



**STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN
PEACEBUILDING IN ZIMBABWE: AN ACTION RESEARCH
PROJECT**

SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF A DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION – PEACE STUDIES

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DECLARATION

I, Ashton Murwira, declare that the ideas in this thesis reflect my original thoughts. I have also acknowledged the thoughts and works of other scholars or participants, by either paraphrasing or direct quotes. The thesis has never been submitted at any other university for the award of any degree.

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I hereby approve the final submission of the following thesis.

..

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my son, Ethan, and my wife, Sharon, for their love, patience and support throughout the research process.

ABSTRACT

The peacebuilding space in Zimbabwe has been contested by a plethora of actors, which include Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). This thesis focuses on civil groups that engaged in peacebuilding in post-independent Zimbabwe. Despite their presence, the country remains in a negative peace mode with continued resurgence of structural-related conflicts. This points to the weaknesses of CSOs' modus operandi of building peace. To address this, the study sought to develop, implement and evaluate a peacebuilding strategy that strengthens community-based CSOs in building positive peace in Zimbabwe through the use of indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) and political intelligence¹. The research design of the study was two-tier, combining explanatory and action research approaches. The qualitative data methods collection used include documentary review, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGD)s. A total of 43 participants were involved in the interviews and FGDs. Findings from the baseline data indicate that CSOs have failed to translate the prevailing negative peace into positive peace because they follow elitist or liberal peacebuilding models. To address this problem, I carried out inclusive knowledge gathering with an action research team. From the team's responses, I designed a training manual to enhance CSOs' peacebuilding activities through IKS and political intelligence. The concept of IKS is embedded in sustainable peacebuilding and a development approach. The training was conducted with members of a CSO² based in Harare but engaged with grassroots in rural parts of Zimbabwe. The findings in the first evaluation showed that the training was successful, and participants learnt a great deal on how they can best build peace using IKS and political intelligence skills. The participants noted that working with local people generates context-specific solutions that are demand-driven and attractive to the beneficiaries. In the second evaluation participants in the training and local people interviewed highlighted that there was a great change in the manner in which CSO(A) was conducting its peacebuilding campaign. There was great involvement of the local people, use of proverbs and adoption of a stakeholder mapping. This approach led to the generation of legitimacy and local ownership of the peacebuilding programme. The ultimate result was that a culture of tolerance, respect and unity was created in the rural community. The study concludes that sustainable peace and development can be realised when CSOs build peace using IKS and political intelligence skills. I recommend that CSOs should continuously be trained and conduct peacebuilding using IKS and political intelligence in other parts of the country. The study is significant in that it combines theory and practice of building durable peace with CSO(A) through action research. The theory of sustainable peacebuilding was realised through training and implementation of building peace through the use of IKS and political intelligence skills.

¹ Varying definitions are used to define one's knowledge of the political sphere. See Chapter 1.

² Called CSO(A) in this thesis.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AWCs	Association of Women's Clubs
CCJPZ	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western States
EFZ	Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
HZT	Heal Zimbabwe Trust
ZIMCET	Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust
IKS	Indigenous Knowledge Systems
LOMA	Law and Order (Maintenance) Act 1960, Rhodesia
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai
MDC-M	Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara
NANGO	National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
ONHRI	Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration
PTUZ	Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
UN	United Nations
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Unity-Patriotic Front
ZCBC	Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference
ZCC	Zimbabwe Council of Churches
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
ZESN	Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network
ZFTU	Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions
ZINASU	Zimbabwe National Students Union
ZPP	Zimbabwe Peace Project
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Zimbabwe has experienced many conflicts since the colonial era. The major and recurring conflicts are structural in nature, emanating from the institutions of the political system. During colonial rule from 1890-1980, the successive white minority governments retained power using inhumane methods such as violence and oppressive and discriminatory laws against the black majority. The ills of the colonial system led to African resistance that morphed into an armed struggle that resulted in the death of many people and left the society divided. The liberation struggle, a series of negotiations and international pressure led to the independence of the country in 1980 (Laakso 2003: 2, Munhande and Nciizah 2013). Unfortunately, Zimbabwe inherited a system of authoritarian rule from the white colonial government (Masunungure 2011).

At independence there were calls made by the political elite, who were nationalist in the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe, to reunite and reconcile with the former enemies. The perceived enemies were the Rhodesian Front (RF) of the Smith government and later Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Nkomo. In the first reconciliation call, the political elite were concerned with state building as opposed to peacebuilding, hence, the reconciliation was aimed at gaining control over the government by the black majority. Sachikonye (2012) argues that the reconciliation between whites and blacks was based on interest rather than attitudes. Despite the calls for tolerance, the country witnessed major human rights atrocities that were committed by the state in Midlands and Matabeleland areas. These affected areas lie in the central and southern parts of Zimbabwe, where the main inhabitants are the Ndebele-speaking people who are the second largest ethnic group in the country. The violations left huge scars which were yet to be addressed up to the time of this writing. In fact, there are still debates on how to effectively heal the wounds (Mashingaidze 2005: 85, Sachikonye 2012: 19, Cameroon 2017: 1).

The black-to-black reconciliation between the political elite in the ZANU and the ZAPU succeeded the violent conflict, widely assumed to have been caused by the Unity Accord signed in 1987. The terms of reconciliation in the Unity Accord resulted in the ZAPU joining the ZANU in the government (Mashingaidze 2005: 86). However, the process was more of political pragmatism in search of stability and power consolidation than promoting genuine reconciliation on the part of the latter. Apart from the first decade experiences, the country has been torn and polarised by a series of election related violence, and conflicts for land and natural resources, discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The failed reconciliation efforts, epitomised by recurring conflicts, indicate the need for a holistic peacebuilding strategy in Zimbabwe. Paffenholz (2010:45) states that peacebuilding is a process aimed at achieving peace in which structures and institutions are developed based on justice, equity and cooperation. The aim of

peacebuilding is to prevent and manage armed conflict and sustain peace after large organised violence has ended (ibid: 29).

One of the critical actors that have carried out peacebuilding programmes in Zimbabwe is civil society. Various definitions have been attached to civil society. Gyimah-Boadi (1996) defines civil society as the realm between the household, family and the state. According to Sachikonye (1995: 7) civil society relates to “an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities, economic and cultural production, voluntary associations and household life and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions”. According to Spurk (2010: 6), civil society “consists of a huge variety of mainly voluntary organisations and associations that maintain different objectives, interests and ideologies.” From these definitions, CSOs perform an assortment of activities that are intended to fill the gaps left or created by the state, family and the business sector. Civil society organisations are therefore formed to give an expression and direction to the social, political, spiritual and cultural needs of its members, including peacebuilding (Barnes 2005:7).

CSOs are not homogenous entities both in composition and outlook (Zigomo 2012; Sachikonye 2012) and can be categorised according to type. While several categories exist, Sachikonye (2012:133) groups the CSOs into the developmental, humanitarian and governance related clusters. Masunungure (2014: 9) puts CSOs in Zimbabwe into three main generations which include: first generation (comprised of humanitarian based CSOs); development-oriented CSOs; and governance-oriented CSOs. CSOs found in the development generation are those that were born in the first decade of independence in Zimbabwe. These include the Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Association of Women’s Clubs (AWCs) (Masunungure 2014; Sachikonye 2012). The third generation of governance-based CSOs emerged in the second decade when the country began to face economic problems (Masunungure 2014: 9). Amongst these are student-led groups such as the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) (ibid).

This study adopts the typology used by Masunungure in understanding the evolution of CSOs in Zimbabwe, explained in detail in Chapter 4. From the generations of CSOs, I focused on the first generation which includes CSOs that are found in the humanitarian cluster. CSOs that fall in this category are those whose operations began during the colonial times and whose mandate was based on alleviating the suffering of the natives (ibid). Amongst the prominent CSOs in this version are faith-based groups and community-based organisations. In this study, I worked with community-based CSOs so as to build peace from below that can translate to positive peace. Donais (2012: 22) defines positive peace as the presence of minimally acceptable conditions of justice, security and prosperity. He further argues that building peace from below creates a sense of ownership and legitimacy of a programme from the community. I posit that past peacebuilding efforts in Zimbabwe by CSOs were not sustainable as they were not drawn from or steered by the local people.

The case for CSOs and peacebuilding is not unique to Zimbabwe. For example, CSOs have emerged to respond to the authoritarian political system in Guatemala (Kurtenbach 2010: 79). In Guatemala, armed conflicts have erupted between the military and the people, leading to daily violence, growth of inequalities and war crimes (Kurtenbach 2010, Louise 1997). The task of CSOs among other stakeholders was to deconstruct the oppressive authoritarian rule. In the case of Sri Lanka, community-based CSOs emerged to tackle the ethnic-based conflicts between the Tamir, Moor and the Burghers (Orjuela 2003, 2010). In all the cases, CSOs scored successes but also faced challenges that are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. However, experiences from the cases provide lessons that can be drawn for CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

While the study considers community-based CSOs, it also recognises the contributions of CSOs in other clusters that have contributed to peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. Among these are CSOs in the humanitarian and governance clusters that have managed, relatively, to combat governmental injustices in Africa. In the post-colonial period, CSOs have positively contributed to democratic achievements in Africa. Among other forces and actors, CSOs challenged the authoritarian regimes and opened an enabling environment for wider political participation (Gyimah-Boadi 1996). Thus, CSOs became agents of change and in some cases were termed a kind of magic bullet (Edwards and Hulme, 1997; Moyo 2013).

The degree of CSOs' success is dependent on the environment in which they operate. Barnes (2005: 9) argues that CSOs flourish and have a high degree of success in an environment where a government upholds democracy and the rule of law. It follows that the space of CSOs is constrained in authoritarian systems and environments characterised by violence and lawlessness. Despite these challenges, international actors such as the United Nations and donor agencies consider CSOs as agents of development and peace (Pearce 2005; Van Leeuwen *et al.* 2012). CSOs became viable alternatives for service provision and post-conflict transformation in areas where the state institutions had been failing. Barnes (2005) states that CSOs were also viewed as the eyes and ears of the international community in monitoring state accountability and human rights abuses. In addition, CSOs renegotiated the mutual rights and obligations of the state and citizens (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). In performing these functions, they managed to deter governments and bring some form of peace within societies.

