itself create animosity against the peacebuilders, who might be tempted to believe that they are justified in ‘forcing the victims to be liberated’, that is, come up with programmes that might not be welcomed by the victims themselves.

2.6 Culture of peace

One of the most basic features that make a human being different from other living species is the ability to adapt to different cultures. This is observed by sociologists who assert that a human being is a ‘product’ of the environment. Understanding this important feature of a human being
will help us in our discussion of the next concept, namely the culture of peace. According to Harris (2011: 122), a culture of peace implies “a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations”. Similarly, Symonides and Singh (1996: 13) define the culture of peace as the creation of peaceful, non-violent behavioural patterns and skills. They argue peace has to be lived and emphasise that “culture is not only a knowledge of certain values but also an adherence to them and a readiness to defend and follow them in everyday life” (ibid).

The human beings’ ability to adapt to different cultures means that despite the fact that many societies are riddled with violent conflicts, they can still pull themselves out of such unenviable situations by developing new mind-sets towards conflict and violence. Harris (2011: 123) insists that “conflict is inevitable, but violence is a choice”. Symonides and Singh (1996: 14) concur with this assertion and claim that “violence is neither part of our evolutionary legacy, nor in our genes; it is in our sociological and cultural roots”.

Human beings can at any time be living in either a culture of peace or a culture of violence. A culture of violence breeds distrust, suspicion, intolerance and hatred, and is unable to interact constructively with any who are different. The culture of peace on the other hand advances non-violence, tolerance, mutual understanding, and solidarity, as well as the capacity to resolve disputes and conflicts constructively. Human society should therefore work towards the culture of peace, which is possible since culture is not static, but always dynamic. As the influence of either a peace or a conflict culture increases, the hold that the other has on people commensurately decreases. The two cultures cannot coexist in a state of stasis. The main characteristics of the two cultures are contrasted in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture of violence</th>
<th>Culture of peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief in power that is based on force</td>
<td>Belief in dialogue to resolve conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having enemies</td>
<td>Tolerance, solidarity, understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian governance</td>
<td>Democratic participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy and propaganda</td>
<td>Free flow of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of people</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of nature</td>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male domination</td>
<td>Equality of women and men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted in section 2.4 above, peace is multi-faceted and can be cultivated at the interpersonal, country and international levels. The culture of peace is also intimately linked with the cultures of human rights and democracy. The protection of human rights and the promotion of a democratic culture are both conditions for the building of the culture of peace, so that well-informed, democratically-minded and responsible citizens may increase and dominate in public discourse. Most importantly, as this study will attempt to show, there is a need to appreciate that disarmament and demilitarization contribute greatly to the building of a peace culture. This is because “a culture of peace cannot be built during arms race and militarization of societies which unavoidably generate enemy images, suspicions and threats” (Symonides and Singh 1996: 15-6). The citizenry therefore needs to be actively educated about the importance of peace. This is expressed in the “Charter of UNESCO which states, since war begins in the minds [of people], it is in the minds [of people] that the defences of peace must be built” (Fischer 2007: 201).

2.7 A ministry of peacebuilding: a potential vehicle for building a culture of peace

I have earlier noted the inevitability of conflict in societal life. I have also noted that various stakeholders, including states have a role to play in peacebuilding initiatives. The inevitability of conflict implies the need at national level to have a permanent institution that advocates the concept of a peace culture. A culture of peace does not just spring up suddenly; it has to be worked at. It is for this reason that various scholars have recommended that governments consider the establishment of a ministry of peacebuilding in order to institutionalise the pursuit of peace. Harris (2011: 124-5) identifies four broad functions and nine tasks that such a ministry could carry out. The four functions are:

- To publicise and encourage existing peacebuilding activities. If established, the ministry would make known the peace initiatives by other existing ministries and provide support to expand such initiatives and make them to be more effective.
- To encourage other ministries and civil society organisations to undertake new initiatives that will promote a culture of peace.
- To undertake initiatives stated in (ii) above where there is no existing ministry and civil society organisations.
- To celebrate the achievements of peace (See also Suter 2004).
Harris (2011) further identifies nine tasks for a ministry of peacebuilding. The nine tasks are:

**Peace education**: Through its programmes, the ministry of peacebuilding would educate people that nonviolence works. It would “cultivate values and attitudes which encourage individual and social action to build and maintain more peaceful households, communities and societies; and would train individuals and communities in the methods of nonviolent conflict resolution” (Harris 2011: 126). This vision of a peaceful society is premised on the understanding that people are not genetically programmed to be violent, and that a culture of violence can therefore be transformed. Education is the most appropriate strategy to follow in the building of a peace culture. This is observed by Suter (2004: 177) who writes that education is a slow process but it is the most effective way of changing attitudes.

**Conflict resolution skills and institutions**: As part of education, the ministry of peacebuilding would empower people with skills for keeping any inevitable conflict from becoming violent. This would involve the capacitating of the societies by training mediators and arbitrators to deal with the conflicts that the conflicting parties cannot resolve by means of dialogue. Foreign mediators have failed to bring sustainable resolutions in many conflicts because of their lack of understanding of local cultural dynamics. The presence of local mediators would therefore make a big difference.

**Respectful relationships and friendship**: Respectful relationships and friendship both are a vital component of peace culture in that they reduce the likelihood of violence, since conflict is more likely to be resolved through dialogue rather than a fight when friends are involved or respect is shown. A ministry of peacebuilding would therefore work towards the creation of an environment where friendships can domestically be built between individuals and between countries at international level. Talking of a country implies redefining national security in a new way that recognises that security is both an internal and transnational issue that incorporates concern for the attainment of basic needs, poverty reduction, disease containment, and good environmental management (Spence 2004: 61). A ministry of peacebuilding would have the task of creating a common perception of national security among the existing ministries, and to coordinate what may be called the country’s National Security Assessment. Such an assessment would “form an official annual report that covers things like defence, foreign trade, disarmament, environment, and the country’s role in international organisations such as the UN, regarding matters like energy and the protection of human rights” (Suter 2004: 179).
**Restorative justice**: History has shown that in some cases conflict persists because of the retributive type of justice administered in modern states. Under this system, the state prosecutes the offender on behalf of the victim. This approach usually leaves the victim or the relatives of the victim, with a desire for revenge and as a result prolongs the conflict. Retributive justice is alien to restorative justice that emphasises the relationship between the victim and the offender and encourages offenders to take responsibility for their actions. With restorative justice offenders ask for forgiveness from their victims and possibly make reparations of some kind. This approach has proven to contribute to peacebuilding, particularly in Africa, since its approach resonates with traditional community conflict resolution in many parts of the continent. The Gacaca court system adopted in Rwanda to reconcile the perpetrators and the victims of the genocide is a good example of this. Harris (2011: 127) claims the restorative approaches may also be utilised at the national level, for example in the work of truth commissions that allow people to openly talk about the wrongdoings of the past, as a way of peacebuilding. A ministry of peacebuilding could thus initiate a review of the justice system to ensure sustainable peace.

**Preventative peacebuilding**: A ministry of peacebuilding could further be tasked with the responsibility of addressing structural violence problems emanating from inequalities arising in social, economic, or political structures. Such violence is more dangerous than physical violence since it may lead to a slow death for many from hunger, preventable diseases, and other calamities caused by the unjust structures of society (Fischer 2007, Harris 2011). The task of the ministry could be to ensure equal access and treatment of all groups in all ways, whether these are based on ethnic, religious, political partisanship, social privilege, or any other grounds.

**Treating the wounds of violence**: In societies that have gone through violent conflicts, the affected people continue to live with the trauma of past violence long after the signing of ceasefire agreements between the parties involved. In such societies, a ministry of peacebuilding could help in coordinating healing activities and support for the various categories of trauma-affected people.

**Peacemaking**: There is a need to reverse the current tendency in peacemaking activities for actors from different levels of society to only engage horizontally with their opponents in the conflict. Here, there is no vertical exchange between different status groups to ensure the building of relationships between the higher and lower levels of society. The significance of such interaction, according to Harris (2011: 128), is the recognition that “peacebuilding and peacemaking involve...”
a range of activities occurring simultaneously at different levels; strong vertical relationships will allow mutual support and coordination which is unlikely where each level acts independently” (see also Spence 2004: 63).

**Peacekeeping:** This involves the enforcement of peace, usually by the military, where civil groups or factions are engaged in violent combat. This remains a common intervention in many parts of Africa that are riddled by armed conflicts, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), to only mention two. The peacekeeping army stands between the opposing forces in order to provide time and space for a peace agreement to be reached. Where the agreement has already been signed, the peacekeeping army facilitates the working of the agreement by disarming, demobilising and re-integrating ex-combatants. All these processes need to be coordinated and this could best be done by a ministry of peacebuilding.

**Demilitarisation:** One other task for a ministry of peacebuilding, which is also the focus of this study, is demilitarisation. As will be seen in Chapter 3, demilitarisation implies working towards a society that emphasises nonviolent resolution of conflict and involves a significant reduction in military expenditure, military personnel and force projection. The central role of demilitarisation in building a peace culture lies in its mission to reduce the risk of violent conflict erupting, and allowing military expenditure to be diverted to dealing with the real threats to national security such as disease, unemployment and poverty.

### 2.8 Summary and conclusion

Achieving a peaceful society is not an impossible task. Peace, which is more than the mere ‘absence of war’, can be achieved if all the stakeholders apply themselves to it. This is possible if there is a clear understanding of threat that all societies face at one time or another, which is the inevitability of conflict. Conflict results from an incompatibility of interests, which is frequently found in any association between two or more people. Societies therefore, need to positively deal with conflict and not to attempt the impossible – eradicating it. In dealing with conflict, societies need to promote peace and counter violence in all its forms – direct, structural and cultural, since violence and peace can never co-exist as an increase in any one of them invariably leads to some decrease in the other.
Human beings are rational and can differentiate between good and bad. Their ability to adapt to different cultures implies that they can also work towards building a culture of peace, which refers to the development of values and attitudes that reject violence and seek to resolving disputes through dialogue and negotiations. Building peace is a long and complex process that requires commitment and dedication from all the stakeholders involved. Because it is geared towards change it will necessarily attract resistance from parties benefiting from the status-quo. In some cases resistance will come from the very victims who have internalised their situation and hence accepted it as normal. Despite all of this, peace remains an achievable goal. The next chapter discusses the concepts that are central to this study, specifically security, the military, and militarisation.

CHAPTER 3

SECURITY AND MILITARISATION

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I define and examine the three concepts that are central to this study, namely security, militaries, and militarisation. A holistic approach is necessary since the peacebuilding context is important, and peace itself is multi-dimensional, needing to be understood from political, economic and social viewpoints. I start by looking at human and sustainable security approaches that apply at global level. At the country level I examine three aspects, namely national, public and citizen security.

The second concept is the military who have to be distinguished from other armed groups found within a country. Here one has to differentiate between the traditional/primary and non-traditional/secondary role of the military. I further examine the ways in which civilian governments relate to the military who are ostensibly under their control, as well as the circumstances under which the military may intervene in politics. I finally consider the concept of militarisation.
3.2 Security

There is a direct relationship between peace and security. In fact one cannot enjoy peace in the absence of security. The term security is broad and its meaning has varied according to contexts existing in different periods. For instance, the meaning of security in the post-Cold War period differs substantially from the one that existed during the time that the ‘war’ was on. We can distinguish between various types of security.

3.2.1 Traditional understandings of security

Security was traditionally understood in terms of the classical approach which defined it more in terms of nation-states than people hence limited it to the task of protecting a particular country from external aggression. This approach was premised on the Hobbesian view of individuals as well as states, as being essentially selfish, thus having self-preservation as their main motive. Co-existence was for both individuals and states unavoidably conflict-ridden and dangerous. According to this view, given the absence of an effective international authority to keep ambitions at bay, states must therefore rely on their own military capabilities to maintain security (Pisani 2007: 15). A sufficient armoury of weapons had to be accumulated to guarantee security, which led to a global arms race developing during the Cold War. At the domestic level, the provision of security then is necessary for the three categories of the national, public, and citizen arenas. Kincaid (2001: 40-41) thus defines national security as the safeguarding of state sovereignty over the territory and population within its borders, implying having policies in place to deal with any threat. He defines public security as being able to maintain civil order that is needed for the execution of the basic societal functions, along with upholding the rule of law.

Lastly, he defines citizen security as the capacity of individuals and organisations to exercise the political, economic and civil rights which are due to all who qualify for the status of a citizen in a society. Of the three, national security is the prime consideration, which is the responsibility of the army. The police and the judiciary on the other hand have to look after matters relating to public security. Citizen security is largely the responsibility of civilian politicians who make laws, enunciate policies, and exercise the necessary control over all institutions, including the armed forces that would otherwise open the citizenry to threat.

The three dimensions of national, public and citizen security are naturally interrelated. For instance, it can be argued that public security is a prerequisite of citizen security. This is so because
people cannot enjoy their rights within a disorderly environment. Similarly there is a need for monitoring and striking a balance between individual rights, which are elements of citizen security, and public order. Excessive and unregulated individual rights can compromise public security. While the army’s chief task is to safeguard the nation from external aggression, it may also be needed to ensure public security by supporting the police when they are overwhelmed trying to maintain public order when mass riots erupt, or when a major natural disaster occurs.

When a situation gets out of hand due to an insurrection or outbreak of civil war, the army will be called in to take over from the police in order to ensure public safety. Co-operation between the police and the army, and the substitution of the former by the latter, is made possible by the fact that the two institutions share the right to legitimate use of coercive force, albeit by use of different means at times. They are also differentiated in terms of organisation, regulation, training, and tactics Kincaid (2001: 41). Different countries usually have constitutional and legal provisions stipulating the conditions under which the army can be called in or even take over from the police. It has to be noted, however, that the involvement of the army in the provision of the public security can only be on a short term basis in a critical situation.

The army has as much as possible to confine itself to its primary function of preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity. History has shown that an ongoing involvement of the army in secondary functions such as public security usually leads to its politicisation and incremental usurpation of the authority of elected civilian governments (Williams 2003: 212). Heywood concurs that the “engagement in secondary roles compromise the traditional neutrality of the armed forces” (2007: 403).

3.2.2 Human security

Human security implies the “attainment of physical, mental, and spiritual peace/security of individuals and communities at home and in the world in a balanced local/global context” (Hastings 2014: 2). The concept of human security gained prominence following the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. The human security approach was formally introduced in the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 and systematically brought into different commissions of the United Nations. In contrast to the traditional approach that focuses on country, human security places the emphasis on people.
Human security is universally relevant to people everywhere, in rich and poor nations alike. For people, security lies in protection from the seven threats of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards (UNDP Human Development Report 1994: 22). Countries can only be seen to be providing adequate security if they protect their citizens from these threats. It is noteworthy that the human security approach does not place the responsibility of security solely on the state. Human security analysis considers multiple providers of security, including citizens themselves (Gomez and Gasper 2013: 3).

The human security approach is premised on the idea that “people have the right to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair … with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential” (Gomez and Gasper 2013: 2). It is important to bear in mind that the human security approach does not necessarily replace the three elements of traditional security discussed in the previous paragraph. It comes as a complement to state security (Pisani 2007: 17). Sovereign states, as shown in section 3.2.1 above, still remain with the responsibility of ensuring security, internal and external, for their people, but are limited in their ability to also provide other aspects of human security.

Despite human security being universal, there are some important factors that need to be considered within a particular context. One such factor is the understanding of the threats experienced by vulnerable groups, as well as their participation in the process of analysis (ibid). Avoiding generalisation and identifying specific threats is more likely if the affected people participate in the efforts of others to ensure their security. This is in line with Owen and Martin’s (2010: 214) assertion that what people consider to be the essence of life and crucially important, varies between individuals and societies.

There is a link between the concepts of human security and human development. The two are, however, not identical as “human development is broader and aims at enlarging people’s choices and freedoms. Human security is about assuring priority freedoms so that people can exercise choices safely and freely, and be confident that the opportunities they have are protected” (Gomez and Gasper 2013: 3). The various human security dimensions summarised in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report are reviewed below (see also Werthes et al 2011: 19-25).

**Economic security**
To have economic security, requires an assured basic income, usually from some productive and remunerative work, or a last resort from a publicly financed safety net, that provides for a minimum standard of living. Economic security is usually measured in terms of employment rates. National indicators of economic insecurity include high and prolonged unemployment rates, a sudden drop in real national income or real wages, extremely high rates of inflation, and wide income disparities between the rich and the poor.

**Food security**

Food security implies the ability for people to at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food, by growing food themselves, by buying it, or through a public food distribution system. The United Nations agencies measure food insecurity by the number of children under five who are underweight for their age, and by percentage of the population that is undernourished.

**Health security**

Health security requires protection from the major causes of death that would vary according to the level of development a country enjoys. In the developing countries infectious and parasitic diseases, such as cholera, HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, are major causes of death. These are linked to poverty, malnutrition and polluted water. In more developed countries on the other hand, major causes of death are linked to diet and life styles. Noteworthy is that the threat to health security from infectious diseases occurs across borders. Health security is measured by the number of the total population who are affected by disease (morbidity) and the child mortality rate.

**Environmental security**

Environmental security implies protection from threats caused by the degradation of local ecosystems as well as of the global system, by factors such as deforestation, erosion and global warming. Such threats are often worsened by ethnic, religious and political conflict over issues like land and access to clean water in developing countries. In the industrialised countries air pollution poses the greatest threat to environmental security. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, drought, or wild fires are also a major threat to environmental security worldwide. Apart from loss of life, environmental insecurity can also have an economic impact by affecting both food and industrial production. Threats to environmental security also transcend borders. It is
measured by the percentage of population that is affected by disasters, as well as by the mean percentage who have access to clean water and improved sanitation.

**Personal security and Community security**

Personal and community security, while not the same, are nonetheless interrelated and are hence treated together. Personal security is defined by the absence of the threat to human beings from physical violence, which may come from various sources. From the state it can come by war, or in the form of torture. It can also come as ethnic violence between domestic groups or from other individuals such as criminals. Violence can be general or aimed at specific groups. Rape and domestic violence for example, is mostly directed at women.

Community security however, implies protection from loss of the cultural identity that provides security to groups of people from their membership in a family, community, association, and racial or ethnic group. The process of modernisation that makes people lose their culture poses such a threat, as does sectarian and ethnic violence. Internally displaced people and refugees are a clear example of people whose community security is in severe jeopardy. The United Nations’ agencies measure the levels of threat to personal and community security in terms of the total number of people assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and scales of political terror.

**Political security**

Political security is about the protection of basic human rights which comes under threat during times of political unrest. It may come from the state in the form of political repression or systematic torture, as well as a clampdown on human freedoms such as the freedom of speech, association, press and violent abuse. Threats to political security are measured in terms of disappearance of people, extra judicial killings, political imprisonment, torture and assassination, as it is by a Press Freedom index. Measures of levels of human security in selected countries are presented in Table 3 below.

The scales range from 0 to 100 with 0 implying highest level of security (no threat) while 100 represents the lowest levels of security (greatest level of threat).

**Table 3: Scales of human (in)security**
Table 4 below shows the Human (In)Security index for Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries. The SADC region was chosen specifically because Lesotho is part of this region.

Table 4: Human (In)Security index for Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
<th>Personal/Community</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Human (In)Security</th>
<th>World Rank (insecurity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>60.95</td>
<td>75.19</td>
<td>87.43</td>
<td>26.87</td>
<td>40.47</td>
<td>49.75</td>
<td>71.29</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>30.07</td>
<td>36.24</td>
<td>35.93</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>12.52</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29.51</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>32.42</td>
<td>56.46</td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>25.01</td>
<td>24.75</td>
<td>48.89</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>74.28</td>
<td>77.56</td>
<td>32.77</td>
<td>43.11</td>
<td>12.51</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>54.56</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>75.82</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>87.82</td>
<td>16.35</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>57.38</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>26.69</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20.33</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>75.11</td>
<td>59.82</td>
<td>95.24</td>
<td>41.72</td>
<td>25.02</td>
<td>35.25</td>
<td>69.51</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>43.07</td>
<td>40.63</td>
<td>59.55</td>
<td>22.07</td>
<td>12.83</td>
<td>17.75</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>17.56</td>
<td>13.13</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>17.75</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>33.85</td>
<td>11.46</td>
<td>21.65</td>
<td>12.05</td>
<td>31.26</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31.24</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>44.18</td>
<td>21.91</td>
<td>59.04</td>
<td>23.11</td>
<td>25.04</td>
<td>50.25</td>
<td>46.78</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>68.25</td>
<td>61.68</td>
<td>92.32</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>18.78</td>
<td>27.75</td>
<td>61.04</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>54.54</td>
<td>40.15</td>
<td>18.96</td>
<td>39.84</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60.79</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ranking of the SADC countries in terms of insecurity, according to Table 4 above, places Lesotho at number 8. Seychelles is the most secure while Democratic Republic of Congo is the most insecure country in the region.
3.2.3 Sustainable security

Sustainable security is a more recently conceived globally applicable concept that looks at security from an international point of view. The central premise is that countries cannot successfully counter all the consequences of insecurity, but must work toward resolving the causes of such insecurity (Sustainable security 2015). This concept came into being at the beginning of the 21st century as a response to new approaches to security adopted by Western countries, premised on the belief that insecurity can be controlled through military force, balance of power politics, and containment (ibid).

The ‘war on terror’ that the Western countries launched in response to the attack of September 11, 2001 on the United States is an example of this approach. They started military operations, even outside their own countries, claiming to pursue security through protecting and expanding democracy by winning the global war against the movements and ideologies that drive Islamist inspired terrorism in particular. Proponents of sustainable security argue that the militarist approach followed by most Western countries are flawed in that they try to find a solution for the problems of insecurity without addressing the root causes of such problems.

Sustainable security is therefore touted by its proponents as an alternative approach. Unlike its predecessors, the sustainable security approach “does not attempt to unilaterally control threats through the use of force which is to attack the symptoms, but rather aims to cooperatively resolve the root causes of those threats using the most effective means, i.e. cure the disease.” (Abbott et al 2006: 4). It identifies climate change, competition over resources, marginalisation of the majority world, and global militarisation as four main long-term drivers of conflict and insecurity (Abbott et al 2006: 6). According to the proponents of sustainable security, addressing these factors would lead to a more likely attainment of security.

Sustainable security is global and multi-dimensional and as a result requires the participation of various stakeholders. It is different from its predecessor approaches in that it
takes global justice and equity as the key requirements of any sustainable response, together with the progress towards reform of the global systems of trade, aid and debt relief; a rapid move away from carbon-based economies; bold, visible and sustainable steps towards nuclear disarmament (and the control of biological and chemical weapons); and a shift in defence spending to focus on the non-military elements of security.
3.3 The military and its roles

Militaries, or armies are a common feature of almost every political system. There are actually only 26 countries worldwide which are without militaries (Barbey 2013: 158). The origins of modern armies are traceable to the Middle ages when the European powers started to develop a standardized type of military organisation, usually based on a standing army (Heywood 2007: 402). This form of armies was adopted in other parts of the world following the spread of colonialism. There are four main factors that distinguish the military from other state institutions. These factors, according to Heywood (2007: 402) are that:

- Militaries are instruments of war and enjoy monopoly of weaponry and substantial coercive force.
- They are tightly organised and highly disciplined.
- They are characterised by a distinctive culture and set of values, and an *esprit de corps* that prepare its personnel to fight, kill and possibly die.
- They guarantee the security and integrity of the state and hence are a repository of the national interest.

It is worth noting that the military share some of its features with other state institutions such as the police, correctional services, and private security companies. The common feature among these institutions is that their members are licensed to openly carry arms and operate them as part of their work. However, military arsenals are usually bigger and have more sophisticated weapons within them, and members of the military are allowed to use force more readily than the others are.

Sharing access to arms by all these institutions implies that the military, police, and correctional services are instruments through which states monopolise the use of violence, which is one of the most important features of a functional state. The military is nonetheless as stated earlier, mandated to use force more readily than other security institutions. By contrast, the use of force by members of the police, correctional services and private security companies is highly regulated and usually allowed as the last option mainly in self-defence. The military, however, is allowed to kill anyone declared an enemy, and destroy anything that is declared a military target (Barbey 2013: 16).
3.3.1 The traditional role of the military

Various authors are in agreement that the role of the military can be categorised into two, traditional and secondary. The traditional is the provision of security for their country. Dandeker (2013: 38) writes that “the primary and traditional role of the military has been territorial defence against attack or deterring threats from the forces of other states, in addition to projecting power abroad in defence of territory and the state’s interests”. Similarly, El-Tom (2012: 93) states that “the prime job of the army is to safeguard political borders against foreign intruders”. An army can be described as

a military force, usually governmental, established to prevent the use of force by others or to undertake military action. It is composed of soldiers and equipped with heavy weapons, and is most often organised hierarchically. When attached to a country, it usually has its own administrative status under its own ministry. The persons belonging to the force have a different status from that of other civil servants and most of them are trained to use violence against human beings; they are, in the times of war, legitimised to capture, maim or kill anyone declared to be a military enemy and to destroy whatever is declared to be a military target (Barbey 2013:16).

The military therefore serve as a deterring factor against potential foreign aggression. The fact is that countries with strong armies are less vulnerable to attacks than their weaker counterparts, since any potential attacker would want to suffer as few casualties as possible during physical confrontations. This, however, is not likely to be the case if a strong country is attacked, so it is best, on the basis of this reasoning, to keep a strong army as a deterrent against potential aggressors.

Such reasoning is however not without problems. Firstly, for a military to be strong it must have strong weapons. The irony is that weapons are inherently of dual use, meaning that weapons reportedly purchased for defensive purposes may instead be used offensively. This thinking is again flawed in as much as it takes an army to ensure that a state is not attacked, it fails to account for the role of the military in intra-state conflicts (Moller 2004: 18). In Sub-Saharan Africa today intra-state conflicts are much more common than inter-state conflicts. What is more, having strong armies in the name of deterrence is detrimental to the people of these states themselves, since most of them suffer from the violation of human rights and use their armies against their own people. Strong armies might actually be used to shield corrupt governments from humanitarian interventions by international forces in the cases of atrocities.
Thomas and Mazrui (1992) warn in an early article that most African states militarise because of internal considerations. They further argue that “many African states lack legitimacy and compete for loyalty and resources with other social institutions such as clans, tribes, patron-client networks, dyads and others. In such countries armies are used to ensure compliance from the groups that question the legitimacy of the state and hence to repress the ‘enemy within’” (Thomas and Mazrui 1992: 160; see also Harris 2004: 36). In order to legitimise the existence of their armies, such countries resort to diversionary tactics, such as “the identification of external enemies, against which the regime may, or may not engage in direct conflict, in order to distract the situation at home” (Thomas and Mazrui 1992: 161).

Harris (2004) using the inward-looking model, adopts an economic approach and claim that countries maintain armies for the provision of security, which is a public good. This refers to the type of good whose consumption by one person does not exclude other persons. Public goods are also characterised by an element of free riding, making it difficult to charge a fee for. Public goods are therefore not likely to be privately profitable hence the need to be financed from general taxation (Harris 2004: 33; Dunne and Coulomb 2008). This view on the centrality of the state in the provision of security is shared by Barbey (2013: 6) when he notes that in theory at least – states have a legal obligation to provide safety and security for their inhabitants. It therefore becomes imperative that armies be used to provide security to inhabitants and not be used for sinister motives as warned by Thomas and Mazrui (1992) in the above paragraph.

3.3.2 Non-traditional roles

Apart from the traditional role of territorial defence, the military has secondary roles such as assisting the police, fostering nation-building, disaster management, and international military intervention. The involvement of the military in these civilian duties needs to be limited to avoid undesirable consequences. Kenosi (2003: 200) warns that “longer term harm may be inflicted on the political system when the military takes on responsibilities in areas where civilian public, or private entities could emerge and develop critical expertise, if the social or political space was not already occupied by the armed forces”. Some of these secondary functions of the military are discussed below.

Internal order
Armies are usually called to come to the assistance of the police whenever the latter is overwhelmed in its efforts to maintain internal order. The sharing of tasks by these two security institutions is observed by Barley (2013: 8) when he writes that “the distinction between the army and the police is not always easy to make, mostly because the personnel and the equipment of these forces are easily shifted from one mission or one status to another”. As a way of avoiding overlap and duplication of tasks, countries normally specify conditions and procedures under which the army may enter the police’s ‘territory’. In most cases armies will only do this on official request by the police channelled through the relevant structures. In countries like El Salvador and Guatemala the military can only engage in internal security activities with the approval of the president, in case of emergencies or disasters (Kincaid 2001: 45).

**Nation-building**

Armies are, because of their supposedly patriotic and disciplined nature, in some countries like Israel playing a role in nation-building through conscription. This refers to the practice where youth, are compulsorily enlisted into military service for a period, before they take up their different careers. Their exposure to the military set-up is assumed to instil a sense of loyalty and patriotism in them. Although the practice of conscription has long been abandoned by some well-established states, Germany, until July 2011 had sought to continue to use the military as a means of establishing a political community, including post-German re-unification after the fall of the Berlin Wall, building strong links between military and civilian society, and (so it was assumed) providing a means of ensuring that the military does not become a potentially powerful political actor or ‘state within a state’ (Dandeker 2013: 35).

**Disaster management**

It is not uncommon to have countries calling on the military whenever disaster strikes, to support other government agencies in times of such emergencies. This is so, says Dandeker (2013: 39), because “all states recognise the logistical power of the military, which is reinforced by its effective command-and-control system and ‘can do’ culture. Indeed, prime ministers are usually enthralled by this aspect of the culture of the armed forces and its impressive capacity to turn its military potential to a variety of civilian purposes”. As an example, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is known for providing relief services during natural disasters, also in
neighbouring countries. The best known of these was in 2000 when the SANDF rescued a woman who had given birth to a baby in a tree during floods in Mozambique.

**International peacekeeping**

With the nature of international politics increasingly shifting to the formation of a ‘global village’, where the problems of one country can become a matter of concern for other countries, the phenomenon of military engagement abroad is becoming increasingly common. Thus national armies also have to be capacitated for overseas missions. The type of international missions armies engage in depends largely on the political economy of the army’s home country. Armies from Western countries typically get involved in wars to either secure their countries’ economic interests or fight against groups that they consider to be terrorist organisations. Hunting down ‘terrorist’ groups in foreign countries is what Dandeker (2013: 40) calls “going to crises before they come to you” approach. The involvement of the US forces in war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the ongoing involvement of Chad and Cameroon forces in pursuing Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria are other example. The Iraqi war of 1990 on the other hand was a classic example of external military intervention motivated by the economic interests of the countries involved.

Another form of international military intervention is manifested in the form of peacekeeping missions, usually following violent internal conflicts. Armies from foreign countries are usually called in after a peace agreement has been reached, to assist in disarming and demobilising ex-combatants and to facilitate the restoration of civilian rule. Armies from developing countries, alongside those from developed countries, are often more involved in international peacekeeping missions than in wars abroad. This is quite popular, since the soldiers involved in peacekeeping missions can earn a lot in foreign exchange coming from the coffers of the UN. The ongoing involvement of armies from various African countries in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides a good example of this.

While it may at face value look like a noble idea, peacekeeping has generated serious debate, with the suitability of soldiers to build peace being questioned. Harris (2004: 38) takes the position that “the military has a role when armed conflict is occurring or is likely. But its coercive presence will delay peacebuilding and, as soon as feasible, it should withdraw and leave the work of peacebuilding to peace teams and humanitarian NGOs”.
National pride

The military may also be a symbol of status for a country, particularly when they are a highly sophisticated force. It was as a result of their military power that the European colonial powers such as Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and Belgium were able to acquire colonies across the globe and build their empires. Having flags fly over all these diverse territories was always a matter of great pride for the colonial powers. And today military strength is still a source of pride for powerful countries, while they are also usually given a commanding position in international peacekeeping missions.

Source of employment

Apart from benefiting their country in general, the military also benefit their members individually. They serve as a source of employment for many people. In the wake of an increasing lack of employment opportunities, particularly in the Third World countries, many youths are forced to look to the army for opportunity, even if it is lowly paid. Because of its diverse activities, the military provide employment for many types of labour, ranging from unskilled work to highly sophisticated professions such as engineers and pilots. It is possible, however, that more employment opportunities can be created in terms of both numbers and productive output by channelling military expenditure into other sectors such as health and education.

Provision of an environment conducive for investment

The military are a vital component in the creation of an environment conducive for investment. It is common knowledge that investors will always prefer to channel their resources toward countries that have order and stability. It is only under orderly and stable conditions that profit-making can be achieved. The presence of the army can play a vital role in the creation of such environment. Harris’ (2004: 5) again draws attention to the other side of the coin, namely that if the army is ‘ill-disciplined’ it then becomes a source of political instability.

3.4 The military and civilian governments
Despite its centrality within the political systems, there is a danger that the military can have undesirable influence on the system, if its power is left unchecked and it becomes a threat to peace in the country. Due to its organised structure and the power it possesses, the military can easily pursue and defend its own interests without paying attention to the interests of the wider society, if they are not kept in check. It is therefore of paramount importance that an army remains under close control of a civilian government. There are two ways in which civilian governments can control their armies. Samuel Huntington (1957) (cited in Heywood 2007: 408) calls these the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ models. These two models are also known as the ‘liberal’ and ‘penetration’ models respectively. The objective/liberal model is mostly used in democratic political systems. Under this model there is a clear division between political and military roles and the army is kept out of politics. The military is subordinate to the civilian rulers who are accountable to the public. Civilian rulers have the responsibility of policy-making, including defence-related policies, and the role of the military is to provide expert advice and see to the implementation of the policy (ibid).

Noteworthy is that the military do not have the authority to challenge decisions made by civilian leaders, have to maintain political neutrality, and remain loyal to the civilian leaders regardless of the party or government in power. An example of the ‘objective’ or ‘liberal’ method of keeping the army under civilian control is provided by Kenosi who uses the Botswana’s case and shows that,

In a democracy, civilian control of the armed forces is a matter of paramount importance. In Botswana for instance, the army falls under the executive arm of government. This arrangement subjects the military to the checks and balances of a legitimate government. This delicate balance of power delineates the place of the executive in the chain of command and defines its place within the political superstructure. The arrangement clears any possible confusion regarding the superior and the subordinate. From this it becomes apparent that in a democracy the army has to be loyal to the government of the day and it has to obey its lawful instructions. Any departure from this principle should invite punitive action” (Kenosi 2003: 193).

In direct contrast to the objective/liberal model, in the subjective/penetration model the military are highly politicised as is common in dictatorial or one-party states. The military are imbued with leadership values and ideals and the army has to bend to the interests of individual leaders which would only rarely be for the common good. The military more often become a tool of repression, mostly against its own people, as was the case in Germany under the rule of Adolf Hitler. To
enhance his grip on the military, Hitler attempted to turn the German army into ‘political soldiers’; by asking them in 1934 to take a personal oath of allegiance to him as the Fuhrer, declaring himself Supreme Commander in 1941 (Heywood 2007: 409).

Military intervention in politics is always a threat to human liberty because the military are orientated toward war, so that they are unlikely to know anything else than repression and violence. When the military exercise a coup d’etat they take direct control of government with absolute power. Government turns into rule by decree, elected assemblies are dissolved, constitutions are suspended, and political party activities banned (Smith 2009: 245). Alternatively, the army can replace one civil regime with another. The latter then becomes a ‘puppet’ which is subject to the ‘big man’s’ dictates. (Smith 2009: 245; Heywood 2007: 409).

Some authors however say that there are circumstances under which a coup may be justified. Varol (2012: 295) supports what she calls a ‘democratic military coup’ that has the following characteristics:

Democratic military coups commonly feature seven attributes: the military coup is staged against an authoritarian or totalitarian regime; the military responds to popular opposition against that regime; the authoritarian or totalitarian leader refuses to step down in response to the popular opposition; the coup is staged by a military that is highly respected within the nation, ordinarily because of mandatory conscription; the military executes the coup to overthrow the authoritarian or totalitarian regime; the military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time; and the coup ends with the transfer of power to democratically elected leaders (Varol 2012:95).

The above scenario cannot in any way justify the intervention of the military into politics. The military are not trained to administer public affairs. Interestingly, Varol herself is aware of this danger and admits that even though a democratic coup may end in free and fair elections, the military behave as a self-interested actor during the democratic transition process and is likely to entrenched, or attempt to entrench, its policy preferences into the new constitution drafted during the transition process (2012: 295). There are various conditions under which civilian governments become vulnerable to military intervention. Heywood (2007) mentions the following four conditions associated with coups.

**Economic backwardness:** Military coups usually occur under harsh economic conditions when citizens become disillusioned and can easily buy the promises of the military to deliver economic development.
Loss of legitimacy by civilian rulers: The military are likely to intervene in politics when the legitimacy of the incumbent civilian powers has been badly eroded, and the military believe that a coup will be welcomed by the citizens.

Conflict between the military and the government: The military are prompted to replace civilian government when they feel that their interests are being threatened by government.

A favourable international context: Military intervention in politics may also have some international support when similar occurrences are seen to be normal in neighbouring countries as was the case in Africa and the Central America during the Cold War.

One of the latest military coups in Africa has been explained in terms of points (i) and (ii). Though he is not convinced by the explanations himself, Beck (2013: 2) notes that the July 2013 military coup that toppled Mohamed Mursi from power was justified as “the only way to avoid a civil war or the failure of Mursi’s government to improve Egypt’s economic situation” (see also Varol 2012). It is however, important to note that the dangerous involvement of the military in politics is not always a one-way process where the military seek to intervene in politics against the will of the incumbent civilian authorities. There is also a more complicated situation where the civilian leaders themselves initiate this unwarranted intervention. In such a case, the civilian elites seek to draw the military into politics, or try to put the military on the spot as to where and with whom their loyalty lies (Macaringue 2004: 148). Whichever way it goes, the intervention of the military in politics is never healthy and needs to be avoided at all costs.

3.5 Militarism

According to Greenhalgh (2014: 1), “militarism is usually defined as a wide range of thought and actions, of customs and interests, associated with armies and navies and war, which permeates the whole of society, even the arts and industry”. Kraska and Kappeler (1997: 1) define militarism as a set of beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve problems and gain political power, while glorifying the tools to accomplish this”. It is clear from the above definitions that use of violence becomes the order of the day for the members of militarised institutions. Human rights become secondary to their penchant for the use of violence. In short, for them the ‘ends justify means’. This became evident during the ‘Marikana massacre’ of 2012 in South Africa when the “police inappropriately abandoned public order policing with its emphasis on crowd control in favour of forcibly disarming the striking miners and breaking the strike” (Duncan 2015).
By being licensed to use physical force, all the state security institutions are in one way or another all militarised, albeit in different ways. The difference lies in the purpose and readiness with which members of such institutions take recourse to the use of violence. For instance, for members of police services violence has to be used as a last resort where all other alternatives have failed, mostly in self-defence. This is however, not the case with armies whose members are mandated to use force more readily than the police (Duncan 2015).

The high level of militarism within military institutions can be attributed to a number of factors, which include the type of training members of the military undergo; type of weapons they use; their dress code; and vehicles they use. Training of the military is geared more towards use of maximum rather than minimum force, while public order policing calls for minimum force. The military of course are expected to deal with ‘enemies’ of the state. The difference in training comes out in the following quote from Costa and Medeiros;

[T]he fundamental difference between the police and the armed forces lies in how they deploy force. For the armed services, controlling force is not a key concern. For police, though, that control is exactly what makes it compatible with a democracy. Consequently, military training does not emphasise the need to control force, military laws and rules of engagement do not underscore the limits, and army deployment strategies do not necessarily take such limits into consideration. When military conduct is evaluated—in military courts, for instance—the control of force is not a central issue (Costa and Medeiros 2002: 29).

Weapons used by the military are usually more sophisticated and destructive than those used by the rest of the security establishment. When it comes to uniform, unlike members of other security institutions that wear plain cloth uniforms, army personnel wear camouflage, that may be called “battle-dress uniform” (Krasca and Kappeler (1997). They use armoured vehicles with matching camouflage colours, whereas the others use conventional transport. If armies are disbanded most of their functions are transferred to the police. The high levels of militarization can however also regrettably be found in some police services. It is therefore important to ensure that when the military is disbanded, its culture is not passed on to the police. We therefore also have to look at how militarization of the police may come about.

Walby and Monaghan (2010: 121) point out that “militarization of policing occurs among others through the trickledown effects that occur through unintended adoption of military technologies by numerous policing agencies – something akin to technological drift”, such as when special police units are created that operate along military lines. The spread of militarism may also be
encouraged by the language that politicians use, when they declare a ‘war’ against terror, drugs, crime and the like. Coordination of activities in which the army and the police carry out joint also contributes to the militarization of the police services.

3.6 Summary and conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed how the understanding of security has unfolded. The conventional understanding of security defined it in terms of the geographical boundaries of countries and not in terms of people. However, since 1994 security has come to be defined internationally as human security, with a greater focus on people. Another concept, sustainable security, emerged at the beginning of the 21st century, premised on the understanding that countries are not able to control all the consequences of insecurity, so that we must work more on the causes of insecurity.

The military have various functions ranging from the primary one of guarding against foreign aggression, to numerous secondary ones. Militaries have to be accountable to civilian leaders and stay out of politics. However, sometimes the military do the undesirable s of overthrowing civilian governments, claiming that their actions are for the benefit of the people whom they are ‘liberating’ from politicians. Whatever the circumstances, the intervention of the military in politics can never be justified as it advances the use of force as a means for resolving conflict. The culture of militarism leads to the violation of human rights and should not be allowed to filter into other security institutions. The next chapter turns to examining the key concept of demilitarisation.
CHAPTER 4
DEMILITARISATION

4.1. Introduction
In this chapter we shall do a detailed examination of the concept demilitarisation and provide reasons why the process of demilitarisation is highly desirable, particularly within the sub-Saharan Africa. Two types of demilitarisation, partial and total will be visited. It is worth noting that demilitarisation last happened in Haiti in 1995, so that dated sources had to be used due to the paucity of literature on the subject.

4.2. Demilitarisation defined
Demilitarisation is one way by which countries can attempt to make, or enhance peace between them and their neighbours. Different meanings are attached to the concept, depending on the context. The most common use refers to the disarming of combatant groups in war-torn countries that have gone through a civil or liberation war. In such cases the process is usually facilitated by external actors such as peacekeeping forces mobilised by regional or international organisations. Demilitarisation is also used to refer to the process of limiting the sale of arms to specified countries, as happened in Africa after the end of the Cold War since there was a reduction in international conflicts. For African countries, the end of the Cold War implied reduced possibility of wars between countries aligned to the opposing blocks. It also implied decline of support (mostly militarily) by the two blocks for movements opposed to the incumbent administrations in different countries.

Demilitarisation may also refer to the process of changing the culture of reliance on use of violence as a conflict resolution strategy, by encouraging state institutions such as the police services to use peaceful rather than violent means in dealing with conflict situations. Demilitarisation may also refer to the disbanding of a country’s armed forces as this study is suggesting is appropriate in the case of Lesotho. Barbey (2013:6) defines demilitarisation as “a process of dismantling military forces and disposing of weapons that leads, if demilitarisation is total, to a state of non-militarisation”. Harris (2004: 3) defines it as a process of working towards a society which seeks to find nonviolent ways of resolving conflict, and ensuring personal and social justice. Harris’ perspective is directly contrary to ‘militarism’ which according to Duncan (2015) is an ideology that employs force and the threat of violence to solve problems.
Harris (2004: 3) maintains that demilitarisation implies a significant and sustained reduction in the power and influence of the military, reinforced by a reduction in military expenditure, military personnel, and force projection (ibid). For Kincaid (2001) demilitarisation means the withdrawal of the army from political involvement in government, or a complete abolition of the armed forces as an institution. The first refers to a military regime in power, while the second may happen under a civilian government. What they have in common is that there is either a significant reduction, or a complete scrapping of arms as a means of trying to resolve conflicts.

Demilitarisation can take different forms. The first is a complete disbanding of the army. To close the void this is likely to leave some countries may sign defence agreements with other countries or a regional bodies, or allow foreign armies to operate within their borders (Barbey 2013: 159). Under these agreements, the signatory states or organisation pledge to come to the defence of the demilitarising country, in the event of it being attacked; sometimes in the event of internal conflict as well’ (Cawthra 2007: 26). Most commonly this happens when small states get security assurance from a more powerful neighbour, or former colonial masters take responsibility for restoring peace in a now independent but destabilised former colony. When a country disbands its army, the limited security function previously performed by the army will be handed over to the police while other related functions are allocated to some government departments, privatised, or outsourced (Harris 2004: 35).

The second kind of demilitarisation occurs when the size of the army is reduced, leaving only a few specialised units with specific mandates, such as presidential guard or ceremonial occasions. As an alternative, peace can be maintained if neighbouring countries band together to form a security web in which each country contributes a small unit to ensure security collectively (Dunne and Coulomb 2008, Fischer 2007). Fischer (2007: 196) uses an example of fire engines in homes to illustrate this. He says “it would be wasteful if all home owners maintained individual fire engines, instead of combining their resources to form one fire company that can be deployed wherever and whenever needed”. Examples of these modes of demilitarisation are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Disbanding or at least reducing the capacity of the military is a needed peacebuilding strategy because the military are inclined to perpetuate violence of all kinds if not kept in check. Because of their war-oriented training and easy access to weapons, military personnel are prone to engaging in direct violence. History shows that brute force becomes the order of the day wherever the
military get involved in public order activities. An example is the ordeal that the residents of Umsinga in Kwazulu Natal went through in June 2001 when the members of the South African Defence Force (SANDF) were in the area on a disarmament operation when the residents “complained of heavy beatings and torture, ranging from being stomped on by soldiers to being suffocated with plastic tied over their faces” (Vapi 2001).

The inability of soldiers to deal with the public was acknowledged by the then South Africa’s Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, when he called upon the police to arrest those responsible for the proliferation of the illegal firearms, pointing out that the SANDF was not the right institution to do so. He said, "we train our soldiers to kill and not to arrest. I don't want them among communities because they can be dangerous when provoked" (ibid). In situations of hunger and deprivation the military also contribute to structural violence when scarce financial resources are channelled to them, as happens in many poor Third World countries. Unfortunately many people under these circumstances submit to the culture of violence waged on them by the military as normal. This in itself is a consequence of cultural violence.

According to Barbey (2013: 159) there are two ways of identifying non-militarised countries. He talks of the legal criterion and the practical-factual criterion. The legal criterion applies to countries that use constitutional provisions to demilitarise the army, or do not apply such provisions to the army. Costa Rica and Panama are for example, countries whose constitutions clearly rule out the army. According to the practical-factual criterion there should be no groups or forces present in the country that amount to an army (ibid). The factual criterion recognises that there will always be armed groups which however, do not qualify as armies. That depends on the mission of such groups. The police are charged with public safety and criminal investigation. There might also be small intervention units manned by specialists that are trained for anti-hostage operations, terror shootings, or special guards. While the army may be involved in their training with sophisticated weaponry and the like, that does not make them to be soldiers.

To be demilitarised, a country has to take into account both legal and practical considerations. Failure to do so would cause a confusing scenario to emerge. Japan provides an example of this. Whereas Japan’s constitution clearly forbids setting up armed forces, the country actually maintains one of the most advanced armies in the world (Barbey 2013: 13).

4.3. Demilitarisation: a myth or reality?
Some people might think that demilitarisation of a country is a utopian idea. However, we shall try in the next chapter to demonstrate that it is not a fanciful idea, since there are societies that have undertaken this process and have become fully demilitarised, while there are also some who have partially demilitarised to retain only a limited number of soldiers with special tasks. Costa Rica is an example of the former, and El Salvador an example of the latter. There is a third category consisting of countries that are non-militarised having never had reason to demilitarise since they never had any army. Mauritius falls into this category. As will be seen in the next chapter non-militarised countries have a higher living standard than their militarised counterparts.

4.4. The rationale for demilitarisation

There are a number of factors that make demilitarisation worthy of careful consideration which are discussed below.

4.4.1. Changed nature of warfare

Harris (2004) points out that the nature of warfare has changed in the sub-Saharan region. Unlike earlier periods when countries faced threats of external aggression from their neighbours, conflicts in the region are now mostly intra as opposed to inter-states. The number and intensity of wars is declining. For instance, following the end of the Cold War and apartheid rule in South Africa, the Southern African countries are no longer exposed to the aggression that South Africa waged against them with its ‘total onslaught’ and destabilisation campaign. Now conflict “translates itself mostly, and with very few exceptions, into intra-state conflict either between opposing political or civil groups, or between the central government and secessionist or guerrilla movements” (Williams 2003: 218).

This is confirmed by Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010: 3) who report that there have been 19 civil wars and one interstate war in 16 African countries between 1990 and 2000. The change in the nature of conflict implies that the meaning of security has also changed insofar as the priority of the states is no longer to wage physical war but to ensure that their citizens enjoy political, economic, and civil rights. The presence of the military in many countries has, however, also proved to be a hindrance to the achievement of these rights, hence the need for demilitarisation.

4.4.2. Military spending hinders economic development
The second and arguably the most important consideration for demilitarisation, particularly in poverty-stricken and underdeveloped Sub-Saharan Africa, is the impact that military expenditure has on economic growth and development. To understand what military expenditure entails, we adopt the definition used by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) which states that

The guideline definition used by SIPRI includes expenditure on the following actors and activities: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. It includes all current and capital expenditure on: (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country). It does not include civil defence and current expenditure for past military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015).

There are three main approaches to understanding the relationship between military spending and economic development. These are the neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxist approaches.

The neoclassical approach assesses military spending in terms of a cost-benefit analysis conducted by the state. The approach “considers the state as a rational actor that balances opportunity costs and the security benefits of military spending in order to maximise national interests within a well-defined social welfare function” (Tian 2013: 5). According to the neoclassical approach, military spending is a public good and its economic effects is determined by opportunity costs as measured against resource benefits for the civilian sector.

The Keynesian approach considers military spending as one way of growing economies. This approach takes a state to be a proactive entity utilising the state funds on military spending as a means of increasing national output through multiplier effects (Tian 2013: 5). According to this approach, spending on the military can lead to increased capacity utilization, higher profits, and subsequently rising investment growth.

The Marxist approach to military spending views the process in terms of capitalist development, which views it as important though contradictory. Military spending, according to this approach, has a negative impact on growth, but it is nevertheless necessary to maintain capitalism and
prevent stagnation. Tian (2013: 6) explains that “where firms produce goods and control labour costs, leading to inadequate consumption, military spending is a way, albeit wasteful, of creating demand to allow firms to sell goods and realise profits”.

There are different explanations pertaining to the causal relationship between military spending and economic development. One explanation identifies a negative effect while another sees a positive one. Others avoid generalisations believing the effect of military spending on economies is determined by a variety of factors such as the country’s level of development and whether it has experienced a conflict or not. Yildirim and Ocal (2014) use the ‘guns – vs – butter’ image to suggest that military expenditure retards economic growth by crowding out investment and consumption. Tian (2013: 5) follows a similar line about military spending causing “crowding out public and private investment, adverse balance of payments within arms importing countries, inefficient bureaucracies, fewer civilian services, dwindling skilled workforce within civil services, and many more”. A review of 102 studies shows that “military spending appears to be more damaging to the poorer countries. … Specifically in sub-Saharan Africa military spending has significant short run effects on growth for countries’ economies (Dunne 2011: 4). To investigate the influence of past conflicts on the relationship between military spending and economic development, a sample of countries 38 countries that experienced conflict and 66 that never did were compared. The findings revealed “significant negative effects of military expenditure both in the short and long run irrespective of whether a country has experienced conflict” (Dunne and Tian 2015: 26).

Yildirim and Ocal (2014) however warn that in some cases it may also provide positive externalities for economy, such as technology spin offs, security spill-overs and human capital formation. Dunne and Tian (2015: 29) claim that their study shows that the negative long run effect of military spending on the developed countries was insignificant. It would, in my view be totally misleading to accept that military spending can have positive externalities. That might be true for developed economies but certainly not always for their developing counterparts.

There is general agreement that military spending mostly has a negative impact on the economies of the developing countries. It is for this reason that demilitarisation is so important for economically struggling sub-Saharan countries. Apart from providing a platform for peace by reducing the potential for direct violence, demilitarisation in these countries could also help to channel more resources toward development oriented projects and thus grow their poor economies. This would provide a direct contribution to peace as economic development would lead to the reduction of structural violence by creating more employment opportunities.
Dunn and Coulomb sum up the potential contribution of demilitarisation to economic development and peace by saying:

[Peace does not necessarily mean demilitarisation and reduced military spending, but if it does then the evidence suggests improved economic performance is possible. It is in fact likely to lead to moving resources away from existing defence industrial bases to other civil sectors and this should have positive effects. It should also allow the focus to move from military to alternative concepts of security, such as human and environmental. This could improve the situation for developing countries as well as the poor in developed countries. It could also provide increased demand for industry, through investment in alternative technologies. This could also allow policies to reduce inequalities, support sustainable development etc and so improve the economic situation for all countries. Improved trade and wealth should reduce the likelihood of conflict, but the experience of this century does make one wary of such statements with confidence. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see anything but economic benefits resulting from peace (2008: 13).

4.4.3. Militaries can hinder peaceful conflict resolution

Demilitarisation is also important in that it paves the way for the peaceful settlement of disputes both internally and between neighbouring states. Within every political system there are cost effective alternatives to the military. However, the presence of the military usually means that these cost effective alternatives are not pursued. The mere presence of the military implies the possible use of violence and creates an insecure environment. The military are at best a hindrance to the peaceful resolution of conflict and more likely encourages adversarial approaches. This is evident in many countries where the military are used by incumbent governments to repress dissent. Using their armies, many “states provoke ‘reactive desperation’ by blocking all avenues of civil and peaceful engagement and change, and the political aspirations of marginalised groups, alienated elite and opposition groups” (Ikelegbe and Okumu 2010: 22). The military have more commonly challenged incumbent governments and staged coups. Most coups staged have resulted in loss of lives and the violation of human rights.

4.4.4. Moral considerations

Demilitarisation is furthermore necessary because of the immorality of trying to resolve disputes by applying force, apart from the military’s ineffectiveness in resolving conflicts (Harris 2004: 6-10). Societies also have moral and spiritual reasons for using nonviolent ways of dealing with
conflict. The presence of the military is in itself a threat to these values because they are inherently war oriented and hardly familiar with nonviolent ways of conflict resolution, since violence mostly only begets more violence. The military simply are not very effective in building peace or resolving conflicts. As the saying goes, ‘war does not determine who is right, but who is left’.

4.4.5. The military promote a culture of violence

The military promote a culture of violence and stress among soldiers insofar as they are trained to use violence affectively, and create awareness among them that they may be maimed or killed in action. The violent and stressful environment becomes part of the soldiers’ lives and this eventually filters into their families and society at large, and is also reflected in the high suicide rate among them. Knock et al (2013: 14) write about the US army that “in certain months and years such as 2010 and 2011, more soldiers died by their own hands than those of someone else through combat”, which is also true of the military in many other countries. Knock et al (2013: 10) explain this trend and observe that

Stressful life events may play an especially strong role in the occurrence, and potentially in the recent increase, of suicide among soldiers, given the severely stressful events associated with military training and practice in general. Soldiers experience many different forms of stressors, which can be classified as: military-related stressors (e.g. combat exposure, injury, bereavement, negative unit climate—such as feeling ostracized from one’s unit, not fitting in, or feeling that one has let the unit down), family-related stressors (e.g., separation from family, marital/romantic distress or infidelity, family illness/death), and other personal stressors (e.g., legal/disciplinary problems, physical/sexual assault, acute health problems, financial/occupational problems).

4.5. Alternatives to the military

The military are as old as nation-states themselves, so citizens find it difficult to conceive of a state without an army and think of any other entity that could take on the duties of the military. In this section we discuss measures that countries can adopt as alternatives to the military, and then proceed to discuss alternatives to its secondary roles.

4.5.1. Security from external aggression

There are various ways of ensuring countries’ security from external aggression without a military, or it being protected by means of only a limited capability.
There are four ways in which it can be done, that are discussed below.
- Arrangements with other countries

In order to avoid being vulnerable in the absence of an army, demilitarising countries can have arrangements with their bigger and more capable counterparts to provide security in case of need. Such countries can also make arrangements with regional security organisations for provision of security. For example, Costa Rica signed a security treaty with the Organisation of American States (OAS) a few days before it disbanded its army (Barbey 2013: 162). It was through this arrangement that the country was able to thwart an attempted attack by the Costa Rican political forces that had earlier been defeated and had fled the country. On hearing that the army had been disbanded these forces attempted an invasion, but the border was closed and their supply lines cut by an order of the OAS commission (ibid).

Countries that demilitarise partially can also establish multi-lateral relations with their neighbours to form a security web. In such a type of arrangement each country contributes a number of security personnel to a regional force responsible for the security of all member countries (see Moller 2004). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an example of such an agreement. Membership of security webs can greatly reduce the chances of external aggression.

There is a more general and encompassing alternative of providing security without the army that Spence (2004) calls ‘befriending neighbours’. The understanding with the idea of befriending neighbours is that where neighbouring states are ‘friends’ and at peace with one another the need for the military withers away. It is important to note that it is not enough for such friendship to exist only between the countries’ elites, but that it has to be established across all societal levels. The idea of befriending your neighbours depends upon the willingness of governments and civil society to look beyond national borders to embrace a more inclusive ideal of community (Spence 2004: 60), in other words, the establishment of a ‘security community’ that transcends national boundaries.

In such a ‘security community’, any misunderstanding that arises between neighbouring countries can be dealt with in a non-violent way such as engaging in dialogue. Regular interaction between different sectors would make it easier to compromise for the sake of peace, and over time leads to the building of trust which “acts as the cement of society, which holds its members together by organic solidarity” (Cromwell and Vogele 2009: 234). Building friendships, according to Spence (2004) can be achieved in a number of ways, including the following three:
- Peacebuilding through people exchange

Countries can build friendships by exchanging people at various levels. In some cases conflicts between countries escalate because of their lack of appreciation for each other’s cultures. The exchange of people may lead to a better appreciation of how life is lived by their neighbours. During exchanges, people come to build relationships as well as learn skills from one another. Even in the worst case scenario where a country would want to attack its neighbour, it would be difficult to do so if there is an awareness of the presence of potential attacker’s citizens in the targeted country.

- Peacebuilding through cooperation over natural resources

I have noted in section 3.2.1 that contemporary approaches to security recognise the importance of the preservation of natural resources. Most natural resources are transnational and traverse geographical borders, turning the countries into a ‘security complex’ – a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Cawthra 2007: 25). Examples of such resources include water flowing into rivers, and the air. The transnational nature of these resources implies that they need to be taken care of by all people irrespective of country. Any collaboration based on shared resources is likely to reduce unwanted conflict between these countries and the need for military interventions. Most importantly, it will enhance environmental protection which is a vital dimension of human security.

- Peacebuilding through economic co-operation

One can never divorce economics from politics. Though political, peace is highly interlinked with the economy of countries. As with the two types of exchanges discussed above, economic co-operation can reduce tension between countries. It would be easier for financial or labour resources to move from one country to another. Such co-operation can best be modelled on the current European Union (EU) which has literally united its member states into a single ‘big state’. This arrangement has almost removed the possibility of violent military conflict between member states.

4.5.2. Alternatives for internal security and other secondary roles of the army

In the absence of the army, some of its secondary roles can be performed as shown below:
- Strengthening the police

I have already noted in Section 3.3.2 that one of the secondary functions of the army is to assist the police in ensuring public security whenever the latter is overwhelmed. If the army is disbanded, there would be a need to strengthen and capacitate the police to deal with any security challenge that might arise. This would also contribute to peacebuilding as it would reduce the likelihood of having to resort to violence. The training of the police is public oriented, unlike that of the army which is enemy-oriented. It is for this reason that members of the army use violence more readily than their police counterparts. In order to fill the gap that would have been created by the disbandment of the army, the police would need to create, or strengthen where they already exist, special units that have other specific security mandates that may be required. This arrangement exists in Mauritius where an intelligence agency known as National Investigation Unit, a paramilitary Special Mobile Force (SMF), and a small National Coast Guard have been brought into being (Cawthra 2007: 104-5).

- Civilianising or privatising of secondary army functions

Armies throughout the world are known for their involvement in relief and rescue operations during times of emergency and disaster. This should, however, never become a reason to desist from disbanding the army. Such important functions can still be exercised by other relevant civilian ministries, and soldiers with the relevant specialised skills absorbed into these ministries. Alternatively, these services can be privatised while trained soldiers seek employment in companies that can utilise their skills. Civilianising should not be a problem since such responsibilities should never have been performed by the army in the first place. Gwyntopher observes:

Armed forces are trained to kill or injure. That is their raison d’etre. ... Killing, maiming, destruction of homes and all that makes wellbeing possible, diseases and the forced migration of millions is being done by ‘conventionally’ armed forces .... There are many other people and organisations capable of using communications, logistics, disciplined planning and brave action to rescue people from natural and human made disasters, including the activity of the armed forces, namely wars. Medicines’ Sans Frontier’s, Oxfam, Christian Aid, Save the Children Fund, fire brigades, Coast Guards, the UNHCR, and in the first and second world wars, the Friends Ambulance Unit, spring to mind (Gwyntopher 2015: 6).
Transferring emergency tasks performed by the army to civilian organisations should not be a problem as countries in which this is already a practice prove. For instance, each of the Australian states has a State Emergency Service (SES) that provides rescue and relief services during disasters such as floods and fires. The Queensland State Emergency Service for instance, is described as “a non-profit organisation that is supported through a partnership between the state and the local government of Queensland and the volunteers of SES themselves. Members are trained and equipped to help the communities across a range of functions during emergency and disaster times. The basic concept is one of self-help and mutual assistance within each community” (Queensland State Emergency Service, 2015). Similarly, South Africa has a National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI) that saves lives along the South African coast. The NSRI is a non-profit organisation “run by over 1000 highly skilled, unpaid volunteers who are on standby day and night. It runs a WaterWise Academy that teaches children what to do in an emergency” (National Sea Rescue Institute, 2015).

4.6. Possible challenges to demilitarisation

The process of demilitarisation has to be understood as an investment whose results might not be experienced on the first day. While it might involve challenges and expenses on commencement, there will in all likelihood be savings in the long term. These possibilities should spur the countries to move forward with the process amid challenges that are likely to arise. Lack of instant returns should be a concern, particularly for poor countries that are in a hurry to divert military budgets to other development-oriented programmes. Kingma (2004: 168) summarises this challenge by warning that, “research on several demobilisations in Africa has shown that the financial benefits of post-war demobilisation are often not as high as expected and come slowly, while the actual direct costs of the demobilisation and reintegration support have been shown to be high”. While this comment refers to post-war demobilisations, the same problems can be expected in countries that have not been at war before the demilitarisation process. It is therefore, important to realise that benefits from demilitarisation will only come gradually over the longer term.

Like any other social group, the military also have their own vested interests. Officers enjoy a certain social status just by virtue of their membership and rank in the army. This may translate into some economic and political benefits that would be reduced if the army is disbanded, creating a resistance to demilitarisation and making the process more difficult. Calvert’s (1985: 33) early warning that “where armed forces enjoy a strong and well-constructed position, demilitarisation becomes a matter of degree rather than absolute” should be remembered.
Demilitarisation may also prove to be an expensive exercise in terms of finances, time and consequences. It may require providing severance packages for the retrenched soldiers, and equipping police personnel to empower them to handle extra responsibilities that result from the disbandment of the army. Demilitarisation therefore needs to be carefully planned and adequate resources be made available before the process is launched.

Another challenge is the long processes of reintegrating soldiers into civilian life. This has to be handled with great care. There needs to be clear programmes and time frames regarding the future of the retrenched soldiers. Failure to make provision for these will lead to problems that may derail the process. We can learn from the experiences of demobilisation in other post-violent conflicts. According to Kingma (2004: 167), they "show that if the prospects for the ex-combatants are not clear, and the period of encampment is too long, violence and rebellion are likely to undermine the demobilisation and resettlement process and, potentially, the overall peace process".

Demilitarisation can have unplanned consequences at both national and international levels. Experience has shown that ex-soldiers are often hired by private security companies leading to unanticipated militaristic influences filtering into the wider society. While demilitarisation might bring prospects of peace in one country, it might also prove to be a catalyst for armed conflict in others where the re-integration of soldiers into civilian life fails, or where they lack alternative survival opportunities. Kingma (2004: 164) citing the example of South Africa, warns that "partially as a lack of alternative opportunities, significant numbers of ex-soldiers of the former South African Defence Force (SADF) and some other African armies have found their way into mercenary companies". Some media reports even claim that South African mercenaries are fighting alongside Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. The challenges faced by demilitarising countries are further discussed in the next chapter.

4.7. Summary and conclusions

For the purposes of this study demilitarisation has been defined as a process of disbanding, or at least reducing the capacity of national armies. Calls for demilitarisation are not utopian as there are examples of countries that are getting along without armies. Demilitarisation makes a positive contribution when financial and other resources allocated to the army are channelled to other development-oriented projects instead, and the chances that violence would be used as a conflict resolution mechanism are reduced. By their very presence, armies promote a culture of violence
and hinder peaceful resolution of conflicts as they turn the attention of conflicting parties away from peaceful and nonviolent ways of handling conflict.

More frequent exchanges through various fora on nonviolent conflict resolution between people from neighbouring countries would reduce chances of conflict, that would subsequently take away the need for the army to stand ‘guard’ over the geographical territories of these states. The void left by the disbanding of the army can be closed by strengthening the police, and by privatising some of the functions of the army or allocating them to civilian departments.

As necessary as the process of demilitarising is, it does not come without challenges. It might attract severe resistance from the army personnel who benefit from the status quo. The process should be adequately planned and enough resources be mobilised for it to be a success. Furthermore, there is a need to appreciate that the benefits of demilitarisation come to fruition only in the long run, not instantly. Failure to observe these might undermine the demilitarisation process and render it a failure. The following chapter takes a global overview of countries without armies.
CHAPTER 5

EXPERIENCES OF DEMILITARISATION

5.1 Introduction

The long presence of the military in modern states has made people think there cannot be an orderly life without them. This chapter attempts to dispel this myth by showing that there are stable societies that exist without the military by looking at some of societies that have existed, and those that still exist without the military. They can be categorised into two types, traditional peaceful communities and contemporary politically stable societies. The former are small and mostly pre-colonial while the latter refer to modern nation states.

Such case studies should help us avoiding an over emphasis of the human capacity for violence, and temper the Hobbesian perception of life as a ‘war of all, against all’ that requires strong armies to ensure national security. It should also help us appreciate that without the military, serious conflicts can be resolved by the use of nonviolent conflict resolution strategies. The case studies also show us that war and peace should not be seen as opposites, but as a continuum ranging from peaceful through to violent, or vice versa (Fry 2004: 186). Peace and violence are not static phenomena hence all processes geared towards peacebuilding, including demilitarisation occur on an on-going basis.

This chapter further demonstrates that life can in fact be better in countries without armies compared to their militarised counterparts, which is particularly instructive for sub-Saharan Africa.

5.2 Peaceful societies

‘Peaceful societies’ in the literature refers to societies that demonstrate the human capacity to prevent, limit, and deal with conflicts non-violently (Fry 2004: 194; see also Boege 2006). These societies, according to Kemp (2004: 10), orientate their culture towards peacefulness and develop ideas, mores, value systems, and cultural institutions that avoid violence and promote peace. Today examples of these societies are mostly to be found in small remote communities that have hardly been affected by modernization. Nonviolent conflict resolution in such societies offers hope for reducing the use of violence in the world. It should be noted however, that referring to these societies as ‘peaceful’ does not necessarily imply they are completely free of violence or conflict.
There might be occasional cases of use of violence by individuals, but these are usually condemned as they go against the values held by the communities. The fact is however, interpersonal conflict may occur in any social setting since it is obviously found in peaceful societies as well, but here it is normally managed without physical aggression. It is also important to note that all traditional societies are not the same, but they prove the point that violence is neither necessary nor inevitable.

Nonviolent conflict management in traditional societies is achieved through numerous means that have been summarised by Fry (2004) under seven headings.

5.2.1 Values and beliefs condemning violence

Peace is highly valued in these societies, as their beliefs and norms that prise nonviolent behaviour shows, putting pressure on people to adhere to the accepted standards. Fry (2004:197) cites the case of the La Paz people of Southern Mexico whose, “criticism, harangues, ridicule, shaming, gossip, and fear of supernatural sanction, witchcraft accusations, or loss of social support illustrate the diverse array of informal social control mechanisms used to prevent acts of violence and other deviant behaviours”, [and the] Sama Dilaut of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, who reconcile, and pressure others to reconcile in part due to beliefs that prolonged enmity leads to illness and other misfortunes”.

5.2.2 Avoidance

The emphasis of avoidance is often the favoured approach in societies that have a high potential for violence. It is manifested at a personal level when people avoid interaction with those with whom they have quarrelled and keep their distance. This distance is kept until the tensions have lowered or third parties have intervened to defuse the tension.
5.2.3 Self-restraint

In these societies people respond to conflict with self-restraint and self-control rather than with aggression and threatening displays. This does not necessarily mean people in these societies are unusual and cannot lose their temper when pushed. They do lose their temper but manage to control themselves. This self-control is helped amongst others by the choice of language used to express one’s feelings. Fry (2004: 195) here cites the Rotuma Islanders of Fiji - under– where there is a great emphasis on self-control and “people say they are sad or disappointed, not angry because anger implies being out of control, hence prone to violence”.

5.2.4 Involvement of third parties in conflict situations

In traditional societies there are nearly always third parties who are ready to serve as ‘friendly’ peacemakers, mediators, arbitrators or adjudicators. Generally the task of the peacekeepers is to cool off tempers; mediators help disputants to find mutually agreeable solutions to their problems; arbitrators and adjudicators determine what conditions are required for settlement in conflict cases (Fry 2004: 195). In making decisions, the arbitrators and adjudicators rely on pressure of public opinion and voluntary compliance on the part of disputants to come to terms with one another.

5.2.5 Search for consensus

The aim of conflict resolution is to bring the parties in conflict to a point of consensus and minimizing hard feelings between them. Reaching consensus is no easy task, but does not deter these societies trying to achieve it. In this manner the conflict resolution process avoids the ‘winner / loser’ situation by aiming to restore normal relationships and close the rifts that might have been opened during a dispute.

5.2.6 Discouragement of alcohol

Shunning or discouraging the use of alcohol is an important way of countering violent tendencies. As will be seen in Sub-section 5.2.8 below alcohol is paradoxically used in these very societies to celebrate the achievement of peace. Societies that discourage the consumption of alcohol include the Hopi of northern Arizona, Paliyan of southern India, Nubians living along the river Nile in northern Sudan and southern Egypt, and the Mardu of the Australian desert (Fry 2004: 197). The main reason for this is that alcohol makes self-restraint more difficult and tends to ‘beget violence’ instead.
5.2.7 Socialisation

Human behaviour is shaped by the environment within which one grows up. In peaceful societies children internalise the core values and beliefs held in these societies which helps them to conform to accepted standards of behaviour. These values are thus passed from one generation to another through the process of socialisation.

5.2.8 Lessons from peaceful societies

It is not difficult to realise that most conflict resolution mechanisms that operate in small traditional communities are not likely to work in modern states. This is because of the complex nature of the modern state that is made up of a large geographical area, and a huge population that has been influenced greatly by Western values. There are, however, lessons that modern societies can learn from traditional communities. Not that they offer a panacea for conflict transformation at all times, places, and in all situations. They can only be applied to specific conditions.

The most important lesson from peaceful societies is that there are alternatives to violence for keeping order in societies. As Fry (2004: 198) points out, “punishments and armed conflicts are not essential for keeping peace. People have to build into their society world views of peacefulness that are as strong as those of peaceful societies”. The second lesson is that interdependence can greatly reduce the chance of violent conflict erupting. This implies that both internally and internationally, states have to promote interdependence within their communities and among themselves. Internally, societies need to be ‘reframed’ and points of common interest be utilised to create a sense of belonging and community among the members. Creation of community projects in which everyone has a role may be one example of promoting interdependence. Various international, continental, regional organisations and trading blocs provide adequate foundations for the formation of ‘communities’ at international level. Multi-national companies that have subsidiaries in different countries provide an evidence of this.

Thirdly, it is important for the states to understand the key role that restorative justice plays in the process of peacebuilding. Unlike the kinds of retributive justice applied in modern states, restorative justice is future-oriented and aims to restore good relations between the conflicting parties for the benefit of the entire community. Fourthly, modern states can learn from peaceful
societies that in order to entrench a culture of peace, achievements of peace need to be celebrated. How this is done is captured by Boege when he writes:

When solutions have been achieved, they are sealed in highly ritual forms. Ceremonies are of great symbolic and practical importance. They are a means of conflict transformation in their own right. The whole community participates in them. They are loaded with spiritual meaning. Wealth exchange, prayers and sacrificing to god/the gods/the spirits of the ancestors are part of those ceremonies as well as customary rituals such as breaking spears and arrows, drinking and eating together, singing and dancing together or consuming certain drugs (Boege 2006: 9).

Consumption of drugs as stated in the above quotation should not be taken in a negative sense to refer to the modern drugs that pose a threat to human lives. Drugs in the context of peaceful societies imply consumables such as traditional beverages that are mostly healthy and are consumed responsibly. The celebration of peace achievement is in direct contrast to modern societies that celebrate and glorify war. In modern states streets, monuments, and other infrastructure of importance are most frequently named after heroes of war. Similarly, military parades are a common feature at events of national significance in modern states. This sends the wrong message that violence should be celebrated. It is therefore, important for modern states to substitute military parades with symbols of peace during national events.

5.3. An overview of demilitarised countries

Demilitarisation is a process that can result in the reduction of the size of the military, or where complete lead to complete non-militarisation (Barbey 2013: 158). Examples of countries that have undergone demilitarisation, full or partial, are discussed here. There are 26 countries worldwide that do not have an army. Of these, seven initially had armies but decided to disband them. The rest never had an army or did not create one when they attained independence (ibid). Most of these countries are small both in terms of geographical size and population, but some are also larger than many states that currently maintain armies. It is important to note that although they are without armies, these countries have managed to maintain their sovereignty. All but three of these countries are full members of the United Nations. The list of non-militarised states by region, is given by Barbey (2013: 160) ¹.

- Africa (Indian Ocean): Mauritius

¹ * implies countries which have defence or military agreements with another country.
^ implies countries that are not members of the United Nations
- Central America and the Caribbean Sea: Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines.
- Europe: Andorra*, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco*, San Marino, Vatican^ (Holy See)

While each of the 26 non-militarised states has its own unique features, a comparison shows up certain similarities, but also differences.

- Seven were demilitarized: five for serious problems due to the army, one for economic reasons, and one for ballistic reasons. The rest all came into being without an army.
- Only seven of them have, to varying degrees, ‘protectors’. The others manage their security and international relations by themselves.
- Except three of them, namely Niue, Cook Islands and the Holy See (Vatican), they are all members of the UN.
- Except for the Vatican, they are all democratic.

According to the Human Development Index of the United Nations, the situation of women in these countries seems to be better than in countries with armies. Budgets for education and literacy rates are also comparatively better. Their history has many lessons regarding conflict resolution (APRED: 2015). They can be put in several groups. The first includes the countries in which the demilitarisation process was complete and who have therefore reached the stage of non-militarisation. The second set consists of countries that demilitarised without completely disbanding their armies. In the first group the focus will be on Costa Rica and Panama. In the second group the focus will be on the South American countries El Salvador and Guatemala. I have also done a brief overview of Mauritius and Haiti. Haiti provides an example of the challenges demilitarisation pose.

5.3.1 Costa Rica

Costa Rica is a striking example of demilitarisation and it is difficult to find a discussion of the process without mention of the country. Situated in Central America, Costa Rica is 51 100 square kilometres and has a population of around 4.25 million (One World Nations Online, 2015). Costa Rica disbanded its army in 1948 as a way of searching for lasting peace following a civil war that left around 2000 people dead (Barbey 2013: 162). In the absence of military security Costa Rica
maintains a number of other forces, including a public force, judicial investigative police, transit transport police, municipal police, DIS intelligence, and a coast guard.

Demilitarisation in Costa Rica went smoothly because of its cohesive culture. At independence it was a relatively egalitarian society mostly of coffee planters, with no economic elite needing a strong army (ibid). The cohesion of the society ensured a social democratic culture which is essential for the building of peace. In order to close the void left by the abolition of the army, Costa Rica opted for collective security under the Organisation of the American States (OAS) and became a signatory to the Inter-American Reciprocal Defence Treaty (TIAR) by which member states are provided with a collective system of military security. Costa Rica called upon TIAR when threatened by Nicaraguan-based forces in 1948, 1955 and 1978 (Harris 2004: 193).

The disbanding of the army in Costa Rica was highly successful and the country provides a model of what successful demilitarisation can lead to. The country is now known for peace, democracy and prosperity. From time to time Costa Rica mediates in conflicts of its neighbours, helps in the restoration of democracy in the region, and is involved in various global peace initiatives. Furthermore, the country hosts the inter-American court of human rights and the United Nations University for Peace. Since the disbanding of its army, Costa Rica has diverted military expenditure to education and health and the country is “now stable, prosperous and three to five times wealthier than its neighbours” (EL-Tom 2012: 98). Praising the bold move taken by his country in abolishing its army, former president Oscar Andrias Sanchez once boasted,

> International development agencies recognize that Costa Rica today has a standard of living comparable to that of industrialised countries. It is universally accepted that the extraordinary advances of my country in the fields of education, health, housing and social welfare are basically due to the fact that we do not dedicate our resources to the purchase of arms. The absence of the army has strengthened the Costa Rica democracy system, making it one of the most consolidated democracies of Latin America.

> To us, these are the dividends that would be within the grasp of all third world (sic) countries if they did not dedicate a very important part of their resources to the purchasing of arms” (Qouted by Harris 2008: 82-83).

Table 5 taken from the Human Development Index 2014 in section 5.3.4 supports Sanchez’s statement and indicates that almost a quarter of a century after his statement, human development remains more advanced in the fully demilitarised Costa Rica and Panama than in their militarised neighbours. The composition of the population in the pre-demilitarisation Costa Rica was similar
to that of many states in modern day sub-Saharan Africa, Lesotho included. Populations in these countries are almost egalitarian and there is no significant economic elite that needs an army to protect them. The army mostly protects the interests of the governing elite. Most of these countries are still characterised by social democratic cultures, particularly in the peri-urban and rural areas. It is on the basis of this that I infer that if it were to be undertaken, demilitarisation would not meet much resistance in most of Sub-Saharan Africa.

5.3.2 Panama

Also situated in Central America, Panama has a geographical size of 75 500 square kilometres and in 2010 had a population of 3.4 million (One World Nations Online, 2015). Panama began its demilitarisation process in 1989 when the United States’ forces invaded the country and defeated the local army in order to capture General Noriega, then chief of the army and president of the country (Barbey 2013: 163). The dissolution of the battered army was formalised as a result of the in-coming president’s realisation that he could not bank on the remnants of the defeated army due to its unpopularity (Harris et al 2012: 10). The demilitarisation process evolved over five years and was concluded in 1994 when demilitarisation was formally inscribed in the country’s constitution to eliminate any future possibility of an army being established.

Most of the army’s weapons had been destroyed during the war and those that remained were distributed to the police force. In the process of demilitarisation, some soldiers were decommissioned and the rest, following due security checks, were integrated into the newly-formed Panamanian Public Forces [PPF] (ibid). The establishment of the PPF and the integration of the non-decommissioned soldiers into it was a strategy of avoiding a security threat that could be posed by dissolving the army without providing employment for the former soldiers (Harris et al 2012: 10). Security in Panama is now the responsibility of the civilian police (PPF). Despite few remnants such as a military mindset and ideology sometimes visible within the civilian police, the transition has been largely successful. Since it demilitarised, Panama has gained recognition alongside the likes of Costa Rica as role models for demilitarisation. It is considered one of the most secure countries in Latin America. Since the disbanding of its army, Panama has enjoyed peace; never had any direct military intervention in politics; held four peaceful elections; and the majority of its people believe the military is not necessary (ibid).

What happened in Panama shows how more powerful countries can end authoritarian rule in their smaller counterparts. This is necessary in cases where the military benefit from the status
quo and are likely to resist any efforts geared towards peaceful demilitarisation. This should, however, not always be the route to follow. As Harris (2004: 193) warns, it is the political will and popular sentiment which are the essential factors behind sustained demilitarisation.

- Partly demilitarised countries

While there is no doubt about its possibility, a sudden and whole-scale demilitarisation might look like an insurmountable task for many countries who might then adopt a gradual form of demilitarisation. It is for this reason we look briefly at two countries that have only reduced rather than abolish their army.

5.3.3 El Salvador

A home to 6.34 million people in 2013, El Salvador is situated in Central America and has a geographical area of 21 000 square kilometres (One World Nations Online, 2015). El Salvador undertook the demilitarisation process in 1992 following a 10-year civil war. A summary of the process is given by Kincaid (2001) as follows. The demilitarisation process followed the signing of a cease-fire agreement between the government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) leading to the dissolution of the latter. The demilitarisation process included the dissolution of various components of the armed forces and a general reduction in its size, replacing it with a National Civilian Police (PNC) which was placed under the Ministry of Interior.

A calendar was established for the implementation process with most of it to be carried out within a two-year period. Following this the size of the army was reduced from 40 000 in 1992 to 28 000 in 1994. In order to restrict the role of the remaining military units, the mission of the military was redefined. While its principal role remained national defence, it could only be involved in public security during national emergencies and with authorization of the president and approval of the legislature. Within two years peace was restored and there was a marked improvement in communication between military officials and civilian leaders.

The armed forces were involved in health, education, and infrastructural repair programmes in the rural areas and this helped them to win the confidence of the communities. The process was however, not without its challenges. There were noticeable delays in the dissolution of the armed forces and their redeployment to the new police force. These delays were mainly due to financial problems. The dissolution of the army had at the beginning been delayed by their resistance to
the loss of control over some institutions. Generally, despite these challenges, the El Salvador
demilitarisation was regarded by the UN and other international actors as a major success story.

Peace in El Salvador has since been affected by an increase in criminal activity, but here is no
evidence to suggest that there is a direct link between the increase in crime and the reduction in
the size of the army. This, I argue, should not be used by sceptics as an excuse to hold back on
demilitarisation. Criminal activity may be higher in countries with large armies. According to
Kincaid (2001), the increase in crime in El Salvador could be attributed to increased
unemployment, commercial circulation of arms, the increase in gangster groups following the
return, voluntary and through deportations, – of youths from the US, and drug trafficking. This
increase in criminal activity has led to much disillusionment among citizens.

Kincaid does not indicate where the savings accumulated as a result of the reduction in size of the
army were channelled to. This may be explained by the failure to follow the example of Costa
Rica however by investing such resources in development-oriented projects such as education and
health that might have contributed to the rise in criminal activity. Demilitarisation however, in
both El Salvador and Costa Rica followed armed civilian conflicts. I believe these success stories
can serve as an inspiration for sub-Saharan countries that have undergone civil wars, and can also
be followed by the countries that have never suffered any armed conflict, as armies are a liability
in all countries irrespective of their histories.

Despite partial demilitarisation, the army continues to absorb a substantial percentage of El
Salvador’s resources, and indicators show that its socio-economic performance lags far behind
that of Costa Rica, as is evident in Table 5 below. El Salvador’s experience can be used as guide
of what needs to be avoided by states that want to demilitarise.