According to Ncube (2014), there are more than fifty civic groups that are involved in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. Despite this quantitative rise, most of the CSOs are not genuine as to their stated purpose; they were more likely to have been created for employment and income generating purposes (Chinhanhu 2015). This is evidenced by the increase of CSOs in peacebuilding that arose in the post-2008 election violence. Most CSOs were formed during this time as donor funding was abundant in the peacebuilding sector (*ibid*). This is similar to the 2000 era when CSOs emerged in the democracy and governance cluster. Masunungure (2014) argues that this is where the money was, and it became an appealing sector in which to launch CSOs' activities. The result was that CSOs concentrated on political

and economic advocacy and relegated other sectors such as the social sphere (Zigomo 2012; Murisa 2010). Chinhanhu (2015) argues that CSOs that were created for income generation and employment were also weak in that their personnel did not have knowledge or experience in peacebuilding issues. Combined with other factors, both internal (agenda setting problems) and external challenges (authoritarian regime), most CSOs' peacebuilding efforts have not been effective in transforming the socio-economic and political environment in Zimbabwe.

There is also scarce conventional literature on CSOs grounded in peacebuilding at the grassroots level in Zimbabwe, except for a few studies by Ngwenya (2015) on Healing the wounds of *Gukurahundi*, and of Makwerere (2017) who focused on equipping CSOs with peacebuilding skills. Most academic literature in Zimbabwe pays attention to CSOs in other clusters such as democratisation, governance, human rights and urban planning advocacy (Masunungure 2014, Sachikonye 2012, Bandaiko 2015). The types of CSOs that are examined are not directly engaged in peacebuilding activities although their efforts contribute to creating conditions for peace in Zimbabwe. This study adds to the scarce literature by developing a bottom-up intervention that community-based CSOs can utilise in their peacebuilding programmes. This study identifies and focuses on an intervention strategy that strengthens Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. I chose CSOs as they emerge as some of the key and strategic stakeholders that can effectively build peace from below. I argue that building peace with local community members, making use of their local knowledge and values can strengthen CSOs' efforts in building durable peace in Zimbabwe.

1.2 Research Problem

The post-2000- era has seen a quantitative increase of CSOs working on peacebuilding in Zimbabwe (Ncube 2014). Despite the increase and their efforts, the country continues to be covered by a dark history of pre- and post-election violence (Barsons 2012). Authoritarianism remains an integral part of the political culture (Masunungure 2011). This points to the weaknesses of the peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented (Steinberg 2013). Firstly, CSOs within the democratisation and governance clusters played roles in building peace through democratisation and constitutional reforms such as the "No vote" and "Save Zimbabwe" campaigns (Zimbabwe Institute report 2008, Masunungure 2011). This approach was based on liberal peacebuilding which brings a correlation between democracy and peace. The model works effectively in established and functioning liberal democracies, yet CSOs in peacebuilding have implemented this model in countries that are decades away from being functioning democracies (Donais 2012; Paffenholz 2013). In addition, the liberal model adopted by CSOs was state-centric and paid little attention to the needs of the country and its people (Ryan 2013, Paffenholz 2013). CSOs that have designed peacebuilding programmes using the liberal template have produced only temporary changes in society. The interventions by CSOs have been misplaced in a politically polarised environment because of their urban bias (Ncube 2014). In cases where they have reached out to the rural communities, the CSOs in the governance cluster have used models that are not

grounded in the local realities of the people's culture and traditions. By so doing, the outcome of peacebuilding has produced negative peace which Galtung (1975) defines as the absence of war. Zimbabwe is not in a state of armed war but many of the conflicts have been caused by a culture of intolerance. The prevailing environment and the limitations of the liberal approach call for a focus on the sustainable peacebuilding approach in CSOs' programmes that are community-based. I argue that sustainable peace can be realised when peacebuilding initiatives are done by the local community members for their societies, along with community-based CSOs.

A sustainable peacebuilding model aims at addressing the root causes of a conflict, creating structures and processes, and rebuilding broken relationships through reconciliation (Lederach 1997; Paffenholz 2013). The post-2008 political violence in Zimbabwe saw CSOs embarking on reconciling victim-perpetrators through sport, empowering victims with developmental projects and dialogues (Ncube 2014). The study argues that CSOs' efforts in building peace are strengthened through working with indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) that are rooted in the local culture, language, people and tradition. This is combined using political intelligence skills. Sillitoe (2002: 9) defines IKS as knowledge held collectively by a population informing understanding of the world. One definition of political intelligence is defined as "the achievement of organisational or personal aims by using appropriate skills, behaviours and strategies, not only an awareness of political landscape but more specifically the skills to manoeuvre through political minefields" (TTM Associates 2017). Another is "Political intelligence is at the heart of avoiding political blunders and conflict in organizations" (Adams and Zanzi, 2006: 350). This involves analysing and understanding the realities of power relations that shape a state (DFID [Department for International Development] 2013, Menocal 2014). The resolution of past conflicts has been premised on structural reforms while leaving out relational issues that are best solved using an IKS peacebuilding model and political intelligence.

1.3 The Aim of the Study

The study sought to develop, implement and evaluate a peacebuilding strategy that strengthens community-based CSOs in building positive peace in Zimbabwe using IKS and political intelligence.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- Analyse past conflict cases that have been witnessed in post-colonial Zimbabwe;
- Examine the nature and role of CSOs in resolving conflicts in Zimbabwe and other selected countries;
- Explore past and current peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented;
- Analyse the trend and challenges that CSOs encounter in building peace in Zimbabwe;

- Develop, implement and evaluate an intervention that strengthens community-based CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

1.4 Justification of the Study

The study adds to the scant academic literature available on CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe that which is humanitarian and community-based. Exploratory studies have been carried out in understanding state-civil society relations, the development and role of CSOs, and the challenges faced by CSOs (Moyo et al. 2000, Raftopolous 2001, Melber 2003). These studies are more grounded in the liberal discourse and very few are done using action research, as is the case in, for example, the thesis by David Makwerere 2017. Research that has been done specifically on CSOs using sustainable peacebuilding models includes CSOs' and NGOs' reports, newsletters and booklets - for example publications by *Heal Zimbabwe*. The literature is descriptive and does not proffer models that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding. My study was therefore designed to fill a methodological and literature gap. Through action research, I explored a peacebuilding model based on IKS that strengthens community-based CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. My study attempts to bridge the gap in literature as well as the theoretical deficiency by locating community-based CSOs in peacebuilding within the sustainable peacebuilding debate. I outlined the value of Shona culture grounded in the concept of '*Hunhuism*' or '*Ubuntu*' in Ndebele culture. This is linked to peacebuilding efforts by community-based CSOs. *Hunhuism* is an African philosophy that is moulded on an African vision that strives for an upright and virtuous individual (Sibanda 2014: 26).

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The study is guided by peacebuilding theory. Paffenholz (2010:45) states that peacebuilding is a process aimed at achieving peace whereby structures and institutions based on justice, equity and cooperation are developed. Peacebuilding addresses the underlying causes of a conflict and prevents their transformation into violence (Galtung 1975: 297). Two branches emerge from this theory: liberal and sustainable peacebuilding. Liberal peacebuilding is premised on democratic rebuilding of states after an armed conflict (Paffenholz 2010: 46). Liberal peacebuilding is also traced from the ideas of Immanuel Kant in his 1795 '*Perpetual peace*' where peacebuilding could occur between states following democratic values (Kant 1795). It placed emphasis on bringing shattered states into conformity with the international system's prevailing standards of domestic governance (Paris 2002: 638). The key issues that emerge from liberal peace models are democratisation, economic liberalisation, human rights and rule of law (Donais 2012: 23). CSOs that fall within the category of democratisation and governance have assumed these functions in their advocacy roles in bringing change in the Zimbabwean context. The study builds upon the weaknesses of the liberal model which lacks input from below as most liberal approaches are associated with top-down approaches. These approaches have reflected the universal solutions to conflicts without considering the context-specific realities.

Apart from the liberal peacebuilding approach, this study locates the efforts of CSOs in peacebuilding within the sustainable peacebuilding framework. Sustainable peacebuilding has a wider focus of peacebuilding while liberal has a short-medium term focus akin to state-building (Paffenholz 2010: 49). Proponents of sustainable peacebuilding include Lederach, who argues that it involves the creation of structures, processes and training of people within a generation (Lederach 1997). Paffenholz (2010: 47) observes that Lederach's definition is premised on promoting sustainable reconciliation within societies. He further argues that sustainability is a proactive process that can result in a spiral of peace and development as opposed to a spiral of violence and destruction. Sustainable peacebuilding involves transformation of the attitudes, behaviour and differences of groups into an engine of peace (Peinado 2003). In addition, sustainable peacebuilding implies a complete transformation of the state and society with the focus on socio-economic rebuilding aimed at addressing the underlying causes of a conflict (ibid).

In the Zimbabwean context, I observed that community-based CSOs working in the humanitarian cluster adopt the sustainable peacebuilding approach. They focus on rebuilding broken relationships. Tapping CSOs' experiences in this model, I developed a peacebuilding approach using IKS. IKS is sometimes referred to as local knowledge, rural people's knowledge, folk knowledge or people's science (Sillitoe 2002: 9). I observed that if community-based CSOs build peace using IKS, a sense of ownership and sustainability was created from the people. Local ownership refers to the degree of control that domestic actors wield over domestic political processes (Donais 2012: 1). It follows that any peace process not embraced by those who live with the conflicts most likely fails. In this study, I developed a model that was based on the Shona concept of *hunhuism*. The core values in it include promoting a culture of respect, love, unity, cooperation and tolerance. In the promotion of peace, CSOs have a role in educating and socialising or reawakening *hunhuism* which is an appeal to the moral values of the people. I observed that while IKS can be an appealing concept in peacebuilding, the prevailing environment can limit its effectiveness. For example, in some rural parts of Zimbabwe the local people no longer value *hunhuism*. Due to modernisation and high levels of unemployment, the priorities of people have shifted. Some people prefer to be employed in a society without *hunhuism* than in a society with firm values but without a job. Furthermore, some of the local knowledge is based on patriarchal beliefs which are oppressive to women and therefore a threat to peacebuilding efforts by community-based CSOs in Zimbabwe. Chapters 2 and 10 demonstrate how IKS within the Shona culture has changed and been modified to suit a generation. These changes in IKS in peacebuilding lead to sustainable development in communities.