5.3.4 Guatemala

Guatemala reduced the size and capabilities of its army in 1991, reducing the size of its military
personnel by 33% within a year and by cutting its military budget by 33% in three years (Kincaid
2001: 43 -47). The country effected some constitutional amendments to pave way for the
demilitarisation process. The roles of the military were redefined with the military being allowed
to intervene in issues of public security only the approval of the country’s president. The relative
success of demilitarisation witnessed in Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador was, however, not
experienced in Guatemala where there was too much resistance from the army (ibid).
challenge was also brought by a lack of the financial resources that are required for effective demilitarisation. Failure to adequately prepare the police for their increased responsibilities also created public security problems, increase in violence and spreading of firearms in the countryside (Kincaid 2001: 49).

Table 5: Human Development Index for six Central American countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank (world)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI Value 2013</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth 2013</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling 2012</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling 2012</th>
<th>GNI per Capita (2011 ppp$) 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>16,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>7,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>6,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>4,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4,266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the purposes of Tables 5 (above) and 6 (below), the Human Development Index (HDI) indices are defined as follows:

Human Development Index (HDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.

Life expectancy at birth: Number of years a newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth stay the same throughout the infant’s life.

Mean years of schooling: Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using official durations of each level.

Expected years of schooling: The number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persists throughout the child’s life.

Gross national income (GNI) per capita: Aggregate income of an economy generated by its production and its ownership of factors of production, less the incomes paid for the use of factors
of production owned by the rest of the world, converted to international dollars using PPP rates, divided by midyear population.

In order to provide a link between non-militarisation and the HDI I have assumed the existence of a causal relationship between military expenditure and socio-economic performance. My assumption is that low military expenditure leads to higher socio-economic performance as it allows relatively high public expenditure allocations to education, health and other social services. This assumption is supported by former President of Costa Rica Oscar Arias Sanchez who stated that “...It is universally accepted that the extraordinary advances of my country in the fields of education, health, housing and social welfare are basically due to the fact that we do not dedicate our resources to the purchase of arms. ...” (cited in Harris 2008: 82-83).

The 2014 Human Development Report classifies countries as follows. 1 – 49: very high human development; 50 – 102: high human development; 103 – 144: medium human development; 145 upwards: low human development. Both demilitarised Panama (65) and Costa Rica (68) therefore fall within the high human development category, while their militarised counterparts stand at medium human development. Table 6 similarly shows that non-militarised Mauritius enjoys higher human development than other militarised countries in the region.

5.3.5 Mauritius: An African example of non-militarisation

Most Sub-Saharan countries adopted the structures, including the military, of their former colonial masters at independence. However, Mauritius is one of the few exceptions that deviated from this norm. On attaining independence from Britain in 1968 Mauritius opted for what some would take to be an odd choice, to go without an army. A home to around 1.3 million people now, Mauritius decided to retain the whole security system, including special forces, within the police force (Barbey 2013: 166). This despite its special security needs due to geographic location as an island and its booming tourism industry.

The absence of an army in Mauritius has not in any way rendered the country more vulnerable to security threats. The 1000-member Special Mobile Force and the 500-member Coast Guard adequately cover for the military (Harris 2004: 193), so that Mauritius remains a peaceful country which is known worldwide as a shining example of democracy. According to the Global Peace Index Report (2015), Mauritius is the most peaceful country in Africa and ranks 25th worldwide.
If Mauritius can survive and maintain peace without an army in an unstable region, then there is no reason why other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot achieve peace by demilitarising.

Often accolades directed at Mauritius focus on its democratic culture and socioeconomic performance without appreciating the country’s unique status of non-militarism. Like its demilitarised Central American counterparts, Mauritius enjoys a far better life than the other islands around it. Table 6 below shows human development indices for Mauritius and two other Indian Ocean islands that are members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) namely Seychelles and Madagascar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank (world)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI Value 2013</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years) 2013</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling (years) 2012</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling (years) 2012</th>
<th>GNI per Capita (2011 ppp$) 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>24,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1,333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.3.6 Haiti: a demilitarisation process gone wrong.

Despite good intentions, the process of demilitarisation can be disastrous and lead to chaos if enough caution is not exercised during its implementation. Haiti provides a very good example of what demilitarisation should not be. Barbey (2013: 165-166) relates that the army in Haiti was abolished in 1995 following the reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power by the US-UN force in 1994 after Aristide had been overthrown by the army in 1991. In preparation for the abolition of the army, a public opinion poll was carried out and its results showed that 62 per cent favoured the move compared to 12 per cent that voted for the retention of the army (Harris 2004: 196).

The demilitarisation in Haiti proved to be flawed and the country paid dearly when the same demobilised soldiers regrouped and came back in 2004 to overthrow Aristide’s regime. Aristide’s government was replaced by an interim government led by Prime Minister Gerard Latortue with United Nations (UN) troops dispatched again to keep peace in the country. Following his victory in the 2011 general elections, President Michel Joseph Martelly is currently pushing for the restoration of Haitian armed forces possibly to use them to cement his own position as has been
the norm by incumbent presidents prior to the disbanding of the army. Martelly’s plans have, however, been met with opposition from both within and outside the country.

When Martelly first came to office pledging to restore the Haitian military, the plan was met with fierce resistance, both within and outside of Haiti, with key donor governments including the U.S. opposed to the idea. Reed Brody of Human Rights Watch told the Associated Press in 2011: “The Haitian army has basically been an army that’s been used against the Haitian people. … It was there as an instrument of repression, so it’s hard to see what Haiti gains by bringing back the army.” (CEPR, 2015).

The Haitian experience points to at least two important conditions that the country ignored and which proved to be detrimental to its future. Firstly, it is not clear if the demobilised soldiers were totally disarmed. Demilitarisation requires that the country gains full control over weapons and ensures proper integration of the demobilised soldiers into civilian life. Secondly, there were no constitutional amendments to underwrite the abolition of the army and to forbid its re-establishment in future. This was despite the fact that the constitution had a large section on the army. Due to this omission, it became easy for the soldiers to regroup since they were not violating any constitutional arrangement. The latest developments of restoring the Haitian armed forces, without sufficient justification and amid warnings of the dire consequences the move will have, show how far politicians will go to entrench their rule against the interests of their people.

5.3.7 Lessons from the demilitarisation experiences

There is much that militarised states, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, can learn from their non-militarised counterparts. While one might think of countries without armies as being vulnerable, “a closer study of their history tends to show that is rarely the case and that, more often than not, they have known how to make the most of their situation. Peace may seem fragile but in the end, somehow and so far, it has always prevailed” (Barbey 2014: 1).

The lessons that can be learned from the countries without armies are summarised by Barbey (2013: 172). The first and the most obvious is the risk of getting caught up in a war or military coup. The history of post-independence sub-Saharan Africa shows a trajectory characterised by military coups. It is not much of a surprise, therefore, to learn that in as late as 2015 the army in Burkina Faso saw it fit to dislodge a civilian government. As indicated earlier, with the exception of the Vatican, all the demilitarised countries are democracies.
Furthermore, statistics show that women are relatively better off in countries without armies, suggesting that armies have a negative influence on men and the general treatment of women. Most importantly evidence shows that the human development indices are better in countries without armies. In summary, it would be wise for sub-Saharan countries to start the process of demilitarisation, as evidence is there for all to see that it is better to live in a country which does not have an army.

5.4 Summary and conclusions

The existence of non-militarised societies, whether small ‘peaceful societies’ or large states, provides hope for a non-militarised world. It shows there is indeed a better life without the military and dispels the myth that the army as an essential ‘guardian’ of a peaceful human existence. While the nonviolent conflict resolution mechanisms used in peaceful societies do not always fit ‘hand in glove’ for large contemporary states., peace can be achieved if societies internalise its values, and states work toward creating the political will to undertake processes supporting the emergence of peace of which the most important is demilitarisation.

A closer look at the countries that have undergone demilitarisation shows that it resulted from periods of conflict, either civil wars, military coups, or confrontations with foreign forces. This should serve as an inspiration to the sub-Saharan countries, the majority of which have experienced violent conflict of one kind or another since they gained independence. But it should also serve as an encouragement to the few that have not experienced violent conflict, or have overcome them and are now relatively stable. This chapter has shown that civil police units can adequately maintain law and order without the help of the military. Finally, we have seen that regional collaboration can provide a more conducive and sustainable form of security for demilitarised countries.

We can conclude that demilitarisation is to be recommended since it is much easier to advance human development in a non-militarised state that allows the channelling of military expenditure to projects to fields such as education and health. Furthermore, evidence shows a link between demilitarisation and democracy as well as with an improved status for women. It is important, however, to bear in mind that the demilitarisation process is complex and needs to be treated with caution. Apart from thorough and clear preparation, the process needs the political commitment of all stakeholders. The next chapter provides an overview of the peace and security situation in Lesotho within the framework of this study.
CHAPTER 6

PEACE AND THE MILITARY IN LESOTHO

6.1. Introduction

Lesotho has appeared as a conflict agenda item at many a SADC summit due to the unending conflict that does not only involve the country’s politicians but the army as well. Such involvement of the army is of concern since the army has an obligation to uphold the country’s Constitution. Considering its geographical location and small economy the need for maintaining an armed force is questionable. This chapter assesses the peace and security situation in Lesotho after a brief historical review of peace initiatives that have been launched in the past and symbols of peace that can be found today in Lesotho.
Here a review of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) is offered in an attempt to understand how and why the army has been involved in peace-threatening conflicts since its establishment in 1979, as well as of the efforts made to keep the army operating within its constitutional boundaries. It is followed by an assessment of the functions of the LDF with emphasis on its primary and secondary roles. Lastly we provide a brief review of the annual budget for defence when compared to education and health.

6.2. The nation-state founded on Peace

The emergence of the modern day Lesotho nation-state is traceable to Chief Moshoeshoe 1 who founded the Basotho nation by bringing together a number of chiefdoms in the 1820s. Moshoeshoe remains one of the most renowned African statesmen of his time and is mostly remembered for his passion for peace. He referred to himself as ‘khaitsei ea khotso’ (brother to peace). Among his numerous acts in search for peace, Moshoeshoe sent 200 head of cattle to the missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) to lure them to come and work among his people in 1832 (Gill 1993: 78). This was after he was told by a Grigua hunter Adam Krotz that the constant wars and disturbances which Moshoeshoe faced would disappear once the missionaries began their work among his people (ibid). The legacy of Moshoeshoe’s was passed on to modern day Lesotho which despite its present history of conflict continues to regard itself as a home of peace which is evident in a number of symbols including the Constitution, flag, national anthem, and welcome messages at the border posts.

Chapter 2 of the Lesotho Constitution states that “every person in Lesotho is entitled, whatever his race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status to fundamental human rights and freedoms” (Constitution of Lesotho, Chapter 2 Section 4). These are all the hallmarks of a peaceful society and when they are observed, peace prevails. Lesotho’s flag consists of three main colours namely white, blue, and green. These colours symbolise peace, rain, and prosperity respectively. Every official statement or public address made in the country ends with the national slogan “Khotso, Pula, Nala” which translates “peace, rain and prosperity”.

The national anthem similarly is a plea for peace. This is particularly evident in the last verse whose lyrics are:

(Molimo a ku boleke Lesotho)
\textit{u felise lintoa le mat’soenyeho}
\textit{o ho faat’se lena la bo-ntata rona}
\textit{le be le khotso).}

Literally translated, these lyrics mean:

(God, please save Lesotho
stop the wars and sufferings
let this land of our fathers
have peace).

The Basotho’s passion for peace is also evident at the countries’ ports of entry where the welcome message reads ‘\textit{Kena ka khotso Lesotho}’ (Come into Lesotho peacefully). More than anything else, the desire for peace can be observed among the Basotho themselves when they greet each other with messages of peace such as ‘\textit{khotso e be le uena}’ (peace be with you) and ‘\textit{lumelang}’ (admit – that peace prevails).

Lesotho has various institutions responsible for ensuring that peace prevails. The country’s judicial system follows the Roman-Dutch law inherited from South Africa. It however, maintains a dual legal system as it also uses the traditional system based largely on \textit{Melao ea Lerotlhi} (Lerotlhi’s laws). Lerotlhi was Moshooeshoe’s grandson and reigned in colonial Lesotho (then known as Basutoland) between 1891 and 1905 (Gill 1993: 143). This traditional legal system mostly emphasises restorative justice and is more concerned with coming up with decisions that compensate the victims of crime, while at the same time building a platform for future peaceful co-existence between the victim and the offender.

This traditional restorative justice is in direct contrast with the retributive justice applied by the higher level courts in the country. Within the latter system, the state punishes the offender on behalf of the victim without any form of compensation for losses suffered by the victim. Should the victim wish to be compensated, he/she has to file a civil case as a follow-up to the original criminal case. The traditional system is however, practiced at the lower level of Basotho society in rural villages that are administered by chiefs at their traditional courts. The decisions reached at by these traditional courts can nonetheless be taken to the higher courts on appeal. It is to be noted however, that the traditional legal system is gradually losing its hold as the rural areas are increasingly influenced by urban ways of life.
In spite of all the symbols showing how highly peace is valued in the country, the situation on the ground show few signs of real peace. Instead, violence of many kinds is common. The use of direct violence as a conflict resolution mechanism remains rife at all levels of society, as can be seen from the violent political conflicts that constantly plague the country. It is no different at the individual level as according to the Global Peace Index (GPI), Lesotho is one of the countries with the highest homicide rate where 38 out of every 100,000 persons were victims of homicide in 2010 (World Data Atlas 2015).

The Global Peace Index ranks countries using qualitative and quantitative indicators which gauge three broad themes: the level of safety and security in society; the extent of domestic or international conflict; and the degree of militarization (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: 2014). In 2013 Lesotho was ranked 49 out of 162 countries (ibid). Peace is constantly threatened as endemic poverty and widespread unemployment continue to contribute to an increase in criminal activity in Lesotho (Lesotho 2014 crime and safety report).

A look at Lesotho’s human development indices shows high levels of structural violence. For instance, according to the Lesotho Bureau of Statics (2017), the country has an unemployment rate of 32.8%; low life expectancy at birth of 39.4 and 45.3 years for males and females respectively; and high inflation rate of 5%.

Lesotho continues to make efforts to address the cultural violence that results from attitudes that stereotypes vulnerable groups such as women and youths by enacting anti-discriminatory legislation. However, some Basotho are still finding it hard to shed such discriminatory norms and beliefs. We will now turn our attention to how the process of demilitarisation can contribute to efforts to bring peace to the country.

6.3. Security in Lesotho

Lesotho maintains security through a number of agencies that include the Lesotho Mounted Police Services (LMPS), together with various units alongside the regular police; Criminal Investigation Division (CID); Special Operations Unit (SOU); the National Security Services (NSS); and the military, being the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). The police are concerned with public security and as such tasked with the daily maintenance of law and order. The NSS is an intelligence agency which gathers information concerning national security and shares it with the relevant authorities
for appropriate action. The army on the other hand is mainly tasked with the protection of the country from external aggression. It is the main focus of our study.

6.3.1. The military in Lesotho: an historical overview

Lesotho attained independence from Britain in October 1966. At independence, Lesotho did not have an army as a result security was the responsibility of the colonial police, the Basutoland Mounted Police (BMP). The police were renamed the Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) when the country became independent. The army was, however, only established 13 years after independence. Providing a brief background of the army, Makoa (1998: 17) outlines how it happened.

The Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) performed a dual role, acting as a law enforcement organ and a military unit until 1979 when the Prime Minister at the time, Leabua Jonathan, forged the Lesotho Para-Military Force (LPF) out of what was the LMP’s riot squad, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), in response to attacks by the South African-backed Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) formed by the exiles of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP).

The LPF became the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) after the overthrow of Jonathan in January 1986. The inclusion of ‘Royal’ in the name of the army symbolised the collaboration of the army and the monarchy in the years of the military junta. The army was then renamed the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) after the return to democratic rule following the 1993 elections.

According to the Ministry of Defence and National Security website the primary role of the Lesotho Defence Force is to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lesotho and uphold the Constitution of Lesotho. Secondary functions include the following:

- Assistance in the preservation of life, health and property
- Provision and maintenance of essential services
- Upholding law and order in support of the police as directed by Government
- Support to State Departments as directed by Government
- Compliance with international obligations like peacekeeping support operations and regional military cooperation (Ministry of Defence and National Security, 2015; see also the LDF Act 1996).
As an institution of state, the Lesotho military has always been mired in controversy and steeped in intrigue, with charges including politicisation and support of incumbent leaders not so much as protection from any external threat, as to quash any internal opposition (Matlosa and Pule 2001: 65). The politicisation of the LDF remains a feature of the present administration. The Lesotho military has also seen a number of revolts by junior officers that not only changed the leadership of the army, but also resulted in a succession of military administration. These mutinies took place in 1991, 1993, and 1998 (ibid). The army’s intervention in civilian politics is discussed below.

6.3.2 Military rule (1986 – 1993)

In 1986 the military seized power from the Basotho National Party (BNP) and established a military regime. Commentators offer a number of possible reasons for the coup. Others take it to have resulted from power struggles within the then-ruling BNP that unsettled not only some party factions but also the army. The BNP Youth League had begun to take over some of the army’s roles which the army saw as a threat to its position.

Others think the coup was engineered by South Africa to punish the BNP government for its sympathy towards the liberation struggle in South Africa, noting that the army felt exposed to South Africa’s attack because of Chief Jonathan’s foreign policy. This included the proxy attacks by the South African-backed Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) and direct ones by the South African Defence Force (SADF) as part of South Africa’s ‘total onslaught’ policy. The LDF had been humiliated as it could not respond, most probably for fear of more severe consequences from the stronger attacker during the two raids in Maseru by the SADF in 1982 and 1985 (See Pule, 2002; Machobane, 2001; Southall, 1995; Gill, 1993). Irrespective of these explanations, it is clear that the army took advantage of the government’s predicament to justify its irregular intervention in politics.

As could be expected from any army-orchestrated coup, citizens’ rights were violated from the very first day of army rule. According to Ajulu (1995: 15) the seven-year military rule was more repressive than the sixteen-year authoritarian rule of the BNP. The most evident of these violations was the suspension of all political activities in the country through the infamous Suspension of Political Activities Order (No 4) of 1986. Among various human rights abuses committed by the military were the assassination of those perceived to be the opponents of the regime. Soon after assuming power, the military faced discontent as a result of the heavy-handed way in which it responded to civil unrest and protests. The regime came under pressure from various civilian
groups such as university students and some trade unions to return the country to civilian rule. The pressure persisted until the military relinquished power in 1993.

6.3.3 The military and post-1993 rule

Despite the Lesotho Defence Force relinquishing power to the civilian rulers in 1993, the army’s interference in politics was not dead and buried yet. However, blaming only the army would ignore the fact that leaders of the major political parties were themselves using patronage to secure the support of the army. After the country’s return to civilian rule the army engaged in various acts that undermined the democratically elected government of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP).

In April 1994 a group of soldiers took four government ministers hostage and in one of the skirmishes the deputy prime minister, Selometsi Baholo was killed. In August 1994, the army appeared clearly supportive of King Letsie III’s partial suspension of the country’s Constitution and disbanding of the BCP government. The soldiers guarding the Royal Palace reacted heavily handedly to a demonstration of BCP sympathisers who had marched to the palace to air their disapproval of King Letsie III’s dissolution of the BCP government. They opened fire and killed three of the demonstrators in the process (Sejanamane 1996: 66).

Two possible explanations for the lack of support from the BCP government for the army are that when it came to power following its landslide victory in the 1993 elections, the BCP viewed the army as an instrument of its rival and predecessor in government, despite the fact that the same army had earlier overthrown the BNP, and later orchestrated the efforts of bringing the BCP exiles home prior to the 1993 elections. Senior BCP figures including Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle continued attacking the army, with Mokhehle actually saying that the army was one of the five enemies of democracy in Lesotho (Mothibe 1999: 48). The attitude of the BCP government towards the army created a toxic atmosphere of distrust since they suspected that the army was going at worst to be disbanded and replaced by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) or at best be neutralised (Mothibe, 1999: 49).

The second explanation, which is closely linked to the first, relates to the role played by the leadership of the opposition party BNP, in worsening the conflict between the army and the BCP government. Apart from criticising the BCP for failing to govern the country and appealing to King Letsie III to dissolve the BCP government and form a government of national unity, the leader of the BNP E. R. Sekhonyna publicly condemned the BCP government for bungling the
army’s demand for a 60 per cent pay increase (Pule 2002: 202). The BNP went as far as calling the army to revolt against the government (Sejanamane 1996: 66; Matlosa 1995: 122).

Though it never materialised, the thought of disbanding the army had always remained part of the agenda of the BCP government. Sejanamane (1996: 67) explains that:

The army was aware of the letters to then-South Africa’s President F. W. De Klerk and later another one to President Mugabe, requesting the dispatch of a force to disarm the Lesotho Defence Force. In a letter addressed to de Klerk, the Prime Minister assured the former that any “hostile reaction from the outside-world would be handled firmly by the government ...”.

Consequently the army as a corporate body felt threatened by the possibility of disbandment and would thus take a slightest opportunity to work with anyone willing to challenge the BCP government. The lack of support from the army for the government once again became evident during the political crisis that followed the highly disputed 1998 elections. As the opposition alliance challenged the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)’s electoral victory staged protests outside the Royal Palace urging King Letsie III to dissolve the LCD government, the army did very little to help the police bring the situation under control. This is noted by Mothibe (1999: 57) when he writes that “during the unfolding of this political saga, members of the military were visible in and around Maseru presumably with the purpose of keeping law and order. As things turned violent as a result of forced stay-aways and clashes between the protesters and supporters of the government, members of the military hardly ever intervened”. The army’s sympathy for the protestors was not only limited to non-intervention. In some instances, the army obstructed the efforts of the police to disperse what had now become illegal protests and gatherings.

In one of these incidents on 3rd September, when the police attempted to disperse the opposition members camped at the Palace gates, automatic gunfire was exchanged with members of the LDF on duty at the Palace (Mothibe 1999: 59). The protestors were finally dispersed when the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) entered Lesotho on the dawn of 22nd September to “prevent anarchy and restore order” (Vhumbunu 2015: 5). The very first casualties of the SANDF intervention were the 17 LDF members who were killed without any resistance at the army’s base next to the Katse Dam. The chaos and destruction that followed the military intervention is well documented elsewhere and falls outside the scope of this study.
6.3.4  The military and the first coalition government
The most recent example of the failure of government to control the armed forces was evident between 2012 and 2015 during the tenure of the country’s first coalition government. The coalition consisted of the All Basotho Convention (ABC), Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and Basotho National Party (BNP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Thomas Thabane, Deputy Prime Minister Mothejoa Metsing, and Minister of Sports and Recreation Thesele ‘Maseribane. When the crisis reached a climax in August 2014 there had been a long-standing animosity between Prime Minister Thabane and the commander of the LDF Lieutenant- General Tlali Kamoli. Thabane had always taken Kamoli to be sympathetic to the former Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili and blamed Kamoli for continuing to hound Thabane’s supporters after the 2007 elections.

Kamoli had been promoted by Mosisili to command the army a few weeks before the latter left office after losing the 2007 general elections. It therefore, did not come as a surprise when Thabane failed to establish a good relationship with the army under the leadership of Kamoli when he came to power in 2012. In one instance the commander of the LDF refused to hand over to police members of the army suspected of various criminal acts. These crimes ranged from the bombing of three families in Maseru in January 2014, to the killing of several people in the southern district of Mafeteng. The suspects were reportedly high ranking army officers who were members of the Special Forces Unit. The show-down between Prime Minister Thabane and Kamoli reached its climax when on 29th August 2014 Kamoli was fired by the King through the Legal Notice No 64, at the advice of the Prime Minister as the Constitution stipulates. In the same legal notice, Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and appointed as the new commander of the LDF. However, Kamoli rejected the dismissal and refused to give up his position.

On 30th August the army stormed Prime Minister Thabane’s official residence in what was all round referred to as an attempted coup. The soldiers, however, found that Thabane had been tipped off regarding their intentions and had already fled to South Africa. Thabane returned to Lesotho a few days later under guard of South African security personnel and remained so until he vacated office following the 2015 snap elections.

On the same night of the attacks on State House, the army launched a mid-night operation against the three main police stations in the capital Maseru. Both the army and the police were highly politicised and factions had emerged, with Thabane being backed by the police and his rival
Metsing having the support of the army (Vhumbunu 2015: 3). The attack on police stations resulted in a shootout that left one police officer dead and several other wounded. This was followed by a series of confrontations between the army and the police. The home of the newly-appointed commander Lieutenant-General Mahao was attacked and although he survived, considerable damage was done to his property by a ‘hail of army bullets’.

The army attacks were a decisive blow that brought down Thabane’s embattled coalition government. As in the past, this attracted the intervention of the Southern Africa’s Development Community (SADC) with an early election being called for February 2015. As part of the attempts to improve the security situation, the Maseru Security Accord (MSA) was signed to enable the renegade LDF commander - Kamoli the newly-appointed LDF commander – Mahao and Commissioner of Police – Khotatso T’sooana to take temporary leave absence in neighbouring countries. Several SADC countries sent a total of 475 police officers to ensure peace during elections (Mohloboli 2015: 4). This followed an agreement that members of the army would be confined to the barracks during the elections.

The three officers returned to Lesotho after the elections that saw Prime Minister Mosisili in power after his party joined forces with six smaller parties to form a new coalition government. Mosisili thereupon reversed the appointment of Mahao and re-appointed Kamoli as the commander of the LDF. Mahao challenged his demotion in the courts of law only to be assassinated before the case was heard. It transpired that he was killed by the members of the LDF who had gone to arrest him for an alleged mutiny he was said to have engineered. Then-Minister of Defence and National Security Tseliso Mokhosi made a public statement on the national radio and television stations to this effect. Mahao’s assassination came shortly after the three leaders of opposition parties had fled Lesotho citing intelligence warnings that the army was planning to kill them. They were joined in exile by several soldiers, journalists and lawyers who all claimed to be the targets of the Lesotho army.

SADC reacted to Mahao’s assassination by instituting a commission of inquiry which was tasked to probe the circumstances surrounding Mahao’s death. The Lesotho army, however, made life difficult for the commission because of their lack of co-operation. Apart from making submissions to prevent the commission from dealing with terms of reference on the alleged mutiny and pleading that all witnesses be heard in public (Ngatane 2015), which were all rejected by the commission, army members refused to provide vital information about Mahao’s assassination arguing they did not want to ‘implicate themselves or other army officials’. The conduct of the
members of the LDF before the SADC commission gave a true reflection of how cheaply military members value life. None of the officers seemed to be concerned that lives were lost during army operations. During the hearings one officer went so far to unapologetically brag, “we (soldiers) carry guns, and guns are meant to kill”.

6.3.5 Assessing the LDF: performance of the primary role

A proper assessment of the LDF as an institution would be easier if official reports and government documents were available, but this is not the case. The only LDF Annual Report available online is that for 1997/98. No literature was available from the LDF itself despite numerous visits I made to the army’s Public Relations Office. At first I got a good reception with the officers telling me the literature I needed was available, but could only be released by one Colonel Ntoi who was reportedly attending a course in the army barracks. I made numerous calls to the number given to me by his officers without any reply. On my next visit to Public Relations Office there was a different officer on duty, and realising that I was teaching at the National University of Lesotho, he became hostile, using highly provocative language and emphasising that he was not going to provide any help to somebody coming from the ‘rubbish university’.

I subsequently realised that his hostile response was due to two things, Firstly, the opinions expressed by some NUL professors in the local media regarding the army’s involvement in the country’s political instability, and the unsatisfactory conduct of the army officers who appeared before the recently held SADC Commission’s inquiry into the death of the former army commander Mahao. Secondly and more importantly, that he was not happy with the NUL Senate’s condemnation, issued on the private radio stations that day, of the brutal beating that the University’s students had received at the hands of some soldiers during a soccer match the previous weekend. These regrettable experiences have nonetheless not deterred me from continuing to pursue my research.

The mandate of the military in Lesotho is contained in article 147 of the 1993 Constitution and in the Defence Force Act of 1996 which outlines the functions of the military. While the main duty of the LDF is to protect the country from foreign aggression, evidence abounds that the army completely lacks the capacity to do so. Lesotho cannot in any way be compared with its nearest neighbour and possibly only ‘external threat’, if one thinks of the ease with which the SADF invaded the country in 1982 and ’85, in pursuit of South Africans exiles who were living in Lesotho. South African forces also easily overpowered the little resistance of the army barracks
in Maseru in 1998. In April 2009 the LDF was further embarrassed when alleged mercenaries entered its barracks and took the weapons that they used to attack the State House, allegedly in an attempt to assassinate the then Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili.

Lesotho has on several occasions sought the assistance of South Africa to provide military support to the LDF, such as when the South Africa-based Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) operatives hijacked a bus full of pilgrims during the Pope’s visit in 1988. This evidence of the incapability of the LDF to deal with external attacks gives credence to the long existing doubts about the relevance of the Lesotho army. The argument made at the beginning of the millennium still holds today:

Lesotho does not face any external or internal military threat. It does not intend to become an aggressor to any one of its neighbours. Besides, the post-Cold war world is generally undergoing disarmament and demilitarisation (sic). Furthermore, with the demise of apartheid in South Africa, which unleashed military and economic warfare against its neighbours, including Lesotho, in the 1970s and 1980s, Lesotho faces no immediate security threat (Matlosa and Pule 2001: 8).

A similar observation is made by the Military Balance, an international organisation concerned with military issues, which notes that “Lesotho’s small armed forces are charged with protecting territorial integrity and sovereignty, though South Africa in effect acts as a security guarantor (italics added). Most personnel are in infantry units, supported by light vehicles, and the country possesses a small number of tactical transport aircraft and utility helicopters” (2014: 443).

### 6.3.6 The LDF and its secondary roles

According to the Defence Force Act of 1996, the LDF has a range of secondary functions that have to do with assisting other government departments in times of need, as well as seeking the necessary international co-operation. Examples of its domestic functions include helping the police to maintain law and order whenever it is overwhelmed, and helping other agencies such as the Disaster Management Authority (DMA) to provide relief services during emergencies. There is little information other than occasional newspaper reports, about the extent to which the army has been involved in such tasks. One of the most memorable ones is of the army rescuing a herd boy whose hand was caught between rocks for days in the Qacha’s Neck district in 2014.

The army was also reported to have signed a memorandum of understanding with the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) to engage in an agricultural project to alleviate
poverty. While the rescue of the herd boy was a success story, the same cannot be said about the agricultural project. The land reportedly identified for the project in Masianokeng outside Maseru still remains uncultivated. There have been a number of emergency incidents in which one would have expected to see the army involved. An example of ineffectiveness was when a car was washed away by the Maoana-mafubelu river in the Leribe district in 2013. One person drowned in this incident where the car and its passengers were trapped for hours in the river before it was eventually washed away. The LDF only appeared on the scene hours after the villagers had tried in vain to rescue those who were trapped even though the place it happened was only about 100 km away from the capital Maseru. Lesotho has from time to time had to rely on the South African armed forces for help on rescue missions most of which involved people trapped by snow during the winter months.

Involvement in the maintenance of law and order is the most obvious secondary function of the army. Members of the LDF are from time to time seen in joint operations with their Lesotho Mounted Police Services (LMPS) counterparts such as the manning of roadblocks and searches for illegal firearms. Giving feedback on one such operation the then-commander of the LDF, Lt General Tlali Kamoli reported that “during the operation, which began on July 5 (2015), a total of 142 firearms and 874 livestock, comprising cattle, horses, sheep and goats, were recovered in Qacha’s Nek district” (Ntsukunyane 2015).

It must also be noted, however, that civilians are often exposed to severe brutality during army operations, particularly when searching for illegal guns at night. In one of them two people were reportedly killed. This is not surprising considering that the army is not trained for public safety but to deal with an ‘enemy’. This is also true in many other countries The “general view is that the military is a corrupting influence in terms of its emphasis on violence and force to deal with disputes; soldiers should be confined to their barracks and brought out only when national security is threatened” (Harris 2006: 242). However when the then LDF commander Kamoli addressed the public in 2015, he warned:

... that if we become aware that you are in possession of an illegal firearm and we ask you to surrender it and you don’t, it will not be nice when we come to you. We know how to make you disclose the whereabouts of the firearm and where you got it. We have been trained to do so. Go and ask those who tried to hide weapons and they will tell you what we did to them. They will tell you it was not nice. ... When the army intervenes to instil the rule of law, the other party will almost always be hurt and feel prejudiced. It happens even during big military operations or peacekeeping missions in other countries; we know other people are going to die (Ntsukunyane 2015).
There is in fact little distinction between the army and the police as far as the maintenance of law and order is concerned. The Constitution does not clearly specify the circumstances under which the army can assist the police, which has led to the army intruding into police ‘territory’, since it benefits from it, as do the politicians whom it supports. Prior to the February 2015 elections, Prime Minister Thabane had to rebuke the army after it had announced it intended to mount dusk to dawn roadblocks when normally such measures are only taken during a state of emergency.

The army’s motivation was no doubt to intimidate urban residents who were generally shown strong support for Thabane’s ABC party. Army roadblocks had in the past not been child’s play as ‘Operation pitika (roll)’ proved in 2007. People found on the road at night were ordered to roll several times on the ground. Failure to comply usually attracted a severe beating from the soldiers. Instead of ensuring their safety the public are more likely to suffer brutality at the hands of the army.

SADC also noted the ambiguities regarding the functions of the army vis-a-vis those of the police. Section 137 (r), Main Findings of the SADC Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Brigadier (sic) Maaparankoe Mahao reads “that the LDF Act Section 5 (b) (ii) and (c) mandate the LDF to issues of internal disorder and maintenance of law and order as well as prevention of crime, which are commonly known to be police duties (my emphasis)”.

The Commission goes further to provide its view on how this problem can be solved. One of its numerous recommendations shows that “the Commission has observed some of the political and security problems peculiar to the Kingdom of Lesotho emanate from the Constitution of the (sic) Lesotho. The deficiencies and overlaps in the constitution with regard to mandates of security institutions need to be looked into urgently with a comprehensive strategy to reform them” (Section 138 (c)).

The other secondary role of the LDF involves compliance with international obligations like peacekeeping support operations and regional military cooperation. There have been media reports of the members of the LDF participating in international, mostly SADC Brigade, military exercises. One of such joint training operations was the ‘AMANI Africa’ by SADC and AU countries which was supposed to be held in Lesotho in October 2014. This operation, however, was cancelled because of the political and security instability reigning in the country at the time.
Apart from these training operations, I am not aware of the Lesotho army sending its personnel to participate in actual international peacekeeping operations. This is despite the fact that most other countries in SADC have continued to commit their soldiers to such missions. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) for example keeps rotating its soldiers who are doing peacekeeping duties in the Democratic Republic of Congo under the United Nations Stabilisation Mission (MUNUSCO). In contrast to this the LDF has demonstrated its inability to perform its key tasks and has only proved to be a burden and liability to the people of Lesotho. Different stakeholders in security matters undoubtedly realise that there is a need to reform the LDF.

6.3.7 Recommendations and attempts of reforming the LDF

One of the earliest recommendations regarding the reforming of the LDF came from the SADC mediators in the 1994 disturbances, when Deputy Prime Minister Selometsi Baholo was assassinated by members of the LDF. After consulting with the various stakeholders, presidents Robert Mugabe and Ketumile Masire of Zimbabwe and Botswana compiled a damning report about the Lesotho army of which the principal recommendation was that “the army should be restructured, retrained and reduced in size. Several groups pointed out that a small landlocked country like Lesotho does not require a large standing army” (Mugabe and Masire 1994: 6).

Following this, the Lesotho government established a commission of inquiry in 1995 to come up with a detailed report pertaining to the political disturbances of 1993 and 1994. The commission was composed of local personnel and headed by Bishop Paul Khoarai of the Roman Catholic Church. Citing parts of the report, Thato Mohasoa, a former Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Defence and National Security reported that:

A commission of inquiry into the events of November 1993 and April 1994 recommended that
  - LDF be employed in civil works, and this role be emphasised more than the defence role
  - Recruit technical and professional personnel
  - Quality of military leadership be improved by retraining and creating separate training programme for officers different from that of other ranks (Mohasoa 2014).

Further attempts for reform were made by establishing the Ministry of Defence (later to be renamed Ministry of Defence and National Security) in 1994, and the enactment of the LDF Act.
in 1996. The Ministry of Defence “is the administrative headquarters of the LDF and responsible, and accountable, for all provisioning and finance matters. ... it supports the Government in its armed forces management role, acting as a two-way channel of communication and facilitating effective and appropriate political dialogue” (Molise – Ramakoae 2003: 171). The LDF Act aims to preserve maximum operational independence for the LDF, while ensuring democratic accountability and the need for ultimate political strategic control of the army.

All these efforts were largely in vain and “did not prevent the unsatisfactory behaviour by some members of the armed forces during the subsequent political crises of 1993/4 and 1998” (Ibid: 173). This ‘unsatisfactory’ behaviour of the army continues to persist in the modern times. Following the involvement of the army in the 1998 political unrest that necessitated SADC military intervention, Lesotho approached the government of India asking them to send a training team that would turn the LDF into a professional force. The Indian Army Training Team (IATT) has been stationed in Lesotho since June 2001. While the IATT team was continuing to train the LDF, an incident occurred that once again revealed the weaknesses of the Lesotho army.

On April 22, 2009 a group of 15 mercenaries from Lesotho, South Africa and Mozambique overpowered the soldiers on duty at the Makoanyane barracks and confiscated weapons before they stormed and opened fire at Prime Minister Mosisili official residence. Mosisili and his family survived unhurt as the attack was foiled by the guards at the State House. Four of the attackers were killed in a gunfight with soldiers while seven were arrested in South Africa and extradited to Lesotho. The Lesotho government established a commission of inquiry that was led by Justice Jan Steyn of South Africa to probe the attack. One of the main findings of the ‘Steyn Commission’ pointed out that the LDF was not adequately trained. Providing a partial summary of the Commission’s report, Southall (2011) writes that:

Although referring to the professionalism of the LDF, the report provided a damning analysis of how a small group of mercenaries had been able to penetrate the Makoanyane base, overpower members of the Special Forces without a shot being fired, make off with weapons from the armoury, commandeer vehicles taking Special Forces hostages with them, and then launch an attack on State House [which was foiled in a shoot out] (Southall 2011: 436).

On the basis of the inadequate training its members observed within the LDF, the Steyn Commission recommended more effective training for the Lesotho army. There are differing opinions about the level of success achieved by the IATT in attempting to professionalise the
LDF. Former Prime Minister Mosisili (under whose premiership the IATT was set up) believes the army has been converted into a proficient organisation. Addressing a press conference in Maseru in November 2015, Mosisili claimed, “when we approached the Indian government to request a training team, the army was highly unprofessional but with the assistance of the Indian training team we have achieved a very professional army. LDF is now very qualified” (Boloetse 2015).

Dr Hoolo ‘Nyane, a long time civil society leader and currently law lecturer at the National University of Lesotho (NUL) holds a different view from that of Mosisili. ‘Nyane argues that despite a decade of training, when a new coalition government came into office in 2012 it became apparent that the army was still greatly concerned about who was at the helm of government (Ibid), indicating that they were not ready to serve the government of the day irrespective of who its leader is. Mosisili’s praise of the army despite its poor record in the 2014 political unrest was to be expected considering his comeback to the premiership was a direct result of the very unrest. Mosisili “himself publicly ‘thanked’ the military for his re-assumption of power and the context in which this was said was widely criticised in some quarters” (Phoofolo 2015: 4).

As Mohasoa (2014) notes, the behaviour of the army in can largely be explained by penchant of the politicians to use the military for their own narrow political interests. The influence of the politicians in the army’s behaviour was also confirmed by a high ranking army officer I interviewed in Maseru in August 2013. He blamed the politicians for the behaviour of the military and argued that “to the country’s political leaders, the army is ‘professional’ only to the extent that it does not overthrow them, or it persecutes such politicians’ opponents”.

The commission of inquiry that was established following the assassination of Lt General Mahao in June 2015 was headed by Justice Mphaphi Phumaphi and commonly came to be known as the ‘Phumaphi commission’ in Lesotho. The commission concluded that some of the security challenges in Lesotho emanate from the overlap that exists with respect to the functions of the army and the police. The commission observed “that the LDF Act Section 5 (b) (ii) and (c) mandate the LDF to issues of internal disorder and maintenance of law and order as well as prevention of crime, which are commonly known to be police duties” (Phumaphi 2015: 56). It recommended that Lesotho institute all-encompassing reforms in search for lasting peace, including that the deficiencies and overlaps in the constitution with regard to mandates of security institutions be looked into urgently with a comprehensive strategy to reform them” (Ibid). It is now two years since the commission made this recommendation but these security reforms have
not been addressed yet. Instead the government has in 2016 established a new task unit consisting of members of the army and police which has already gained notoriety for arresting opposition activists without following normal arrest procedures, such as the production of identity cards to the suspects before arresting them. To the dismay of many people, known members of the army would sometimes be seen wearing police uniforms at roadblocks manned by this unit.

6.4 Placing the Lesotho army into the international context

Dandeker (2013: 38) notes that “the primary and traditional role of the military has been territorial defence against attack or deterring threats from the forces of other states, in addition to projecting power abroad in defence of territory and the state’s interests”. It is on this basis that the role of Lesotho’s army needs to be assessed. The country by virtue of being completely surrounded by South Africa, has the latter’s forces as its only potential external threat, which also happen to be among the most powerful militaries on the continent. With its small army Lesotho cannot possibly defend itself, or deter such a force. It must be obvious the Lesotho army’s existence can hardly be justified and that it is left with only one option regarding its neighbour, namely to pursue non-military ways of building peace.

The military imbalance between Lesotho and its superpower neighbour is just one of the various factors that make the army unnecessary. Apart from being a morally correct step to follow, demilitarisation of Lesotho would also be a pragmatic approach. Just for the moment assume the two countries were almost equal in military strength, it would still be extremely difficult to imagine the two countries going to war against each other. The two countries claim to be democracies and the liberalists’ argument that ‘democracies do not go to war against each other’ has generally held true. History has also shown that even non-democratic states are no longer so prone to war against other states as was the case in the past. Since the end of the Cold War around 1990, full-scale wars between states have been rare. In Africa, the only such war was the 1998 – 2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Unlike many African militaries, the existence of the Lesotho army cannot be justified even on the basis of a civil war as Lesotho has never had one. It is noteworthy that even the civil wars that were a feature of post-independence Africa have also changed in character. At first they were between governments and opponents wanting to take over, to secede. Instead the wars of the past 20 years can be categorised as (a) state based conflicts that occur when one of the parties is the state, (b) non-state based conflict, which involve parties other than the state, and (3) one-sided
violence against civilians, which may be carried out by states or non-state actors (Harris 2004: 5). The last of the three categories is the most common in Lesotho where the army has from time to time been used by the state to unleash violence on civilians aligned to opposition parties. This use of the Lesotho army cannot in any way serve as a justification for the army’s existence.

From an international perspective, the traditional understanding of security in terms of geographical state boundaries and not in terms of the safety of its people, ended in 1994 when security came to be defined internationally as human security, with the emphasis more on people. The concept was systematically brought into different commissions of the United Nations by the UNDP. The new millennium brought in yet another concept, namely sustainable security which is premised on the understanding that countries cannot successfully control all the consequences of insecurity, hence must work towards addressing the causes of insecurity. This approach requires more sophisticated strategies, not necessarily physical military strength. This is because the sources of the current insecurity are complex and involve issues such as climate change, just to name one.

In line with this shift in perspective, countries are now seeking to equip security personnel with a wider range of skills to address the new challenges, which would require better educational qualifications. However, in Lesotho recruitment for the army has been strictly confined to the holders of Cambridge Overseas Schools Certificate (COSC) only, not anything higher, but the COSC holders that join the army are mostly poor performers who are forced into labour market early because they are ineligible for enrolment in tertiary institutions. Apparently, the army prefers such recruits as they easily takes orders and manage to cope with the hard conditions within the army.

One of the conditions highlighting the violations of human liberties within the LDF is the 2014 Standing Order that makes it an offence for a female soldier to fall pregnant within five years of recruitment, despite the fact that reproduction is an internationally-recognised human right. In line with the provisions of this order the LDF in December 2015 dismissed four female soldiers who had fallen pregnant. Three of them have sued the army, arguing their dismissals were “contrary to public policy, common law principles of reasonableness, legality and rationality” (Staff reporter 2016). In their High Court application they argued that the pregnancies were accidental and happened despite the use of contraceptive measures. One applicant received the order only 20 days before completing her six months training as a cadet in the army, while two other got the order on parade on the day of their pass-out” (ibid).
Many countries use their armies also as foreign policy tools to protect national interests outside their borders. The fact that the target of the SANDF’s first incursion into Lesotho in 1998 was the LDF base near the Katse Dam is an example of this. The Katse dam is part of the highlands scheme that supplies water to South Africa’s industrial heartland and South Africa might have feared that the Lesotho army could blast the dam in revenge for their incursion. This threat had earlier been made on national television by a high ranking politician opposed to South Africa’s earlier intervention. The argument would thus be that Lesotho’s army like its counterparts from other countries is a tool of foreign policy. The argument of protecting national interests, however, cannot stand as Lesotho neither has identifiable interests abroad necessitating military attacks, nor the capacity to do so.

6.5 Summary and conclusions

Built on the foundations of peace laid by the great Moshoeshoe I, the modern day Lesotho and its people have always been associated with peace. However, the country has been riddled with political instability in which ironically the army has played a major part. The army intruded in politics and overthrew the civilian rule in 1986 as a way of avoiding attacks from South Africa that it could not handle due to its lack of capacity.

Following the political transition in South Africa in the early 1990s, Lesotho was literally left without any real external threat. This rendered the Lesotho army idle and provided it with the opportunity to pick a fight with the newly-elected BCP government. On its part, the government didn’t trust the army and wanted to emasculate or dissolve it. The irrelevance of the army coupled with the government’s negative attitude rendered the army vulnerable to manipulation by opposition politicians who used it as a pawn to fight their political battles. Similarly, the incumbent governments patronised the army and used it as an instrument of persecution against the opposition.

There is no evidence that the Lesotho army adequately performs its secondary functions. At times it has had to rely on South African armed forces to perform basic tasks that one would have expected the LDF perform without difficulty. And when the army gets involved the public are exposed to it brutality. The next chapter will make a case for the demilitarisation of Lesotho.
CHAPTER 7

THE CASE FOR DEMILITARISATION: A COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE
LESOTHO DEFENCE FORCE

“Because there is global insecurity, nations are engaged in mad arms race, spending billions of dollars wastefully on instruments of destruction, when millions are starving. And yet, just a fraction of what is extended so obscenely on defensive budgets would make a real difference in enabling God’s children to fill their stomachs, be educated, and be given the chance to lead fulfilled and happy lives” – Archbishop Desmond Tutu.

7.1 Introduction

This chapter makes a case for the demilitarisation of Lesotho. It argues that the expenditure on the Lesotho Defence Force is tantamount to waste. It does this by highlighting some of the opportunity costs of the country’s military expenditure. The chapter is divided into sub-sections that take an overview of military expenditure in Lesotho; reveal how military expenditure in Lesotho is amenable to corruption due to lack of transparency; and highlights how military expenditure is wasteful as it does not provide returns. The chapter finally also examines the army’s questionable involvement in civilian matters and in the maintenance of law and order.

7.2 An overview of the Lesotho’s military expenditure.

Lesotho’s revenue comes largely from external sources such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the European Union (EU). The latter has in March 2016 “suspended the pending Budget Support payments, totalling to €26.85 million in grant funding to Lesotho citing the country’s unsatisfactory compliance with the conditions for payment (Shale 2016). One would think that a country in such a precarious situation would channel as much resources as possible toward projects that can stimulate the economy. Not in Lesotho where in spite of its questionable
existence, the army takes not less than four per cent of the country’s meagre budget annually. This has been the case since the beginning of the current millennium. Matlosa and Pule (2001: 8) observed that in Lesotho the defence budget consistently ranked in the top three, alongside education and health.

In recent years the defence budget has moved down to number five, but the country still spends heavily on defence. In the 2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16 fiscal years, 4.7, 4.4 and 4.6 per cent of the budget was allocated to the Ministry of Defence and National Security (Ketso 2014; Khaketla 2015; Military Balance 2014). The largest proportion of this allocation goes to the army and its extensions. For instance during the 2015/16 fiscal year, 82.41 per cent of the money allocated to the Ministry of Defence and National Security went to the army, with the ministry’s administration department and the National Security Services (NSS) sharing the remainder. The M539,349,534.00 allocated to the ministry was divided as follows: the administration department received M18,818,917.00; LDF was allocated M337,788,185.00; Air wing got M86,130,886.00; Makoanyane Military Hospital got M20,550,068.00; NSS received M76,061,478.00 (Ntaote 2015). It is worth noting that though allocated separately, Air wing and Makoanyane Military Hospital are just departments within the army.

7.3 Lack of transparency in military expenditure

There is little transparency with respect to military expenditure. A number of respondents including a former deputy minister of Finance, three former principal secretaries for the Ministry of Defence and National Security, as well as a former member of the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the Prime Minister’s Ministries all admitted that the army’s expenditure lacked transparency. They noted for instance some money requisitions were simply listed under ‘Other expenditure’ and ‘Training’.

One respondent revealed that when they were called before the Portfolio Committee during the Eighth Parliament (2012 -2015) to clarify such items, the army representatives explained that ‘Other’ also included ‘payments to army informers’. The army representatives reportedly refused to identify who, or how many the ‘informers’ were, or to justify the large amount budgeted for the purpose. Neither could the representatives provide information on the kind of training that was being done. They insisted that they were not permitted to divulge such details because of ‘security reasons’.
It is more worrisome to note that not even parliament is allowed to be privy to such information in the name of ‘security’. The allocations to the Ministry of Defence have, despite being approved by parliament, been accompanied by controversy and displeasure, particularly from the opposition benches. This is the case due to the suspicion that the army is being used for sinister purposes against the opposition. This was evident during the 2015/2016 budget debate, when one-third of the opposition MPs walked out in protest as the then-minister of Defence and National Security was trying to get parliament’s approval for his ministry’s budget proposals. The scepticism of opposition MPs is well captured in the following account:

Mr Mohlajoa (opposition MP for Malimong Constituency) asked National Assembly Speaker, Ntlhoi Motsamai, who was acting as Parliamentary Committee chairperson, why government MPs were so excited by the minister’s presentation.

“Is the minister genuinely seeking approval of the budget or is this noise coming from the government side of the House about already knowing what this money is really going to be used for? We already know what this money is going to be used for.”

But Mr Mohlajoa’s interjection prompted an angry reaction from the ruling party MPs, with the Speaker trying, and failing, to bring the House to order (Ntaote 2015).

It becomes clear that Mr Mohlajoa was insinuating the money was going to be used by the government to silence the opposition. This was after the army had played a leading role in dislodging the three-party coalition government and appeared to be unleashed on anybody associated with the opposition. The budget was approved a few days later, but the former commander Lt-Gen Mahao was assassinated in cold blood by the military on 25th June 2015. He had few weeks earlier been demoted by the new government who argued that his appointment by the previous government was ‘unlawful’.

The LCD leader Mothejoa Metsing, who had been in the three-party coalition and was now part of the new government, complained that the previous Prime Minister Thomas Thabane had not consulted him as a coalition partner when Mahao was promoted in August 2014. The argument that Mahao’s appointment was unlawful was, however, rejected by the SADC commission, who found “that the appointment of Brigadier Mahao as Commander of LDF on the 29th August 2014 was legal. The law is clear that the appointing authority, then Prime Minister Thomas Thabane had no legal obligation to consult on the appointment” (Phumaphi 2015: 57).
While elements of secrecy form part of army operations worldwide, the situation in Lesotho has gone to the extreme. Since the army is financed from the public purse, “military expenditure, both current and capital, should follow the same rules as any other government expenditure category i.e. there must be a clear justification for the expenditure. Then some other body (normally the Ministry of Finance) needs to estimate the opportunity cost of this expenditure” (Harris 2017: 4). Otherwise the pretence of ‘secrecy’ may be used to cover up to corruption. It is not difficult to see that part of the money requested by the army under vague headings such as ‘Others’ and ‘Training’ ends up being used for highly dubious and illegal purposes.

Commenting on the relationship between military expenditure and corruption, Gupta et al. (2000,cited in Willet 2013: 79) hypothesised that corruption would be highly correlated with high levels of both general military and procurement expenditure, when calculated in terms of GDP, and overall government expenditure. These percentage levels are relatively high in Lesotho, despite its poor economy, compared to its superpower neighbour South Africa, as shown by the fact that Lesotho spent 2.2 per cent of its GDP on defence in 2015, while South Africa spent only 1.1 per cent in the same year (Harris 2017: 4).

7.4 The case against high military expenditure in Lesotho

The yearly average of 4.6 per cent of the national budget that Lesotho channels towards defence is unjustifiable considering the country’s economic situation. The greater part of this money goes to the military, instead of being used to advance economic development. There are several reasons why high military expenditure cannot be justified.

7.4.1 The absence of threat

The main question is whether Lesotho really needs an army. As indicated in chapter 6, the country’s geographical position hardly justifies keeping a standing army. This is supported by the fact that post-independence Lesotho managed for a full 13 years without an army which leads to the conclusion that high military expenditure is tantamount to the misuse of resources and should be stopped. Harris advises that “budgetary allocations to the military should be made on the basis of an objective assessment of a country’s security situation. It makes no sense to maintain large military forces, as many countries, including Lesotho - (my own insertion) do, when there are no credible threats” (2006: 247).
The LDF’s arsenal contains a few sophisticated weapons such as towed artillery, mortars, recoilless rifles and rocket launchers (see Defence Web, 2017), and we know that such weapons do not come cheap. It is important to note that most of these have never been used, and are not likely to ever be used, since the likelihood of South Africa attacking the little “mountain kingdom” is so remote, as would Lesotho’s ability be to counter it be. There is therefore hardly a reason to keep any ‘arsenal’, implying that the money spent on the military is in reality wasted.

In the bigger picture the situation is that “worldwide, it seems, the military is used to a certain level of spending, irrespective of the need. And when there are no threats, these are invented in order to justify maintaining or increasing the expenditure (Coneta and Knight 1998, cited in Harris 2017: 4). This applies more to Lesotho than most other countries, and amounts to nothing more than a gross misuse of very limited resources.

7.4.2. Wasteful expenditure by military

Detailed records are needed if one wants to analyse how the military spend the money that they are allocated, but as was indicated in section 6.3.5, the relevant LDF office flatly refused to cooperate in this regard. Some light nevertheless emerged when interviewing a former principal secretary of the Ministry of Defence and National Security in October 2015, when it transpired that the greater part of it was spent on food supplies and transport. Food is provided to members of the LDF whenever they are on duty. They are further transported to and from work within Maseru, and so are those who are stationed at other military posts within the country.

This expenditure on food and transport for an idle army is not only a burden on the taxpayer, but also manifests unjustifiable discrimination since most other civil servants who have to pay for food and transport from their own pockets, do not enjoy the same privileges. The command structure of the LDF is another factor contributing to the army’s high expenditure. The LDF is commanded by a lieutenant-general who apart from a big salary and other benefits usually goes around accompanied by a three-car motorcade. People ask why a relatively small army requires to be headed by somebody of the rank of a lieutenant-general, when until recently the highest rank in the Lesotho army had been that of major general. The Elevating this to a lieutenant-general was a political decision not related to the size of the army. It was simply aimed at appeasing the politicised army in the name of ‘bringing LDF’s commander on a par with his counterparts from other countries’. Opposition to elevating the position of the commander, and the promotions policy generally was evident when the BNP’s deputy leader Joang Molapo in January 2017 said...
it was unjustified, since Lesotho had a small army in which the most senior rank should be that of major-general, with a maximum of four brigadier-generals and 10 to 12 colonels (Ntaote 2017).

7.4.3. Priorities in government expenditure

The opportunity costs of Lesotho’s questionable military expenditure falls on social grants and other basic income schemes, such as those offered to vulnerable citizens and low income groups as a way of helping them to escape poverty. While social grants are almost universal in developed countries, the Finnish government, as well as provinces in Canada and some Dutch cities are looking at pilot schemes for providing a basic income to the poor (McKenna 2017).

Finland has randomly chosen 2000 Finns for a government experiment to provide unemployed people with a basic income of $600 as a way of reducing poverty and to see whether such provision will make the unemployed more eager to go into short term jobs, a key feature of Finland’s labour market (Unkuri, 2017). The expected contribution of the basic income scheme is that “some might decide to acquire more education or change their career, to make themselves more attractive to the labour market. Others might seek to start a business” (ibid). Lesotho can learn from these countries by extending, and experimenting with social grants in a way that addresses the unemployment rate that presently stands at around 32 percent.

Lesotho is of course already providing some social grants, albeit of relatively small amounts, to some of its vulnerable citizens. According to the Director of Social Welfare the ministry offers the following type of grants, namely public assistance offered in both cash and in kind. The former involves a M250 per month cash grant per person or household, depending on the level of poverty, paid as M750 once every quarter. The latter involves the purchase of assistive devices for needy citizens such as wheelchairs, crutches, hearing aids, and doctors’ fees.

There are also child grants provided for families caring for orphans under 18 years of age, depending on the number of orphans, and ranging between M350 and M750 which is paid once in three months like public assistance. The last kind of social grant comes in the form of bursaries. Initially meant for orphans only, the bursaries now cover other needy children who qualify in primary and secondary schools. As stated above, the provision of social grants is only available to people in 43 of the country’s 67 community councils (Mutizwa 2015), where eligibility requires prior application and assessment by Social Welfare officials. However, despite limited coverage,
child grants have already yielded positive results that warrant the extension of coverage and an increase in the amounts provided.

Highlighting its advantages, UNICEF’s chief of social policy in Lesotho, Ousmane Niang, indicated that the grants have already led to an increase in school enrolments. Niang added “the biggest bonus for us has been the community dynamics. We found for instance, that for each Maloti (sic) invested at the community level, there is a return of 2.3 per cent” (Ibid). The same can of course not be said about each Loti invested in military expenditure, which strengthens the argument for the diversion of funds from unproductive sectors like the military to more productive ones. As Niang indicated “the government would like to increase the amount of the grants, on average 500 Maloti ($37) each quarter for two children, but can’t afford to (ibid). It is therefore necessary that the government also looks at other possibilities for achieving this objective.

Harris (2017: 4) states that ‘some other body (normally the Ministry of Finance) needs to estimate the opportunity cost of Lesotho’s military expenditure’. It is difficult to justify the budget allocations for the Ministry of Defence and National Security vis-a-vis that of Ministry of Social Development, since the former was allocated M539.3 million in 2015/16 while the latter only received M226.7 million, hence only 58 percent of the Ministry of Defence’s allocation. If directed to the right sectors, resources currently channelled to the military could help address the root causes of vulnerabilities and in the long run help to shield the recipients from the structural violence they are currently subjected to.

Channelling current military expenditure to more development-oriented social sectors such as education and health could have a very positive impact in the long run. Table 7 below shows Lesotho’s defence budget in relation to education and health in recent years.

**Table 7: Lesotho education, health and defense budgets, 2012-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>2015/16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amoun t</td>
<td>% of National budget</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1985.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1985.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1160.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1160.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>375.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>375.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Lesotho Budget Speeches 2013/14 and 2015/16*
Despite being much higher than defence, the budget for the two vital ministries of education and health are far from sufficient, given the challenges faced by these ministries. The country’s education system for example, is facing serious challenges that have been summarised as follows:

- Teachers have few resources to work with;
- Teachers must board at the school during the week and often live in very housing conditions;
- Teachers’ salaries are very inadequate;
- Many teachers do not have proper training;
- School buildings are old and crumbling and there is no money for maintenance or repair; and
- Pit latrines are often full and must be emptied or replaced. Without adequate toilet facilities, many girls will not come to school (Help Lesotho, 2014).

The Ministry of Health is not in a much better position, facing many challenges which include a high HIV prevalence rate of 23 percent, and a low life expectancy rate of 39.4 and 45.3 years for males and females respectively (Lesotho Bureau of Statistics, 2015).

Lesotho’s high allocation for military expenditure comes at the time when other African countries, even those which are realising consistent economic growth, continue to budget prudently. Ethiopia is a good example. Despite witnessing an impressive average growth rate of 11.4 percent between 2004 and 2011, and a further projected 7 percent, Ethiopia’s total defence budget has remained within, and often below 2 percent of its national budget (Military Balance 2014: 419). Table 7 above shows that Lesotho on the other hand has allocated an average of 4.51 percent of its budget for defence annually between 2012 and 2016.

The channelling of military expenditure to the sectors that are more transparent and have the potential to pull the country out of its current poverty would, as Archbishop Tutu argues in one of his famous quotes ‘make a real difference in enabling God’s children to fill their stomachs, be educated, and be given the chance to lead fulfilled and happy lives’.

7.4.4 Questionable involvement in development
Lesotho’s former Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili has on a number of occasions defended the existence of the LDF against those who call for the army to be disbanded. Mosisili has launched scathing attacks on those questioning the value of the Lesotho’s army and has labelled such sceptics as being ‘unpatriotic’. Interestingly, he recognises that a war between Lesotho and South Africa is unlikely. It is for this reason that he has attempted to justify the existence of the army by referring to its purported role in development, arguing that the defence of the country was ‘not only through the gun, but also through engagement in civic matters’. Addressing the July 2016 Army Day celebrations in Maseru, Mosisili remarked:

“I find it shocking that some shallow analysts can say we don’t need the army in this country. I am going to list some of the most positive contributions the LDF has made. Other than protecting the people and their property, the LDF has made notable contributions in agriculture, infrastructure development, the health sector and promoting the spirit of patriotism in this country,” (Ntsukunyane 2016).

Looking at the evidence it is hard to attach any credibility to his claims.

His ‘appreciation’ of the LDF is actually a relatively new development. Following his return from exile in the early 1990s, Mosisili and his Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) were very hostile to the army, labelling its members as ‘lintja tsa Leabua’ (Leabua’s dogs). This was a reference to former Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan under whose rule the LDF was established in 1979 “in response to attacks by the South African-backed Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) formed by the exiles of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)” (Makoa 1998: 17). The hostility of Mosisili’s government to the army is well documented and it was he himself who called on SADC to intervene militarily in 1998 when opposition protests were threatening his rule. According to the South African Parliamentary Monitoring Group (1998) 29 Lesotho Defence Force soldiers were killed and 51 wounded while the SANDF lost 8 with 17 wounded during the ensuing operation.

After the military intervention and disarming of the LDF, Mosisili despatched a delegation led by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Thomas Thabane to Latin America to find out how countries that do not have armies in that region safeguard their security. At this point it was clear that the Lesotho government was contemplating disbanding the LDF. This, however, never happened and the government instead engaged the Indian army to retrain the Lesotho army with the aim of ‘professionalising’ it. However, the relations between the army and Mosisili’s government had apparently ‘improved’ considerably before he left office in June 2017, with the army being used mainly against internal opposition. It tallies with an assertion by one respondent – a senior army
official - who blamed the politicians for the interference of the army in politics and added that ‘to Lesotho’s incumbent governments, the army is professional only to the extent that it does not overthrow them, and allows itself to be used against the opposition politicians’.

Prime Minister Mosisili, in his defence of the army usually mentioned sporadic incidents of involvement in societal matters. These include a few visits of Lesotho villages, particularly in mountainous districts, by military doctors, and some rescue operations by the army during emergencies. Globally things are moving in a different direction as the following quotation depicts clearly.

Interest in the role of military in development waned during the 1980s, in part because abuses of human rights by the military have been almost endemic in developing countries. As a result, there has been a very widespread reluctance to encourage any military involvement with wider society. The general view is that the military is a corrupting influence in terms of its emphasis on violence and force to deal with disputes; soldiers should be confined to the barracks and brought out only when national security is threatened (Harris 2006: 242).

While it cannot be denied that the LDF occasionally engages in benevolent activities, the question that needs to be answered is whether the military are the most efficient body to carry out the functions in which it is involved, or could these be better handled by civilian bodies or other government departments Most would answer this question, based on the record of the LDF’s involvement in societal activities, in the negative, ‘no, the army is not the most efficient body and these activities could be better handled by other bodies’. The following paragraphs draw on just a few examples to support this contention.

7.4.5 Inefficient utilisation of developmental resources

Some of the LDF equipment could be better utilised by some other private bodies and government departments, considering the secondary role of the army in the preservation of life, health and property, and provision and maintenance of essential services. The army display at the Setsoto Stadium during the 50 year celebrations of Lesotho’s independence in October 2016, included fire trucks, helicopters, and combine harvesters, just to mention a few.

There are two angles from which the unsuitability of the placement of this equipment needs to be understood. First, as noted earlier in section 7.4.4, interest in the contribution of the military to development waned in the 1980s, in part because of endemic abuses of human rights by the
military in developing countries (Harris 2006: 242). Examples of human rights abuses by the Lesotho army are discussed in sub-section 7.4.6 below. Secondly, there is the issue of the efficiency of the military with respect to non-military activities. There have been many cases of fires that destroyed valuable property, both private and public, most of these incidents have occurred in Maseru where the military and its equipment is stationed. While there are a few instances where the army fire brigade managed to extinguish fires, a block at the Government Office Complex in 2012 being the - the best known, there are many more cases where this did not happen.

Two examples are the Shoprite store, and the well known Basotho Shield building that was gutted by fire in May 2011. The latter was located 200 metres from the Lesotho Mounted Police Services (LMPS) fire brigade station and about a kilometre from the Ratjomose army barracks. Despite Basotho Shield being a stand-alone structure, it could not be saved due to inefficiency of the military and police’s fire brigades. In another case, a Shoprite U-Save Store in Butha-Buthe and an adjacent supermarket were burnt down in March 2016, with the fire destroying goods and infrastructure worth millions of Maloti. Stalls which were close to the two buildings also caught fire leaving their owners devastated. Here there were not fire brigade services or equipment nearby. It is imperative therefore, that Lesotho strengthens its fire rescue services by creating a civilian fire brigade.

The LDF remains the only public institution that owns planes and helicopters. These could provide the most efficient mode of transport for rescue operations during emergencies, the LDF is usually very slow in reacting, or does not respond at all, so that Lesotho sometimes has to call in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) for rescue operations. This has happened on a number of occasions when travellers and herdboys trapped by snow in the mountainous districts had to be rescued by members of the South African army. For instance, in August 2006 SANDF helicopters rescued people in the Thaba-Tseka mountains and airlifted some of the injured to Roma Hospital. Jerome Barnes, a spokesperson for the South African High Commission, said one man who was in a critical condition would probably have died had the rescue team arrived an hour later (Adams and Masolankwe, 2006).

. The current state of local rescue services is further illustrated by the following account:

Their car burst into flames when it was involved in a head-on collision with a taxi near Palace Hotel, about 35km north of the capital Maseru. All three passengers in the
private car perished after they were burnt to ashes. Their vehicle was also reduced to a mangled wreck. When the car burst into flames, people who had stopped to give some help could only watch helplessly as they heard the victims scream for help. But none arrived. The police’s emergency paramedics could not respond in time to save the victims. …*Fire-fighters only pitched up at the accident scene some hours after the incident when the fire had died on its own* [italics, my own emphasis] (Moremoholo 2017).

It is worth reiterating that rescue operations in Lesotho can be improved if such services are placed in the hands civil institutions.

Turning to agriculture, the inadequacies are equally apparent. Although the LDF paraded a combine harvester during the 50th Independence Celebrations, wheat farmers were as late as January 2017 still waiting for their fields that had been ready since November 2016, to be harvested. One of the affected farmers, Ishmael Moabi said, “we have been waiting for the combine harvesters to harvest our produce from the fields, but to date they have not come. Our wheat gets wasted and germinate in our fields because there are no machines to harvest it,” (Molupe 2017). While around 16 000 hectares of land was reportedly put under wheat in 2016, there are only 16 combine harvesters in the country (ibid, which probably includes the army’s combine harvester(s)).

It is sad that Lesotho, a country that has had from time to time to declare a state of food emergency, the most recent being in December 2015, allows wheat to germinate in the fields due to an insufficient number of harvesters, some of which are probably not in working condition. One can ask whether it would not be better to have money spent on armament that is never used, rather be put to purchase agricultural machinery that can contribute to food production. The above examples demonstrate that the army does not really have the capacity to make a meaningful contribution to development.

### 7.4.6 Human rights abuses

It has become clear that in Lesotho the army’s assistance to the police does not come without a cost. The very people that need to be protected end up being the victims of the army that claims to be their protectors. This is not surprising, as the army is in the first place not trained for public, but for national security. The two are different, and executed differently. Below is a quote that explains this.

> Armed forces are trained to kill or injure. That is their raison d’etre. .. Killing, maiming, destruction of homes and all that makes wellbeing
possible, diseases and the forced migration of millions is being done by ‘conventionally’ armed forces... There are many other people and organisations capable of using communications, logistics, disciplined planning and brave action to rescue people from natural and human made disasters, including the activity of the armed forces, wars. Medicines’ Sans Frontier’s, Oxfam, Christian Aid, Save the Children Fund, the fire brigade, the Coast Guards, the UNHCR, and in the first and second world wars, the Friends Ambulance Unit, spring to mind (Gwyntopher 2015: 6)

There have been outcries in Lesotho about the brutality that the public suffer at the hands of the army and police, particularly the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the Lesotho Mounted Police Services (LMPS), reinforcing the view that the military has a corrupting influence because of its penchant for using violence and force in dealing with disputes (Harris 2006: 242). An army operation to confiscate illegal firearms and fight rampant stock theft that took place in Qacha’s Neck district during March 2016 provides an example of this. A woman named Puseletso Pelesa was killed by army officers when she was sent to the base by the village chief following a dispute in the village.

Upon arrival “Pelesa was beaten by some soldiers using a spade, stick and a whip. The officers approached the group that had accompanied Pelesa to the military base and requested them not to divulge that the deceased had been beaten, but the group decided not take the advice but to tell what they observed” Boloetse (2016). The treatment she received at the hands of the military was more like that would be meted out to an enemy of the state. With the army continuing to be involved in matters of public security, more such atrocities can be expected in Lesotho. As William Adama, a fictional character in the television series Battlestar Galecticar warns, “there is a reason you separate military and the police. One fights the enemies of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state become the people”.

This matter could surely have been treated differently and more constructively dealt with by other bodies such as the churches who do not believe in violence as a conflict resolution strategy. It would certainly contribute to peace building if the money spent on the military is redirected to institutions that are involved in reconciliation efforts.

7.4.7 There are alternative ways of building security

As noted in section 3.2.2, the end of the cold war saw the approach to security change from emphasising national boundaries to focusing on human beings. Having to maintain the LDF and
its high expenditure, Lesotho has lost an opportunity to join other countries that are seeking to advance human development in all its aspects, that requires, as Harris (2006: 246) says, “move(s) from an emphasis on territorial security based on a strong military towards broader human security that protects individuals from a range of insecurities and thereby encourages improved levels of human development”. Table 8 below illustrates the relationship between cost and levels of efficiency when one is using conventional military as compared with non-military means to improve public security.

**Table 8: Alternative ways of achieving security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Likely effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventional military</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low - moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Transforming the military:</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-offensive defence</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
<td>Increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilianising military functions</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
<td>Increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social defence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Reducing the incidents of disputes:</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Befriending neighbours</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate - high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting democracy and development</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Building dispute-resolution capacity:</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in conflict management and</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing conflict resolving institutions</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Harris (2004:200).*

Table 8 reveals that non-military ways of achieving security are cheaper and more effective than military ones. Lesotho can benefit by shifting from a conventional army to non-offensive defence. This can be achieved by civilianising some of the functions currently performed by the military. For instance, rescue operations can be transferred to the Disaster Management Authority (DMA), while the agricultural machinery in possession of the army can be more efficiently utilised by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. This shift would be in line with contemporary security approaches that focus on human beings rather than on geographical state boundaries.
Such a shift would further help to reduce the incidents of disputes, and make it possible to act on Military Balance (2015)’s recommendation of signing a defence pact with South Africa, thereby ‘befriending’ the two neighbours. Disbanding the army may also promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts, particularly among the politicians. As Thomas and Mazrui (1992: 160) have rightly observed, in countries like Lesotho “armies are used to ensure compliance from the groups that question the legitimacy of the states hence repress the ‘enemy within’. Governments sometimes surreptitiously resort to their armies for the resolution of political disputes, so the disbanding of the army would allow countries to invest in the establishment of conflict resolution institutions, as well as educating societies about conflict management.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to show that it is more costly in every way for Lesotho to build peace in the presence of an army, than without it. Around five percent of the annual budget is allocated to the Ministry of Defence and National Security which places the ministry fifth in rank in terms of its budget share. 82 percent of the ministry’s budget goes to the LDF when important sectors such as education and health are faced with huge challenges due to a lack of sufficient funding. More importantly, defence expenditure could hardly be justified in the light of Lesotho’s geographical position and the military might of its only neighbour South Africa.

It is hard to assess Lesotho’s military expenditure because of the lack of transparency regarding the army’s operations. This also renders the military more prone to corruption as there is no necessary disclosure of all operations, with the army citing ‘security considerations’ as the reason. It is common knowledge that corruption is a factor that adversely affects economic development. Opposition parties have on occasions objected to budget proposals for the Ministry of Defence and National Security, questioning the operations of the army that they argue are used to suppress them; without success since the proposals have always been passed despite their objections.

Lesotho continues to allocate large amounts to defence despite the fact that it does not provide any direct benefits which could stimulate its poor economy toward growth. High military expenditure results in equally large opportunity costs with respect to social grants, when such grants have proved to contribute significantly to improving social security and thereby to efforts toward peace building. This has been recognised by UNICEF when it notes that social grants have led to increased school enrolments and that for each Maloti (sic) invested at the community level in the form of social grants there is a positive return of 2.3 per cent.
This chapter reiterates that Lesotho stands to benefit by civilianising some of the functions currently performed by the army, as indicated the examples provided in this chapter. The LDF has proved to be extremely inefficient in carrying out its mandate, since the country has several times had to rely on its neighbour’s forces to step in during emergencies when the LDF failed to cope. It is therefore important that Lesotho does away with its costly army and pursues other non-offensive avenues for strengthening security. We now turn to examine the action research methodology that I have employed in this study.
CHAPTER 8

ACTION RESEARCH

8.1 Introduction

A range of quantitative, qualitative and participatory methods are available in the social sciences that can be applied in a research study such as this one. A choice needs to be made in terms of the suitability of a particular method to serve the objectives of one’s research. The one adopted for this study is known as action research (AR) which was developed out of different participatory approaches. This chapter covers the various aspects of action research, drawing a link between AR and participatory action research (PAR). The second examines the role of an action researcher as an agent of change. This is followed by a discussion of the issues around participation and the objectives of PAR. Finally, the way that PAR is applied in this study is outlined.

8.2 What an action research is

Action research which came into prominence during the ‘80s and ‘90s of the previous century refers to an “applied research in which the primary goal is to facilitate social change, or bring about a value-oriented political-social goal” (Neuman 2006: 28). Kurt Lewin is credited with having already used the term ‘action research’ in 1964 (Barbour 2014: 229). AR scholars emphasised that there is a need to seek not only an understanding of the problem being researched, but also to seek solutions to practical problems. Jacobs defines action research as “a systematic process in which a problem is studied scientifically, and where the results are used to take a particular action to help solve the problem” (2016: 196).

A distinction is sometimes made between action research and participatory research. The former arose in the context of the need to change the way industrial companies and other companies are managed, while the latter first became popular in the fields of education and community development. This difference in history is still visible in some differences between the two approaches. However, they have become increasingly inconsequential, and current usage favours the term ‘participatory action research’ (Bhana 2014: 431). I have therefore also used the concepts action research and participatory action research interchangeably in this study.
Simply defined, PAR is a research that aims to produce knowledge in an active partnership with those affected by that knowledge, and for the express purpose of improving their social, educational and material conditions (Blanche et al 2016: 562; Ozanne and Saatcioglu 2008:425; Barbour 2014: 232). It is premised on the understanding that “knowledge develops from experience; particularly the experience of socio-political action” (Neuman 2006: 28). According to Jacobs (2016: 198), “PAR is to be used when studying social issues that constrain individual lives. Collaboration with participants is imperative and the focus is on taking action that will lead to changes in the lives of the participants”.

PAR assumes that through participation, ordinary people can become aware of their own conditions and learn to act in ways that would improve their situation. PAR is, therefore, in line with the ‘bottom-up’ developmental model that recognises local people to be the experts in assessing their own situation and that the therefore play a central role in the resolution of local problems. PAR arose in the developing countries – notably South America – and has spread across the world, where it has been influential not only in education but also in other fields (Bhana 2014: 430).

8.3 Researcher as an agent of change

because of its change-oriented nature, action research is more appropriate in poor, underprivileged, or socially and economically exploited and oppressed communities (Babbie and Mouton 2005: 314, Gray 2004: 375). It is also appropriate in societies that are characterised by cultural vulnerability, that is, communities or groups that do not form part of the dominant culture in a country or region. It is within this context that the role of a researcher in action research needs to be understood, which is to become an agent of change whose role is not only to understand the problem, but ultimately to search for a solution to it. The objective of bringing change and collaboration between the researcher and the locals as meaningful participants differentiates action research from other research paradigms. As observed by Gray (2004: 373) “in other research paradigms the researcher is seen as a detached scientist, intent on avoiding any action that might bias or tarnish the results. Action research, in contrast, is committed and intentional but also informed and systematic”. The following should also be noted:

It should be obvious that PAR exists in a tensional relationship with regard to positivism, which value objectivity, distance, and precision of measurement over active engagement. PAR also presents a challenge to the interpretive research paradigm. Interpretive research, like PAR, emphasises inter-subjective engagement
and the fostering of democratic research relationships, but PAR goes further in locating this in a community rather than an individual context and in emphasising the action consequences rather than the reflective truths of the research (Bhana 2014: 430).

The points of difference between participatory action research and its traditional counterparts are shown in Table 9 below.

### Table 9: Values and ideologies in traditional research and participatory action research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Traditional approaches</th>
<th>PAR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assumptions</strong></td>
<td>Based on scientific or interpretive assumptions about knowledge. Good life and good society are based on value-free liberalism, individualism, and meritocracy.</td>
<td>Promotes grounded knowledge through collaborative relationships which emphasise mutuality, obligations, and the removal of oppression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practices</strong></td>
<td>Problems defined in asocial and deficit-oriented terms. Interactions are reactive.</td>
<td>Problems defined in terms of interpersonal and social oppression. Interventions seek to change individuals as well as social systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefits</strong></td>
<td>Preserves values of individuality and freedom.</td>
<td>Promotes sense of community and emancipation of every member of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risks</strong></td>
<td>Victim blaming and tacit support for unjust social structures. Solutions may have little relation to real-world experience.</td>
<td>Denial of individuality and sacrifice of personal uniqueness for good of the community. Solutions may not generalise beyond immediate contexts.</td>
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</tbody>
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Understanding a social problem requires researchers who can adequately relate to the social dynamics of a given situation, or area within which the problem is researched. It is for this reason that Babbie and Mouton (2005: 314) insist that PAR should be carried out by scholars from those areas or countries where there are socio-economic or political issues to be addressed, or where “conflict situations are playing”. It recognises that change is usually a continuous long-term process, sometimes characterised by resistance from the benefactors and beneficiaries of the status quo. This implies that participants in any research geared towards change do not only need to have a long term commitment, but must also have perseverance and will to handle challenges that might arise during the course of the research. The choice of a social problem to be tackled and desired solution should also be approached with caution. As Gray (2004: 377) warns, it is wise at the outset for researchers to be very realistic about what action research can achieve. Failure to achieve the desired social change as a result of an unrealistic choice may lead to disillusionment among the participants. Furthermore, in order to ultimately realise the desired change, it is vital that researchers duly plan for various phases of the PAR. We discuss this in sub section 8.1 below.
8.4 Participation in PAR

The success of an action research project depends in large measure, on the success of the researcher in working with other people. The researcher has to identify a range of people who will be involved in the project. Participation in action research is an interactive communal enterprise involving collaboration between the participants and the change agent. Unique about action research is that it does not treat locals as mere informants or research objects, but gives them a role in the research to in the end bring about change in their own situation. This makes them active research partners:

Non-academic research partners are not viewed as passive, unintelligent subjects, but as people who possess valuable insight and experiential knowledge into the conditions and problems that affect their lives; expertise that is parallel and as legitimate as academic knowledge (Guishard 2009: 87).

In order to have a successful action research, Gray (2004) says that it is essential for researchers to pay close attention to gaining access and maintaining relationships with the participants by keeping them informed about the progress of the research and by thanking them for their assistance. This is, as Chevalier and Buckles (2013: 173) point out, because people engaged in PAR “are not subjects, or participants, but, rather partners engaged in all phases of the process”. These phases include:

(a) Problem formulation
(b) Planning the initial design of the project
(c) Implementing and monitoring the project
(d) Reaching final conclusions, creating new meanings, and generating new knowledge
(e) Communication of the results
(f) Review and reflection
(g) Generating problem solutions and applying these to produce outcomes
(h) Assessment of the results
(i) Validation of the findings (Babbie and Mouton 2005: 315-6; see also Gray 2004: 378-82). Noteworthy is the fact that the phases listed above do not necessarily follow this particular logic. Action research is cyclical in nature and it works through a series of stages that overlap. Some activities may also run parallel to each other. Each step is continually monitored to make adjustments as needed. The cyclical nature of an action research is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
In all phases of PAR, participation between the change agent and participants needs to be harmonious and characterised by authentic and democratic collaboration. As Neuman (2006:28) notes, the ultimate goal of PAR is to democratize the knowledge-creation process, reveal injustices, highlight the centrality of social conflict, and emphasize the importance of engaging in collective action to alter social structures. Despite being an equal in the research group with fellow participants, the researcher needs to play a leading role and perform several important responsibilities. He/she needs to make all the necessary effort to create an atmosphere that embraces democratic values in the group. However, instead of directing and dominating, as is usually the case with traditional researchers, the researcher needs to assume a supportive and facilitative role. To be able to perform these roles adequately, the researcher needs to be prepared to learn and teach through interaction and on an equal footing with the participants. He or she thus, has to avoid academic imperialism and de-professionalize or de-class in order to understand, respect and communicate with grassroots communities more effectively (Babbie and Mouton 2005: 318).
The involvement of locals is not enough in itself; it has to be guided by a clearly defined collaboration of the researcher and the participants which is premised on principles of democracy. This implies that the researcher and the participants have to interact as partners who share information and freely deliberate in issues. Abiding by the principles of democracy, it is important that the researcher keeps the participants informed about the progress of the research and thank them sincerely for their assistance (Gray 2007: 377).

In a democratic setting the researcher is more of a facilitator than expert. He/she acts as a catalyst for achieving change by stimulating people to review their practices and to accept the need for change. The researcher needs to appreciate that he/she is “not there to offer blue prints but to enable people to develop their own analysis of the issues facing them and their potential solutions” (Gray 2007: 383). Adopting such a role helps researchers to incorporate local knowledge into their own technical expertise and abstract general knowledge, resulting in “valid scientific sense-making” (Babbie and Mouton 2005: 320).