Sustainable peacebuilding is preferable because of its capacity to enhance sustainable development. According to Strange and Bayley (2008: 24), sustainable development involves developing in a way that benefits the widest range of sectors, across borders and even between generations. Strong (1992) argues that it involves a process of deep and profound change in the political, social, economic, institutional and technological order. The concept is based on three interconnected pillars that include

social, economic and environmental processes (Strange and Bayley 2008; Rogers et al. 2008). Strange and Bayley (2008: 27) argue that a society with unrest, poverty and disease will not develop in the long term. Therefore, there is a strong link between social wellbeing or stability and sustainable development. This study is premised on the idea that peacebuilding strategies that are owned and driven by local communities in line with their contextual realities can lead to sustainable social, economic and environmental development. In short, sustainable development is possible where there is participation of the beneficiaries of a reform. Rogers et al. (2008: 58) note that participation is a process through which stakeholders can influence and share control over development initiatives and the resources used to fund them through engagement in decision making. When people are given an opportunity to take an active role in planning, implementing and monitoring projects that affect them, they will develop a sense of ownership and become motivated to ensure the success of a project (Rogers et al. 2008: 60). To realise the wider input of stakeholders in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe I used action research working with community-based CSOs that are in touch with people affected with conflicts in their day-to-day lives.

CSOs' roles in building peace have been informed by the liberal and sustainable peacebuilding approaches at different conflict stages. However, the standard adoption and application of the peacebuilding approaches by CSOs; those found in the democratic cluster; has been based on supply or outside agendas rather than context-specific or demand oriented which makes their efforts ineffective (Barnes 2005; Ncube 2014; Paffenholz 2013). In Zimbabwe, there is evidence of authoritarian rule that has led to recurrence of violence despite the presence of these CSOs (Masunungure, 2011, Barsons 2012). Through action research, I explore the limitations of both liberal and sustainable peacebuilding approaches which CSOs have used in their peacebuilding models. I argue that durable peace can be realised by working with community-based CSOs using IKS and political intelligence. Such an approach is realised within the sustainable peacebuilding framework. Detailed discussion of the theoretical framework follows in the next chapter.

1.6 Research Design and Methodology

My research design was both exploratory and action research. The exploratory procedure in action research enabled me to gather data that was used in designing the intervention strategy. Siddiquee et al. (2008:32) note that action research seeks to investigate action, implement investigation by acting and by transforming the research into action. This means that, unlike other designs, action research focuses on the problem and acting upon it by producing a solution with a specific and relevant context. The aim of action research is to bring change (Siddiquee et al. 2008) within a context. This study aimed at strengthening community-based CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. The action process was achieved through collaborative planning, designing a training intervention based on IKS and political intelligence, implementing the training and finally evaluating outcomes of the intervention with the action team.

The rationale behind involvement of participants in the action process was that the intervention plan or trainings should continue even after the end of my study. Further, the aim was to create a sense of ownership of the solution reached or model created as opposed to top-down research that is often not synchronised with local realities. The top-down approach has been a practice followed in Zimbabwe but has not yielded sustainable solutions. In action research, the stakeholders should carry improvements and revisions forward through reflections and evaluations of the training. In the action cycle, continuous communication was constantly maintained with all the actors, as they remained important in generating a practical solution to the identified problem (see Chapter 6 on the detailed action research process). The design I adopted also informed my methodology.

Methodology involves analysing principles and procedures for an inquiry, which in turn determines the application of those methods (Schwandt 1997 in Lewin et al. 2007). Thus, a research methodology is a way of obtaining, organising and analysing data. This becomes the theory of correct scientific decisions. The methodology therefore is how the research was done and its logistical sequence. It includes the design, sample, limitations and the data collection and analysis techniques to be used (Henning 2004). While action research can take both qualitative and quantitative methodology, this study was grounded on a qualitative research methodology. The nature of the problem to be solved as well as the outcome of the research required a thorough and in-depth analysis, planning, acting and evaluation of the problem. Qualitative methodology is grounded in an essentially constructivist philosophical position in the sense that it is concerned with how the world is experienced and understood within an environment at a given point in time (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012). Qualitative research describes “life worlds from the ‘inside out’ point of view of the people who participate in it” (Flick et al. 2004:1). These views came out in in-depth interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and information-sharing that occurred between the researcher and action group. The inside out point of view is holistic as it involves discovering new information (Williams 2007) and it is an effective model that occurs in a natural setting thereby allowing the participants to add their personal experiences. Thus, there is a strong co-relation between the researcher and the data (ibid). In relation to action research, the members of the action group, as well as other stakeholders involved in the action process, described and gave meaning to the problems that they face within the CSO sector.

1.7 Sample

Boeije (2010:35) defines a sample “as consisting of cases (units or elements) that will be examined and are selected from a defined population”. Babbie (1989: 206) further defines it as “a chosen subset representing the total population itself.” The purpose of a sample population is to get a balanced picture of the situation under-study (Babbie 2011). Ncube (2014) estimates that there are 50 CSOs that are engaged in peacebuilding programmes in Zimbabwe. Out of the 50 CSOs, I purposively selected one CSO that covers a wide geographical area in the country. To ensure anonymity of the organisation in the presentation of findings I labelled the CSO as CSO(A). Apart from purposive sampling the selection

criteria for CSO(A) was based on convenience sampling. CSO(A) is headquartered in Harare where I stay and as such, I could easily get access to it. 43 participants took part in this study and the participants are broken down as follows:

- The sample for baseline data collection was 26 participants (five in-depth interviews with officials from Heal Zimbabwe Trust, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ), Centre for Conflict Management and Resolution, five academics specialising in CSOs, and three experts in peacebuilding in Harare: I conducted two FGDs and they composed of 13 members drawn from CSO(A) explained in Chapter 8 (seven males and six females).
- From the sampled participants for FGDs I then drew nine (four males and five females) voluntary members from CSO(A) to constitute the action team. These nine were also interviewed to get responses in the first evaluation Chapter 9.
- I interviewed 17 participants for the second outcome evaluation of the intervention (their views and profiles are captured in Chapter 10).

1.8 Location of the Study

The study was conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe. The location was chosen as it was convenient to me both in terms of access and costs. I easily managed to get access to key-informants that I interviewed to gather baseline data as well as members that made up my FGDs and action team. I also had access to some of the libraries that had literature on CSOs in Zimbabwe. In addition, the location was convenient in that the CSO that I worked with is headquartered in Harare. In brief, CSO(A) was created in 2009 with the purpose of building peace through addressing past injustices, healing and reconciliation in various communities in Zimbabwe. CSO(A) is a humanitarian community-based organisation that works with grassroots formations in peacebuilding exercises. Its establishment came in the post-election-related violence that the country underwent in 2008. I also drew findings in the second evaluation from one area in Mashonaland East province where CSO(A) has conducted its peacebuilding activities as discussed in chapter 10.

1.9 Thesis Outline

Chapter 1: introduction to the nature of the study.

Chapter 2: provides the peacebuilding theoretical framework.

Chapter 3: gives a background of conflicts that Zimbabwe has witnessed since the colonial period up to the post-colonial era.

Chapter 4: flags the development and responses of CSOs in Zimbabwe to the past and on-going conflicts.

Chapter 5: details selected country case studies where CSOs have undertaken peacebuilding efforts and campaigns.

Chapter 6: discusses the research design, methodology, data collection methods, sampling and ethical issues observed.

Chapter 7: unpacks and analyses the findings from interviews and FGDs.

Chapter 8: describes the intervention plan that was designed and implemented by members of the action group to strengthen CSOs' efforts in building durable peace in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 9: presents findings of the first evaluation of the training that is the immediate responses of the participants.

Chapter 10: outlines and analyses the findings that emerged from the second outcome evaluation of the training.

Chapter 11: concludes the study noting chapter summaries, implications and areas of further research.

1.10 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the main objective of the study: to strengthen community-based CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe using IKS and political intelligence. The chapter advanced the context, statement of the problem, major theoretical framework and brief research design and methodology. The next chapter further develops and discusses the theoretical framework.

CHAPTER 2: EVOLUTION AND DEBATES ON CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS WITHIN THE PEACEBUILDING THEORY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the genesis and debates on civil society and peacebuilding theory. The chapter maps the position and functions of CSOs that are involved in peacebuilding. The types of CSOs and their roles (based on the liberal and sustainable peace models) in peacebuilding will be explored. Questions to be addressed include: What is peacebuilding? What is the role of CSOs in peacebuilding? What is the trend of CSOs in building peace? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the peacebuilding models that CSOs utilise at different conflict stages? Which model best yields sustainable peace?

This chapter takes an audit of how the theory of peacebuilding has evolved from the international level, state to grassroots level. Arguments have been that peacebuilding has an elitist approach and its roots lie in the liberal peace model (Ryan 2013). An expansion of this thought is that the orientation of peacebuilding is liberal but what differs is how it has been implemented (ibid). In pursuit of the limitations that come within the peacebuilding theory and the branches that emerge from it, CSOs' role remains crucial in the peacebuilding framework, as shall be discussed. To this end, the fundamental issues traced and examined aided in mapping an effective peacebuilding approach that can be utilised by CSOs in peacebuilding to meet the needs and demands from the environments in which they function.

2.2 An Overview of Peacebuilding Theory

The idea of building peace in human history is not new as societies have their own mechanisms and structures to achieve this (Boege 2006). The development of the idea in the international system began in the 19th Century with attempts such as The Hague Convention of 1899, League of Nations, United Nations and non-violent peace movements (Paffenholz 2010). The nature of the conflicts in the 19th Century was inter-state, resulting in the protagonists of conflict resolution being States only (Cortright 2008). The belief was that too many actors would complicate conflict resolution processes. Civil societies were excluded in peace processes. For example, they were deliberately left out in the 1995 Dayton peace agreement where the belief was that peace processes should be a preserve of the main warring parties (Belloni 2001). In addition, CSOs were also side-lined as the task of peacebuilding was left to professional diplomats (Berman and Johnson 1977). For example, there was the Vietnam War which pitted the North Vietnam against South Vietnam. The former was a communist and the later was an ally of the United States of America. During this period the Quakers were identified as an exception which contributed to the peace processes (Curle 1971). The Quakers are a religious group that emerged in Europe to spread messages of peace. Despite these developments, the discourse of peacebuilding gained momentum in the 1950s when academic research in peace was established (Paffenholz 2010).

This followed contentious debates in the definitions and practice of peacebuilding (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010).

The concept of peacebuilding differs in terms of approach, scope of activities and time-frame (Paffenholz 2010). Notwithstanding these differences, there is consensus among scholars that the concept of peacebuilding formally came to light in the United Nations 1992 Agenda for Peace report (Paffenholz 2013, Ryan 2013). Its inception, however, is linked to Galtung's 1975 *Essays on peace research publication*. The definition put forward was that peacebuilding is a process which attempts to address the underlying causes of conflict and prevents their transformation into violence (Galtung 1975, Gawerc 2006). Galtung's understanding of the concept was based on the belief that it should be an associative approach, with the aim of creating better peace infrastructures (Ryan 2013). Another meaning attached to peacebuilding is that it involves preventing and managing armed conflicts and sustaining peace after the war has ended (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). The latter understanding gives a starting point in peacebuilding along with the defined phases of an armed conflict. Peacebuilding has been classified and applied in different forms matching the different conflict phases. Firstly, there is conflict prevention that aims at preventing the eruption of an armed conflict; secondly, there is conflict management or peace-making which seeks to end violence and reach a peace pact; finally, is the post-conflict stage which focuses on how to sustain the peace achieved (ibid). Therefore, there is a correlation between a conflict phase and peacebuilding approaches that need to be utilised by different actors such as civil society which determines the effectiveness of their functions. The core elements in peacebuilding that can be located within the conflict stages continuum are, but not limited to:

- Political and institutional dimension which focuses on democratisation, good governance and state reform;
- Military and security reforms paying attention to security sector - demobilisation, demilitarisation, disarmament and reintegration of combatants;
- Social dimension involving social rehabilitation of vulnerable groups that include women and children, internally displaced persons, restoring basic social services with the aim of rebuilding social fabric;
- Economic peacebuilding that involves reconstruction of infrastructure, revamping economic production, making fiscal reforms meant to address poverty and exclusion which result in war or worsening of the situation;
- Environmental aspect addressing issues around sustainable management of resources and access to the resources (Peinado 2003).

The core elements fed into the peacebuilding function that was carried out by various actors from the international level down to the lower echelons in post-war-torn society. From the above one can note

that peacebuilding is a multipronged process in which different actors at different levels play to create peaceful societies through, for example, economic reconstruction, political reforms, environmental management and social development. This study sought to identify CSOs that are involved in peacebuilding from several perspectives and to enhance their roles and activities.

2.3 UN Peacebuilding Perspective and Practice

In the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* report by the then Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding is defined as actions taken to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to prevent conflict recurrence (Ryan 2013). The aim of the report was to recommend how preventative diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping can be utilised by states in meeting threats to common security, by widening cooperation and reducing nationalistic rivalries (United Nations 1992). Despite these aims, the report did not adequately address the concept of peacebuilding; it was only mentioned in five paragraphs of the report (Ryan 2013). The UN 1992 definition is criticised in that it was state-centric and had a narrow focus (Ryan 2013, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). This led to a revision of the concept where Galtung challenged the scope of the concept to encompass multiple approaches and actors in peacebuilding (Ryan 2013). The 1992 report necessitated growth of research around peacebuilding from several scholars and institutions (Paffenholz 2010). An expansion of the concept was done in the 2000s through the Brahimi report stating that peacebuilding encompasses activities undertaken on the far side of a conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for building something on those foundations that will lead to positive peace (UN Peacebuilding Fund 2015). While the concept of peacebuilding has been changing over time, the UN was not seen as adequately providing the measures that need to be undertaken in order to build peace. As a result, recent scholarship has attempted to fill this gap by broadening the concept.

The rationale behind the expansion of UN peacebuilding in literature has been the shift in global conflict trends. Peacebuilding has become relevant in the modern-day era where conflicts have moved from micro to macro levels (Ryan 2013). There has been a rise of ethnic conflicts and a demise of inter-state conflicts, which warrants an associative approach to build peace as people tend to regroup and live together in their societies (Galtung 1975, Ryan 2013). The 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*'s view of peacebuilding remained on the structural efforts; it was a shift from inter-state conflicts to armed conflicts (Ryan 2013). In addition, the UN model prioritised the interests of states over human needs (Steinberg 2013). The UN peacebuilding missions are portrayed as the vehicles of liberal peacebuilding thereby reflecting global liberal projects, which are a site of elite consensus (Selby 2013). The approach taken by the UN overlooks and undermines people-to-people and bottom-up initiatives which are crucial in sustaining peace settlements (Steinberg 2013, Selby 2013).

2.4 Grassroots Peacebuilding Approach

There is broad consensus among scholars that past peacebuilding efforts have been owned and steered by elites (Paffenholz 2010, Ryan 2013). Yet reconciliation and peacebuilding must involve local groups to provide a sense of ownership. Grassroots or bottom-up initiatives start by diagnosing problems first, then providing solutions (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004). Examples of bottom-up initiatives are the people-to-people workshops that were implemented in Rwanda to promote psychological healing from the trauma caused by genocide (Steinberg 2013). Grassroots approaches are meant to rebuild fractured relations, change negative attitudes and behaviour of people towards one another into positive relationships. Such bottom-up approaches can effectively be coordinated by middle-out actors. In this study, CSOs that are involved in peacebuilding working in conflict-torn communities assume the role of middle-out actors. As noted, this study sought to strengthen community-based CSOs' peacebuilding approaches using IKS and political intelligence and therefore focused on grassroots approaches.

2.5 Defining CSOs and Locating Their Roles in Peacebuilding

CSOs are part of the “middle-out”³ actors in peacebuilding. Before exploring their role, it is important to trace the evolution and meaning of the concept of civil society. Definitions and approaches to civil society have their genesis in past philosophical writings. Aristotle, Rousseau and Kant view CSOs as synonymous with the state or as a political society (Keane 1988). Accordingly, civility was perceived as an antithesis to the state of nature. In other words, civil society came to mean the opposite of rude society (Masunungure 2008). The role of civil society was to spread civilisation within the society (Kumar 1993 in Spurk 2010). Montesquieu, in his separation of powers doctrine, stresses that the powers of the central authority should be checked by other forces within and without the government (Paffenholz et al. 2006). Thus, CSOs in authoritarian systems have widely been perceived as anti-state agents who fight for the emancipation of the public from oppressive regimes (Masunungure 2008). Despite these debates, Gyimah-Boadi (1996) defines civil society as the realm between the household, family and the state. According to Sachikonye (1995: 7) civil society relates to “an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities- economic and cultural production, voluntary associations and household life and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions”. From the definitions, CSOs perform an assortment of activities that are intended to fill in the gaps left or created by the state, family and the business or market.

Authors tend to agree that peacebuilding is a process of achieving peace through addressing the root causes of a conflict to prevent their transformation into violence (Galtung 1975, Gawerc 2006, Paffenholz 2010). Peacebuilding can mean a range of activities and measures designed to mitigate the effects of war and prevent its future re-emergence (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004). Peacebuilding goes

³ Generally meant to mean that efforts start at the middle, influencing both top and bottom.

a step further from peace-making where political leaders seek to negotiate to end violence and peacekeeping where troops are sent to separate warring parties (Moore 2011). Peacebuilding involves stabilizing states, strengthening institutions and reinforcing post conflict governments to build lasting peace (ibid). The place of CSOs in peacebuilding can be understood in the definition provided by Lederach (1997) that peacebuilding is a process made up of various functions and roles. In the context of this study, CSOs act to address the underlying causes of a conflict at different stages. Accordingly, the study addresses the question of how CSOs can be strengthened in preventing conflict manifestation or recurrence and rebuilding fractured societies.

CSOs' role is shaped by different situations and contexts, which in turn shapes their peacebuilding objective (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004, Paffenholz 2010). In addition, peacebuilding interventions need to be matched with the prevailing circumstances, which can influence people's attitude and behaviour; these include the prevailing political and economic climate (Steinberg 2013). The consideration was useful to this study as I aimed to strengthen CSOs involved in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

Apart from strengthening institutions and enhancing their functions in building lasting peace, measures need to be taken on board by different actors to achieve the intended goals. Moore (2011: 23) provides the following steps or activities in building peace in post-conflict environments:

Disarmament; demobilization and reintegration; establishing truth and reconciliation commissions; creating legal process to help returning refugees deal with people living on their old homesteads; jump starting the economies; building infrastructure; training competent judges and lawyers; building functioning army and jails.

These activities can be performed depending on the context and objectives of the actors involved in the peace building process. In Zimbabwe, the activities that CSOs play can be summarized according to decade of experiences since 1980. For example, in the first decade of independence (1980-1990) the activities centred on demobilisation and reintegration, reconciliation of blacks and whites and reconciliation after the 1981-7 ethnic violence. During the first decade CSOs were not very effective and visible as they were still developing. Their activities were more evident after the Matabeleland violent clashes, with the CCJPZ monitoring and documenting human rights abuses. Mashingaidze (2005: 85) notes that the ZANU government deployed the Fifth Brigade in 1983 (military wing) to kill the Ndebele ethnic group from ZIPRA which was PF ZAPU military wing during the liberations struggle. The killing of the dissidents was justified as internal defence by the government and the operation was termed *Gukurahundi* meaning the first rains of the year that wash away chuff (ibid). From 1990 up to the time of this writing CSOs activities are mainly found in political and state reforms, jump-starting the economy and to a lesser extent social rehabilitation. Within the laundry list, CSOs play certain roles and functions that can result either in negative or positive peace outcomes which will be discussed in detail below.