8.5 Advisory boards/groups as a part of action research

As highlighted in section 8.3 above, community participation is a defining characteristic of PAR. This participation is vital since it safeguards the interests of the local population. Community participation can be ensured in different ways, but maintaining the balance of power between the researcher and the community is the essential point. According to Sharp and Foster (2000, cited in Marsh et al. 2008: 723) this balance of power ranges from community consultation through dialogue, to full participation, which implies the greatest empowerment. One of the vehicles for community engagement can be in the appointment of a Community Advisory Board (CAB). CABs are, “probably the most prominent mechanism for community engagement in international research and they are usually composed of committee members who share a common identity, history, symbols and language, and culture. Important about the CABs is their establishment of a solid foundation that supports a relationship based on trust and engagement between the research team and the community members. Furthermore, they establish relationships that are sustained overtime, specifically beyond the lifetime of any specific research projects” (Strauss et al. (2001: 1940 cited Marsh et al. 2008: 723). This feature is of vital importance to PAR which aims to bring positive social change in the communities concerned, even if the change may only be noticed and appreciated long after the research had been done.
In spite of its importance, it is not that easy for the researcher to set up the right kind of CAB. It is a challenge to identify stakeholders with legitimate interests, that is, to avoid politicisation and ensure authentic community representation. Close attention has to be paid to the formation of a CAB, otherwise it might not contribute much to actual change in the community or nation.

8.6. Objectives of PAR

Good action research leads to positive change in the lives of the people amongst whom it is conducted. According to Grant et al. (2008), PAR has four main goals that can be summed up as emancipation, empowerment, participatory democracy and elimination of social problems. Looking at these goals one notes that they are closely inter-related and all involve bringing positive change to existing situations, and that this is what distinguishes PAR from other modes of research. Gray (2004: 379) underlines that unlike experimental research, PAR “is not an attempt to identify causal relationships between variables. It is trying to identify the kinds of actions that can lead to positive change”. PAR also differs from positivist forms of research in which researchers try to avoid active involvement in the community and go to the extent of having research reports written in the third person in order to reduce bias, all in the name of enhancing objectivity (Babbie and Mouton 2005: 326). PAR recognises the subjectivity of the researcher and accepts his/her values, objectives and viewpoints as important in the research. It is worth reiterating that PAR researchers work towards achieving the type of change to which they aspire.

The expectation of desired outcomes in PAR is observed by Ngwenya when he writes that:

There is no attempt by the researcher(s) for objectivity by distancing oneself/themselves from the situation. The very selection of PAR as a research approach is an indication of the nature of outcome expected by the researchers. Proponents of the approach firmly believe that social change is best determined and achieved by those individuals who are involved in a particular activity (Ngwenya 2014: 101; see also Bhana 2014: 430).

The above assertion is in line with the view of PAR as “a way of working that helps us to identify the things we believe in and then work systematically and collaboratively one step at a time, to making them come true” (MicNiff et al. 1996 cited in Gray 2004: 380). Desired change, however, can only come about through a combination of the technical efforts of the researcher and the practical contributions of the local participants.

8.6.1 Emancipation through democratic participation
PAR therefore entails thoroughly examining an existing situation and taking action to change it positively for the benefit of the affected community. Most situations involve injustices that need to be corrected, bringing about the emancipation of communities. Emancipation involves the freeing of the local communities from the ‘shackles’ of ignorance, impotence, or fear characterising their situation. Once the participants have been made aware of their situation, they can develop liberated minds that are able to critically reflect, question and to continuously enquire. This resembles what Gaventa and Cornwall (2001) have called the development of ‘critical consciousness’, which helps the locals to make positive inputs in the decisions that affect their lives. As Ngwenya (2014) rightly points out the emancipation of communities becomes a political process, since it has consequences far beyond the researcher and the participants involved alone.

Experience has shown that local people, because they are often perceived as ignorant, are commonly reduced to being mere recipients of interventions resulting from the research done by outsiders. PAR addresses this problem by creating a conducive environment for participants and their local communities to become more autonomous, by learning how to solve their own problems and develop their own leaders. Where the objective of autonomy is achieved, external resources, including expertise, are brought in only as supplements in the process of mobilising people’s own resources and skills (Babbie and Mouton (2005: 324).

Emancipation can only come about if there is democratic interaction between researchers and local participants, which depends on the real power balance that exists between the parties involved in the research. The link between the emancipatory goal of action research and the democratic process is captured in the following quote:

The primary goal of transformation driven by the research participants makes collaboration a central topic, in which the core characteristics of collaboration between researcher and participants are seen as a democratic process. Even so, there are challenges and dilemmas concerning the question of power in the research collaboration, and important issues are the role of the researcher and the balance of power between the researcher and the participants (Löfland et al., 2004; Ladkin, 2004). In order to realise the emancipatory intention, participation must be based on democracy and participants’ involvement as equal members. Participation is purely symbolic if the participants are invited to collaborate but underlying interests do not serve democracy and a balanced power between the researcher and participants (Borg et al., 2012) [Aasgaard et al 2012: 1-2].

8.6.2 Empowerment
Successful PAR does not only result in “a better understanding of a problem, nor even successful action to eliminate the problem, but also raised awareness in people of their own abilities and resources to mobilise for social action. This is known as empowerment” (Bhana 2014: 438). Empowerment is closely related to emancipation and in most cases the former serves as a pre-requisite to the latter. Empowerment is particularly important and is an ethical requirement in research involving vulnerable, oppressed and minority groups (Marsh et al. 2008: 723). Through it participants attain new skills which subsequently enable them to analyse their own situation and problems, and devise solutions for such problems. The following quote states it succinctly:

[Empowerment is a key to all other issues in PAR. It is accorded such a high priority that PAR could be seen primarily as a research approach for empowering participants and only secondary as a methodology for producing research in the conventional sense. PAR is therefore, considered to be inquiry as empowerment (Babbie and Mouton 2005: 322).

PAR is a learning process for participants regarding things that they might have missed in formal education settings, which is the reason why non-formal education is emphasized as the central objective of PAR. It empowers participants in a number of ways that Babbie and Mouton (2005: 323) summarise as follows. First is the basic learning which involves acquisition of new skills, ranging from basic literacy to data analysis. Second is learning to discover new knowledge which involves discovery of “specific insights, new understandings, and new possibilities. This results in knowledge upon which to construct power for the participants and their organizations and which is used to enhance the grip of the participants on their own lives”(ibid). Third is learning to be self-reflexive and critical. This provides the participants knowledge to learn to critically analyse their own particular situations and problems and subsequently devise solutions and new possibilities for action.

8.6.3 Elimination of social problems

A final objective of PAR is to bring positive change by addressing social problems in a way that will significantly improve the conditions and welfare of the affected people. It is noteworthy however, that social problems will never be entirely eliminated. The choice of issues to be addressed through PAR therefore has to be confined to those that the research team can effectively address, since the objective is to find practical, workable solutions to particular problems (Bhana 2014: 439). The correct choice will reduce the chances of failure that might lead to a feeling of
disempowerment on the part of the people involved. It therefore, is important that ambitious changes be planned by means of small achievable goals. Grant et al. (2008: 596) advise that “in social change work, it is important to achieve ‘small wins’ rather than expecting large-scale change to occur dramatically”. The ultimate goal of PAR is the emergence of autonomous movements that can continue with the project – even beyond the duration of action research - to solve other social problems in an ongoing process that reduces dependence on external change agents.

8.7 Issues of methodology in PAR

All empirical research uses different methods of data and information gathering. The following quote explains how PAR does it:

PAR is multidisciplinary and eclectic because of its applied and problem-solving nature. The research methods PAR mobilizes must therefore be tailored to each specific situation and should be adapted to what the participants jointly believe to be relevant to reach their objectives, for example, measures should be generated in response to the local situation. As a result, PAR must be structured differently in different settings, which explains its use in practice of a wide array of research methods and techniques (Babbie and Mouton (2005: 325).

PAR recognises traditional methods like document analysis as proper sources of data because it provides essential background information and helps researchers to avoid duplication of past efforts. PAR, however, also utilises a whole range of other expressive forms of data including song, dance, and theatre (Babbie and Mouton 2005: 326). It is important that data collection should be as comprehensive as possible, because important insights may only emerge once the data is being analysed (Gray 2004: 381).

8.7.1 Preference for qualitative data

PAR can use both quantitative and qualitative research methods. However, it draws more on qualitative methods and takes into account that view-points and practices in the field are different because of the different subjective perspectives and social backgrounds related to them (Flick 2014: 16). PAR therefore gives preference to qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. It compels researchers to move away from ‘positivist inquiry’ which “emphasises the search for universal laws of human behaviour, quantification in measurement, and in definition of ‘objectivity’ which requires a distance between the researcher and the research subjects” (Babbie
Qualitative methods have various advantages as Sarantakos (2005: 45) notes when he writes that qualitative research “focuses on contextuality, with the aim of gaining an impression of the context, its logic, its arrangements, its explicit/implicit rules.” Use of qualitative methods therefore provides change agents an elaborated and richer understanding of the case within which they are working, which is vital, since experiences are highly subjective and need to be interpreted and understood within the context in which they occur.

Data collection should be as comprehensive as possible. The wide range of data gathering tools that can be used includes interviews (individual and focus groups), participant and non-participant observation, informal meetings and document analysis (ibid). In the application of these methods data is generated by recording what is happening, including the participants’ own, reactions, and impressions of what is going on.

Table 10 below provides a summary of qualitative data collection methods and techniques that Babbie and Mouton (2005) call ‘newer and unconventional’ methods.

### Table 10: Unconventional techniques for data collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of technique</th>
<th>Methods utilised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective research techniques</td>
<td>Periodic meetings - camps or peoples’ workshops - in which participants collect and systemise information on a group basis. These meetings constitute important sources of data and objective knowledge of facts as participants have been found to perform better as a group. Dialogue is a key notion in PAR as participation is perceived in terms of a continuous dialogue. This dialogue takes the form of small group discussions and argumentation and consensus meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical recovery of history</td>
<td>Interviews in the form of witness accounts by older members of the community. The primary goal is that data and facts are discovered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which correct, complement, or clarify official or academic accounts written with other class interests or biases in mind.

Participants build the records of their own improvements or progress.
Personal journals are kept of
Participants’ changing activities and practices.
The changes in the social relationships and forms of organisation which characterise and constrain their practices.
The development of their expertise in PAR

Source: Babbie and Mouton (2005: 327-8).

The above shows that qualitative methods derive from vernacular traditions of communication and dissemination of knowledge that include interviews and observation. Open interviews and dialogue sessions (group discussions) are methods central to PAR and are the source from which change agents learn to understand the context within which the study project can be implemented.

PAR can, however, also make use of quantitative data collection methods such as surveys or censuses. There are nevertheless two preconditions that have to be met for these methods to fit in with PAR. According to Babbie and Mouton (2005: 327) “such surveys should be ‘simple’ enough that the participants are able to take an active part in data collection or even conduct the survey by themselves; and the information be analysed, or at least be made sense of from the perspective of the community”.

8.7.2 Validity in action research

In order to adequately achieve the objective of bringing about positive change that solves social problems, it must be ensured that the research instruments utilised actually measure what is intended, i.e. that they are valid measures. Validity implies “the degree to which data in a research study are accurate and credible” (Gray 2004: 407). Validity differs in quantitative and qualitative research, but in both approaches it serves the purpose of checking on the quality of the data, the results, and the interpretation. In qualitative research such as action research, “the focus is more on validity to determine whether the account provided by the researcher and the participants is accurate, can be trusted, and is credible” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985 cited in Creswel and Clark, 2011: 211). Validity in traditional and action research differs in certain respects:

The focus of traditional social inquiry regarding validity is on two issues—generalisation and causality—which is basically the quest for prediction and control of events. From this perspective, research is seen as valid if the researcher can make
defensible general causal inferences. This is not the emphasis of participatory action research. McTaggart (1998: 214) notes that, like all sciences, PAR must submit to the testing of arguments, evidence and conceptual coherence, but a consensus on how these knowledge claims are to be examined needs to be arrived at through negotiation. Another point is that social science aims to be educative. The production of knowledge only is not enough; it must also have a pedagogical purpose as well, and it must also address what McTaggart calls ‘political efficacy and prudence’. The last is perhaps what PAR does better than other approaches because it is intentional in seeking change as the key to enhanced understanding as well as enhanced practice. (Ngwenya 2014: 106).

According to Gray (2004: 91) the issue of validity is complex and can best be defined in terms of the seven types summarised below.

**Internal validity** refers to correlation questions and to the extent to which causal conclusions can be drawn. This implies an extent to which one is able to say that no other variables except the one being studied caused the result.

**External validity** implies an extent to which the results of a study can be generalised to other situations and to other people. It is mostly important in experimental and quasi-experimental studies where sampling is required and where the potential for generalising findings is often an issue.

**Criterion validity** is where a comparison is made of how people have answered a new measure of a concept, with existing, widely accepted measures of a concept. It therefore measures how well one measure predicts an outcome for another measure.

** Construct validity** relates to the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the operationalizations in a study to the theoretical constructs on which those operationalizations were based.

**Content validity** is associated with validating the content of a test or examination. It helps create a match between what is taught and what is tested.

**Predictive validity** is concerned with an extent to which a score on a scale or test predicts scores of some criterion measure. It shows how well a test can forecast a future trait such as job performance or attainment.
**Statistical validity** relates to an extent to which a statistical study is able to draw conclusions that are in agreement with statistical and scientific laws.

Focusing specifically on a qualitative research, Creswel and Clark (2011) note that, qualitative validity comes from the analysis procedures of the researcher, based on information gleaned while visiting with participants, as well as from external reviewers. They further note that there are various strategies of data collection and qualitative researchers typically use more than one of them. The first of these strategies is called ‘member checking’ or communicative validation: Here the researcher “takes the summaries of the findings (e.g., case studies, major themes, theoretical model) back to the key participants in the study and asks them whether the findings are an accurate reflection of their experiences” (Creswel and Clark 2011: 210, see also Steinke 2004: 185). The second strategy is triangulation. This is a common strategy that implies the use of complementary methods, theories, data and investigators in order to compensate for any one-sidedness or distortion that may result from an individual method, theory, database, or researcher (Steinke 2004: 185).

Reporting of disconfirming evidence is the third validity strategy used in qualitative research. This is the information that presents a perspective that is contrary to the one indicated by the established evidence. According to Creswel and Clark (2011: 212) reporting of disconfirming evidence is important as it “in fact confirms the accuracy of the data analysis, because in real life, we expect the evidence of the themes to diverge and include more than just positive information”. This implies that researchers should never shy away from including in their reports this type of information. The fourth strategy involves the engagement of other people to examine the data collected. These may be peers who are familiar with qualitative research as well as the content area of that particular research, external auditors, or individuals not affiliated with the project and who review the database and qualitative results using their own criteria (ibid).

It is important that the principles of validity be put to test at different stages of the research. Whittemore et al (2001) provide a useful check list (see Table 11) below of how it can be done.

**Table 11: Techniques for demonstrating validity**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of technique</th>
<th>Technique</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design considerations</td>
<td>Developing a self-conscious research design</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sampling decisions (i.e. sampling adequacy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.8 Conclusion

I have explained action research in detail in this chapter as the chosen mode of research for my study. The term action research was coined in the 1960s by Kurt Lewin to imply a type of research emphasising more than the mere understanding of a problem, but also and more importantly to seek solutions to such practical problems, so that the researcher also serves as an agent of change. We have seen that action research has been incorporated into the broader stream of what is now commonly known as ‘participatory action research’ (PAR). We have also noted that participation involves both the researcher together with local participants, who interact as co-researchers within a democratic environment characterised by mutual respect, free deliberations and constant sharing of information. Advisory Boards/Groups are constituted from participants in the local community to serve as leading partners and interlocutors in the study project.

PAR is a goal-oriented process whose objectives can be summed up as emancipation through democratic participation, empowerment, as well as elimination of social problems. As a mode of research PAR can utilise both quantitative and qualitative methods, but is predominantly qualitative in nature.

The next chapter will present and discuss the research design chosen for the demilitarisation study in Lesotho.
CHAPTER 9
APPLYING PARTICIPATORY ACTION RESEARCH

9. 1. Introduction

This chapter discusses further the rationale for the choice of Participatory Action Research (PAR) as the approach for this study. It touches on issues of methodology, validity and reliability, as well as the ethical considerations that guided the research. It describes how the Advisory Group was constituted, followed by the research story as it began to unfold. This study is built on both qualitative and action research; qualitative because it sought the views of the participants about the role of the military in Lesotho with regard to the building, or breaking down of peace in the country. It was action research in that it involved participation that was aimed at bringing change to the existing situation. It is these two types of research that will be discussed here.
9.2 Qualitative research

Qualitative research is according to Babbie and Mouton (2001: 270), a generic social research approach which takes as its point of departure the insider’s own perspective on social action. The actions of the participants are described in great detail, and seeks to understand them in terms of the actors’ own beliefs, history, and context (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 271). A similar view shows that a qualitative research “demonstrates the variety of perspectives on the object and starts from the subjective and social meanings related to it. … Qualitative research takes into account that view-points and practices in the field are different because of the different subjective perspectives and social backgrounds related to them” (Flick 2014: 16).

Theoretically, qualitative research is premised on the perception of reality, and of human beings. The two are summarised by Sarantakos (2005: 42) as follows:

- Perception of reality
Reality is considered to be subjective, constructed, multiple and diverse. Reality is experienced internally, and resides in the minds of people who construct it; hence each person constructs his/her own reality, which is therefore subjective. Following this, there are as many realities as there are people, and since people perceive the world in different ways, their realities are different.

- Perception of human beings.
Human beings occupy a central position; they create the meaning systems of events and with these they construct reality. They are not non-participant observers, but active creators of their world… patterns and regularities of behaviour emerge as a result of social conventions, established through interaction.

This study is qualitative because it aims to get an in-depth understanding of the participants’ views about the military in Lesotho, and their understanding of demilitarisation as a potential process of reform for the country. It is important to understand the views of the participants in their own context as they come from different sectors of Basotho society so they might have different views about the military and demilitarisation possibilities. That is, having different realities, according to Sarantakos (2005). The qualitative data in this study was gathered through various methods that included observations, interviews and discussions. Interviews were held with various individuals purposively selected on the basis of their familiarity with the issues being researched. But discussions of different kinds were also held such as group discussions, radio shows, conferences,
seminars and workshops. The value of qualitative data lies in the fact that it is “a source of well-grounded rich descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts, … findings of qualitative data have a quality of undeniability…” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 1).

9.2.1 Action research

This research was conducted within the Peacebuilding paradigm which aims to go beyond only gaining new knowledge, but also to put such knowledge to use in order to bring change. This requires “an applied research orientated towards bringing about change, involving respondents in the process of investigation, and particularly in the implementation of the findings” (Sarantakos 2005: 423). Action research has as its primary objective to identify a specific social problem, and then to undertake research in order to identify effective means and action which could solve it (Henn et al 2009: 66). Of great importance is that it ‘is collaborative and participative, and emphasises the involvement of both researcher and the research participant(s) in the research process (ibid).

It is important to mention that it was not my intention at the beginning of the research for my degree to adopt PAR. In fact, I had very little knowledge of what action research entails prior to my enrolling at the Durban University of Technology (DUT), where I became convinced that it was the appropriate approach for my study. What persuaded me was its appeal of aiming beyond just gaining knowledge, but using the acquired knowledge to bring change, and thus “finding a solution to a local problem in a local setting” (Leedy and Ormrod 2001: 114). In this way I found action research to be addressing the problem of the results of good research lying idle in university libraries when their findings and recommendations are never utilised.

I personally have two such research studies lying idle at two universities. One is a written requirement for a Bachelor of Art Degree and lies in the library of the National University of Lesotho (NUL). The other was submitted for a Masters of Arts at the University of the Western Cape (UWC). Action research avoids this academic wastage by “building research elements into change-oriented programmes with the aim of achieving fruitful interaction between the accumulation of evidence and the implementation of the projects” (Davies 2007: 34). Once researchers have identified and understood a problem, it becomes easier to achieve change, but it will not change unless action is taken.
The action research component of this study was put into effect when the views of the participants were used to inform the design and implementation of the action research plan aimed at demilitarising Lesotho, and the recognition that it was going to be a long term process since demilitarisation can never be achieved instantaneously. It is a complex process since it involves a variety of factors and forces including that it is likely to face resistance from social groups that are benefitting from the status quo, and a hostile political environment because of the power of the army. The long term view is supported by an appreciation that action research “uses continuing cycles of investigation designed to reveal effective solutions to issues and problems experienced in specific situations and localized settings. In doing so it also seeks to build a body of knowledge that enhances professional and community practices and works to increase the well-being of the people involved” (Stringer 2014: 1)

PAR calls for the involvement of participants in all stages of research, from the identification of the problem right to the dissemination of the findings. This requirement could, however, not be fully satisfied in this study, because like many other universities, DUT leans towards the traditional scientific research paradigm which demands that a proposal be submitted before the approval of a research topic. So, the problem identification is inevitably done singlehandedly by the applicant. I was as a result forced to continue with the initial stages of my research within the DUT campus, hundreds of kilometres away from my potential PAR co-researchers with the hope that they would later appreciate my predicament. The dilemma I found myself in is well described by Janet Moore when she writes:

“I want to practice PAR for the principles it espouses and yet I fear that I will create paradigmatic battles in my doctoral research with this type of direction in my research. I am also aware that I do not have the time (and perhaps patience) for engaging in a truly participatory study. I am required to write a research proposal with research questions, research problems and a direction for the research, none of which involves the participants of the study. If I were to wait until this stage were completed I would risk not completing my doctoral programme within a reasonable timeframe (Moore 2004: 158 cited in Ngwenya 2014: 120).

By the time I met my PAR participants, important elements of the research such as the research questions and general direction of the study had already been decided. All these issues were however, extensively discussed with the participants in Lesotho to bring them on board regarding the purposes and methodology of the study and convince them their participation and contribution to the action part of the study is vital. This was not a difficult task as all five of the advisory group members were familiar with the way in which post-graduate studies in universities function. The
engagement of the advisory group composed of Lesotho nationals hence was in line with what Leedy and Ormrod (2001: 114) have described as the focus on “finding a solution to a local problem in a local setting”.

9.3 Advisory Group

I grew up and have lived in Lesotho ever since, so I am fairly conversant with the country’s issues, but it has been important for me to get the support of an advisory group of local participants who are also, and possibly more familiar with Lesotho’s military situation, so that I purposively identified five suitable people who were well acquainted with the military. According to Creswell (2008: 214) “in purposeful sampling, researchers intentionally select individuals and sites to learn or understand the central phenomenon. The standard used in choosing participants and sites is whether they are ‘information rich’”. The need to choose intentionally-identified individuals is also noted by Babbie and Mouton (2001: 202) who write that “purposive sampling allows the researcher to use his/her own judgement in selection of sample members conversant with the issue”.

I then identified members for the advisory group, namely a Professor from the National University of Lesotho who has published extensively on democracy, the military and conflict; a retired citizen who earlier in his career served the country in various capacities including being a diplomat, government secretary, and an active politician, and who has also contributed articles about the Lesotho military to various newspapers. The third was a former principal secretary in the Ministry of Defence and National Security who has also published various articles about the military in both local and international newspapers. The fourth member was an independent professional consultant who deals mostly with issues of public participation. The last member was a former member of the Upper House of the Lesotho’s National Assembly who is also a long time civil society activist. I am deeply indebted to these men who were prepared to sacrifice their time amidst busy schedules to offer assistance, despite a not-so-favourable political climate, as highlighted in section 9.4.1 below.

9.4 The research story

I focus here on the different issues that had to be taken into account at the commencement of the action research process, including the highly polarised political environment during the time of
the research, in which the military were playing a big part. The advisory group assisted me in developing a vision of what Lesotho could become, as well as how that vision could be realised.

### 9.4.1 Research in a politically polarised environment

A stable environment characterised by the prevalence of essential freedoms such as those of speech, movement, and association is one of the basic prerequisites for a successful research project. This is essential because the data researchers get from the local participants is vital in order “to provide workable solutions to immediate concerns and to develop local human capacities” (Ozanne and Saatcioglu 2008: 425). As it is the underlying assumption that ‘solutions lie in the local’, it becomes imperative that inputs to the solutions be made freely without any fear of intimidation. It therefore goes without saying that an intimidating environment can prove a hurdle to a meaningful research as the participants will neither be free to avail themselves for research activities, nor freely provide the essential data.

In reality, however, our research was conducted within an intimidating and politically polarised environment. Being on demilitarisation, the research focussed directly on the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) which had not only become involved in politics, but had also become very controversial due to its violation of human rights. The research was conducted at a time when Lesotho was suffering from great political instability as a result from, among others the intrusion of the LDF into the country’s politics when it helped to bring to a pre-mature end the three-party coalition government that resulted from the 2012 general elections. Formed out of the All Basotho Convention (ABC), Basotho National Party (BNP), and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), this government relinquished power following the February 2015 snap elections that were necessitated by the instability within the coalition government, in which the defence force played a big part (Letsie 2015: 106-7).

The LDF was evidently working closely with the second biggest LCD party in the coalition, and supported the party’s ministers who had defied decisions that were taken regarding them by the then prime minister. High ranking officials within the LCD and the LDF were both facing criminal charges at the time. The LCD leader Mothejoa Metsing and secretary general Sedibe Mochoboroane faced corruption charges that their party described as politically-motivated, and as a witch hunt by the ABC leader and the country’s then Prime Minister Thomas Thabane, whom they accused of using state organs to fight his political battles and humiliate his opponents (Tefo 2014). Some high-ranking LDF officials were also facing numerous charges, including bombings,
attempted murder and murder. The LDF commander, Lt Gen Tlali Kamoli himself reportedly had a case of high treason investigated against him after the events of 30 August 2014 (News 24 2014). In a manner that highly compromised the rule of law in the country, the LDF refused to hand over the officers suspected of crimes to the police, which they accused of being aligned to Prime Minister Thabane and his party, ABC.

As tension between Thabane and the army commander Lt General Tlali Kamoli intensified, the former advised His Majesty King Letsie III to dismiss the latter, in accordance with the country’s constitution. The dismissal was effected through a government gazette on the 29th August 2014. Kamoli, however, refused to leave the army commander’s office and denied his appointed successor Lt General Ma-aparankoe Mahao to take over his position. On the night following the dismissal of its commander, the LDF launched attacks on several police stations in the capital Maseru as well as on the State House. One police officer was killed and several others wounded in the attacks. Several police weapons were also confiscated by the LDF during the attacks. Prime Minister Thabane was on his part forced to flee the country for a few days, only to come back under the guard of the South African security agencies. Parliament was dissolved with the facilitation of SADC and a snap election called for February 2015.

Following the February 2015 elections Thabane’s government was replaced by a seven-party coalition government under the premiership of former Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, the leader of the Democratic Congress (DC). Mosisili on a number of occasions thanked the army for ‘bringing his government into office’. In what appeared to be a gesture of reciprocation by the new government to the army, he reversed Mahao’s appointment and re-appointed Kamoli as the commander of the LDF through a Government Gazette dated 21st May 2015 (Mohloboli, 2015 (b)). Kamoli’s reappointment was retrospective to the 29th August 2014, the day he was fired (ibid). Remember that although legally dismissed, Lt General Kamoli had refused to vacate office. Re-appointment was therefore only a way of formalising the status quo and simply offered impunity to the LDF soldiers accused of criminal activities.

The result was that the LDF came to be perceived by many Basotho as being above the law. It was for this reason that several would-be participants in my research project hesitated, and then declined to be part of the research because of its focus on the army, despite my assurance that it was an academic study aimed at bringing about peaceful change to Lesotho. However, despite the observable signs of fear of possible reprisals, the advisory group was finally established as seen in section 9.3.
The political situation in Lesotho is mostly polarised along party lines. There is hardly ever any consensus between members of the ruling parties and those in the opposition. The role of the army has contributed immensely to this political polarity, which “spans from its politicisation and use by incumbent leaders as an instrument not only to ward off external threat, but also to emasculate internal opposition” (Matlosa and Pule 2001: 65). Because of the role it played in the post-2012 government’s era, the army has come to be praised by the members of the seven parties forming the 2015-coalition government, while at the same time being demonised by the members of the opposition parties. This is evident during phone-in programmes on the radio when callers air their sharply differing views about the army. The sad part of this polarity has been the erosion of objectivity in the emotionally charged debates about the army. It hence has been difficult to maintain my own impartiality during the research.

9.5 Planning for demilitarisation journey: the advisory group in action

The first meeting of the advisory group was scheduled for 18th February 2016 at the Institute of Extra Mural Studies (IEMS) of the National University of Lesotho (NUL) in Maseru, where officials provided an office for our meeting without any charge. The choice of the university campus as venue was motivated by the consideration that meeting at any other venue other than the academic setting would probably be interpreted by state agents as being ‘political’. As it happens, only two of the five advisory group members managed to show up, making for a meeting of only three instead of six members. The attending members agreed to postpone the meeting to 13th March.

This was a blow for me, but as researcher I knew I had to exercise patience. The process finally began on Sunday 13th March as planned with two members sending their apologies so that we had only four members present instead of six. Details of what the research entails had been discussed separately with each participant during the invitation meetings, so with a short recap deliberations got underway. As Gray (2004) notes, ‘in all the phases of PAR participation between the change agent and the participants needs to be harmonious and characterised by an authentic and democratic collaboration’, and thus create an atmosphere characterised by trust and respect between the participants. Democratic participation is important because “rigorous action research depends on the quality of participation and the fair distribution of power in the relationship” (Ozanne and Saatcioglu 2008: 428).
The calibre and status of the other members created a challenge for me. Rather than being ‘equals’, I at times felt intimidated by the fact that I had to play the leading role in a group that included such highly qualified individuals. However, as time went on they seemed to take it upon themselves to put me at ease and give me greater confidence. The professor would keep reminding me that “we were learning together as action research was not common in many universities”. I eventually settled and developed a good bond with all the members of the advisory group. The process began with all participants having pledged their commitment and desire to contribute to the effort aimed at bringing about peaceful change with regard to the state of the military in Lesotho. The development of a vision and the strategies of achieving peaceful change became the main goal of the deliberations.

Our task was to come up with a ‘blue print for a peaceful revolution’ as described by Popovic (2015). He identifies the different stages of the process as follows:

- **Development of a vision**

An action directed to bring about social change needs to be driven by a clear understanding of what the post-change situation needs to look like. There is therefore always a need for clear strategic planning to achieve the desired change. A strategic plan, according to Sharp (2003) consists of the understanding of the context in which the struggle is to be waged, which means assessing where one is at the moment and determining where one wants to get to in the future. It also includes the assessment of likely impediments to achieving the desired goal. Strategic planning further involves a thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both the group intending to bring about peaceful change and possible resistance that there might be to such change. A clear strategic plan is essential since haphazard implementation of an action plan may result in dismal failure. As Sharp rightly observes, “the more important the goal, or the graver the consequences of failure, the more important planning becomes” (2003: 40).

- **Building (more) alliances**

As part of the strategic plan, there is a need to appreciate that bringing about social change requires a concerted effort from different societal groups. It is for this reason that there is a need to engage other relevant social groups in efforts to bring about change. As they say ‘unity is power’.

- **Picking up small battles**
Usually, people are adverse to change, particularly if such change involves well established practices and, or institutions. People normally do not envisage any meaningful pattern of life outside of what has become a norm to them. This is the feeling that Popovic (2015) describes as “it can never happen here”. Even when they are made aware of change in other settings, people who are too accustomed to a certain status quo will simply not accept that change can occur in their own setting. It is therefore important for those wanting to bring change, to undertake small peaceful initiatives that will make people aware of the feasibility of the planned process and change. Furthermore, agents of change need to encourage local people to believe that they can themselves become agents of change. Such initiatives should not threaten anyone. Popovic (2015) says it is important that where possible such initiatives should involve an element of fun - laughterism (sic).

Deliberations of the advisory group on the development of a vision sought to create an atmosphere in which every member felt free to agree or disagree with any issue that was raised. The following paragraphs tell how the advisory group went about strategising on how to start moving toward bringing about demilitarisation.

### 9.5.1 Development of a vision

In line with Sharp’s view (2003), that understanding the context is a prerequisite for the development of a clear vision, the group decided to go down the timeline of figuring out ‘where we come from’, ‘where we are now’, and to agree on where ‘we want to be going to’. All the members agreed that the presence of the army was a major impediment in the quest to bring peace in every sense in the country, which necessitated reconsideration of the status of the military in Lesotho. . The vision agreed upon was thus of ‘an army-less and politically stable Lesotho that is free of violence and provides good opportunities for human development’. The call for an army-less Lesotho was based on an assessment of the current situation and the following problems created by the presence of the army.

- **Historically irrelevant army**

The advisory group recalled why the Lesotho army was established in 1979, 13 years after independence, in response to the politics of the time, both domestic and international. Domestically, Lesotho was under the illegitimate authoritarian rule of Dr Leabua Jonathan who
had annulled elections in 1970 and set up a de facto one party state. His oppressive rule forced some members of the opposition parties to go into exile in South Africa and neighbouring countries. It was from exile that members of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), assisted by the South African Defence Force, launched raids into Lesotho through its armed wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). The LDF was then formed, mainly to defend the country from such attacks.

This happened during the Cold War era when international politics was characterised by polarity between the East and the West. After having had a close relationship with the West, the Jonathan-led government turned more toward the East and began supporting the liberation struggle in South Africa. The liberation movement was seen by the South African apartheid regime, which was aligned to the West, as Communist and ‘terrorist’ groups, which is why the SADF supported the LLA incursions into Lesotho. However, the SADF also launched direct attacks on the country in 1982 and 1985. These developments were the rationale for justifying the creation of an own Defence Force., and it did not prove too demanding for Lesotho as it got a lot of arms in the form of aid from different countries aligned to both East and West, as each camp wanted to lure Lesotho. Like many other newly independent countries, Lesotho had joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), hence its ability to enjoy the support of both camps.

With the return of the political exiles to Lesotho and the resultant transition of the country to democratic rule in 1993, domestic politics hardly justified the maintenance of an army. Most importantly, with the end of apartheid rule in South Africa in 1994, there was no longer the threat of any external aggression. This meant that there was no longer the need or justification for having an army, even though its record up to that point did not inspire much confidence in its capacity to carry out its mandate of ensuring the safety of the country’s citizens, which became evident on 9th December 1982, the day on which the SADF raided Maseru without any resistance from the Lesotho army and 42 people, 30 South Africans and 12 locals, were killed.

A similar raid was repeated, still without any resistance from the LDF, in December 1985 when nine people were killed by the SADF. There were other occasions when the Lesotho military failed to protect Citizens, such as during the Papal visit in 1988 when a bus carrying worshipers was hijacked by elements affiliated to the LLA. Again, in 1998 the LDF was easily overpowered when it tried to resist another armed intervention by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The South African army came to be known as the National Defence Force after the democratisation of the country in 1994. In intervening in Lesotho SANDF, was acting on behalf
of SADC and was later joined by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), although the latter was never involved in any active confrontation with the LDF.

The advisory group agreed that in the light of all of the above Lesotho would be more secure if it explored other defence alternatives than the military, which would include strengthening of the Lesotho Mounted Police Services (LMPS) and its Special Operations Unit (SOU) in particular to deal with any serious internal disorder. This, the advisory group noted, would not be anything new, since the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), the paramilitary wing of the Lesotho police, carried such responsibilities before the LDF came into being.

Signing a defence pact with its only immediate neighbour - South Africa - was another option that Lesotho could consider. This, one member suggested, could be similar to the defence pact that Costa Rica entered with its neighbours when it disbanded its army in 1948. The signing of such a pact, it was suggested, would in fact only formally recognise what was already a reality, since Lesotho is wholly surrounded by South Africa and no external attack can be directed without passing through South Africa. The role of South Africa in the defence of Lesotho is noted by the Military Balance (2014) that opines that “South Africa is actually the security guarantor of Lesotho”. South African forces have in the past demonstrated this when they assisted in quelling uprisings in Lesotho.

Prime Minister Mosisili had on various occasions defended the army, arguing that it “does not defend the country through weapons only, but also through engagement in developmental projects” (see Ntsukunyane 2016). The advisory group however, held a different view than Mosisili. One of the members commented that ‘a closer look at the involvement of the LDF in social activities reveals that such involvement is aimed more at building the army’s disputable image than helping the communities’.

- **Financially costly army**

The advisory group also examined the financial implications of maintaining the LDF, and agreed that the low economic status of Lesotho was one of the main reasons for calling that the LDF should be disbanded. Lesotho remains one of the poorest countries in the world whose economic survival in large measure depends on foreign aid. The group, however, noted that despite this precarious situation, Lesotho channels an ‘unjustifiably huge chunk’ of around five per cent of its yearly budget to the military (see Budget Speeches 2014/2015 and 2015/2016). One group
member, a former Principal Secretary (PS) in the Ministry of Defence, Police and National Security reported that in 2015/16 financial year his ministry was allocated around M550 million. Out of this total, M398 million went to the LDF, the greater part of being spent on food and fuel because of the large fleet of vehicles that the army maintains.

The amount spent on food was corroborated by an army officer I interviewed earlier in 2016. The officer had indicated that the army consumes a minimum of seven cows a week, adding up to 336 per year, apart from other types such as mutton, chicken, and canned meats. Taking into account the bigger picture it was agreed that the money spent on the LDF amounted to misuse in so far as it does not in any way help to alleviate poverty, or yield any tangible returns.

The advisory group appreciated that with its 3500 officers and an average of 300 new recruits annually, the LDF was one of the most reliable sources of employment in Lesotho, but that the type of employment it offered was unproductive and unaffordable for a poor country that did not need their services. One member remarked that army officers are actually under-employed because they never make full use of the military skills they have acquired. The training itself is expensive, and is provided at the taxpayers’ expense, yet they may never have the opportunity to exercise their military skills in actual combat. The duties currently performed by the army can be carried out at much less cost by other government departments such as the police.

- Army’s involvement in political conflict

In assessing ‘where the country is at present’, the advisory group identified the continuing involvement of the Lesotho army in political conflict as the major reason why the army needs to be done away with. Various incidents of political conflict involving the army were recalled by the members. First was the January 1986 coup in which the army dislodged Chief Jonathan’s government. One member commented that although this coup is usually downplayed by some people because of its bloodless nature, the coup was an unacceptable anomaly as the army is never trained to rule. The second incident that exposed the army’s unwarranted involvement in politics was the 1994 crisis in which the army factions took up arms against each other, cabinet ministers were detained by the army, and the deputy prime minister was cold bloodedly assassinated by the army (see Pule 2002: 201).

Third was the 1998 political uprising in which the opposition political parties revolted against the Lesotho Congress for Democracy’s government and eventually paralysed the state administration.
Despite having maintenance of law and order as one of its functions, the army flatly refused to assist the police in quelling the unrest. The bystander role of the army in this debacle is described in the following quote:

“What was shocking to note in this state of anarchy was the role of the members of the military. During the unfolding of this political saga, members of the military were visible in and around Maseru presumably with the purpose of keeping law and order. As things turned violent as a result of forced stay-aways and clashes between the protesters and the supporters of the government, members of the military hardly intervened” (Mothibe 1999: 57).

Lastly, the group noted the role of the army in the political conflict that has rocked the country since 2014, when Lesotho was under the rule of the coalition government composed of the All Basotho Convention, Basotho National Party, and Lesotho Congress for Democracy.

Notable events of this period include the refusal of the army to hand over to the police officers suspected of criminal offences; the refusal by the army commander to leave office when dismissed by the King in line with the Lesotho Defence Force Act 1996; the raid by the army in August on state house resulting in the prime minister skipping the country fearing for his life; the raid on three police stations in Maseru resulting in the death of one police officer and injury of others, as well as the confiscation of the police guns; the brutal assassination of the former army commander Maaparankoe Mahao in June 2015. All these incidents, and others, manifest how the army itself can become a threat to peace, and to law and order in the country.

The group further sought to establish the real reasons behind the army’s treasonous conduct. A few explanations were offered. The first is related to the establishment of the army itself. A member explained the conduct of the army in terms of it being formed to fight a domestic group - Basutoland Congress Party’s armed wing - Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). This laid the foundation for giving incumbent political leadership a sense of entitlement to use the army as a repressive machine against fellow politicians, rather than serving the nation at large. This explanation fits the argument that most African states militarise because of internal political considerations, principally to ensure compliance from groups that question the legitimacy of the state; hence, to repress the ‘enemy within’ (Thomas and Mazrui 1992).

In addition to being used as a repressive machine against opposition politicians, a member added, the army provides protection to corrupt politicians, which is the reason they lack any inclination
to control the army, and that the army in the end becomes a law to itself, and thereby an enemy of the people. Without control and oversight from the government, there is no incentive for the army to develop a culture of professionalism. The member familiar with the running of the army claimed that despite the government subscribing to anti-corruption legislation, there is high level of nepotism and bias evident in appointments and promotions within the ranks of the army that the government has never attempted to correct. It is quite common to find children and close relatives of senior officials within the army ranks.