2.5.1 Roles and Functions of CSOs in Peacebuilding

Literature has attempted to demonstrate constructive roles that are exhibited by CSOs in peacebuilding. Yet there is little acknowledgement from scholars that CSOs can act as uncivil elements or spoilers to peacebuilding (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Paffenholz 2010). CSOs can also thwart the process of democratisation (Okuku 2002). However, CSOs remain relevant in peacebuilding. CSOs can play the following major functions: protection; monitoring; advocacy and public communication; in-group socialisation; social cohesion; intermediation and facilitation; service delivery (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, 2010). Such roles can be played by civil society entities during conflicts or in post-war situation. For example, CSOs can be involved in peace-making and have the potential to promote reconciliation, serving as a corrective to political and military elites, enhancing local ownership and fostering democracy (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004). Other states like Norway provide support to CSOs in peacebuilding. They perform the following functions: promoting reconciliation, non-violent conflict management, watchdog role, bridge building and empowering the weak. Other actors within the state play dominant functions in peacebuilding efforts. For instance, the mediation and facilitation role has been a preserve of states with CSOs playing little or no role at all (Paffenholz 2010). The service delivery function has not been immune to criticism in that some states tend to offload their service delivery role to non-state actors (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006).

2.5.2 Protection

One of the preconditions of CSOs in peacebuilding is to protect people; whether during or after an armed conflict. The rationale behind this is that a state might fail to protect itself after being weakened by an armed conflict. What becomes prudent is for CSOs to provide security, autonomy and protection, reduce the occurrence of violence in preparing an enabling ground for peace work (Peinado 2003). CSOs can protect citizens from a despotic government, hegemonic tendencies of the state, armed actors which might be a national army or local dominant groups (Peinado 2003, Paffenholz 2009a, 2009b). The outcome of a performing protection function is negative peace (absence of war). Activities which underlie the protection function include international accompaniment; watchdog activities and establishing zones of peace; humanitarian aid and civil society initiatives for human security (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). The main activities by most CSOs are related to watchdog and creation of zones of peace.

Other debatable forms of protection support that CSOs can deliver are landmine removal, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (Paffenholz 2009a, 2009b, Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). The reality of the past indicates that states and the UN (in some cases private business contractors) perform the above function (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). One example of CSOs performing a demobilisation role was in Mozambique where churches embarked on a demobilisation exercise after UN demobilisation had come to an end. Thus, CSOs can complement a states' protection function in order to yield peace within a society. At the same time, CSOs can also be protected by states for them

to perform their functions effectively (Peinado 2003). This implies that the protection function is the preserve of the state and the survival of CSOs is also dependent on the state. CSOs then assume the protection function when the state fails to carry out its responsibility. As such CSOs cannot totally substitute the state in carrying out this function (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). In conflict phases, protection function ceases with an end to a war or violence which then calls for other functions to be performed by CSOs (Paffenholz 2009a). Activities like the watchdog role can also be carried into the monitoring function that CSOs can play in building peace.

2.5.3 Monitoring Role

CSOs also present a critical monitoring role in peacebuilding. The main aim of monitoring is to bring a sense of accountability to the state's action. This role is embedded in Montesquieu's separation of powers doctrine (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). The activities that are carried out by CSOs include establishing a political early warning system and reporting on human rights abuses (ibid). In the Ouagadougou Declaration, CSOs pushed the Economic Community of Western States' (ECOWAS) agenda to establish mechanisms to prevent future conflicts by calling for an effective ECOWAS Executive Secretariat for conflict prevention and management and a peace observatory research unit (Riley 1998). Certain peace pacts such as the Ouagadougou Declaration spell out CSOs' monitoring function of a state's human rights observance after the signing of the agreement (Bell and O'Rourke 2007). Consequently, the legal framework can enable or empower CSOs to execute monitoring functions in the practice of peacebuilding.

2.5.4 Advocacy and Public Communication

Related to the monitoring function, CSOs conduct advocacy and public communication. CSOs unearth the suffering or oppression of groups in a society and put them on public agendas (Schmid 1968, Galtung 1969). The activities that come along with this function are agenda-setting of local themes for consideration and debates, conducting awareness workshops, public campaigns, lobbying for CSOs' inclusion in peace negotiations (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). With the signing of peace agreements, CSOs can sell and build a peace agreement through awareness campaigns together with other actors. For example, CSOs were part of a peace delegation in Somalia as set out in the 1993 agreement (Bell and O'Rourke 2007). CSOs' advocacy role comes in two classes. On one hand, CSOs can utilise non-public advocacy methods where they can have meetings in private with political representatives to raise specific issues affecting the State (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). On the other, CSOs can engage in public advocacy where demands on political systems are channelled through demonstrations, petitions and

press statements. In the Ouagadougou Declaration⁴, CSOs also emphasised bottom-up approaches to conflict prevention and resolution by building a culture of peace through teaching human rights in educational institutions and encouragement of inclusion of women by shunning all forms of discrimination (Riley 1998). In most cases, CSOs adopt public advocacy when non-public advocacy fails to yield fruits.

2.5.5 In-Group Socialisation

In-group socialisation is another function that is linked to CSOs in peacebuilding. CSOs support democratic behaviour, upholding democratic attitudes and values in a society (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, 2010). There is thus a conviction in the correlation between democracy and peace. CSOs achieve this by sowing a culture of peace in divided societies, which would be used in conflict resolution and reconciliation (ibid). For instance, by providing peace education, peace campaigns through media outlets (radio, TV), poetry, and street theatre. In Cambodia, socialisation was performed by several CSOs which included Youth for Peace and carried out village dialogue projects, bringing together victims, perpetrators and youth to talk about their views on the Khmer Rouge's past atrocities (Dosch 2012). Such activities can lead to durable peace as they lay emphasis on correcting past wrongs in non-violent ways. In-group socialisation transforms negative culture into positive culture that subsequently needs social cohesion to subsist.

2.5.6 Social Cohesion Function

The concept of social cohesion or integration in a community lies in the 'bridging ties' works of Gramsci, Tocqueville and Putnam (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, 2010). The thrust of the function is to rebuild societies in post-war environments in order to reconstruct trust and prevent uncivil virtues (ibid). This was showcased by NGOs when they were involved in rebuilding the Cambodian state or communities after the demise of the Khmer Rouge regime (Dosch 2012). Social cohesion is not limited to building bonds within specific groups but also bridging ties among adversarial groups (Putnam 2002, Peinado 2003). The activities in social cohesion include relationship-oriented integration involving dialogues, workshops and exchange visits to rebuild destroyed relationships. The activity is followed by outcome-oriented cohesion which involves conflict resolution workshops and participating in peace negotiations (Cuhadar and Dayton 2008). Lastly there are outcome-oriented activities for business or development work. In this activity, the outcome is for bringing conflicting groups together to run or

⁴ The 5th Pan African Conference was convened in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from 21 to 25 September 2000 with delegates from 52 African National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in attendance. The resulting document was entitled "The Ouagadougou Document: the power of humanity building a healthy future".

provide services such as water supply within a community (ibid). The result is to bridge ties between the divided groups through social and developmental projects.

2.5.7 Intermediation and Facilitation

CSOs can work as inter-mediators or facilitators between citizens and the state. Facilitation can either be formal or informal, it can take place between armed groups themselves or between armed groups and communities (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). Apart from the protection function, facilitation and the other functions highlighted above remain relevant in a post-war environment (Paffenholz 2009a). In such scenarios, CSOs can act as mediators or observers during the negotiation of peace agreements (Bell and O'Rourke 2007) if a certain provision is laid out. The intermediation function is mainly exhibited in the conflict management and resolution phases.

2.5.8 Service Delivery Function

Service delivery function establishes entry points for other CSOs' peacebuilding functions to be carried out (Paffenholz 2009a, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, 2010). Cambodian NGOs produced a handbook on managing post-conflict trauma, which began to be used by tertiary institutions in their psychological studies (Dosch 2012). The development activities of NGOs should converge and be mutually reinforcing with the aim of peacebuilding (Peinado 2003). However, some of the roles that are assumed by NGOs in service provision tend to free the government of its responsibilities in delivering to its citizens (Peinado 2003, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). CSOs are channels for assistance and not for emergencies and development assistance (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004). The assistance rendered comes in the form of influencing state's action, political processes and corrective action (ibid). Service provision becomes a direct function of CSOs only when it is synchronised with the objectives of peacebuilding. Apart from this, it remains as a state economic and social function (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). Accordingly, CSOs do not fully take up the service delivery function and when they do so it is on a temporary basis. On one hand, when a government fails to deliver service to its people, CSOs assume this role. In this case, they become part of the government which then redefines their appearance and how they ought to function. In authoritarian systems, when CSOs assume such roles particularly during election time as in Zimbabwe, the CSOs are viewed as agents of regime change. This has crippled CSOs' operations typically through a plethora of legal and non-legal means and many times the people are left to suffer as the government would have failed to provide service.

Accordingly, the roles and functions that CSOs play at a conflict phase determine the success of peacebuilding (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). Different methodologies apply to different functions (Paffenholz 2010). Aid that is given during the peacebuilding process should match the phases of a conflict which range from emergence to post conflict and development (Peinado 2003).

There is need for context analysis for a peacebuilding function to be relevant. Identifying the activities of CSOs along with the defined phases of a conflict is also imperative (Paffenholz 2010, Harpviken and

Kjellman 2004). The roles of CSOs appear to be weak during a conflict and their influence is greater in the post- conflict phase. One limitation of CSO activities is that in some cases they end up being agents for implementing a donor's project without taking into consideration the prevailing environment (Paffenholz 2010).