9.5.2 What needs to be done: Reformation or disbandment?

The advisory group focused next on ‘what needs to be done’. They observed the country in the current predicament had at least two options. The first and less drastic option would involve reforming the army. The second and more drastic would be to completely disband the army. Debates about whether armies need to be transformed or abolished, have been going on for a long time. Galtung (1996: 5) for example, argues that “the military has developed a range of ‘very bad habits’ but also has virtues such as good organisation, courage, willingness to sacrifice. The bad habits have to go; not necessarily the military, and certainly not the virtues”. His view is somewhat different from that of Dumas (2002) who believes that the military have to be abolished as they are incompatible with democratic principles. Arguing that it is impossible to transform the military due to its nature, he says:

People do not ordinarily relish the idea of killing other people ... Yet, stripped of the pomp and ceremony, of the uniforms and rituals, that is exactly what militaries are all about. Soldiers must be ready to kill or be killed or militaries cannot do what they have been designed to do. Military training ... is very much a process of social and psychological conditioning, designed to take away their individuality and train them to do what they are told. There is no room for questioning authority, no place for free and open debate ... It is difficult to see how militaries could be effective if they were not authoritarian organisations ... It is therefore very difficult for truly democratic political systems to develop and prosper in militarised societies (Dumas 2002: 19)

The above quote sheds light on the situation in Lesotho. The country’s ‘shaky’ democracy has found it extremely difficult to develop, let alone prosper, in the presence of the military. After a thorough analysis of the two options, reformation and disbandment, the advisory group agreed that the reformist road would not bring an end to the Lesotho army’s saga, and concluded that total disbandment would be the preferable option. They were convinced that the history of attempted reforms had failed to yield any results.
The past reforms included the assistance in the 1990s by the British government in attempts to professionalise the Lesotho army; establishment of the Ministry of Defence in 1994 with the aim of preserving maximum operational independence for the LDF, while ensuring democratic accountability and the need for ultimate political strategic control of the army (see Molise-Ramakoae 2002: 173); the enactment of the Lesotho Defence Force Act 1996 ‘whose objective was to provide for the command, control and administration of the Defence Force of Lesotho and to provide for incidental matters” (Mothibe 1999: 52, see also LDF Act 1996: 863); the engagement of the Indian Army Training Team (IATT) in 2001 to retrain and restructure the LDF.

It was evident that all these efforts to reform the army never yielded the anticipated results, and that demilitarisation would be the most appropriate option under the circumstances.

- Demilitarisation: issues to be considered

Sharp (2003) lists a number of considerations that agents of change need to bear in mind if they want to achieve their desired goal, which include the impediments they are likely to meet, and what their own strengths and weaknesses are. The advisory group were well aware that their calls for demilitarisation would meet a lot of resistance. They proceeded to identify the main likely sources of such resistance. The group agreed that it would come from the army itself and the interest groups who are currently benefiting from the activities of the army. Members of the army would most definitely feel threatened that the disbanding of the army would affect their employment and social standing, which is to be expected considering how scarce employment opportunities are in Lesotho. This raised the whole issue of how their redeployment and retrenchment could be handled in terms of Lesotho’s labour legislation.

There was the matter of retirement for those officers that are nearing retirement age. The suggestion was that the retirement packages of such members be calculated from the time that they would be due for retirement. The legal retirement age for members of the LDF is 55. There is, however, an early retirement option that they can utilise which comes in two forms. Firstly, members of the army can apply for a voluntary early retirement once they reach the age of 40 irrespective of the number of years of service. Secondly, members of the army become eligible for early retirement once they have completed 20 years of military service. The option of compulsory retirement, however, a group member pointed out, would mostly affect officers in the senior ranks. For those of lower age and rank, the recommendation would be retraining and redeployment to different government departments that would be able to utilise the skills they acquired during their training. Disbanding of the army would also call for improving the efficiency
of the police. The Lesotho Mounted Police Services would therefore be recommended as one of the departments to accommodate former army officers.

Re-training of the army officers earmarked for the police services would however be essential, and their performance upon joining the police be closely monitored to avoid the culture of violence so common in the army being transferred to the police. Recruitment would obviously also have to be stopped. To curb the increase of unemployment, the government would be advised to channel the money that had previously been allocated to the army to more productive and profitable development projects that could absorb former soldiers One member commented that he found it bizarre that the Lesotho government had frozen the recruitment of teachers, yet it was still taking 300 new recruits into the army every year.

- **Strategies for demilitarisation**

In developing strategies for demilitarisation, the advisory group bore in mind the complexity of the project to be initiated. History has often shown that societies do not easily accept change. There is always resistance to change, particularly when such change leads to an unknown situation. Resistance might not necessarily result from any benefit from the status quo, but because of ignorance and unfamiliarity regarding demilitarisation. However, as Sharp (2003) says, ‘there is always an alternative’. The group thus remained confident the demilitarisation process could be initiated and completed peacefully for the sake of the Basotho nation at large.

With the complexity of the project in mind, the advisory group concluded that the most meaningful way of kick-starting the demilitarisation project in Lesotho would require the sensitization of the nation about the project. This could be achieved through undertaking of initiatives that would make the people aware of the feasibility of demilitarisation and the role that they could play in bringing about the desired change. The saying goes that “every regime is held in place by a handful of pillars; apply enough pressure to one or more pillars and the whole system will collapse” (Popovic 2015: 86). It appears that the ignorance of the nation regarding demilitarisation is a pillar that has been helping to prop up the wasteful military in Lesotho. It implies that if people knew that there is life without the military, the whole military system would eventually collapse. The group concurred that it is necessary to offer peace education to various sectors of Basotho society.
Peace education is based on the premise that conflict and violence is present in some measure in all societies, and that there are means to address and transform such situations. The centrality of peace education in the eradication of violence in all its forms has been adequately summarised below:

Peace education, as a strategy for lasting peace on the macro level, relies on educating enough people within a given population to establish widespread support for peaceful policies. Everett Rodgers, a professor at Stanford University, showed in his studies how an idea or innovation spreads throughout society. The six stages of adoption that he has defined are attention, interest, evaluation, trial, adoption and confirmation. Individuals have to first become aware of a new idea, for example, through media exposure. Interest is developed, and a favourable or unfavourable attitude forms. The pros and cons of the idea are compared and the idea is tried out. A decision is then made to adopt or reject the idea. Finally, the individual seeks confirmation for a particular decision concerning the idea (Harris and Morrison 2003: 26)

Gene Sharp (2003) reminds us that one of the requirements for bringing a positive change is that the agents of change know their weaknesses. The group noticed that one of the most serious weaknesses likely to affect my action research was lack of numbers and the immediate capacity to attract them on my own. The importance of numbers is observed by Popovic (2015) when he writes that in a nonviolent struggle the only weapon change agents can have is numbers. In order to overcome the logistical problems of trying to build ‘consciousness’ among the Basotho, the group pointed to the need to make use of already established organisations that have access to the people. It was therefore agreed that various organisations and institutions be approached for this purpose. This, according to Sharp (2003)’s ‘blueprint’ for bringing a peaceful change, is called ‘building more alliances’. The organisations identified were the Development for Peace Education (DPE), Transformation Resource Centre (TRC) and the National University of Lesotho (NUL).

Formed by Sister Veronica Phafoli in 1989, Development for Peace Education (DPE) is a non-governmental organisation whose main is to “empower communities to transform their own world” (Shale, 2015). It operates in eight areas within seven Community Councils throughout Lesotho. DPE seeks to sensitise communities about burning national issues of the day, gathers their views about these issues, and uses them to influence public policy making by having consultations with relevant parliamentary cluster committees, and convening ‘people’s parliaments’. These ‘people’s parliaments’ are made up of representatives from its eight areas and local government representatives who are brought together to deliberate on particular issues
identified for that ‘sitting’. DPE has acquired a reputation countrywide of having been able to influence policy to the benefit of marginalised communities.

At the time of our first meeting DPE was holding public meetings in different constituencies under the theme ‘The Lesotho I want’ gathering information on people’s views regarding the public service, army and other security agencies, powers of the prime minister, conduct of the members of parliament, and the like. The inclusion of the army in the list of the issues under scrutiny, as well as the organisation’s *modus operandi*, made DPE a very strategic partner in my research. The advisory group recommended that I take up this opportunity. The suitability of the DPE for my action research is evidenced in the following quote:

> DPE was formed to empower communities to transform their own world. In her founding conceptualisation, the founder emphasised for real transformation to occur, there must be accurate analysis of the problems and their root causes and for it to be accurate it has to start with the people themselves. DPE is therefore the people’s stage for the change they themselves define and act towards achieving. *DPE philosophy hands over the stick to the communities to do things on their own and determine their own destiny* [italics my emphasis] (Shale, 2015).

I had the advantage of having been invited several times to present a paper at different DPE workshops and was therefore familiar with their work. I presented one such paper just before the 2012 national elections that focused on possible post-election scenarios. I had in 2011 also been one of the guest speakers at a public gathering in the Mokhotlong district, which is one of the eight areas in which DPE operates. One of the issues under discussion was the continuing lecturers’ strike at the National University of Lesotho at the time in which I was also involved.

The Transformation Resource Centre (TRC) is also a non-governmental organisation mainly concerned with the protection of the rights of the marginalised communities. The TRC can thus be described as one of the ‘voice of the voiceless’ organisations. Apart from regularly interacting with local communities, the TRC has slots on some of the country’s radio stations through which it disseminates its information. The meeting agreed it would be important to link with TRC and utilise these channels at its disposal to kick-start the demilitarisation project. Coincidently, I had earlier in January been invited as a guest to one of TRC’s programmes on Catholic Radio FM to provide an analysis of the ‘issues to be considered in formation of coalition governments’. The anticipation was therefore, that it would not be difficult to secure a partnership with the TRC.
The different links I and other advisory group members had with the National University of Lesotho (NUL) made the institution a natural choice for establishing a partnership. Different departments organise periodic seminars where different topics were discussed. The advisory group suggested that I approach the Department of Political and Administrative Studies offering to present a paper on demilitarisation.

The existence of the Lesotho Defence Force is provided for by Section 146 of the Constitution of Lesotho, which reads that “there shall be a Defence Force for the maintenance of internal security and the defence of Lesotho” (Constitution of Lesotho, 1993). This implies that the disbandment of the army can only be effected through a parliamentary process of amending the Constitution. With this in mind, the advisory group noted it would be vital to have political parties on board throughout the demilitarisation journey. The aim was, therefore, to get one of the largest parties, in terms of number of seats in parliament, to adopt demilitarisation as one of its policies. As part of the deal, the party would be assisted with the technical know-how once it intends to pursue demilitarisation.

Finally, as a way of allaying the military’s fears and subsequently minimising resistance, there would be a need to assure the military that it would be treated fairly without any prejudice and that they, like any other sector of Basotho society, had the opportunity to reap the fruits of the proposed demilitarisation process.

9.6 Conclusion

This chapter has been divided into two parts, namely the choice of research methodology and then an account of how the research journey begins. Regarding the former I have shown that this research is both qualitative and action oriented in nature. It is qualitative because it has aimed to get an in-depth understanding of the participants’ views about the Lesotho military and feasibility of a non-militarised polity, and has relied principally on qualitative methods of data collection. It is action oriented in that it is directed at bringing about positive change to the status quo. In line with the requirements of an action research the involvement of local participants was secured by an advisory group of five purposively selected individuals. Due to the logistical problems associated with DTU’s requirement of a pre-approved topic prior to the commencement of the actual research, the advisory group was not involved in the initial stage. This was, however, inevitable.
Regarding the beginning of the research journey, this chapter has showed that the study was launched in a politically polarised environment of a society divided between those who supported the incumbent seven-party coalition government and the others who supported the opposition. One of the most contentious issues at the centre of this polarisation was the role of the army in the country’s politics. Such a tense environment not only caused some would-be participants to withdraw but also narrowed the range of methods that could be employed.

The chapter has discussed in detail what transpired at the first meeting of the advisory group in February 2016, which deliberated on strategies for launching a platform to build ‘an army-less and politically stable Lesotho that is free of violence and provides good opportunities for human development’. It also looked at the impact the army had on various aspects of Basotho life, and there was agreement that its impact on both politics and the economy was largely negative. Most of the past reforms failed to yield the desired results, so that the advisory group concurred that action geared towards demilitarisation was the route to follow.

Various challenges that would confront those who seek to bring about the kind of changes that would lead to demilitarisation were identified. There would be resistance from all sectors benefitting in one way or another from the existence of the military. A challenge facing the advisory itself group was lack of the necessary voice due to its small size, so that there was a need to partner with already established organisations that have a wide societal outreach capacity. Three in particular were identified to be approached, namely Development for Peace Education (DPE), Transformation Resource Centre (TRC), and the National University of Lesotho (NUL).

The next chapter discusses the action research journey during the period from April 2016 to May 2017.
10.1 Introduction

This chapter starts by highlighting the importance of peace education in the search for sustainable peace. It takes an historical overview of the activities used to educate the public about the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation. Each of the activities is briefly discussed. Some of the notable events that occurred during this period are also highlighted. They include the setbacks suffered, as well as the responses of other persons and organisations to our action research activities.

10.2 Peace education and the feasibility of demilitarisation

In accordance with the recommendations of my advisory group, I undertook a number of activities to inform Basotho people about the feasibility and the benefits of demilitarisation. Within the peacebuilding context, demilitarisation is a central component in changing the culture of reliance on violence as a conflict resolution strategy (Duncan 2015). The education that was spread via the activities discussed in this chapter was thus aimed at helping Basotho to adopt the demilitarisation idea as a way of reducing violence in all its forms.

Commenting on how peace education gets to be internalised and applied to make rational decisions, Harris and Morrison (2003: 26) say that “individuals have to first become aware of a
new idea, for example, through media exposure. Interest is developed, and a favourable or unfavourable attitude forms. The pros and cons of the idea are compared and the idea is tried out. A decision is then made to adopt or reject the idea”. Peace education is a result-oriented activity that attempts to transform society by creating a consciousness, one may even say conscience of peace that abhors violent behaviour (Ibid: 28). It is premised on the understanding that once such consciousness has emerged, citizens will demand and pressurise their government to adopt non-violent policies.

The program undertaken over a twelve-month period running from April 2016 to March 2017 was sometimes undertaken solely by myself following consultations with the Advisory Group, while other activities were undertaken under the umbrellas of established organisations. Table 12 below shows the list of activities and the dates on which each was undertaken.

**Table 12: List of demilitarisation action research in activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thaha-meso: People’s Choice FM</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPE public gathering, Boinyatso</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Times article</td>
<td>26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUL Conference</td>
<td>6-7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society research</td>
<td>September – November 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rise and Shine: Harvest FM</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; March 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demilitarisation seminar</td>
<td>30&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; March 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own

A brief description of what each of the activities listed in Table 12 above entailed, is followed by an analysis of their outcome.

**10.2.1 Thaha-meso: People’s Choice FM**

People’s Choice (PC) FM is a privately-owned radio station based in Maseru. It has a limited coverage of just five of the country’s ten districts. Among others, the radio runs a daily morning show, in the Sesotho language, called *Thahameso* (the Sesotho term for an early breakfast). The programme runs from Monday to Friday and is concerned with current affairs, mostly politics. Due to its nature, the programme hosts people from different backgrounds to deliberate on issues under discussion on particular days. Deliberations usually include phone-in slots where listeners make contributions or seek clarity on topics under discussion. By virtue of existing within the
Lesotho’s politically-polarised society, electronic media is also affected by the polarisation and PC FM is no exception.

This station covers mostly the urban areas and, like many other private radio stations, has become an alternative to the national Radio Lesotho which is utilised by government more as a mouthpiece of the state than a public broadcaster. This means that PC FM was at the time of the research generally perceived as being anti-government by those linked to the government of the day. This perceived partisan bias of the station was always going to limit use of listeners’ views for any research purposes, since they would not necessarily be representative of a cross-section of the community.

Following the release of the findings and recommendations of the SADC-instituted ‘Phumaphi’ commission of inquiry into the circumstances that led to the killing of the former Lesotho army’s Commander Lt Gen Mahao in June 2015, the contents of the report dominated discussions on various media platforms in the country. Central to the report was the conduct of the Lesotho army. This turn of events provided a good opportunity for me to make a contribution to discussions about the value of the army, and the possibility of demilitarising Lesotho. I therefore approached the PC FM management who after a thorough interrogation offered me a 45-minute slot from 7:30 to 8:15 on the 4th April 2016. Despite it being a commercial radio station which sells programme slots to people not invited by the station, they offered me this opportunity without a charge.

The programme went fairly well, though the 45 minutes proved too short considering the broad nature of the demilitarisation topic. There was a need for thorough explanation of what demilitarisation entails as well as its possible benefits in the context of Lesotho. Furthermore, there was a need to show clearly that the discussion was thought through and not simply an emotional reaction to the current political situation in Lesotho. Despite the limited time, a handful of listeners managed to make contributions. Not unexpectedly, the views of the listeners reflected the polarisation of the nation with regard to political institutions like the army. Of the ten listeners who phoned in, seven supported the idea of demilitarisation while three did not.

10.2.2 DPE public gathering, Boinyatso

Pursuant to the advisory group’s advice, I approached the Civil Society Organisation (CSO) Development for Peace Education (DPE) about being allowed to participate in its public meetings. Coincidentally, the DPE was around this time engaged in a countrywide canvassing of opinion on
various national issues. They included the public service; the army and other security agencies; the office of the prime minister; members of parliament; cabinet, Senate and the Council of state; formation of governments and the functions of parliament; powers of the citizens in governance; strengthening the pillars of peace; and the powers of the office of the King (Development for Peace Education, 2016).

These views were collected through public gatherings under the theme ‘The Lesotho I want’. A copy of the questionnaire used in this study appears in Appendix E. The second of nine items was about the army, inquiring what the public ‘thought the country needed to do to its army and other security agencies as a way of eradicating political instability and ensuring sustainable peace for Lesotho’. A close look at this question shows that it specifically raises the possibility of demilitarisation. Participating members of the public were given a number of options from which to choose what they thought the country needs to do about its army in future. The first question in the security category was particularly relevant for the purpose of this research and reads as follows:

Which of the following do you think needs to be done as a way of eradicating governance and political instability, as well as stabilising the pillars of peace in Lesotho?
(a) The current Lesotho army should be disbanded and be replaced by a new one.
(b) The army should be disbanded and the country be left without one.
(c) Army officers previously implicated in political conflicts be removed from the army and be placed in other sectors that could utilise their skills for the benefit of the nation; then the army be given new generation of command that could be trained and empowered with skills and contemporary understanding of the role of armies within democratic systems.
(d) The whole army undergo re-training (Development for Peace Education, 2016).

Given that I had worked with the organisation before, the DPE did not hesitate to co-opt me into its programme.

The next of DPE’s public gatherings was held at Boinyatso, about 30 kilometres north of Maseru on the 12th May 2016. Boinyatso is only five kilometres away from Mokema where the former LDF Commander Lt Gen Mahao was murdered by members of the army in June 2015. It was not possible for me to have a slot to address the gathering as I had anticipated, given the DPE’s need to ensure uniformity in the way it collects views across the many gatherings it holds and
addressing people there about demilitarisation would certainly have influenced their responses to questions about the army. A concession was made that I could address the people at the end, when the DPE had completed its business. This implied that my role was limited to being an observer. By the time the DPE’s programme came to an end people had lost interest and were starting to leave in droves, despite the fact that the proceedings had not been closed yet, so I did not have a chance to share my views. Despite this, the exercise was quiet meaningful for me as I made important observations during the discussions about the army. It came out how much some people in the rural communities fear the army, a point I discuss in detail in section 11.4.4.

10.2.3 Lesotho Times article

With the previous activities of informing the nation about the feasibility of demilitarisation having triggered a generally positive response, it was time to target a larger stage. I therefore drafted an article on the subject for one of the country’s leading newspapers, the *Lesotho Times*. This is arguably the best-selling weekly English newspaper in Lesotho with a nation-wide circulation. It was targeted for a wider readership that might have missed the presentation on PC FM. Titled ‘Demilitarisation: a viable reform action’, it saw publication in the May 26-June 1 2016 edition, in the National Agenda section. It is included in Appendix A.

My article achieved the objective of bringing the demilitarisation idea into public discourse and generated some debate around it. Some people shared their ideas with me in chance encounters, when they recognised my face from a photo printed alongside the article. The next issue of the Lesotho Times, dated 2-8th June 2016 carried another article on demilitarisation, in response to my article. Titled ‘Deconstructing the demilitarisation argument’, it had been written by Dr Ramaele Moshoeshoe of the Economics Department at NUL. Its main purpose, according to the author, was to challenge the thesis that military expenditure hinders economic development. It is included in Appendix B. In truly academic fashion the author pointed to what he found to be the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the paper. His conclusion read:

> Hopefully, this reaction will provoke the author to better advance his arguments and ultimately move me from this position. As it stands, I don’t think the article does enough to achieve its goal of showing that Lesotho does not need an army. However, I must admit that I have learned a lot from reading Mr Letsie’s article. Keep up the good work (Moshoeshoe, 2016).
He had thus acknowledged the validity of many of my arguments and supported the idea of further debate, which has indeed been a key objective of my action research assignment. This encouraged me in the preparation of my next presentation.

10.2.4 National University of Lesotho Conference

As part of Lesotho’s 50 years independence celebrations, the National University of Lesotho (NUL) organised a conference on the theme ‘Understanding political instability in Lesotho, 1966-2016’. The conference was to be held at the Roma campus of NUL and was scheduled for 6 and 7 October 2016 and was open to participants from both within and outside Lesotho. Due to its broad programme and open environment, the conference provided a suitable platform from which the issue of demilitarisation of Lesotho could be debated. I therefore, took the opportunity to present a paper titled ‘Demilitarisation: a viable security reform option in Lesotho’s quest for peace’.

The choice of the title and inclusion of ‘reform option’ within it was strategic to make the presentation fit within the multi-faceted reform process recommended to Lesotho by several international organisations including the AU and SADC. The conference saw a total of 17 papers and mine was presented on 7th October 2016 (See Appendix I). The audience included people from various sectors such as academics, members of civil society organisations, government officials, church leaders, university students and others. The presentations generated lively debates that were, however, limited by the short time allocated. Some of the contributors argued that the expenditure on the Lesotho Defence Force was ‘wasteful’, while others emphasised how the army was held in high regard in some mountainous areas where it has been engaged in anti-stock theft operations.

10.2.5 Civil society research

After the political polarization that followed the formation of the second coalition government in 2015, the AU, the Commonwealth, the SADC (through various reports, including the ‘Phumaphi Report’), and a host of local and international stakeholders, recommended broader constitutional, judicial, parliamentary, public sector and security sector reforms for Lesotho. These proposed reforms could only be meaningful if they were inclusive and involved the participation of all sectors of the Basotho nation. It was for this reason that, after consultations with the relevant
stakeholders, UNDP Lesotho in September 2017 commissioned a 10-day study on the proposed national reforms in the country. The outcome would be a discussion paper on national reforms that would be produced for civil society organizations. The aim of this process was facilitation and capacity building to enable civil society organizations (CSOs) to undertake advocacy and actively participate in the reform process.

I applied to be part of the commissioned study for two reasons, the much needed cash incentive it carried, and most importantly, the opportunity it offered for the continuation of my action research. The latter would be possible as the UNDP terms of reference for the discussion paper was that it “would help discussions around the proposed national reforms so that by the end of the discussions there is a unified approach and consensus around the appreciation of reforms”. Of greatest relevance to me was that the engagement of the civil society organisations was expected to result in a common reform agenda for the CSOs. This provided an opportunity for me to sell the idea of demilitarisation as part of the discussion on security reforms. My application was successful and I produced a discussion paper for the NGO Week at the ‘Manthabiseng Convention Centre, Maseru on 30th November 2016. The recommendations that the representatives of the CSOs made with regard to the military included that (a) powers to appoint the commander of the army be taken away from the prime minister and that the Defence Commission be resuscitated to perform such appointment, and (b) that the roles of the army be reviewed with the aim of it ultimately being disbanded.

10.2.6 Rise and Shine: Harvest FM

Due to the instability that has characterised politics, the Lesotho army is usually part of the daily debates about the reasons for the country’s instability. It was for this reason that I was invited to present my views on Harvest FM’s morning show, Rise and Shine. The recording of this programme is included in Appendix C. The station had come to know about me, I was told, following the presentation I made on its counterpart - PC FM earlier. Just like People’s Choice FM, Harvest FM is privately-owned and broadcasts from the capital Maseru. Listening to phone-in programmes on this station gives an impression that its listenership is mostly supportive of the opposition parties as opposed to the ruling coalition. I accepted the invitation with open hands as it provided another opportunity for me to promote the demilitarisation idea. The programme was aired on Monday 6 March 2017 from 6:30 to 9:00. The audience of Harvest FM is similar to that of PC FM as the two stations cover almost the same geographic area. The responses of the listeners
not only reflected a common divergence of views, but also serious polarisation along political party lines.

10.2.7 Demilitarisation seminar

To grow into a national programme, the idea of demilitarisation needs to be understood and adopted by national stakeholders, including CSOs, political parties, government and media. Of these categories, only the CSOs and media to a lesser extent had thus far been directly engaged. There was a need therefore, to have other national stakeholders briefed concerning the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation and have a chance to discuss the issue under one roof. This, in terms of the peace education approach, is premised on the understanding that informed citizens can pressure their governments to adopt non-violent policies (Harris and Morrison, 2003). Bringing so many people together under one roof was certainly beyond my ability to organise, so that my association with Development for Peace Education (DPE) in the end proved invaluable.

Following earlier failures to bring together the stakeholders (discussed in detail in 10.2.2 below), an inclusive stakeholders seminar was organised under the auspices of DPE to take place on Thursday 30th March 2017. The audio record of my presentation is included in Appendix D. The paper I presented was titled, ‘Demilitarisation: a viable reform option in Lesotho’s quest for peace’, and was followed by an open discussion. It fitted my purposes well as it was part of DPE’s ‘The Lesotho I want’ campaign, discussed in section 10.2.2 above, and covered the security sector which was one of the sectors that were earmarked for the proposed national reforms.

Although the seminar was my initiative, its organisation and running became entirely the responsibility of the DPE. My responsibility was to provide rental fees for the venue and the food and refreshments that would be served to the participants. The initial plan was to make the seminar a whole-day event to allow for discussion. However, considering that it was the campaigning period prior to the June 3 snap elections, we agreed with the DPE to arrange the seminar as a half-day event. Despite the invitations being sent to a large number the stakeholders, some never showed up for the seminar. Most notable of the absentees were representatives of the Ministry of Defence and National Security and some political parties. There was nevertheless, a good attendance and heated debate which went mostly along political party lines. A memorable moment of the debate was when two male stalwarts of opposing parties, both in their late sixties and mid-
seventies, had to be physically restrained as they began charging towards each other with the intention of exchanging blows.

10.3 Experiences and reactions to the demilitarisation research activities

Action research is about bringing change, and is also about generating knowledge for the affected people so that they can continue to solve their own problems (Gray 2004: 383). Research activities usually generate mixed experiences both for researchers, as well as the communities amongst whom research is conducted. It is necessary that “individuals have to first become aware of a new idea, for example, through media exposure. Interest is developed and a favourable or unfavourable attitude forms” (Harris and Morrison 2003: 26). My demilitarisation action research was no exception as it also generated new experiences, in the process helping to form attitudes among the people, as can be seen below.

10.3.1 Instant impact followed by fading promises

Judging by the reaction to the very first presentation on People’s Choice FM, our action research seemed to make an instant impact. Two incidents that happened within a matter of days after the airing of the programme give credence to this claim. First, there was the interest from the All Basotho Convention (ABC), which is the main opposition party, and then the airing, on the same radio station, of a ‘counter programme’. A day following my presentation on PC FM, I got a call from a well-known member of the ABC. I had previously had some contact with him and he had apparently been directed by one member of the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) to enquire about my willingness and availability to brief the party’s members of parliament (MPs) about the idea of demilitarisation. The plan, I was informed, would be for me to brief the party’s parliamentary caucus so that at a later stage the issue could be tabled for discussion in parliament. The invitation had come most unexpectedly, but I did not hesitate to assure the official that I was ready to avail myself whenever needed.

My excitement over the party’s invitation was, however, to be short-lived. Weeks passed without hearing a word again from the party. Upon enquiry, the member who approached me indicated he learned from the NEC official that the plan had been deferred for a number of reasons. Firstly, there was a feeling that any presentation about the army would be misinterpreted and hinder efforts to return Thomas Thabane, the party’s leader from exile. Thabane, together with two other opposition leaders had been living in South Africa since 2015, claiming their lives were in danger
as the army was allegedly planning to kill them (Ntsukunyane 2016). For this reason, discussions regarding demilitarisation are likely to be perceived as emanating from anger and vindictiveness towards the army. It was furthermore likely to increase the hostility of the army towards the party, and in the process jeopardise the already fragile negotiations for the leader’s return from exile.

The NEC official was also said to have referred to the sensitivity of the topic. His argument was that army members who had nothing to do with the atrocities committed by the army would also feel threatened by the whole process. These members and their families would see such discussions as presenting a threat to their job security, and that assurances that they would be offered job opportunities outside the army would not be sufficient to convince them. Furthermore, with the political situation being fluid and the possibility of snap elections at any time, it was ‘unwise’ to pursue the matter as it was ‘not certain the process would be easily understood by the electorate’. The conclusion was therefore, that the process be deferred until a later stage.

The other sign of the impact of the presentation on People’s Choice FM was to become evident a week later. On 13th April 2016 retired LDF Major General Sam Makoro was hosted by the same programme that had earlier hosted me. In commencing his presentation he stated clearly that it had been triggered by my presentation. He said he agreed “99 per cent” with my position, but argued that the army should not be abolished because in his view, it was the pride of the nation and needed to be reformed rather than disbanded. In addition, he drew attention to the fact that the nature of global security had also changed, a point with which I could agree.

Disagreeing with the disbandment of the army was not unexpected from someone who had spent all his working life within the ranks of the army and was still carrying the title on which his social status depended. His view was clearly contrary to that of Dumas (2002) who believes that because of their training, the military cannot be reformed and need to be abolished as they are irreconcilable with democratic principles. Despite our differences, Major General Makoro’s presentation was for me a milestone in proving that the demilitarisation idea had been firmly put in the public arena. There were of course, still major challenges awaiting me.

10.3.2 DPE setback

With our action research having started on a positive note, I was keen to take it to a higher level. The plan was therefore, to organise a two-day conference that could bring together various national political stakeholders under one roof where the idea of demilitarisation could be
discussed. These would include representatives of political parties, relevant government ministries, civil society organisations, media, academics and the like. This could only be achieved through the involvement of already established organisations. Once again, the partnership with Development for Peace Education (DPE) and Transformation Resource Centre (TRC) provided me an opportunity to organise a conference under the auspices of one of them. In August 2016 I therefore, shared the idea with DPE officials and they were impressed.

The intention was that the conference would be funded from my DUT research grant. I was hoping to withdraw around M6000, equivalent also to R6000, for this purpose. Discussions with DPE officials, however, indicated that the amount was inadequate to fund such a conference, since attendance, particularly of government officials, is largely determined by the class of the venue. Accordingly, it costs over M50 000 to successfully hold a conference of such magnitude in a modest local hotel. This was a serious setback, as there was no way I could afford to fund the conference myself.

At this point, the DPE suggested that it took full ownership of the conference, instead of only serving as an institutional home, since it had good relationships with development partners who were always willing to assist financially whenever it had a justifiable peace building programme such as this one on demilitarisation.

All of this happened at the time when Lesotho was busy preparing for its 50 year independence celebrations on 4th October 2016. The pre-occupation with preparations for this event meant that it would not be easy to attract the targeted audience and government officials in particular, in the time before this date. We therefore agreed to aim for a date after the celebrations, and the 3rd week of October was suggested, because like me, the DPE was going to be part of the conference that was to be held at the National University of Lesotho two days after 4th October.

My research supervisor was keen to attend, but said that the proposed dates would clash with other commitments. Mr Christophe Barbey, a renowned author on demilitarisation based in Switzerland also expressed interest and willingness to present a paper, or alternatively to make a presentation by Skype. My hope for a dream conference began to fade as the targeted date approached. I then learnt that DPE had change its plans and was thinking of having the demilitarisation theme presented as part of its annual Peace Day celebrations on the 21st of September.
The reason for the change of plan, according to the responsible DPE official, was to avoid a ‘duplication of events’. This official briefed me that their annual Peace Day celebrations usually involved field activities in chosen communities during the day followed by peace-related presentations in the evenings. He assured me the purpose of my action research would still be served as their previous presentations had attracted lot of officials from the government including the reportedly ‘elusive’ Minister of Defence and National Security. Despite realising that what could be achieved through a two-day conference would never be achieved in a one evening event, I accepted the change of plan. Further disappointment was, however on its way. Just days before the Peace Day I got informed the DPE had decided to abandon the evening part of the day’s activities. This implied a lost chance, at least for then, to present the idea before the national stakeholders. I nevertheless remained positive and appreciated the DPE might be experiencing some challenges that they did not want to disclose to me. I therefore persevered. The opportunity to make up for the lost chances finally came when under the auspices of the DPE, I finally managed to hold a demilitarisation seminar discussed in subsection 10.1.7 above.

10.3.3 Post-demilitarisation seminar impact

The contribution of the demilitarisation seminar held on the 30th March became evident only a week later. On Wednesday 4th April Lentsoe la Sechaba, a Sesotho version of the Informative newspaper, carried an article about the seminar under the heading ‘Lesotho ha le hloke sesole – Letsie (Lesotho does not need an army - Letsie). A copy is included in Appendix F. The publication of this article was not only increasing the exposure of the demilitarisation idea, but most importantly taking it to those readers who could not read English.

A day later The Post, another local weekly English newspaper, carried a two-page detailed coverage of the demilitarisation presentation, and went further to provide summary examples of six countries that have no armies, namely Costa Rica, Grenada, Kiribati, Andorra, Vatican City, and Iceland. Strange about The Post’s article was its layout. The paper had pictures of guns pointing to my picture which was at the top of the article. The motive was never clear to me, but it was a highly intimidating picture. This article is included in Appendix G. It was a further milestone in educating the public about the feasibility of demilitarisation of Lesotho.

One more exposure of the demilitarisation idea was to come on Friday, 6th April. This time the idea was discussed on Thaha-Khube (TK) FM, a private radio station based in Maseru. It is worth noting that unlike People’s Choice and Harvest FMs whose broadcasting and listenership are...
usually sympathetic to the opposition parties, TK FM has been more sympathetic to the seven-party coalition government. I was alerted about the discussion at around 7:00 am by a friend who had tuned in to the radio station. Some journalists from this station had participated in the seminar and had an audio recording of it. The radio hosted one Mr ‘Lebese’ (whose real name is unknown to me) to give a talk on demilitarisation, which had dominated the print media during the past few days.

Lebese is a known activist of the Progressive Democrats (PD) which is a very small party that broke away from the All Basotho Convention (ABC) in 2014. It is in this capacity that Lebese had attended the seminar although he did not participate in the discussion. For reasons better known to himself, Lebese decided to ‘play the man and not the game’ during his radio presentation. As he rejected and sometimes distorted facts presented at the seminar, he continued to attack me by calling me mocking names as well as repeatedly stating how he doubted my integrity. He was definitely ‘playing to the gallery’, considering that most of the listenership of the radio was sympathetic to the government, which in turn was pro the army.

The programme generated a lot of interest with callers obviously influenced by the manner in which the guest had organised his presentation. They all dismissed the idea of demilitarisation and with most also attacking the integrity of ‘the person who presented it’. Midway into the programme, the presenter called the spokesperson of the LDF, Brigadier Ntlele Ntoi, to give the army’s view of the article that appeared in The Post. Ntoi’s view was what could be expected from an officer of his rank and position in defending the army. If the principle of balanced reporting was applied, one would have expected the radio to give me an opportunity to defend my view. I stopped listening to the programme at around 8:30 as I had to attend to previously arranged commitments.

Later in the day a colleague told me to tune in again to ‘listen to the insults being hurled at me’. By this time the presenter on air had played the whole tape of my demilitarisation seminar presentation. Unlike during the early morning programme, comments from the callers were now polarised. Some were in full support of the idea, while other rejected it completely. There are at least two possible explanations for the polarisation of callers’ responses. Firstly, the opportunity that the listeners had to listen to the full recorded presentation, and not the distorted version given by Lebese earlier, would have contributed to this change. The second explanation might be attributed to the fact that around this time there were only two radio stations broadcasting political
programmes, so that more interested listeners had by now tuned in to TK FM. The discussion finally ended at around 14:00.

On May 11, the LDF Public Affairs published an article in *The Post* which is included in Appendix H. It is titled ‘Demilitarisation article was fallacious’ and was a response to the extract of my presentation at the demilitarisation seminar which had been published by the same newspaper two weeks earlier. As could be expected, the article was written in a very defensive manner calling me a ‘self-proclaimed security expert’. Generally, the article attempted to build a case for why Lesotho should not demilitarise. It argued that the call for Lesotho to be demilitarised was not justifiable because, “the sense of insecurity that most states experience in Africa originates within their boundaries rather than from outside” (The Times 2017). It is indeed true that the military are used throughout Africa to maintain the power of government against its opponents. Justifying the existence of the army on the basis of the insecurity that emanates from within, as the LDF attempted to do, can never be a convincing argument when it springs from authoritarian rule. It thus can be more easily avoided through democratic rule than via the military.

The LDF’s article was clearly biased and can be understood as an attempt at ‘self-preservation’. It did not touch on other issues that were raised in my article, such as the unwarranted intrusion of the Lesotho army into civilian politics, which has on numerous occasions contributed to political instability and violence. Another issue it did not address was the negative impact that military expenditure has on the economy in general, and more specifically on the performance of other departments with whom the army shared its secondary functions. Despite its defensive posture, the army’s response served the purpose of my research as it contributed in bringing the demilitarisation debate on to the public stage.

10.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the activities I undertook in educating the public about the feasibility of demilitarisation of Lesotho. These activities were conducted over a period ranging from April 2016 to March 2017. Listed in chronological order, they include an appearance on the Thaha-meso programme of People’s Choice FM; attendance at a public gathering organised by the Development for Peace Education at Boinyatso; publication of an article in the Lesotho Times newspaper; presentation of a paper at a conference at the National University of Lesotho; engagement in research aimed at capacitating the civil society organisations to participate in the planned reform process in Lesotho; participating in the Rise and Shine morning show on Harvest
FM; presentation of a paper at the demilitarisation seminar organised under the auspices of the DPE. Generally, these activities have reflected the high level of polarisation along political party lines, of the Basotho nation that determine people’s views regarding the idea of demilitarisation in Lesotho.

The activities were generally successful and some of them triggered instant reactions from certain sectors of the Basotho nation. These reactions came in the form of radio programmes dedicated to discussion of the demilitarisation idea from different viewpoints on both PC and Thaha-Khube FM stations, and newspaper articles by various authors in different newspapers. Some were highly positive and came as a surprise during the early phase of the research. Among the most significant reactions was a promise to facilitate the tabling of the demilitarisation issue in the National Assembly. Some of these events never materialised for various reasons. Nevertheless, the study objectives were still achieved, albeit by means of lower key activities. The failure to hold a two-day national conference that would have involved the participation of high-profile individuals from abroad is a notable example. The multi-stake demilitarisation seminar organised by DPE however, became an ideal substitute for the national conference that never materialised. Analysis of the data collected during the above-mentioned activities follows in the next chapter

CHAPTER 11

REFLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable called cognitive dissonance. And because it is so important to protect the core belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn’t fit in with the core belief (Frantz Fanon)

11.1 Introduction

This chapter concerns itself with two important stages in a social research, namely reflection and data analysis. The first section provides a conceptual framework for reflection, followed by discussion of the action research journey. The second section discusses issues of data and qualitative analysis, providing a justification for the methodology employed. This is followed with the presentation of the findings and conclusions of the study.
11.2 Reflection on social research

An action research project is goal-oriented in that it aims to bring about change. Reflection in the context of research implies an important human activity in which people recapture their experience, think about it, mull it over and evaluate it (Boud et al 2005). According to Boud et al (2005: 10), “reflection is needed at various points; at the start in anticipation for the experience, during the experience as a way of dealing with the vast array of inputs and coping with the feelings that are generated, and following the experience during the phase of writing and consolidation”. The following quotes emphasise the importance of reflection:

“In doing research, researchers discover new information which they consciously reconstruct to form new beliefs or personal theories. The personal theories thus derived are personal constructs which require re-working and revision in reflection, for deeper understanding or for further articulation and communication to the wider research or educational audience.” (O’Hanlon 2002: 113)

“When we stop to think, to reflect, we do so in order to take stock of something that has happened, in order to prepare ourselves for action, or usually to do both. Reflection is a dialectical process: It looks inwards at our thoughts and thought processes and outward at the situation in which we find ourselves; when we consider the interaction of the internal and the external, our reflection orients us for further thought and action. Reflection is thus ‘meta-thinking’ (thinking about thinking) in which we consider the relationship between the thoughts and action in a particular context.” (Kemmis 2005: 141)

Given the cyclical nature of action research, reflection will be important at various stages of a research project so as to help shape the next stage. At the end of the project, according to Coghan (2001), the outputs should include the evidence of:

- How researchers engaged in the steps of action research, how they recorded their data, and how they reflected of what was studied.
- How they challenged and tested their own assumptions and interpretations of what was happening on a continual basis.
- How they accessed different views of what was happening, showing both confirming and contradictory interpretations.
- How these interpretations and analyses were grounded in academic theory, and how this theory both confirmed and challenged the analyses (Coghan 2001:55)
In addition to providing an overall reflection, my research shows how I reflected during the course of the study, as well as how my experiences were tested or changed my earlier assumptions. My reflection will also be useful in shaping and planning further action research of this kind.

11.3 Reflection on the demilitarisation action research journey

One of the distinguishing features of action research is its objective of bringing about social change. In order for the desired change to be meaningful, the affected communities have to develop practical knowledge. Barbour (2014: 232) defines action research as a “participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes”. Action research, therefore, has to be understood as a learning exercise for both the researcher and members of the community in which the research is conducted. In line with this, the aim of our research has been to educate the general Basotho public concerning the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation. It is therefore, essential that we reflect on the action research journey and highlight some of the observations made during the various stages of the process.

Our study has been premised on the understanding that the existence of the military in Lesotho impacts negatively on peace by contributing to all three types of violence, physical, structural and cultural. This is the underlying message that we set out to communicate to the public. Understood in this way, demilitarisation becomes a part of peacebuilding efforts (Duncan 2015).