2.6 Contending Issues on the Roles and Functions of CSOs in Peacebuilding

Theorists and practitioners in conflict studies tend to disagree on the extent to which CSOs must be involved in peacebuilding processes. The role of CSOs was marginal during the Cold War era and gained prominence in the mid-1990s (Paffenholz 2009b). Development agencies began to fund interventions that were directly aimed at peacebuilding and this led to the growth of CSOs in peacebuilding giving rise to professionalisation and commercialisation of peace works (Orjuela 2004). However, funding was cut by the donor community as they were not seeing results in the peace processes that were being carried out by CSOs. In addition, CSOs were also excluded in conflict management due to the dominance of the realist school of thought (Paffenholz 2009b). The mind-set of the conflicting parties involved in conflict resolution has a bearing on whether CSOs can be included or not.

Realists believe that only states and track one (formal) diplomats were supposed to manage and resolve conflict without the input of other actors (Paffenholz 2014). In other words, the involvement of many actors in conflict management would complicate the whole process in that there would be many channels of communication in the process (Donais 2012, Paffenholz 2014). For example, the facilitation or mediation role in peacebuilding is widely believed to be a key role for states and official diplomats (Paffenholz 2010). Nonetheless, the role of CSOs can also be constructive compared to other actors in peacebuilding even though it is not decisive but supportive (Paffenholz 2009b). The supportive role of CSOs is exhibited in violence reduction, negotiating peace settlement and sustaining peace after conflict resolution. In general, the effectiveness of CSOs' role is contextual and applicable to a certain conflict phase. Apart from the limitations existing literature shows that the roles and functions of CSOs have revolved around liberal and sustainable peacebuilding concepts.

2.7 Liberal Peacebuilding

Liberal peacebuilding thinking has its roots in Immanuel Kant's views on democracy and peace while a sustainable peacebuilding approach mainly held by Lederach involves creation of structures, processes and training people to create a culture of peace and development (Lederach 1997, Paffenholz 2010). The liberal peacebuilding approach gained momentum and became influential in the post-Cold War period (Ryan 2013). This model stems from the liberal peace model and has been used in societies that have emerged from civil wars (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). Liberal peacebuilding efforts pay attention to democratic rebuilding of states after armed conflicts (Paffenholz 2010). Assumptions in liberal peacebuilding are that liberal economic, political structures and processes ultimately lead to

sustainable peace in societies emerging from war (Selby 2013). The approach is rooted in liberal democracy which means that peacebuilding activities revolved around this and global institutions of governance were to follow this track. These assumptions filtered from the philosophical arguments on liberal peace and democracy which became features of past peacebuilding actors.

The liberal concept is rooted in the belief that mature and stable democratic states do not fight each other (Doyle 1983 in Paffenholz 2010, Zurcher 2011). Another argument put forward is that democratic states have less internal armed wars and CSOs were actors who could play crucial roles in supporting the creation of democratic states based on good governance, respect of human rights and rule of law (Paffenholz 2013). There was a correlation between democracy and peace where democracy was believed to be a system which can deliver peace and stability (Zurcher 2011). The activities of peace building by CSOs and other stakeholders were centred on paving the way for democratic principles, values and norms. In a broad sense, peacebuilding came to entail quick establishment of security, democratic political structures and economic reforms (Paffenholz 2010). Adam Smith, in his 1904 *An inquiry into the nature and causes of Wealth of Nations*, cited in Paffenholz (2010), argues that the higher the level of a free market economy in combination with a democratic political system, the higher the chances of achieving peace. These thoughts resulted in a liberal peacebuilding model placing emphasis on human rights, democracy, free market and rule of law (Donais 2012). This study sought to identify ways in which CSOs, following the liberal model, can be strengthened in building peaceful societies in Zimbabwe.

It can be noted that at its birth in the Cold War period, liberal thinking was limited to states but later was applied to an intra-state situation (Ryan 2013). In intra-state cases, democratic norms enshrined in constitutions were believed to be ingredients of peaceful conduct resulting in conflicts, not to being transformed into violent conflicts (Paffenholz 2010). Furthermore, debates emerged that democracies (democratic states) have less internal revolts while authoritarian systems would have relatively low numbers of armed conflicts depending on the situation (Rummel1997 in Paffenholz 2010). This led to the liberal approach being adopted in the UN's 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* doctrine. Peacebuilding missions started to focus on spreading peace and liberal democracy in post-war states (Zurcher 2011, Selby 2013). Other non-state actors such as CSOs carried on with this approach of creating liberal peace projects. However, liberal peacebuilding was not short of weaknesses.

The pitfalls of the model can be noted in that the nexus between democracy and peace was rather simplistic and an underestimation of its effectiveness (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Democracy and development could also be a source of conflict in trying to resolve them (Ryan 2013). States in a transitional phase between authoritarian and inclusive democratic governance have the highest levels of armed conflicts or violence. In countries such as Rwanda and Afghanistan where peacebuilding missions were implemented based on liberal democracy, local elites in the countries saw it as a problem, not a solution (Zurcher 2011). Democratic opening became a zero-sum game, a threat to the political

power of the elites. In Rwanda, it was believed that it could widen ethnic tensions. The quality of peace yielded following this model proved to be unsatisfactory and few cases have been successful (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). Thus, peace builders have spent their energy on liberal forms without the support of the local elites, rendering their missions ineffective (Zurcher 2011). The outcome of this has been poor quality peace that is characterised by persistent mistrust, insecurity and poorly distributed economic growth (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007).

The UN *An Agenda for Peace* is criticized in that it excluded non-state actors like CSOs and did not reflect gender issues in the process. According to Ryan (2013), it did not cater for ethnicity, national identities and class divisions in the efforts to build peace (Ryan 2013). Liberal peacebuilding did not have a connection with cultural understanding of peace in war-torn societies, local needs and aspirations were not catered for (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). In other words, liberal peacebuilding models remain standardised on liberal social norms that are insensitive to local realities therefore disempowering them and delivering poor quality outcomes in peace processes (Newman et al. 2009). To this end, liberal peacebuilding remains a top-down project that is ineffective and inappropriate in some contexts, yet liberal peacebuilders continue to apply standard recipes of the model (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007, Donais 2012, Paffenholz 2013). This study thus sought to incorporate the elements excluded in line with the Zimbabwean context to enhance CSOs' role in peacebuilding.

Furthermore, it can be noted that the liberal peacebuilding model works well where there is a functioning democracy, yet most states that have tried to follow the model are decades away from this status (Paffenholz 2013). CSOs have failed to analyse adequately the context in which they have attempted to build peace, by conducting blanket liberal peace projects. Liberal peacebuilding approaches have been branded as “colonial projects cast in the mould of colonialism and aiming to restructure Southern societies in accordance with Northern metropolitan ideology” (Darby 2009:35). Coercive tactics and strategies have been used to implement liberal norms through diplomacy, cultural exchanges, trade, aid or militarised ways (Selby 2013). Regrettably, ‘uncivil societies’ have been agents of transmitting some of these destructive peace projects.

Peace processes in the contemporary era are at fault as they fail to address bitterness that includes memories and images and the sources that generate them (Gawerc 2006). In addition, liberal peacebuilding is less effective in addressing or managing affective dimensions of peace, which include reconciliation, trust building and inter-communal respect (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). Liberal models in peacebuilding are narrow, state-centred and do not match some contexts where they have been implemented (Paffenholz 2013, Ryan 2013, Steinberg 2013). Unfortunately, there have been misconceptions that peacebuilding entailed promoting and establishing liberal peace (Selby 2013). The misconception has manifested in some of the peacebuilding roles that CSOs have solely implemented in post-war environments. In short, the faulty implementation of liberal peacebuilding has led to disastrous outcomes, as in some cases it has been applied through coercion and deception. The

limitations of liberal peacebuilding therefore call for sustainable peacebuilding models to be taken on board which do not breed instability or negative peace but positive peace. The study aims at bolstering the roles that can be played by CSOs involved in rebuilding fractured relations in Zimbabwe through action research. Such measures can aid in establishing durable peace, as they go beyond addressing the structural issues but also focus on bridging ties amongst the people.

The reality of the past has shown that the international community tends to react to conflicts when it reaches the peak of humanitarian crisis or disaster (Lederach 1997). This leads to a crisis mentality that is bent on a disaster management model. Automatically, the input or role of the local people is sidelined. The model followed has inherent faults in that it provides for quick solutions to the crisis though the manner of problem-solving will be unsustainable (ibid). Peace accords, democratisation and open market strategies are creations of the international community and have led to unsatisfactory outcomes (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). CSOs have played the advocacy roles supporting or opposing some of these peace outcomes. This has led to peace agreements and talks that do not transcend into finding ways that can sustain the accords over the medium- to long-term plan (Lederach 1997). Peace accords are pregnant with liberal norms; they are transmission mechanisms for the norms and values (Paris in Selby 2013). The cracks in this strategy have been seen by the continued conflict resurgence (Lederach 1997). My intention was to discover ways that CSOs in peacebuilding can avoid this so that their actions can be efficient and effective in building peaceful societies.

The critique of liberal peacebuilding theory is also found in the post-liberal peacebuilding. Post liberal peacebuilding brings in the return of the locals or voices from below in the post-conflict environment (Richmond 2009, 2010 and Finkenbusch 2016). Liberal peacebuilding approaches are barren of the will of the people and this leads to a legitimacy crisis of the theory yet CSOs have adopted such liberal templates and yielding unfavourable results. Post-liberal models put emphasis in looking beyond liberalism in peacebuilding and focus on the everyday lives of the people and how they can be included in peacebuilding (Richmond 2010: 666). The inclusion of the locals increases the effectiveness of peacebuilding at the same time empowering the locals (Leonsrdson and Rudd 2015: 826). Such weaknesses in liberal peace and strengths found in post-liberal peace informed the development of a peacebuilding strategy that is context and culturally specific to be used by community-based CSOs in Zimbabwe. Despite the identified strengths in post-liberal peace, Paffenholz (2015) argues that the theory is hampered by a binary understanding of the local and the international which makes it a hybrid peacebuilding model. The observation by Paffenholz calls for a discussion into the sustainable peacebuilding theory and how CSOs can fit in an effort of building positive peace in Zimbabwe.