Reflections on the demilitarisation action research process had two effects on the beliefs I held about the demilitarisation process. The first strengthened my beliefs, while the second challenged some of my previously held beliefs. The first that was strengthened was that use of military for civilian tasks detracts from the efficiency of other government departments and agencies. There is an abundance of data to support this inference in Lesotho, but for the purpose of this chapter only two examples will be used.

11.3.1 Strengthening previously-held beliefs

The first example of how the army hinders the efficiency of other departments relates to an incident observed at Pioneer Mall, Maseru in April 2017. Four armed soldiers were guarding two sentenced inmates who were transported to the shopping mall in a Lesotho Correctional Services (LCS) truck. It was readily apparent that they had been sentenced as they wore the maroon jerseys
and khaki trousers of serving inmates but I could not figure out what the purpose of their visit to the shopping mall was. Apart from being handcuffed they also wore leg shackles. The whole party was accompanied by an unarmed LCS official who carried what looked like small files. What puzzled me was the role of the army in what I thought was purely the responsibility of LCS staff. Like the police and army, the Correctional Services are also part of the country’s armed forces. The latter’s staff are all trained, including in the use of violence, in order to adequately guard inmates.

While it is known that the three armed agencies may seek assistance from each other during emergencies, what transpired at Pioneer Mall seemed to be something quite different. One would have expected that armed LCS personnel would be enough to guard the inmates. In the case of dangerous criminals or anticipated trouble, which did not seem to apply here, judging by the relaxed mood of the prisoners and the soldiers themselves, one would not have thought that soldiers were needed here at all, let alone to be in control over LCS staff. This, in my view, was one of the various ways in which the embattled Lesotho army was trying to assert themselves amidst growing doubts regarding their relevance in Lesotho.

It is important to note that an incident occurred at Maseru Central Prison in May 2015 when warders complained that soldiers had taken over their duties. The following is a report of what happened:

Then at around 9am, Superintendent Masenkane demanded all prison gate keys from the gatekeeper. After that, soldiers drove into Maseru Central Prison and we, the LCS guards, were told to leave the premises and handover whatever duties we had been doing to the soldiers. We were never given an explanation of what was going on,” said the warders, who spoke to the Lesotho Times as a group, yesterday morning.

“Those of us who were supposed to resume duty at 2pm and 7pm on Tuesday were not allowed onto the prison premises by soldiers who were manning the main gate. We were simply told that our duties had been taken over by the LDF, and we could see the soldiers patrolling the complex.” (Mohloboli 2015 [c])

Although the LCS’s senior administration dismissed the presence of soldiers at the prison as ‘nothing unusual’, there is evidence of increased involvement of the army in LCS affairs. It is difficult to find a justification of this increased involvement hence my reiteration that it is just a strategy of the idle and embattled army trying to assert itself. This, as can be seen in the extract, is detrimental to the morale and efficiency of the LCS staff.
A second example of how the army can be a hindrance to efficiency relates to the provision of rescue services in Lesotho. While the army keeps the resources that can be used for rescue operations in the country, its services have been hardly effective at all. For instance, the army as well as the police both have some fire trucks. However, they have contributed little to dealing with actual fires around the country. Fires that have destroyed textile factories have already cost some lives and many job losses. Two employees were burnt to death when two factories caught fire in the Maseru Industrial Area in April 2014. In April 2017 Golf Plastics, a plastic bag manufacturer, and Daisy Africa, a bakery and a storage facility, were gutted by fire. Although the fire was eventually put out by fire fighters from the Lesotho Mounted Police Service and Lesotho Defence Force, help arrived late, after serious damage had already been done.

Commenting on the fire the Trade and Industry minister Joshua Setipa, admitted that Lesotho's fire prevention and fighting services providers were ill-equipped for the task and this increased the fire risks for businesses (Kabi, 2017). In June 2017, Maseru City Council also joined calls to improve the preparedness of fire rescue services. The Council’s spokesperson Lintle Moerane-Bless said there was an urgent need to beef up fire prevention and fighting capability to protect lives and businesses (Ibid). This warning followed a blaze that gutted five vendors' shacks at Sefika bus stop in Maseru in June 2017. I strongly believe an improvement in fire rescue services can only be achieved if these services are contracted out to civilian agencies that are better equipped to deal with such risks.

Adding bureaucratic inefficiency to armed forces operations is not going to improve matters. In 2004 a bus ferrying passengers to Mokhotlong was trapped in a heavy snowfall. Numerous calls were sent out on local radio stations for the army to dispatch helicopters to rescue the passengers. On calling the Lesotho Defence Force Air Wing, a presenter from Mo-Afrika FM was reportedly told that they could not do so without the approval of a senior officer whom they reportedly failed to locate at the time. It took around four hours before the trapped passengers could be rescued. It would therefore benefit the country if rescue services could be taken out of the hands of the armed forces and transferred to other agencies. The Disaster Management Authority has been overshadowed by the army to the extent that it is currently hardly operational.

A second view that was confirmed by our study was that military expenditure has a negative impact on the economic development of poor countries. We have shown in Chapter 7 how Lesotho diverts a significant proportion of its resources to the military at the expense of other more profitable sectors. The LDForce keeps an armoury of sophisticated weapons that include armoured
carriers that are rarely used. I know of only one incident in which these vehicles were used for a few hours. That was in 1994 when ironically, factions of the LDF were fighting each other. There is no way in which the keeping of such expensive yet idle equipment can be justified. Lesotho is a poverty stricken country where the majority of citizens lack food security. The country needs to attract foreign direct investment as well as produce enough food for its citizens. I am convinced that the money the country spends on the military can, if diverted to productive sectors, help improve this situation. Lesotho at present cannot easily attract investors due to a lack of confidence in its ability to provide a safe business environment. For example, the Minister of Police, Phallang Monare in March 2017 noted that “Lesotho police fire brigade has only four fire trucks. Only two of these trucks are functional as two are in South Africa for repairs. In one incident, the police could not attend to a fire because the officers were not aware the truck’s battery had gone flat” (Moremoholo 2017). Surely, Lesotho needs fire trucks more than armoured vehicles.

In a similar manner, some of the money Lesotho uses for purchasing expensive but unnecessary weaponry can be better applied to raise agricultural production. Food emergencies are declared from time and urgent assistance requested from development partners. It was sad to hear (as noted in chapter 7) that a large part of the wheat harvest of 2016 and 2017 was lost due to a lack of equipment.

11.3.2 Challenging the previously-held beliefs

Reporting of disconfirming evidence is another way of ensuring validity in a research. According to Creswel and Clark (2011: 212), this is important as it “in fact confirms the accuracy of the data analysis, because in real life, we expect the evidence of the themes to diverge and include more than just positive information”. The findings of my study challenged some the beliefs that I had prior to the commencement of my action research. While these experiences did not necessarily give birth to completely new beliefs, they did alter some of them. For instance, while I understood it would not be easy for people to accept the idea of demilitarisation, I underestimated the potential hurdles and resistance that I encountered. My initial expectation was that upon being briefed about the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation, people would readily be persuaded of its merits. This, however, was not to be as most people ignored the facts put forward and allowed their personal biases and political affiliations to determine their stances.
My passion for the study was at times also affected by negative reactions to the demilitarisation ideas I put forward. The environment in which the research was conducted at times became intimidating. The non-corporation and often opposition of the LDF was one such factor. As noted in section 6.3.5 I approached the LDF offices to seek literature pertaining to the army’s functions as well as finances. Some officers advised me that the information I needed was available, but that it could only be obtained from the army’s spokesperson, I was however, never allowed to meet him. Instead of helping me, officials in his office verbally abused me and refused outright to provide me with the needed information. They openly declared that their refusal to cooperate was due to my association with the National University of Lesotho whose academics had been vocal against the atrocities committed by the army. While it strengthened my belief that armies mostly resort to violence for the resolution of conflict, their abuse also instilled some fear in me as a researcher.

The LDF’s spokesman also made intimidating remarks on TK FM in response to the demilitarisation article published by The Post newspaper on 5th April 2017. He claimed that talk about demilitarisation was a ‘war against the army’, adding ominously that ‘normally gunshots only imply the end of a long-fought war’. He further declared that his counterparts in the army ‘knew how to deal ‘legally’ with those waging a war against the army”. The statement was heard by a number of people who let me know that they were worried about my safety. Reference to ‘legal ways’ would not be taken seriously by people who were familiar with the army’s penchant for disregarding the law. I was afraid and became careful in my movements.

The suggestions by people close to me of possible danger put more pressure on me, but I nevertheless persevered and continued with the research since there was no way I could abandon my study after investing so much in it. That would have resulted in a failure not only to complete my thesis, but also to achieve a vision of ‘an army-less and politically stable Lesotho that is free of violence and provides good opportunities for human development’ as agreed in our first meeting with the Advisory Group. I took courage from an article titled ‘Protest and persist: Why giving up hope is not an option’, in which the author warns that:

Newcomers often think that results are either immediate or they’re nonexistent. That if you don’t succeed straight away, you failed. Such a framework makes many give up and go back home when the momentum is building and victories are within reach. This is a dangerous mistake I’ve seen over and over (Solnit 2017).

This encouraged me to understand that intimidation, and the failure to convince important stakeholders about the benefits of demilitarisation, did not warrant giving up on the research.
11.4 Data analysis

The aim of data analysis is the discovery of patterns that be discerned in data, patterns that point to a theoretical understanding of social life (Babbie 2010: 400). This study is principally qualitative in nature. According to Babbie and Mouton, qualitative research is primarily interested in describing the actions of participants in great detail, and to understand the social phenomenon in terms of the actors’ own beliefs, history, and context (2001: 271). The research design chosen was to gather data by triangulation and qualitative techniques, such as direct observation, making field notes, and audio-recording of research activities, the methods of analysis hence also had to be qualitative in nature. Qualitative analysis relies on what is usually referred to as qualitative significance. This implies looking at the relevance of what is important in what people say or do as well as what this means for the research. In doing qualitative data analysis, researchers are “concerned with the stories of people, their anecdotes, their experiences and the meanings of them all” (Amdalla et al 2011: 29).

Highlighting the suitability of qualitative data for studies like this one, Miles and Huberman state that qualitative data is:

- a source of well grounded rich descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts; with qualitative data, one can see precisely which events let to which consequences and derive fruitful explanations; qualitative data are likely to lead to serendipitous findings and to new integrations, they help researchers go beyond initial conceptions and to generate and revise conceptual frameworks; findings of qualitative data have a quality of “undeniability”, because words have a concrete, vivid, meaningful flavour that often proves more convincing to a reader, another researcher, a policymaker, a practitioner. than pages and summarised numbers (Miles and Huberman 1994:1).

The field notes were thoroughly studied and the audio records replayed to identify the key themes and patterns that emerged during the different activities as a way of coding data. Neuman (2000) defines coding as the process in which raw data is organised into conceptual categories to create themes or concepts which are used to analyse the data. After it was coded, the data was thoroughly studied in order to make inferences. To infer means to pass judgment, to use reasoning, and to reach conclusions based on evidence (ibid). As a means of helping to ensure validity and reliability of my interpretations, I continually discussed these with my Advisory Group.
11.4.1 Little or no knowledge about non-militarised countries

From the inception of my research, I was aware that few people know about the existence of non-militarised states and that many would question the feasibility of demilitarisation in Lesotho. These views were confirmed by my research. The lack of knowledge about non-militarised countries and the demilitarisation process was manifested in two contrasting ways. The first group was composed of people who appreciated the new knowledge and thought demilitarisation was worth considering, whereas the second group simply dismissed the whole idea as something that could never happen in Lesotho, which Popovic (2015) has described as the sense of ‘it can never happen here’, even if it may have happened elsewhere.

A number of people admitted that they had not prior to my presentations been aware of the existence of the countries without armies. One notable confession emerged at the NUL conference when a Zimbabwean student expressed her amazement to hear that there were countries without any army. Due to the limited discussion time she did not have the opportunity to ask her question but we had a side talk during the tea break. She wondered how countries without an army were able to ensure external security and deal with internal dissent. Her interest arose from her experience in Zimbabwe where the army plays a key role in suppressing ‘internal dissent’ After a brief explanation of how weaker states usually get into defence pacts with their stronger counterparts or regional bodies, the excited student said she was ‘beginning to make sense of what Tito Mboweni had said’. Tito Mboweni, a former governor of the South African Reserve Bank is an alumnus of NUL, had argued there is a need for a federal arrangement between Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa that will retain the sovereign status of the former two. The proposal he suggested was to:

... create a common police border-patrol system for basic anti-crime measures, not people management; create a new revenue/fiscal framework; abolish certain unnecessary ministries and departments in Lesotho and Swaziland and create a common Swaziland-SA federal force in addition to the South African National Defence Force because Swaziland shares an external border with Mozambique, while Lesotho does not need a defence force; and, finally, create federal “Scorpions-type” anticorruption machinery to stamp out corruption and root out the predatory, corrupt and parasitic political class (Mboweni 2014).

As noted in chapter 6, the army without question contributes to the political instability witnessed in Lesotho. Roger Southall, who has written extensively about Lesotho’s politics, insists that in order to achieve peace, Lesotho will have to do away with what he calls its ‘pondokie’
(ramshackle) army. While he appreciates that this will prove to be a challenge, he maintains that failure to disband the army will be catastrophic:

Demilitarising Lesotho’s politics won’t be easy. But if it doesn’t happen, there will be a constant replay of military intervention and changing political coalitions. There would be no shortage of donor assistance, perhaps to retrain foot soldiers as police. But the officer corps needs to be pensioned off. In toto. Full stop. (Southall 2017)

The reaction of the other group has been to simply dismiss the idea of demilitarisation as something that could never succeed, even after learning of the success of non-militarised states. This became evident mainly during radio phone-in programmes such as PC FM and Harvest FM. Since they did not question or respond to specific arguments that had been raised, but simply rejected the idea of demilitarisation out of hand, I suspected that they had not actually listened properly to the ongoing discussion. The other observation mostly evident on Thaha-Khube FM was the influence of the biased studio guest who dismissed the idea, thereby influencing the callers. One caller, for example, was adamant that “there is no way a country can be without an army”. The caller audaciously warned the radio presenter to ‘next time become careful of the topics you bring for discussions on air as well as the calibre of individuals you invite to present them’. Below is a literal English translation of what he said in Sesotho before he was reprimanded by the programme presenter:

What that man says can never happen. Where on earth have you seen a country without a military? Who would defend such a country? You radio presenters need to be aware of what you bring on the air for listeners. Some of these guys you think are educated are actually mad. Only someone who has taken nyaope (a home-made drug mostly found in South Africa) can say what this ‘educated’ man is saying.

The blind ignorance and bias of this caller highlights the need to educate the public about issues that affect them, so as to liberate them from their mental constructs of what the world is like. Such people will resist any knowledge, irrespective of how beneficial it might be to them. Frantz Fanon comments:

Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable called cognitive dissonance. And because it is so important to protect the core belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn’t fit in with their core belief (Fanon, 2008).

11.4.2 Failure to differentiate between army and police
One other aspect that was observed in our research which influenced people’s views was their failure to clearly differentiate between the army and the police. As the fiction character William Adama has noted, the former fights the enemies of the state while the latter serves and protects the people. Barbey (2013) has explained the distinction by defining the army as follows:

It is composed of persons (soldiers) and equipped with heavy weapons, and is most often organised hierarchically. ... The persons belonging to the force have a different status from that of other civil servants and most of them are trained to use violence against human beings; they are, in the times of war, legitimised to capture, maim or kill anyone declared to be a military enemy and to destroy whatever is declared to be a military target (Barbey 2013:16).

Many people in Lesotho, the research has shown, perceive the police and the army to be the same, with the only difference being the uniforms they wear. This was evident when many people showed ignorance of the fact that Lesotho only came to have an army in 1979 when the Lesotho Defence Force was formed. Prior to this, the country had relied on the Police Mobile Unit (PMU) for many of the functions performed by the LDF in recent times. When complaining about the atrocities allegedly committed by the army, many people mentioned events of the immediate post-independence years, as well as the mid-1970s. This was long before the conversion of the PMU into a defence force in 1979. Treating the police and the army as one thing is totally misleading.

As seen in definitions of the army in section 3.3 of this thesis (see also Barbey 2013 above), the police and the army fall under the category of the armed forces but are in reality two different entities. Their differences lie in various factors including training, functions, methods of operation, and types of weapons used. Most importantly, the army is far more ready to resort to violence.

The fundamental difference between the police and the armed forces lies in how they deploy force. For the armed services, controlling force is not a key concern. For police, though, that control is exactly what makes it compatible with a democracy. Consequently, military training does not emphasise the need to control force, military laws and rules of engagement do not underscore the limits, and army deployment strategies do not necessarily take such limits into consideration. When military conduct is evaluated in military courts, for instance, the control of force is not a central issue (Costa & Medeiros 2002:154).

Those who cannot distinguish clearly between the police and army believe that disbanding the army and relying on police would not be a solution to Lesotho’s problems as the police ‘are capable of behaving like the army’. One notable individual sharing this view was a Physics professor at the National University of Lesotho Conference. In his view, the police units that would need to be strengthened as alternatives to a disbanded LDF would still be misused by the
politicians to suppress opponents and trigger political conflict. The view, I had to explain, was partly true, but the actions of the police would not be as violent as those of the military in the similar position, given that the latter’s training is mostly ‘enemy-oriented’ (Duncan, 2015). This point is emphasised by Costa and Medeiros (2002: 29) who have shown that “the fundamental difference between the police and the armed forces lies in how they deploy force. For the armed services, controlling force is not a key concern. For police, though, that control is exactly what makes it compatible with a democracy”. Militarising the police would imply having to reverse the service and protection orientation that forms the basis of the normal police training.

Arguing that the disbanding of the army would not be a solution to the country’s problems because it was likely to be replaced by militarised police fails to appreciate how such a move could contribute in the reduction of other types of violence namely structural. Even if the police were to be militarised they would never purchase the sophisticated military weapons hence allow funds to be diverted to other sectors with the ability to stimulate the economy. I emphasised during the NUL conference that this kind of reasoning does not take into account the contribution that military expenditure makes to structural violence. It has been noted several times that the budget for the Ministry of Defence and National Security ranks among the top five in Lesotho.

Ignoring this fact would appear to support the wrong view that military expenditure is normally regarded as essential for security and “beyond price”, - hence beyond scrutiny and criticism. This view has been rejected by Stiglitz and Biles (2008) in their book titled ‘The three trillion dollar war’. Reducing military expenditure could create an opportunity to set up better disaster management and rescue services that the country is so much in need of. My emphasis was therefore that in line with the criterion that “military expenditure, both current and capital, should follow the same rules as for any other government department i.e. there must be clear justification for the expenditure. Some other body such as the Ministry of Finance needs to estimate the opportunity cost of this expenditure” (Harris 2017: 4).

Surprisingly, the Lesotho Defence Force has recently attempted to justify its existence by equating a defence force with the police. Below is an extract from an article titled “Demilitarisation article was fallacious”, which was published by the LDF Public Affairs Office in The Post newspaper:

Letsie to supports (sic) his argument by postulating that “In Africa, only Mauritius has no military force” and by extrapolation, Lesotho should also do away with its military force.
This is totally not true; the country has a military force by another name. It has what is called Special Mobile Forces (SMF) and National Coast Guards (Sic) which bear all the characteristics of the military force through weapons, systems and training, and formations. For example the SMF is organised as an infantry unit (for land warfare) which is purely military, with six rifle companies, and one Engineer Company (combat support unit) to mention but some.

In terms of training programmes the SMF is trained by military advisers from India and the United Kingdom. Therefore, Letsie picking up of Mauritius as a classical example for demilitarisation in Lesotho is totally misleading (The Post, May 11-17 2017)

The argument of the LDF that Mauritius has a military force by another name has a serious conceptual flaw. The argument is tantamount to arguing that before 1979 Lesotho had a military force by another name in the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); which is totally wrong. We have shown before that “Mauritius has decided to maintain the whole security system, including Special Forces, within the police force” (Barbey 2013: 166; Ebrahim 2017). The article by the LDF left out this important aspect, that Mauritius’ SMF is part of its police, and also its capacity in terms of size. Mauritius maintains only the 1000 member Special Mobile Force and the 500 member Coast Guard (Harris 2004: 193), far below that of the LDF which has around 3500 officers. Most importantly, Mauritius maintains such small numbers despite being an island that is more vulnerable to external attack than Lesotho which is totally surrounded by a military superpower, South Africa. The argument by the LDF that ‘picking up of Mauritius as a classical example for demilitarisation in Lesotho is totally misleading’ (The Post 2017) goes against the international recognition of the country as being non-militarised. A simple search on any online listing of non-militarised states always includes Mauritius.

In response to the argument that Lesotho does not have any potential external threat that it can fight successfully by virtue of being completely surrounded by South Africa, the LDF has pointed to threats originating from within states. There army’s article argues that ‘the sense of insecurity that most states experience in Africa originates within their states rather than from outside’. This, of course ignores the point that the primary role of armies is national or territorial security, while public security implies the responsibility of the police, i.e.-the maintenance of civil order necessary for the execution of the basic societal functions, along with the upholding of the rule of law.

Arguing that the Lesotho army is needed for public security considerations reflects the reality that “most African states lack legitimacy and compete for loyalty and resources with other social
institutions such as clans, tribes, patron-client, dyads and others. In such countries armies are used to ensure compliance from the groups that question the legitimacy of the states hence repress the ‘enemy within’ (Thomas and Mazrui 1992: 160; see also Harris 2004: 36). The LDF’s argument cannot hold. There are alternatives that such states can adopt that would not in any way necessitate the maintenance of expensive and often brutal armies that work against the establishment of democratic rule. History has shown that internal insurgencies in Africa have mostly been the result of repression of subject groups by authoritarian rulers.

In summary, the LDF’s article did not address the impact the army has had on the lack of peace in the country, or of military expenditure on the economy. It ignored the fact that the army’s budget was far too big for a poor country like Lesotho. Not surprisingly it also would not admit the atrocities the LDF has committed and the role that it has played in the country’s political instability. The LDF’s article can simply be explained as an attempt to block any ideas that would challenge its existence. It underscores Sharp’s (2016: 43) observation that “powerful players who stand to lose money or status from reform can be very adept at blocking it. Especially when a small number of players stand to lose a lot, whereas a large number players of stand to gain a little, the blockers are likely to be much better organised than the proponents”.

11.4.3 The dominance of political party lines

The politically polarised environment in Lesotho proved to be a major factor that rendered my action research a challenging task. Polarisation was evident in the conflicting views concerning the role of the army. The opposition parties, on the one hand, generally have a negative view of the army. This mostly results from the role the army played in dislodging the coalition government consisting of these parties in 2015. The ruling parties, on the other hand, had the support of the army that they used to suppress and intimidate the opposition. This polarisation has filtered down to the rank and file membership of the country’s political parties and has eroded the element of objectivity in the debates about national issues.

Despite thorough explanations of what our demilitarisation research was all about, many people continued to interpret it along political party lines. This became evident during radio shows and the demilitarisation seminar. For instance, during the Harvest FM show, one caller insisted I was not an independent researcher but an ‘agent’ being used by the opposition party All Basotho Convention (ABC) ‘to destabilise the government of the day’. The leader of the ABC had his
government dislodged in 2015, largely as a result of the role played by the army. Afterwards he, together with other two opposition leaders went into exile claiming the army planned to assassinate them (Ntsukunyane 2016). This particular caller insisted that the timing of the research was questionable and wanting to know ‘why I had been keeping quite during the ABC rule (2012-2015)’. A similar allegation was made at the demilitarisation seminar where a representative of a party in the seven-party coalition government said that the seminar was ‘just a smear campaign against the army and the government ahead of the 2017 snap elections’.

Linking the demilitarisation argument to political parties was not only limited to the ordinary citizens. A similar link was drawn by the LDF’s spokesperson Brigadier Ntoi on TK FM on the April 6, 2017. When responding to the demilitarisation article that formed part of the discussion on the day’s programme, he claimed that the argument was influenced by those political parties that ‘tried to reject the budget proposals for the Ministry of Defence in parliament’. He was clearly alluding to the 2015/2016 budget debate when one-third of the opposition MPs walked out in protest as the minister of Defence and National Security was trying to justify approval of the proposed budget for his ministry. The scepticism of the opposition MPs about military financing is captured in the Lesotho Times of the 25 June 2015:

Mr Mohlajoa (opposition MP for Malimong Constituency) asked National Assembly Speaker, Ntlhoi Motsamai, who was acting as Parliamentary Committee chairperson, why government MPs were so excited by the minister’s presentation. “Is the minister genuinely seeking approval of the budget or is this noise coming from the government side of the House about already knowing what this money is really going to be used for? We already know what this money is going to be used for.”

But Mr Mohlajoa’s interjection prompted an angry reaction from the ruling party MPs, with the Speaker trying, and failing, to bring the House to order.

To someone familiar with the political climate, it would have been clear that Mr Mohlajoa was insinuating that the money was going to finance the army’s repression of the opposition. Although the opposition lost the vote and the budget was approved, they had made known their dissatisfaction with the army.

The views of the opposition parties regarding demilitarisation were equally apparent. For them it was not only proper but long overdue. While their stance was supportive of demilitarisation idea, the manner in which it was advanced was also more emotional than rational. In their arguments, the opposition parties disregarded the few admittedly inefficiently performed tasks performed by the army that were generally of some benefit to the Basotho society (see section 6.3.6). For
instance, one caller had to be reprimanded by the presenter of the Thaha-Khube FM for arguing that members of the army were ‘parasites’. Literally translated from Sesotho, the caller said that

These soldiers need to be sent home and the money paid to them be channelled to some other meaningful sectors. They are just parasites who consume national resources while not performing any meaningful tasks. All they do is to roam the streets in trucks and buses during the day while they chase our leaders at night”.

Such an approach is problematic because it creates hostility and is sure to stir up the army’s ire. If it is to succeed, the whole demilitarisation process will have to be handled in a diplomatic manner that will convince the members of the army that the process is for the benefit of everyone, including themselves. The end result of such polarised views is the diversion of debates from a measure of objectivity to a blind defence of party positions. This became very clear during radio shows where instead of addressing issues callers ended up taking entrenched positions.

11.4.4 Fear to discuss military-related issues

Our review in Chapter 6 of the involvement of the army in politics shows that it has contributed to political instability and at times led to violence. Similarly, use of violence has been the order of the day in cases where the army has been involved in the maintenance of law and order, with or without the police. My various interactions in the course of this research showed that many people felt uneasy about discussing issues related to the military openly, since they feared that there might be repercussions. Some incidents revealed that people were apprehensive that their views would in one way or another get to be known by the military and were therefore reluctant to discuss any issues pertaining to the army for fear of consequences.

This was manifest during a public gathering organised by the Development for Peace Education (DPE) at Boinyatso, when a plane flew over the place of the gathering twice. Under normal circumstances that would not even have warranted any mention. However, to some of the participants it was an ominous sign. An elderly lady expressed anxiety that ‘it might have been an army plane and that they would later come to raid our village’. Her fear was based on reports of a woman who had earlier been brutally killed by members of the army in Lebakeng in the district of Qacha’s Neck (see section 7.4.6), which had dominated the media after the DPE had organised a fact-finding mission and compiled a report that exposed the brutality of the army.
Another example comes from the Demilitarisation Seminar. A political party representative stated that she was not ‘at ease discussing such sensitive stuff about the army’. The disclosure was worrisome considering it coming from an official who should understand the human liberties ensured under Lesotho’s Constitution, but is understandable in the light of the history of violence that has been unleashed on the public by the army in the past.

The army’s threatening approach is continuing (see section 11.2.2.) with the LDF comparing calls for its disbandment to war against the army. Talking of war is certainly intimidating when it is known what an army is and how its members can behave during ‘wars’:

It is composed of persons (soldiers) and equipped with heavy weapons, and is most often organised hierarchically. ... The persons belonging to the force have a different status from that of other civil servants and most of them are trained to use violence against human beings; they are, in the times of war, legitimised to capture, maim or kill anyone declared to be a military enemy and to destroy whatever is declared to be a military target (Barbey 2013:16). Despite the emphasis that ‘members of the Lesotho Defence Force knew how act legally with people who engaged in ‘war’ with the army’, the emphasis on legal action was not convincing, considering the history of how the army has disregarded the country’s laws. It is the very same army that has refused to hand to the police various officials suspected of various crimes, including house bombings and murders (Staff Reporters, 2014). Members of the LDF have in recent times also been reported to have been involved in brutal beatings of patrons in Maseru drinking pubs, including those at the 4 Fordy Night Club at Mapeleng Ha Mabote on July 1, 2017. Victims of these attacks have claimed their assailants were members of the LDF, but the police and the army have denied the allegations.

The Police Spokesperson stated that the police are still investigating reports of attacks not only at the 4 Fordy Night Club but other attacks at the Litaleng and Ha ‘Nelese Night Club formerly known as Setsoto. He said no arrests have been made thus far and therefore could not say if the assailants were members of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) or not as has been reported. On the other hand, LDF Public Affairs Office Spokesperson Brigadier Ntlele Ntoi also denied any knowledge of any members of the army having been involved in an attack the night club (Lena, 2017).

These denials would not surprise to anybody familiar with the security situation in Lesotho as it is common knowledge that members of the army involved in criminal activities are hardly ever brought before the courts of law. The police do not seem to have any power to apprehend members of the army, except in the cases where individual perpetrators are handed over to the police by the LDF Military Police. The army seems to be able to break the law with impunity. The call for the
members of the same army to act ‘legally’ on those ‘waging a war on the army through demilitarisation debate’ is hardly convincing.

11.4.5 Insecurity among army personnel

Another finding relates to the sense of insecurity among the members of the army, and their families, over the discussions relating to the demilitarisation process. They fear that it would see them lose their jobs, and for some, social status. Members of the army enjoy some respect within their communities due to their status within the army. Such feelings can be expected and points to the need to convince LDF members that their interests would be looked after in the process.

There are two examples that illustrate the level of this fear. The first incident relates to a middle-rank army officer who called one of my friends and told him how much he ‘got annoyed whenever he saw me as I was busy calling for them to lose their jobs’. I went to the same high school with my friend and this army officer, although the latter was a year behind us. The army officer reportedly told my friend the feeling was also shared by many of his counterparts in the army and I was in danger of being ‘harmed’. While the officer did not explicitly tell my friend to pass the message on to me, he obviously expected my friend to do so. I was obviously upset but concluded there was no turning back on my mission.

In the second incident, a former class mate at NUL confronted me and told me how she listened to my radio presentation in which I, according to her, called for their husbands to be dismissed from their jobs. It took me a while to explain to her that I was not targeting individuals but the army as an institution. I reiterated that if carefully implemented, the process would in the long run benefit the very people who now felt threatened by providing them more challenging and productive jobs in other sectors. She grasped this and shared with me how her husband often complained about how monotonous routine tasks within the army were. I really understood the difficulty the members of the LDF, and their families, had in appreciating the potential of demilitarisation in Lesotho. This is because “it is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it” (Green 2016: 43).

11.4.6 Lack of interest in military expenditure

Another finding of my demilitarisation research was how little interest there was in the implications of military expenditure. This probably was due to lack of quantitative evidence which
has been a serious limitation of this research. As stated in section 6.3.5, some officials at the DF Public Affairs Office blocked my efforts to meet the LDF’s spokesperson who was the only person authorised to release information pertaining to the army’s expenditure, or records regarding its secondary functions. Without this information it was difficult to present convincing arguments and left me with the only possibility of relying on publicly accessible information, such as national budgets.

Despite attempts to explain how military expenditure could be channelled to more productive sectors and in the process stimulate much-needed economic development, the discussion never seemed to interest people in most of the different forums. The idea was only briefly aired at the NUL conference. Two viewpoints were expressed regarding this issue. One participant supported the argument and advocated that the money be channelled towards agriculture so that the country could become self-sufficient in food production.

Another participant was, however, less optimistic that a reduction in military expenditure would necessarily contribute to the country’s economic development. According to him, ‘Lesotho was economically backward not because of insufficient resources, but due to the rampant corruption that results in misuse of public funds by those in power’. This person mockingly suggested that the money generated from a reduction in military expenditure was ‘likely to be channelled to Bidvest’. He was referring to the corruption scandal that saw the Lesotho government award a transport fleet tender to South African-based Bidvest Bank Ltd without following the normal procurement procedures.

Bidvest was reportedly charging exorbitant fees that depleted the Ministry of Public Works and Transport’s budget and forced the government to source funds from other ministries. The government struggled to pay Bidvest and eventually terminated the deal in April 2017. In his announcement of the cancellation of the Bidvest deal, the Minister of Finance Tlohang Sekhamane admitted that the South African financial institution had milked government of millions of Maloti and the bills were spiraling to a point where it was difficult to pay them off (Ntaote 2017 (b).

According to the leader of one of the opposition parties, Monyane Moleleki, the government paid M600 million in the 2016/17 financial year to Bidvest Bank Ltd and recently followed up with another M73 million in penalties after prematurely terminating the controversial fleet service contract it signed with the South African company last year (Ntsukunyane 2017). The allegedly corrupt deal proved to be a serious financial setback as Lesotho had since independence in 1966
never spent more than M200 million for transport in one financial year (ibid). The existence of deep-rooted corruption has so badly eroded public confidence that most Basotho do not believe that any amount of money pumped into the system can ever remedy the country’s economic woes, and think that it would in the end only benefit a handful of individuals involved in corrupt government deals.

11.5 Conclusion

This chapter has centred on reflection and data analysis. The process of reflection was necessary because “in doing research, researchers discover new information which they consciously reconstruct to form new beliefs or personal theories” (O’Hanlon 2002: 113). The main objective was therefore to conduct an examination of the impact that information and experiences of demilitarisation research might have had on me as a researcher. The research has generally strengthened the views I previously had about the need for demilitarisation in Lesotho. These include the view that involvement of the army in civilian matters undermines the efficiency of other civilian departments and agencies.

My action research has introduced and helped to spread the idea of demilitarisation, showing that it merits attention. Polarisation along political party lines, and the violence perpetrated by the LDF, causes many people to be reluctant to express their support for demilitarisation. I was also subject to intimidation myself.

This chapter has relied on qualitative data analysis in the sense of being “concerned with the stories of people, their anecdotes, their experiences and the meanings of them all” (Amdalla et al 2011: 29). The findings of my research have shown that generally the people of Lesotho have very little or no knowledge about the existence of non-militarised and partially demilitarised states; they fail to differentiate between armies and police; discussions pertaining to the demilitarisation process are complicated by contrasting views of issues along polarised party political sympathies; some people are fearful discussing army related issues; members of the army feel threatened by the discussion of the feasibility of demilitarisation as they think it could cost them their jobs; and that there was little interest in the implications of the LDF’s expenditure for the country’s economy. These findings will form part of the considerations for future plans, research, and launching of the demilitarisation process in Lesotho.
CHAPTER 12

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION IN PLANNING FOR DEMILITARISATION

12.1 Introduction

It is worth noting right from the onset that in this chapter I discuss not a plan, but things which a plan would need to consider in case Lesotho plans to embark on demilitarisation. The discussion is premised on the understanding of the situation as analysed in chapter 11. It starts by taking a brief overview of the countries that have gone through the process of demilitarisation, which will serve as a guideline for Lesotho on what to copy and avoid in the search for a successful and sustainable demilitarisation. The following section hence discusses various factors that would need to be considered in drawing up a demilitarisation plan for Lesotho.

12.2. Brief overview of cases of demilitarisation

There are a number of countries that have for various reasons taken on the process of demilitarisation. In some cases the process was completed, leading to non-militarisation, while in some it was only partially achieved. Costa Rica and Panama are two examples of complete demilitarisation. They opted for non-military defence thereby drastically reducing the potential for fatal violence often associated with armies. It should be understood that non-militarised countries do, to some extent also use violence, but that “abolition of the army eliminates the state institution that typically has the greatest technological and organisational capacity to kill en masse (Peters 2013: 202), thereby reducing the magnitude of violence used. El Salvador and Guatemala are examples of partial demilitarisation, while Haiti is also included to provide an example of what demilitarisation should never be. These are only briefly presented in this chapter, since they have already been discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
12.2.1 Costa Rica

This Latin American country abolished its army in 1948 as a peacebuilding measure aimed at settling the intrastate violence that culminated in a civil war that claimed around 2000 lives (Barbey 2013: 162). Noteworthy about Costa Rican demilitarisation was that it was introduced by the leader of the country’s military junta, Jose Figueres Ferrer. Prior to its abolition the Costa Rican army was highly sophisticated having received its military equipment and training from the USA as a result of its interest in protecting the Panama Canal (Peters 2013:184). Costa Rica became so committed to its demilitarisation plan that the army was dissolved in the face of the most serious national security crisis, an invasion.

In the absence of the military, security in Costa Rica is maintained by a series of police forces including the Public Forces, Judicial Police (investigative), Transit Police (transport), Municipal Police, DIS (intelligence), Coast Guard and others (Barbey 2013: 162). The Public Forces included a lightly armed Civil Guard that was finally disbanded in 1996. The Civil Guard’s “technological and organisational capacity to use force was relatively limited and until mid-1970s it stood at 1200 members. It could only be used to maintain public order and to aid in law enforcement” (Peters 2013:189). Costa Rica’s demilitarisation became long-term, multi-phased and strategic, and included the following steps:

- On the 1st December 1948 the Minister of Public Security turned over the keys of the main army barracks to the Minister of Education and the government then converted the barracks into a museum of art.
- The country instituted an ‘arms for tractors’ plan through which it traded approximately 2000 of the Civil Guards small arms for half a dozen tractors.
- It confiscated all of the Civil Guard heavy equipment; converted Civil Guard barracks throughout the country into police stations in order to prevent the militia from exerting too strong an influence in Costa Rican society and politics.
- President Echandi helped to end the political conflict that pre-dated the civil war by allowing Guardia to return to Costa Rica without facing charges of treason (Peters 2013)

Costa Rica formalized its abolition of the army in Article 12 of the 1949 constitution. Introduced in the Legislative Assembly on 4 July 1949, the Article reads,
The Army as a permanent institution is abolished. There shall be the necessary police forces for surveillance and the preservation of the public order. Military forces may only be organized under a continental agreement or for the national defense; in either case, they shall always be subordinate to the civil power: they may not deliberate or make statements or representations individually or collectively (Costa Rican Constitution 1949, cited in Peters 2013: 185).

In order to close the void left by the abolition of the army, Costa Rica opted for collective security under the Organisation of the American States (OAS) and became a signatory to the Inter-American Reciprocal Defence Treaty (TIAR). Through this treaty member states are provided a collective system of military security. Costa Rica invoked TIAR against invasion threats by the forces led by the Costa Rican ex-president Calderon Guardia through the backing of the neighbouring states in 1948, 1955 and 1978 (Harris 2004: 193). In all these instances the intervention of OAS facilitated the signing of the peace pacts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, from which attacks had been launched, thus enabling the former to guarantee its national security. Costa Rica has in the recent times allowed the US military forces into its waters and ports in order to aid in drug traffic interdiction.

12.2.2. Panama

Panama is another Latin American country that abolished its army, the Panamanian Defence Force (PDF) in 1989. Transformed from the National Guard, the PDF became a full military in the 1980s and by the time of its dissolution the Panamanian army “had 16 000 professional soldiers that had complete control over almost every function of the Panamanian governance” (Harris et al 2012: 9). The involvement of the PDF in issues of governance was an inheritance from its predecessor, the National Guard which much involved itself in politics to a point where it grabbed power in 1968. Prior to its transformation, The National Guard was used by Omar Torrijos to suppress all opposition, including the free press and opposing political groups (Ibid).

The abolishment of the PDF followed an invasion of Panama by the United States’ forces. The PDF was defeated and General Noriega, then chief of the army and president of the country was captured (Barbey 2013: 163). The dissolution of the battered army was formalised as a result of the in-coming president’s realisation that he could not bank on the remnants of the defeated army due to its unpopularity (Harris et al 2012: 10). The demilitarisation process took more than five years and was concluded in 1994 when the abolition of the army was formally inscribed in the country’s constitution to eliminate any future possibility of a military. Since abolishing the standing army would pose a continuing challenge for the country, it was necessary that steps be
taken to avoid chaos that could result from a poorly-planned demilitarisation process. The quote below captures what came to be part of the demilitarisation plan.

Although the immediate stabilization of the country was their first priority, they also knew that if they dissolved the PDF without creating a new institution in which the former soldiers could find employment, the former soldiers could represent a serious security threat. The first steps towards the demilitarization of security forces, therefore, were intended to officially eliminate the last traces of the military in Panama, and to create a new civilian force whose mission and ideology would be distinct from their military forebears.

In February, just a few weeks after the invasion, Cabinet Decrees No. 38 and No. 40 created the Panamanian Public Forces and officially eliminated the Panamanian Defense Forces. The former military forces were split into several divisions to decentralize the armed command structure and were put under civilian control. A few years later, in 1994, the government amended the Constitution to eliminate any future possibility of a Panamanian military (Harris et al 2012: 11-12)

Demilitarisation involves a complex process that does not aim to only get rid of the military institution, but also to mitigate the psychological impact that a military culture has on the minds of its members. The Panamanian government tried to break down the military culture by:

- demolishing the barracks;
- changing the types of weapons officers were issued;
- eliminating the separated health and banking systems, and ending the scheme of “institutionalized prerogatives and illicit privileges” that had characterized the PDF;
- a new khaki uniform was issued, to separate the police in the minds of the populace from the military, who wore dark green;
- the language was also purposefully changed;
- bases became stations and all military ranks above Major became Commissioners or Sub-Commissioners (Ibid: 13).

The Panamanian demilitarisation was not without its flaws and therefore provides an example of what countries aiming to demilitarise should be prepared for. In their study of Panama Harries et al (2012) identify a number of challenges that the country faced as a result of demilitarisation. The first challenge emanated from the weakness of civil institutions that had been part of the country’s history. The civilian government always relied on an external force to provide it with the legitimacy necessary to govern effectively. Without the army the government was going to face a challenge of governing. The second challenge had to do with the culture of militarism inherited
from the nature of training. Many who served in the PDF had trouble letting go of military ideology and carried their mindset into their work in the PPF. The third challenge arose from the culture of fear of the armed forces that persisted from the days of the PDF, which was manifested in the avoidance of the police by civilians.