2.8 Sustainable Peacebuilding

The main proponent of sustainable peace is often seen as Lederach. Firstly, he advances an integrated model for building peace using the conflict progression matrix (Lederach 1997). Sustainability is a proactive process that can result in a spiral of peace and development as opposed to a spiral of violence

and destruction. In other terms, sustainable peacebuilding involves transformation of the attitudes, behaviour and differences of groups into an engine of peace or preventing a relapse into conflict (Peinado 2003, Langer et al. 2016). In addition, sustainable peacebuilding implies a complete transformation of the state and society with the focus on socio-economic rebuilding at addressing the underlying causes of a conflict (Peinado 2003). In this regard, I endeavoured to find ways in which CSOs can effectively perform in transforming negative violent attitudes of people in Zimbabwe to achieve positive peace within through building peace in IKS.

In the sustainable peacebuilding framework, I noted that CSOs need to build peace using IKS. The use of this concept was localised in the Zimbabwean context. IKS is an alternative to liberal peacebuilding (Close 2016, 2017). It embraces longer-term bottom-up initiatives that seek to build inclusive social capital necessary for durable peacebuilding models (Brown 2016). IKS is generally rooted in the spirit of humanism or *ubuntuism*; in the Shona context I adopted *hunhuism*. This is an African philosophy that is moulded on an African vision that strives for an upright and virtuous individual (Sibanda 2014: 26). Mapara (2009: 142) defines it as what indigenous people know and do or what they have known and done for generations. IKS involves long historical practices that are applied to a defined local community, it is firmly rooted in customary law or a set of rules and prohibitions followed by indigenous people (Adeosun 2015: 262; Close 2016: 135). From these definitions, Africans and Zimbabweans have their own local ways of relating socially, politically and economically. These local ways have tied groups together, for example, in community projects and in some cases resolving communal problems. IKS has traditionally been passed through oral traditions and in some cases through games or other forms of entertainment (Mapara 2009). The core values in IKS include promoting a culture of respect, love, unity, cooperation and tolerance. In the promotion of peace, CSOs have a role in educating and socialising or reawakening *hunhuism* which is an appeal to moral values of the people. To be effective, CSOs' activities must be inclusive and democratic through working with the local people and demonstrating life-oriented experiences that are sensitive to the people's culture, language and history. Doing so breeds a culture of legitimacy while at the same time addressing the root causes of conflicts that stem from a breakdown in moral values. IKS has been credited in that it is less costly and there is greater ownership through collective experiences of the indigenous people (Benyera 2014, Close 2017).

IKS has merits in generating local ownership but it also has weaknesses. I observed that while IKS can be an appealing concept in peacebuilding, the prevailing environment limits its effectiveness. For example, in some rural parts of Zimbabwe the local people no longer value the ideals of *hunhuism*. The value of IKS has been eroded by the impact of colonialism. Colonial governments taught people to despise their own local ways of doing things, they constructed a universal knowledge system defined in the Western lenses or models (Mawere 2012: 9). The effect was that African societies were disempowered from their culture while that of the West and colonial governments was entrenched (ibid). Other factors that continue to threaten the value of IKS have been contacts with the external actors and

factors in the globalisation wave (Mapara 2009). In this study I noted that, modernisation and high levels of unemployment, have shifted the priorities of people. People prefer to be employed in a society without *hunhuism* than in a society with firm values without a job. Further, some of the local knowledge is based on patriarchal beliefs which are oppressive to women and therefore a threat to peacebuilding efforts by community-based CSOs. Patriarchal beliefs contradict a more just, equal view of the involvement of women and the importance of their role in peacebuilding. For example, Manojlovic (2018) observes that some cultural practices present barriers to the education of girls yet education is key in emancipating one from oppression. This exclusion also applies when women are denied the opportunity to play their roles in public spaces and rural communities. Transforming such perceptions was done in the training on the use of IKS through political intelligence in building peace (more detail in Chapters 8 and 9).

Apart from deep-rooted patriarchal beliefs, generational gaps have resulted in IKS losing some value. The young generations are slowly neglecting and despising the traditional approaches to conflict handling. Contributing to this neglect has been the disintegration of traditional family structures which are the agents of socialisation (Mapara 2009: 142). Rural-urban migration to some extent results in this family breakdown, while some family members have gone outside the country in search of greener pastures. The migration exposes the people to new and different cultures. Nonetheless, the concept is still valid although it has evolved over time. IKS remains important in designing peacebuilding approaches that local people are familiar with, without such models I argue that sustainable peace and development can be difficult to achieve in rural communities in Zimbabwe. This emphasis was made in the training of CSO(A). Mawere (2012: 8) argues that knowledge remains indigenous despite the contemporary events and changes. Its values remain through serving the indigenous ends (ibid). This approach is demonstrated by CSO(A) through merging traditional and modern proverbs that suit the current generation in Zimbabwe.

It can also be observed that sustainable peacebuilding can be realised through the creation of structures, processes and training people within a generation (Lederach 1997). In other words, peace dividends should be widely shared to avoid future conflict resurgence or authoritarianism; participation by the people is essential for successful long-term peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007, Lederach 1997). Accordingly, CSOs' legitimacy stems from their ability to deliver services or resources on issues of concern that arise from their local membership (Lederach 1997). The absence of legitimacy makes reconstruction and peacebuilding less durable (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). Lack of understanding realities of each conflict can prove disastrous for any hope of achieving lasting peace (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004). An observation has been made that bottom-up approaches hold most promise and yield significant results as they focus more on the needs of the society. The focus of this study is on how CSOs can build on sustainable peacebuilding roles to enhance local ownership by catering for local needs in a context which leads to more peaceful societies in Zimbabwe.

Another dimension of a sustainable peacebuilding model is that it focuses on democratising the political institutions in order to bring a new spirit into the political system that is legitimate, effective and capable of responding to social frictions by allowing peaceful resolutions (Paffenholz 2010). It can be noted that sustainable peacebuilding is a multi-pronged issue which encompasses physical infrastructure, re-launching of the economy, addressing national reconciliation, establishing new institutional and political reforms for resolving conflicts peacefully to break the cycle of violence (Peinado 2003). There are CSOs that can pay attention to building and reforming norms and institutions that bridge electoral violence, structures based on insecurity and fear to structures based on security and trust that can sustain peace and democracy (Saki and Katema 2011). Such roles can be played effectively by local CSOs who have greater proximity to the local people, thereby forging lasting peace (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004). The local CSOs have the knowledge and contextual understanding of the challenges and opportunities that are present at local level. Civilians are vital in that they are involved in a conflict either as perpetrators or victims and as such they need to be included in efforts to prevent or end wars (Orjuela 2006). This study answers the question of how best CSOs in Zimbabwe can bring together perpetrators and victims to tolerate and forgive each other on past wrongs through inclusion of IKS and political intelligence.

Accordingly, sustainable peace can be yielded through transformation which involves a shift from the latent phase to confrontation and a process of negotiation that leads to dynamic peaceful relationships (ibid). The process of transformation is multi-level and designed to increase justice, address the root causes of enmity, reduce violence and reconstruct broken relationships (Lederach 1995, Deutsch and Coleman 2012). Following that transformation is a multi-levelled process which also requires multiple actors in carrying out the process. A sustainable transformative approach is hinged on building the relationships of the conflicting parties which encompass psychological, spiritual, social, economic, political and military levels (Lederach 1997).

A sustainable peacebuilding model has not been spared from criticism. Like the liberal project, the enduring importance of strategy. States and geo-politics in making peace is understated (Selby 2013). Scholarship agrees that sustainable peacebuilding is applicable to post-conflict situations. Despite this, sustainable peace building models are weak in that they give a limited role to outsiders and fail to address the power dimension in the process (Paffenholz 2010). The faults in these approaches have resulted in continued conflict resurgence and negative peace that is an absence of war (Galtung 1975). During a conflict, sustainable peacebuilding often becomes a secondary objective (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004). The approach suffers a limitation in that its end and scope in peacebuilding is unclear (Paffenholz 2010). Thus, CSOs are in a dilemma of what exactly to follow in pursuit of a sustainable peacebuilding model. This study addresses this problem through training community-based CSOs in building peace grounded in IKS located in *hunhuism* in the Shona context.

This study also locates theories of peacebuilding within the concept of sustainable development. According to Strange and Bayley (2008: 24) sustainable development involves developing in a way that benefits the widest range of sectors, across borders and even between generations. Strong (1992) argues that it involves a process of deep and profound change in the political, social, economic, institutional and technological order. The concept is based on three interconnected pillars that include social, economic and environmental (Strange and Bayley 2008; Rogers et al. 2008). Strange and Bayley (2008: 27) argue that a society with unrest, poverty and disease will not develop in the long term. Therefore, there is a strong link between social wellbeing or stability and sustainable development. I argue that peacebuilding strategies that are owned and driven by local communities in line with their contextual realities can lead to sustainable social, economic and environmental development. In short, sustainable development is possible where there is participation of the beneficiaries of a reform. Rogers et al. (2008: 58) note that participation is a process through which stakeholders can influence and share control over development initiatives and the resources used to fund them through engagement in decision making. It follows that when people are given an opportunity to take an active role in planning, implementing and monitoring projects that affect their own development the people will develop a sense ownership and thereby motivates them to ensure the success of a project (Rogers et al. 2008: 60). To realise the wider input of stakeholders in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe I used action research working with community-based CSOs that are in touch with people affected with conflicts in their day to day lives. Further in creating a sense of ownership my intervention model was based on building peace with community-based CSOs using IKS and political intelligence.