12.2.3 El Salvador

El Salvador, an example of partial demilitarisation, started the process in 1992 following a 10-year civil war. A summary is given by Kincaid (2001) of how it played out.

The demilitarisation process included the dissolution of various components of the armed forces and a general reduction of the size of the army. A calendar for the implementation of the process within a two-year period was drawn up. This saw the size of the army reduced from 40 000 in 1992 to 28 000 in 1994. In the place of the dissolved components, a National Civilian Police (PNC) was created and placed under the Ministry of Interior. In order to restrict the role of the remaining military units, the mission of the military was redefined. The military role in national defence remained. It could only be involved in matters of public security in the event of national emergencies, which required authorization by the president and prior approval of the legislature. The reduced armed forces also had their roles redefined. They now carried out health, education, and infrastructural repair programmes in the rural areas which helped them to win the confidence of local communities.

Although the demilitarisation process in El Salvador came to be regarded by the UN and other international actors as a major success story it did not come about without challenges. This included delays in the dissolution of the armed forces and deployment and establishment of the new police force, which was due in part to the army’s loss of control over some institutions.

12.2.4 Guatemala

Guatemala also represents a case of partial demilitarisation by reducing the size and capabilities of its army in 1991, following a civil war. Below is an extract on Guatemalan demilitarisation as given by Kincaid (2001: 43-49).
Guatemala effected some constitutional amendments to redefine the role of the military in order to pave way for the demilitarisation process. The newly amended constitution allowed the military to intervene in matters of public security only during times of emergency with the approval of the country’s president, changing the previous constitution that assigned responsibility to the armed forces for both external and internal security.

A number of targets were set as part of the demilitarisation plan. Broadly the target was to close military bases and redeploy troops in conformity with the revised military mission, and to put military institutions and units under civilian control. Specific targets included the reduction of the size of the country’s military personnel by 33% within a year; cutting the military budget by 33% and increasing the number of police from 12,000 to 20,000 within three years coupled with significant salary increases; and ensuring the participation of local communities in the recruitment and selection of personnel so that the police would reflect the diversity of the Guatemalan society.

Guatemala’s demilitarisation faced many challenges, the most significant of which was the resistance of the army. The process was also hampered by lack of adequate financial resources and failure to prepare the police for their increased responsibilities, as the country saw an increase in violence and proliferation of arms among villagers.

12.2.5 Haiti

Haiti presents a case that reveals the dangers of poorly planned demilitarisation. It is an example that Lesotho has to avoid at all costs. Barbey’s account (2013: 165-6) relates that the country abolished its army in 1995 after an earlier army coup that ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Following this coup, soldiers and paramilitary forces committed countless atrocities, killing an estimated 4,000 people over the next three years (BBC 2017). The atrocities came from a long tradition, as “for much of Haiti’s history, the army had been used to crack down on political dissent by a series of authoritarian presidents” (Ibid).

Aristide was reinstated in 1994 following the intervention of the US-UN force that effectively neutralised the Haitian army. He went on to abolish the remnants of the army in 1995, following a public opinion poll whose results showed that 62 per cent population were in favour of the move, compared to 12 per cent who wanted to retain the army (Harris 2004: 196). In its demilitarisation plan Haiti omitted two important factors that later came to haunt the country as demobilised soldiers reorganised and ousted Aristide once more in 2004. Firstly, Haiti never ensured control
of the battered army’s weapons prior to its abolition. Secondly, the country failed to integrate demobilised soldiers back into civilian life. Thirdly, despite Haiti’s constitution having sections concerning the military, it did not undertake to make the necessary amendments to ensure that the abolition of the army was reflected in the constitution.

This has left Haiti vulnerable to the resurgence of the military. In late 2012 talks about re-establishing the army started again. In July 2017 Haiti announced its intention of establishing an army again by recruiting 500 men and women to assist in case of natural disasters, and to patrol the country’s borders. This followed on the announcement by the UN that it would be pulling out its peace keeping forces by October (BBC 2017). Critics of this move argue that the island’s small budget should rather be spent to augment the national police force, raising it to 15,000 officers. They are fearful that the army could be politicised, becoming a weapon in the hands of whoever is the president or Prime Minister (Ibid).

12.3 High prospects of demilitarisation in Lesotho

The findings of our research have strengthened the view that demilitarisation would be a highly positive step in Lesotho’s efforts at peacebuilding and the containment of violence in all its forms. The army has in one way or another contributed to all the types of violence that have characterised the country since the army was established in 1979. It is worth stating once more that discussion in this section is not on a plan for demilitarisation per say, but regarding issues that need to be considered in mapping out a viable plan for demilitarising Lesotho.

There are basically two options to choose from if Lesotho wants to demilitarise. It can either completely abolish its army and join the non-militarised states, or reduce the size and capacity of its army by leaving only few units for specialised tasks. Of these two options the former looks the most appropriate considering the country’s geographic, economic, as well as political situation. Complete disbandment of the army would imply that the country would get rid of the militaristic mindset found within the institution of the army. It is worth assessing now the prospects for undertaking the demilitarisation process, before discussing the specific issues that would need to form part of the demilitarisation plan.

The decision to demilitarise would have to be made by certain national stakeholders. The most notable of these are politicians. It therefore goes without saying that demilitarisation can be initiated and succeed only if there is sufficient political will among the leadership to grasp the
Our research has shown that there are divergent political views regarding the military in Lesotho. Some support the army while others are opposed to it. Important to note is that among those who oppose the army, not all necessarily support the idea that it must be abolished. For instance, much as some people may be against the army’s conduct, they still see the army as an important source of employment in a country characterised by high levels of unemployment of around 25.3% (Lesotho Bureau Statistics, 2015).

Again, there are some politicians who would resist demilitarisation because of their relationship with the army. Such politicians include Mothejoa Metsing of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) who has for a long time maintained a close relationship with notorious yet influential elements within the army’s command. The address Metsing gave to his supporters on the 5th June 2017 in Maseru reveals the likelihood that he would resist the demilitarisation process. He is reported to have said: "Let me tell you that it is because of members of this country's army who put their necks on the block that we ended up taking power (in 2012), and if today Thabane attains power, it is clear that some of them would be in danger," (Tefo 2017). This was in reference to the ongoing publication of the June 3 2015 election results that were indicating that Thabane’s All Basotho Convention (ABC) was going to be well placed to form a new government.

Despite potential resistance from some politicians, the current administration in Lesotho provides good prospects for kick-starting the demilitarisation process. The incumbent Prime Minister Thabane who heads the four-party coalition government has in the past hinted at the possibility of a non-militarised Lesotho. His view on this has probably been influenced by a number of factors. Firstly, he headed the delegation dispatched to Latin America by then-Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili in 1998 to study how countries without armies conduct their security. This was after the army had played a role in the political conflict that almost ousted Mosisili’s government, which was so serious that it nearly plunged the country into civil war (Sekatle, 1999).

Secondly, Thabane’s view could have also resulted from the experiences he had when the army was instrumental in pre-maturely ending his rule in 2015, and he was twice forced to go into exile in South Africa for fear that the army would kill him. His view of the army is contained in an extract from his campaign message on Lesotho Television’s Seotlong programme on the 20th April 2017. This was ahead of the June 2017 snap election that saw Thabane’s party win most of the parliamentary seats allowing him to form a coalition government. He said in Sesotho:
- There is something wrong with the Lesotho army. I was exiled, with some other army officials, because of members of Lesotho’s own army. That anomaly needs to be corrected. I am not prepared to go into exile again, running away from soldiers young enough to be my children.
- There are countries without armies and military infrastructure, but such countries are far safer than Lesotho.
- There is a need to review whether some tasks currently undertaken by the army cannot be performed by highly specialised police.
- There is therefore need for the nation to soberly come together to review the situation of the Lesotho’s army.
- The army should allow for a smooth process of reform by leaving the civilian leadership to perform its functions (Seotlong, 2017).

Though consistent, Thabane’s criticism of the army has at times been ‘diplomatic’ by avoiding ‘tough talk.’ This has particularly been evident when he addresses the local media, although he is more forthright when addressing foreign media. This is to be expected from a politician who despite his reservations about the army, still hopes to win the votes, including from those who have links with, or support the army. His ‘diplomatic’ approach was evident when on June 06, after his party was declared to have won most seats in the elections, he indicated that he was not going to ‘disband the army’. He however, emphasised that he wanted to have an army that was accountable to civilian authority, would not intrude into civilian politics, or meddle with the police; and that would be retrained in line with the needs of the country, t would be confined to the barracks, and would come out only for operations that can be conducted by the army and nobody else (Sehlohlolong, 2017).

He is, however, more forthright when talking to the South African media. Below is the AFP’s report of Thabane’s response to a question regarding his view about the army that orchestrated his government’s fall in 2015.

“Thabane said he did not seek revenge against the alleged coup plotters, but added that he hoped the army would eventually be merged into the police. “That is my vision” he said. We shouldn’t have had the army in the first place …. which country could we successfully attack?” (italics my own emphasis) he asked (News24.com 2017).
Despite the inconsistency of his remarks about the army, Thabane appears to be the prime minister under whose administration demilitarisation could best be initiated. His admission that Lesotho ‘shouldn’t have had the army in the first place’ provides a suitable point of departure for the demilitarisation process. What is needed now is that relevant stakeholders show support for Thabane and his colleagues in government, and lobby the public to garner more support for the idea. A window of opportunity is created by the fact that the country is now on the verge of engaging in comprehensive reforms on its constitution, judiciary, parliament, public service and security sector. The process is earmarked to start when the parliament returns from Christmas break in January 2018. The proposal for these reforms has come as a result of both domestic and external initiatives. International bodies that have called for these reforms include the Commonwealth, African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). It remains to be seen how the reform process will unfold as some of the opposition parties have threatened to boycott the process if some of their demands are not met by the government. The government has on the other hand insisted the reform process cannot be held back by what it has called irresponsible conditions by the opposition parties.

The possibility of some opposition parties trying to scuttle the demilitarisation process should not in any way deter kick-starting the process. The World Bank warns that:

“Many institutional changes that could produce greater long-term resilience against violence frequently carry short-term risks. Any important shift, whether holding elections, dismantling patronage networks, giving new roles to security services, decentralizing decision-making, empowering disadvantaged groups, all create both winners and losers. Losers are often well organized and resist change (World Development Report 2011: 7).

Resistance to change is normal, but can be overcome by persistence and application. It is likely that members of the Lesotho army will attempt to block moves toward demilitarisation the way their counterparts in El Salvador and Guatemala did, since they will stand to lose from the process. It is true that “powerful players who stand to lose money or status from reform can be very adept at blocking it. Especially when a small number of players stand to lose a lot, whereas a large number players of stand to gain a little, the blockers are likely to be much better organised than the proponents” (Sharp 2016: 43).

The support by external organisations and countries for the planned reform process in Lesotho provides a good chance for overcoming resistance from the army. In June 2017 South Africa issued a warning that it would not tolerate a military coup in Lesotho. Speaking at a media briefing
in Johannesburg, South Africa’s International Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane emphasised that “South Africa in particular and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in general would not tolerate any attempt to overthrow a democratically-elected government in Lesotho (Lesotho Times 2017). She is on record emphasising, “so the coup thing, I think it is as clear as (daylight), we will not allow it to happen, not in our backyard. That is not a threat; it’s just the way it is” (Ibid).

12.4 What the demilitarisation plan would need to include.

In these favourable circumstances, it would be prudent for Lesotho to kick-start the demilitarisation process now. The country needs to draw up a long-term plan that would start with partial demilitarisation and end with the abolition of the army. Specific measures that need to be taken are discussed below.

12.4.1 Constitutional amendments

Sections of the constitution dealing with security and the army will have to be removed or radically modified. The existence of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) is ratified under article 147 of the 1993 Constitution. There is also the Lesotho Defence Force Act of 1996 which amongst others outlines the functions of the military. These would have to be removed to ensure that Lesotho avoids the Haitian experience of a regrouping of demobilised soldiers and the overthrow of the government in 2004, which has opened the door to re-establishing the army again (Barbey 2013 and 2017) . Due to this omission, Haiti is on the verge of recruiting 500 men and women as part of its effort to re-establish its army (BBC 2017).

One of the most important constitutional amendments would have to address the subject of territorial defence which has been the primary role of the LDF. Like other non-militarised countries, it would have to be clearly stipulated that Lesotho opts for collective security with its only neighbour, South Africa, and SADC in general. The country would have to consult South Africa to come up with a suitable arrangement that would preserve its sovereignty. The federal arrangement recommended by the Lesotho-educated former governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Tito Mboweni (see section 11.4.1) provides such an example.

Amending the constitution should not be a very difficult task as the sections on the army are not enshrined and can be changed without having to call for a referendum. It would therefore only
need to have the support of two thirds of the National Assembly to pass. The ruling coalition in the current 10th Parliament has 66 seats and would therefore need a minimum of 13 votes from the opposition benches to win approval. They may be persuaded if they come to appreciate the benefits that Lesotho could reap by demilitarising.

However, should efforts to demilitarise fail to garner the required majority in the first presentation of the demilitarisation bill, the quest should not be abandoned. There must be sustained efforts to enact the required constitutional amendments to allow the process of demilitarisation to proceed. Those proposing the amendment should always bear in mind that “even losing can be part of the process: as the bills to abolish slavery in the British empire failed over and over again, the ideas behind them spread, until 27 years after the first bill was introduced, a version finally passed” (Soltin 2017). In a similar manner the goal of demilitarisation will keep spreading until the majority of MPs accept the idea. As Green (2016) predicts, entrenched ideas will eventually change with generational turnover.

12.4.2 Assuring the military of the necessary support

One of the main principles of civil-military relations is the subordination of the military to the civilian rule. However, it always has to be borne in mind that the military have their own interests, both at personal and institutional levels. It would therefore, be important to make sure that their interests are catered for when the army is disbanded. Members of the LDF would need to be assured that they are not being ‘punished’ for past wrongs, but that disbandment is a positive step forward towards achieving peace for the benefit of the whole Basotho nation, of which they are part. There will have to be clearly defined plans of how members of the army will be compensated for the loss of their jobs. These would include necessary retirement packages and redeployment to other relevant sectors. The former would apply to older officers while the latter is intended for the younger generation. The choice of redeployment should involve thorough screening of rogue elements, and be combined with the retraining in order to reintegrate the demobilised soldiers into civilian life. Failure to do so would otherwise leave them with a militaristic mindset and possible transferal of violent attitudes into their new environment.

12.4.3 Continued education on demilitarisation

The existence of the army has for long been accepted in Basotho society as an essential part of life. Willet explains the reason for this:
Intrusion of the military into civilian lives is a process involving both material and ideological dimensions. In the material sense it encompasses the gradual encroachment of the military into civil society and the economy. The ideological dimension implies the extent to which such encroachments are acceptable to the population and become seen as “common sense” solutions to civil problems (Willet 1998: 411).

Green (2016: 41) elaborates that resistance to change comes from institutions, ideas and interests, but that it can also over time be changed with generational turnover. It would therefore, be important for the demilitarisation plan to make provision for ongoing education about the process, so that the ideas and attitudes of the society about the army can change and that they can appreciate that there are other alternatives to it.

12.4.4 Capacitating alternative institutions

The legal framework for demilitarisation should be accompanied by plans for the strengthening of the institutions that would serve as alternatives for the functions currently performed by the LDF. Three of them are briefly discussed here.

- Police

Ensuring public security in Lesotho is the responsibility of the police. However, there are times when the army gets involved in the provision of the same services, such as assistance in the preservation of life, health and property, as well as upholding law and order in support of the police as directed by Government, which are all provided for in the LDF Act of 1996. This means that any plans for demilitarisation should include provision of ways to capacitate the police to effectively deal with the cases that it might normally ask the army to perform. Such capacitation will have to be multi-phased and include the recruitment and thorough training of new members, purchasing of the necessary equipment and operational means, and improvement of general police infrastructure.

Adequately arming the police should be a priority in order to deter criminals who might want to take the advantage of the abolishing of the army. It always has to be remembered that demilitarisation does not necessarily rid a country of the tendency to use violence. Political scientists tend to emphasize that one of the prime prerogatives of the state is its monopoly over the use of violence. It is equally important, however, to note that the use of violence by the state
has to be strictly regulated and only be allowed as a last resort. This is the element that is often violated by armies who are by nature prone to the arbitrary use of maximum violence. Police should on the other hand have a different orientation of avoiding, and only using the minimum force that is necessary in exercising their duties.

Adequately arming the police should therefore be one of the priorities of any demilitarisation plan for Lesotho, but should not be confused with equipping an army. The weapons needed by the two institutions are different as Peters points out. “Governments may need arms to maintain domestic law and order. But the police weapons required for internal purposes are different from weapons of war ... abolition of the army eliminates the state institution that typically has the greatest technological and organizational capacity to kill en masse (Peters 2013: 180). Should there be a need to incorporate junior members of the demobilised army into the police, a thorough reintegration programme would be needed to rid them of the military mindset that is a feature of the army. Such a programme would prevent Lesotho from falling into the trap of Panama where “many people who served in the PDF had trouble letting go of military ideology and carried that mindset into their work with the PPF” (Harris et al 2012: 11).

- Rescue services

In line with its secondary function of ‘assistance in the preservation of life, health and property’ as stated in the LDF Act of 1996, the Lesotho army has been involved in rescue missions, albeit inefficiently. The Force is therefore also equipped and trained to carry out these duties. For instance, the army is presently the only institution that has aeroplanes and helicopters in Lesotho. There have for a long time been calls on the government to purchase a helicopter for the police to help them curb rampant stock theft in the mountain districts. The army also has a fire fighting unit with fire trucks. As detailed in chapter 7 rescue services in Lesotho are totally inadequate, despite the army having all the necessary equipment. The country has on numerous occasions relied on the assistance of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to rescue people trapped by snow in the mountains. It would therefore be necessary to include in the demilitarisation plans ways in which the Disaster Management Authority (DMA) could be adequately resourced to effectively perform the rescue operations that the LDF has been struggling to carry out.

The provision of effective fire brigade services is another problematic area for Lesotho. A number of businesses in Maseru have collapsed after being gutted by fire. Letuka (2017) reports on a recent incident when two buildings housing Saverite Supermarket and Hurry Wholesalers were
completely destroyed, and the two businesses lost M340 000 in cash and M20 million worth of stock.

These incidents demonstrate the necessity of establishing an independent fire brigade department that would be adequately resourced to effectively deal with fires.

- **Ceremonial functions**

The LDF is seen by many people as a symbol of the country’s sovereignty. It usually takes a centre stage during national ceremonies where it presents a guard of honour to be inspected by the King and/or prime minister. Similar parades are formed whenever foreign heads of state visit Lesotho. The Lesotho army is popular for providing entertainment during national events. It is therefore, of great importance that any demilitarisation plan includes attempts to close the void that would be left at ceremonial occasions when the army is abolished.

In non-militarised countries police usually provide the inspection parades. It is interesting to note is that army parades also has its critics, since it is said that they tend to ‘glorify war’. Costa Rica has thought up a different way of welcoming visiting heads of state with a parade of students clad in uniforms with similar colours as the national flag of the particular visiting head of state’s country. There are other alternatives with regard to entertainment, such as parachute landings performed by members of the army, police horse troops, or martial arts displays can all provide entertainment at ceremonial occasions.

**12.4.5 Creation of a ‘peace dividend’**

It always has to be borne in mind that abolishing the military is in itself not enough, since peace building, and abolishing violence in all its forms is the ultimate goal. Any plan must furthermore take into account that military expenditure contributes virtually nothing to economic development. This means that resources which become available by the cutting of military expenditure should rather be used for development purposes. Lesotho can benefit from the example set by Panama which turned its army bases into police stations (Harris et al 2012), or Costa Rica that turned its main army barracks into an art museum, and went further to exchange ‘arms for tractors’ by trading 2000 small arms for a half a dozen tractors (Peters 2013: 189).
Enhancing development through diverting resources from the military has not only been limited to demilitarising countries. South Africa for example, despite maintaining a large army, after the Government of National Unity took over in 1994 decided on a ‘peace dividend’ by diverting resources from its military expenditure. According to Willet,

The White Paper on defence argued that “the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) is the principal long-term means of promoting the wellbeing and security of citizens and, thereby, the stability of the country. There is consequently a compelling need to reallocate state resource to the RDP (Willet 1998: 417).

Lesotho’s demilitarisation plan should, likewise, identify specific areas to which resources that are released through the cutting of military expenditure would be directed. It would be important that the demilitarisation plan include not only a transparent estimate on how much demilitarisation would cost in the short term, but also regarding the use to which its long term ‘savings’ would be put. It should also indicate what current military infrastructure would be used for in the transition. The country cannot afford to allow such infrastructure to go to waste as white elephants.

12.5 Conclusion

There are various issues that would have to be addressed in the demilitarisation plan, when Lesotho decides to disband its army. Here countries that have demilitarised can serve as a guideline for Lesotho. Examples are the conversion of the main barracks into a museum of art, as well as the ‘trading of arms for tractors’, as Costa Rica has done. The country would also need to draw up a clear time table for the major phases of the demilitarisation plan as El Salvador did. Similarly, Lesotho should avoid making the mistakes that some countries made in attempting to demilitarise, as happened when Panama redeployed demobilised soldiers into the police force before they had undergone proper reintegration training.

Currently the prospects for demilitarisation in Lesotho are looking good. Prime Minister Thomas Thabane, has on several occasions hinted at the possibility of a demilitarised Lesotho. With the country about to engage in multi-sectoral reforms, there have already been assurances of support by the international community, and by South Africa and SADC in particular, to deal with any resistance from the army to the government’s plans. The demilitarisation program should include the necessary constitutional amendments so as to avoid what happened in Haiti, when the disbanded army regrouped and ousted a civilian leader. Members of the army would have to be assured of compensation for their loss of jobs. There would need to be an ongoing education about the process of demilitarisation. Finally, it is of great importance to strengthen other relevant institutions such as the police, and capacitate them to carry out the functions that they currently share with the army. Such functions include the maintenance of law and order, public
safety, rescue services, and ceremonial functions. Furthermore, the plan would have to include a transparent proposal of how the resources that become available as a result of the cutting of military expenditure would be utilised for the benefit of the entire society.

CHAPTER 13

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

13.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes by reflecting on the whole research process and its outcomes. It highlights the insights and learnings that came out of the study. The chapter is divided into four sections namely summary, validity and limitations, personal assessment, and conclusion

13.2 Summary

This study was motivated by the desire to find a sustainable solution to the problem of the lack of peace and the prevalence of all types of violence in Lesotho. Its overall objective was to design and implement an action research study aimed at demilitarising Lesotho. The specific objectives of the study included making a case for demilitarisation by comparing the potential costs and benefits of maintaining the military using the cost effectiveness approach, as well as demonstrating the feasibility of demilitarisation by showing that demilitarised countries are able to survive well. Another objective was to build a case for the demilitarisation of Lesotho by using a cost effectiveness approach, and engaging an advisory group to help devise and implement and action research plan aimed at demilitarising Lesotho.

This study relied on qualitative methods. As an action research study it also engaged an advisory group consisting of highly qualified and experienced Basotho professionals conversant with issues regarding Lesotho’s army and public participation (see section 9.3.). In pursuing its objectives, the study utilised different participatory fora such as the media, public gatherings, seminars and conferences. It was conducted in a highly politicised and intimidating environment that made it very difficult to obtain vital military related information. Fieldwork was carried out over a period of two years in and around Maseru district, amplified by documented information from other rural districts.

In chapter two I highlighted the ability of human beings to live in peace and show that by virtue of their rationality, human beings can differentiate between bad and good. They are able to adapt
to different cultures, hence can work towards a culture of peace by developing values and attitudes that reject violence, and learn to resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiation. To achieve this one must accept that conflict within societies is inevitable, and understand that peace building is a long and complex process that requires commitment and perseverance from interested stakeholders. Since it is geared towards change, it will at times attract resistance from parties who are benefiting from the status quo. Despite all of this, the ultimate goal of peace remains achievable.

Chapters three and four covered the discussion of concepts central to this research namely security, the military and demilitarisation. The traditional understanding of security defines it in terms of the geographical boundaries of countries and not in terms of the safety of the people that inhabit the land. This changed in 1994 when security came to be defined internationally as human security, with a greater focus on people. Yet another concept, sustainable security, emerged at the beginning of the new millennium premised on the understanding that countries cannot successfully control all the consequences of insecurity, must hence work towards addressing the causes of insecurity.

This study acknowledges that the military are a set feature of most countries and fulfil various functions ranging from the traditional guarding against foreign aggression, to numerous secondary ones. Despite their popularity, the military are a threat to peace in so far as they spread militarism, namely beliefs and values stressing the use of force as a conflict resolution tool, and glorifying the instruments of force. Demilitarisation has for the purpose of this study been defined as a process of disbanding, or at least reducing the capacity of national armies. The argument has been that demilitarisation is a positive contribution in the quest for peace as financial and other resources allocated to the army can be channelled to other development-oriented projects. The process can also reduce the chances of using violence as a conflict resolution mechanism. If the army is disbanded, then functions normally performed by the military are transferred to alternative institutions or government departments. Experience has shown that demilitarisation is a viable option as there are various examples of countries that have undergone the process, either wholly or partially. Evidence has proven that demilitarised countries generally have a higher standard of living than the majority who maintain an army.

Chapters six and seven assess the peace situation in Lesotho, making a case for the country’s demilitarisation. Though usually associated with peace because of the prowess of its founder Moshoeshoe I, contemporary Lesotho is characterised by violence in all its different forms. Apart
from persistent political instability and conflict, the country has a weak economy characterised by high levels of poverty. Ironically, one of the main contributors to violence is the country’s own army, the Lesotho Defence Force.

The analysis shows that it is more difficult for Lesotho to realise peace with the presence of the army than in its absence. Despite its weak economy where the financing of important sectors such as education and health remains a challenge, Lesotho allocates around five percent of its annual budget to the Ministry of Defence and National Security. Around 82 percent of this ministry’s budget goes to the LDF. Such expenditure is difficult to justify considering Lesotho’s geographical position. A further problem is that the expenditure lacks transparency so that it is amenable to corruption.

The unjustifiably high military expenditure also has high opportunity costs in terms of the productive use of financial resources. The LDF has proved to be very inefficient in the performance of its secondary functions, leading to the conclusion that the country stands to benefit if these functions are transferred to civilian agencies. Lesotho has at times had to call on its neighbour South Africa, for assistance during emergencies when the LDF was not up to the task. It is therefore imperative that Lesotho does away with its costly army and resort to cheaper but efficient peaceful ways of achieving security.

The action research design that I chose for this study only came to prominence in the mid ’60s, and I only came to know about it upon joining DUT in 2015. I therefore devoted the whole of chapter eight to examine the action component that seeks to bring about positive social change. It involves the participation of local people who together with the main researcher are seen as agents of change. Interaction between the researcher and his local co-researchers need to be democratic and characterised by mutual respect, free deliberation, and constant exchange of information. Advisory boards/groups are one of the important ways through which locals are represented in research activities. It was in line with this thinking that I involved an advisory group of five individuals in my research.

The research began with a meeting of the advisory group in February 2016. After lengthy deliberations, the meeting concurred that the army has had a negative impact on both the politics and the economy of the country. Due to past failure to reform the LDF into a professional army, the group agreed that disbanding the army would be the most viable course of action to pursue. The meeting therefore adopted a vision of ‘an army-less and politically stable Lesotho that is free
of violence and provides good opportunities for human development’. It also agreed on a plan to educate the general public about the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation and concluded that to do this there was a need to partner with already established organisations that had a wide outreach into Basotho society.

A variety of activities aimed at educating the public about the feasibility and benefits of demilitarisation of Lesotho were carried out. They included radio programmes, a public gathering, publication of a newspaper article, a conference, civil society research and a multi-stakeholder seminar. These activities triggered instant reactions from different sectors of the Basotho society including academia, media and the army, which in itself became a platform for wider publicity and education on the demilitarisation idea. The research process was, however, not without its challenges. Some of my planned activities for a variety of reasons never materialised. However, as “there are always alternatives” (Sharp 2003), I devised alternative plans to make up for lost opportunities.

One of the observations that were most evident from our research activities was the extent of polarisation that exists along political party lines regarding the existence of the LDF. People associated with the governing parties tended to side with the army, while those in the opposition supported calls for its disbandment. Confrontational debate was obviously not going to make objective discussion any easier.

Our qualitative data analysis produced a number of important findings. First and foremost was that generally the people of Lesotho have very little or no knowledge at all about the feasibility and benefits of the demilitarisation process. They are largely unaware of the existence of non-militarised and partially demilitarised countries.

Our research has therefore contributed to reducing the knowledge gap about demilitarisation in general among the Basotho. The findings have also shown most Basotho cannot differentiate between the army and the police. To them the two institutions are the same with the difference being only in the uniforms they wear. Another finding was that many people are afraid of being drawn into discussions about the army. This fear stems from the atrocities that the army has committed in the past. As for the army, they again feel threatened by discussions about the feasibility of demilitarisation, since they know that if it comes about they will lose their jobs.
As for the impact of LDF expenditure on the country’s economy, there was little interest from the public, probably due to the lack of information on the subject. Yet, despite differing views, there is general agreement among the majority of people encountered in this study that the peace situation in Lesotho remains a cause for concern, and that demilitarisation would be the most viable way of tackling this problem. With the present Prime Minister having hinted several times that he desires to see a non-militarised Lesotho, and the current support there is internationally for reforming the military, it is now an opportune time to consider disbanding the LDF. Lesotho should therefore come up with a detailed demilitarisation plan which will include the demobilization of the LDF and the reintegration of its personnel into society; reallocation of some LDF functions to other government agencies; a budget plan, which would include the cost of demilitarisation and possible sources of revenue, including foreign assistance to finance it; providing a peace dividend that shows how the resources currently financing military expenditure would be utilised for development purposes.

13.3 Validity and limitations

I mentioned in section 9.2.1 that due to university entry requirements this study failed to adhere to the requirement of action research that co-researchers have to be involved at every stage of research, in this case at the inception. Despite not being involved in the initial stages of my study, my advisory group appreciated my dilemma and became fully involved in formulating the research plan as well ensuring validity, in the sense of checking that data from the study is accurate and credible (Gray 2004: 407), since I constantly shared information regarding my research with them. As it became evident that meeting regularly was problematic, we relied on an e-mail group for the dissemination of information. By virtue of their backgrounds and experience, members of the advisory group were from time to time able to advise on data that they found inaccurate and helped in verifying it.

There is no doubt that the politically polarised environment in which this research took place affected the findings of my research. Many people who could have provided useful information were reluctant to do so. The polarisation also eroded the element of objectivity in many participants. Coverage is another concern as all the research activities were confined to the Maseru district, with the views of people in the rural districts only being available from media sources. Most importantly the secrecy surrounding military operations and expenditure, coupled with the hostility the LDF showed towards my research, prevented me from being able to get any information directly from the army. This proved to place serious limitations on the study. Time
limitations have also played a role. There were many developments in which the army was involved during the three years of my study, and as will be seen in the Post Script to the thesis, a lot continues to happen. Recent developments are likely to have changed some of the views of the people who form part of the findings of this study.

13.4 Personal assessment

The process of “reflection is needed at various points; at the start in anticipation for the experience, during the experience as a way of dealing with the vast array of inputs and coping with the feelings that are generated, and following the experience during the phase of writing and consolidation” (Boud et al 2005: 10). It is in line with this statement that I look back to reflect how this research has impacted on me as an individual and a researcher. Like many Basotho, I at the beginning of my study did not have much knowledge about demilitarisation and non-militarised countries. My research equipped me with the knowledge that I needed to interact with other people on the relevant issues concerning demilitarisation (see chapters 10 and 11). In practical terms it means that I can now argue more strongly and confidently about the need for demilitarisation in Lesotho. Since the country is now on the threshold of undertaking multi-sectoral reforms, I look forward to making a contribution to efforts to bring about change in the security sector, and specifically the disbandment of the LDF, for the sake of peace, and containment of violence in all its forms, for the sake of my country.

Action research has been an eye-opener for me. As a result of my research, I began to look at the military in a more analytical way. The implication of this new approach was two-fold. Most of the findings of my research strengthened the beliefs that I had about the army while others challenged these beliefs. Concerning the latter, I was of the idea at the beginning of my research that people would, upon being briefed about the demilitarisation idea, buy it right away.

The research taught me that I had underestimated the extent of polarisation in Lesotho and how much the military has affected every aspect of human life in Lesotho. The study has also exposed me directly to intimidation by the army (see sections 6.3.5 and 11.3.2), something that I had known to exist, but had never experienced myself. However, generally the research has strengthened most of my previously held views, including that the involvement of the army in civilian chores is hindering the efficiency of other civilian departments or agencies (see chapter 7). I am thus more convinced than ever before that Lesotho generally stands to benefit from disbanding its army.
13.5 Conclusion

Our study has shown that Lesotho stands a good chance to achieve peace by engaging in the process of demilitarisation. Having a better understanding of Lesotho’s situation and comparing the country to its demilitarised counterparts has persuaded me that the process stands a good chance of success. The involvement of the advisory group helped to ensure validity of the data collected for this study. The study has also had some limitations as a result of various factors including lack of information on the workings of the military itself and the intimidating environment, just to mention two. New knowledge and experiences generated by the research has significantly increased the appreciation of participants and audiences regarding the nature and purpose of the demilitarisation process. This knowledge and experiences have prepared me, and hopefully other Basotho to argue more vigorously for the disbandment of the Lesotho army for the sake of realising peace, and advancing the welfare of our people.
APPENDICES

Appendix A. Demilitarisation article (Letsie): Lesotho Times
Appendix F. Demilitarisation seminar (Sesotho): Lentsoe la Sechaba
Appendix G: Demilitarisation seminar: The Post
Appendix I. NUL Conference programme

Understanding Political Instability in Lesotho, 1966–2016

National University of Lesotho
Roma Campus
6 and 7 October, 2016

PROGRAMME

DAY ONE

08.00–08.30 REGISTRATION

08.45—09.15 Opening

09.15–09.30 TEA BREAK
09.30—11.30
SESSION I: Church, Education & Gender Justice in a Politically Unstable Society—Chair: Dr L. Matlosa

Leshota, Lekholokoe, “Prophets or Allies? Interrogating the Post-colonial Church’s Intervention Strategies in the Political Instability in Lesotho, 2007-2016”.
**Mushonga**, Munyaradzi, “The era of a large ‘elephant in the room’: Overt and Covert, Discursive and Non-Discursive Struggles and Instabilities at the National University of Lesotho in the 1980s”.

**Matashane-Marite**, Keiso, “Understanding the Gender Dynamics of Political Conflicts in Lesotho: Is Gender Justice A Mirage?”

**11.30—12.50**  
**SESSION II: Political Leadership, Political Parties and Political Instability in Lesotho**—Chair: Dr C. Paramaiah

**Mothibe**, T. H., “Political leadership challenge in Lesotho—a cause of political instability?”

**Shale**, Victor, “Political Parties and Instability in Lesotho”.

**12.50-13.45**  LUNCH BREAK

**13.45—15.05**  
**SESSION III: Coalition Politics, Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Political Stability**—Chair: Ms P. S. Adams


**15.05—15.15**  TEA BREAK

**15.15—16.35**  
**SESSION IV: Democratic Citizenship, Multiple Citizenship and Political Stability in Lesotho**—Chair: Dr M. Kapa


**Thabane**, Motlatsi, “Political Instability, Multiple Citizenship and Citizenship Legislation in Independent Lesotho”.

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DAY TWO

08.30—11.10
SESSION V: Fragility, Viability and Instability of State & Statehood—
Chair: Prof. R. C. Leduka

Thabane, Motlatsi, “Towards an Identification of Historical Roots of Lesotho’s Political Instability”.

Letete, Emmanuel & Tumelo Tsikoane, “‘Muddling through’ the Basic Limited Access Order for Five Decades in Search for Long Term Political Stability and Development, 1966-2015”.

Matlosa, Khabele, “Political Economy of Elections: Making Sense of the Post-2015 Crisis in Lesotho”.


11.10–11.20 TEA BREAK

11.20—12.40
SESSION VI: Security, Insecurity, Militarisation and Demilitarisation

Makoa, F. K., “Lesotho Fifty Years after Independence: Still grappling with the Problem of Insecurity?”

Letsie, Tlohang, “Demilitarisation: a viable security reform option in Lesotho's quest for peace”.

12.40–13.30 LUNCH BREAK

13.30—15.30
SESSION VII: Professionalisation and Politicisation of the Public Service—Chair: Dr P. Mosetse


Rakolobe, Mamello, “Politicised Public Service, Coalition Politics and Political Instability in Lesotho”.

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Khasoane, Napo Claudius, “Towards a Sustainable and Efficient Governance: Imperatives of Professionalising Public Service in Lesotho”.

15.30—15.40  TEA BREAK

15.40-17.00  CLOSING SESSION  Facilitator: Santho, Sehoai

Santho, S., *Can Lesotho Survive the next 50 Years?*
Debates and Way Forward: *What is to be Done & By Whom?*
Appendix J: Demilitarisation seminar programme

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The Lesotho I want campaign - Dialogue session
Theme: Demilitarization: Viable Option for Lesotho`s quest for Peace

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<td>Sofonea Shale</td>
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<td>1440: 15 30hrs</td>
<td>Presentation on Demilitarization</td>
<td>Mr. TlohangLetsie</td>
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<td>Discussions/Questions/Comments</td>
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<td>164000hrs</td>
<td>Prayer !!!!!!! Prayer!!!!!! Prayer!!!!!!</td>
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Reference List


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As this thesis was to be submitted, several developments took place within the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), further proving the need for Lesotho to reconsider the position of its army. On Tuesday, September 5 2017, the LDF commander Lieutenant General Khoantle Motsomotso was assassinated by his subordinates. According to the government account, Lt-Gen Motsomotso was short dead at his Ratjomose barracks office allegedly by Brigadier Bulane Sechele who was accompanied by Colonel Tefo Hashatsi and Major Pitso Ramoepane. Brig Sechele was killed in a hail of bullets by Lt-Gen Motsomotso’s bodyguards soon afterwards, while Col Hashatsi died
of his wounds in a nearby hospital. Major Ramoepane has since been charged with murdering Lt-Gen Motsomotso in the Magistrate’s Court and currently awaits trial.

Lt-Gen Motsomotso became the second LDF commander, in two years, to be assassinated by the army subordinates. Lt-Gen Maapara-nkoe Mahao was the first and was assassinated on the 25th June 2015. The LDF claimed Lt-Gen Mahao had resisted arrest during a special operation to nab mutiny suspects (Staff Writer, 2017). Both Brig Sechele and Col Hashatsi had been pointed by the SADC Commission of Inquiry as having played a role in the assassination of Lt-Gen Mahao. This commission amongst others recommended that the Lesotho government should investigate the killing of Lt-Gen Mahao and prosecute those found to be responsible.

At the time of his assassination, Lt-General Motsomotso was co-operating with the government by releasing to the police the members of the LDF suspected to be involved in various criminal acts. Prior to his removal from the army (as part of the SADC commission recommendations) in December 2016, Motsomotso’s predecessor Lt-General Tlali Kamoli had refused to hand the LDF members suspected of criminal acts to the police. Lt-Gen Motsomotso’s co-operation with the police was probably seen as a threat to the freedom of the army officers – including Hashatsi and Sechele - who enjoyed long moments of impunity.

At the request of the Lesotho government SADC has dispatched a standby force comprising military, security, intelligence and civilian experts to assist the LDF in managing the current security crisis as well as to oversee the implementation of the Phumaphi Commission recommendations. These include prosecution of army officials implicated in criminal acts. The standby force which is dominated by Angola and Zambia defence forces arrived in Lesotho in November and will be in the country for six months, reportedly at the cost of around M78m to SADC. There have been signs of calmness in the LDF since the arrival of the SADC forces and the police continue to arrest the suspects without any resistance. There are around 30 soldiers who have since been arrested for various crimes. One of the most notable figures in custody is the former commander of the LDF Lt Gen Tlali Kamoli under whose reign the crimes were committed.

One of the cases that shocked the country involves nine members of the LDF who are now in custody awaiting trial for the murders of three men who disappeared immediately after being released from the police custody after the police could not pin the murder of one army officer on them (Motopi, 2017). It is suspected that the soldiers were angry that the men were in the company
of another man who shot and killed a soldier and injured another during a gunfight at the Maseru Boarder Gate in May (Molupe 2017). According to police investigations, the detained soldiers abducted the three men after their release and strangled them to death on May 16 at a military camp in Setibing before they dumped their bodies in Mohale Dam. The accused soldiers have reportedly confessed to tying the three men’s corpses with stones to ensure they did not surface after being dumped in the dam (Mohloboli 2017). The bodies of the three men were retrieved from the dam in November by the members of the Lesotho Mounted Police Services assisted by divers from the South African Police Services.

In yet another recent incident that proves the indiscipline characterising the Lesotho army, three LDF officers of the rank of private were together with a police constable and a civilian in September charged with armed robbery after allegedly tailoring their victim to his home before making off with M10 000 and cellular phones (Mohloboli, 2017).

The conducive environment provided by the SADC standby forces should serve as a motivation for Lesotho to take drastic decisions and correct the anomalies of its infamous army. The most viable solution seems to be the disbandment of the LDF as various efforts of reform have failed to yield sustainable solutions. Doing away with the idle yet expensive LDF will greatly contribute to peacebuilding in Lesotho. The country cannot afford to waste another opportunity of working towards a sustainable peace. The time to demilitarise is now.