To effectively embrace the elements found in sustainable peacebuilding and development, the training developed in this study comprised of political intelligence skills. As noted in Chapter 1, political intelligence has several definitions, one is: “the achievement of organisational or personal aims by using appropriate skills, behaviours and strategies, not only an awareness of political landscape but more specifically the skills to manoeuvre through political minefields” (TTM Associates 2017). Adams and Zanzi (2006: 350) define it as avoiding blunders and conflict in organisations. Reffo and Wark (2014: 4) posit that political intelligence is the leadership’s capacity to interact strategically in a world where government, business and wider society share power to shape the future. To realise this, I conducted a capacity building training with CSO(A) members for them to enhance their peacebuilding campaigns. One way of embracing the skills include understanding power and politics as well as the stakeholders involved in decision making (Adams and Zanzi 2006: 350). The skills shape the behaviour and skills that CSOs can adopt in building durable peace and realising organisational goals. Reffo and Wark (2014: 5) argue that political intelligence is targeted at business leaders, policy makers and implementors, leaders in NGOs and executive teams. In this study, CSO leaders are the targets as they are the ones that work with the local people and government in order to bring positive change in various communities. In political intelligence these leaders have to offer what meets the needs of citizens in line with their environments and future generations (ibid). The realisation is possible through sharpening

political skills of leaders involved with working with people or communities. Political skills are the abilities to effectively understand others at work and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one's organisational objectives (Ahearn et al 2004: 311). With political intelligence, they can also conduct stakeholder-mapping. Stakeholder mapping is part of conflict mapping that is needed by CSOs in peacebuilding processes. Conflict mapping is about being able to understand the root causes of a conflict, the nature, dynamics and chances of conflict resolution (Hocker and Wilmot 2001: 70). Hipel (2009) concurs noting that it involves understanding perceptions, attitudes, goals and power dynamics of the parties in a conflict. Stakeholder mapping is process of understanding actors or stakeholders' powerbases and influencing their strategies (Adams and Zanzi 2006, TTM Associates 2017). Past CSOs' peacebuilding approaches have had weaknesses due to the lack of thorough conflict and stakeholder mapping exercises. This has resulted in faulty peacebuilding interventions that only produce negative peace as opposed to positive peace. I argue that the training that CSO(A) received enhances its members with political intelligence skills which enabled them to design IKS models that meet the contextual realities. The holistic approach developed and implemented in chapter 10 leads to durable peace and sustainable development.

Having done this, there is need to identify alliances or networks with which to work in addressing certain issues; for example, constructively engaging the media, other local influential people and experts on that issue. Part of this is embraced in the concept of political skills which Ferris et al (2001: 5) note that it involves the ability to build networks, developing friendships and building strong and beneficial alliances. Such strong and beneficial alliances have been lacking in CSOs' peacebuilding programmes. This has been attributed to competition over donor funds and other resources that comes with working with communities and government or businesses. The networks are useful in getting information and advice that can enhance CSOs' peacebuilding models. Despite the merits, political intelligence has its dangers. While CSO members can be trained on political intelligence, one may be tempted to use it with wrong intentions or motivations. A member can use it to achieve selfish ends or being dishonest with the people yet political intelligence is about being genuine or sincere with the people being served (Ferris et al 2001: 5). Fortunately, this danger was not recorded in my study, the assumption being CSO members are charged with a duty of cultivating civility in the people, they are the agents of positive change in communities. This however, does not mean that CSOs and their members are perfect beings when they conduct peace campaigns. Political intelligence skills are further elaborated in the training manual (see Annexure 9). The skills complemented in ways that strengthens CSOs' peacebuilding approaches in Zimbabwe.

2.9 Conclusion

The theory of peacebuilding has evolved over time and has different contextual meanings. Scholarships put forward that peacebuilding is a process of preventing violent conflict from re-emerging and sustaining the peace processes as well as conflict through non-violent ways. At the UN tier,

peacebuilding is a trickle-down process which emerges from the top with a liberal orientation. The focus is on building institutions based on democracy and liberal peace ideas. The belief was that establishing liberal peace or democracies would translate to peaceful societies. To this end various UN resolutions from the 1992, 1995 and 2001 agenda for peace were pregnant with this approach. Yet the approach was narrow and had inherent faults. For instance, other actors were left out in the process. The exclusion of other actors was as a result of the dominance of the realist school of thought, the nature of Cold War conflicts which were inter-state and a liberalisation wave which proceeded in the late 1990s. Consequently, most post-war states have remained in a trap of negative peace which called for a revisit of the theory and its subsequent approaches. In most scenarios, local needs and actors have been sidelined which led to unsustainable peace initiatives in post-war environments. This was followed by a focus on the middle-out actors and grassroots input in peacebuilding. Middle-out peacebuilding focuses on the roles and functions performed by actors such as CSOs and strengthening the actors involved in peacebuilding. The latter narrows to lower levels, the locals whose needs and interests need to be catered for in transforming broken relationships in order to yield sustainable peace.

It can be observed that with the continued conflict recurrence in post-war states, CSOs have been found to be a viable alternative to filling the lacuna in peacebuilding processes. Funding and other supports have been given to CSOs performing the following roles or activities related to peacebuilding: monitoring, protection, socialisation, social cohesion, service delivery and intermediation. The roles and functions of CSOs are interlinked, though they can be applied differently at a conflict stage. Thus, literature places emphasis on the appropriate application of each function to meet the specific peacebuilding goals for the process and outcome to be durable. Scholars tend to debate the extent to which CSOs can effectively carry out these roles which can lead to durable peace outcomes. Arguments have been that CSOs can assume two characters which are civil and uncivil agents in peacebuilding. The former portrays constructive roles and the latter destructive. This chapter highlighted and placed more emphasis on the civil aspect of CSOs in peacebuilding. In addition, the chapter laid the foundation for identifying how best CSOs involved in peacebuilding could be strengthened in building peaceful societies in Zimbabwe through working with the IKS and political intelligence. This can bring sustainable political reforms, jump-starting the economy and rebuilding social relations broken as a result of election-related violence.

Apart from this, literature has shown that some of the roles and functions of CSOs have their roots in the liberal and sustainable peacebuilding models. These models have strengths and weaknesses in transforming societies. Proponents of the sustainable peacebuilding assert that the outcome of this approach is positive peace whereas liberal peacebuilding results in negative peace. Liberal peace focuses on building democratic structures and institutions and sustainable peacebuilding is oriented around transforming or mending broken relationships and the creation of zones of peace. This study relied more on the sustainable peacebuilding model to arrive at training on CSOs as to how they can incorporate IKS/local grain and political intelligence in their peacebuilding efforts. Poor quality peace

outcomes can be attributed to the poor implementation of the peacebuilding models by different actors. The ensuing chapter discusses the nature of the conflicts that have occurred in Zimbabwe which justifies the involvement of CSOs in peacebuilding.

CHAPTER 3: THE STATE AND NATURE OF ZIMBABWE'S CONFLICTS

3.1 Introduction

Conflicts that occur and have occurred in Zimbabwe have multifaceted causal factors. The root cause of conflicts frequently stems from the decay in the moral values for humankind. Moral values inform an individual of the need to be in harmony with others and the surroundings within his or her environment. In this study, I argue that the breakdown of humanism has led to a series of conflicts and fractured relationships in countries. This chapter presents the manifestations of the major political, economic and social upheavals that unfolded in Zimbabwe in the post-colonial era. The unresolved causes of past conflicts continue to haunt current and future generations in Zimbabwe. A negative political culture has been created and transmitted from one generation to the next. The main issues have been political intolerance, violence, restriction of civil and political liberties as a result of the authoritarian style of governance. Post-colonial woes in Zimbabwe stem from an inherited system of colonial governance which unfortunately has not been abandoned after attainment of independence in 1980. On the economic front, incidences of corruption and abuse of public facilities have led to economic crises. Party politics have played a more important role in the country's conflicts.

3.2 Zimbabwe's Context in Brief

Zimbabwe was a British colony from 1890 to 1980 when it attained independence. Independence came as a result of a protracted liberation struggle (Munhande and Nciizah 2013) that pitted Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) military forces against the white colonial regime (Laakso 2003:120). ZAPU's military wing was titled the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) while that of ZANU was Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). Following the struggle for independence, the two liberation movements emerged as the victors leading to independence in 1980. The black government took over power and was led by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and President Canaan Banana in the first seven years after independence. Mugabe then became President in 1987 up to 21 November 2017 when he resigned following a military intervention. After 1980 there has been a relative continuation of past political and absolute economic policies of the former colonisers or colonial system. While "one man one vote" rule was established in 1980 (Laakso 2003), there were nonetheless disturbing incidences of violence. On the economic side, efforts to replace capitalism were tried in the early years of independence with socialist policies, for example, increased social services and access to basic needs (Herbst 1990: 227), but these were defeated, and capitalism remained as the dominant economic system. One can conclude, therefore, that what changed in 1980 was a change in personnel in the running of the government and

not a change of the violent and colonial economic system. Herein lies the problem that continues to require effective peacebuilding strategies from several key stakeholders, CSOs included.

3.3 The Emergence of Political Conflicts or Crisis

The genesis of Zimbabwe's politics lies in the historical discourse. The events and issues that occurred during the colonial epoch are to some extent being replayed in the post-colonial era. In other words, the current political system inherited the same colonial governance set up and system. Zimbabwe was under colonial rule by Britain from 1890 until 1980. In the late 1950s, two black political parties emerged: ZAPU and later ZANU, which broke away from ZAPU. ZAPU was led by the late Joshua Nkomo and ZANU was led by the late Ndabaningi Sithole. Reasons for the split were based on strategic ways of fighting the colonial system. On the one hand, ZAPU wanted negotiations with the colonialists; while on the other, ZANU desired a violent overthrow of the system. Despite these differences, the two political parties later fought against the white colonial rule and the country attained its political freedom in 1980. Zimbabwe's independence was won through the 'barrel of the gun' which forced the Lancaster House negotiations that ended the impasse.

According to Ranger (2003), the liberation party ZANU developed a human rights declaration in 1973 with the intention of promoting democracy and rights of the oppressed people. The liberation movements, not only in Zimbabwe but also other countries, left a positive legacy of wanting to put the people first in their fight against the white hegemony (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). Such declarations earned the party a reputation as positive schools of democracy that wanted to reclaim the lost dignity of the black majority (Ranger 2003). Unfortunately, upon assuming the reins of power, this did not materialise. For example, countries like Malawi were despotic and Zambia was authoritarian (ibid). This view is supported by Makumbe and Compagnon (2000) who state that the ruling ZANU PF party has been in power from the time of independence and its leader, Mugabe, has been in power ever since. Following Operation Restore Legacy (15 November to 18 December 2017) Emerson Mnangagwa became the leader of the government and party replacing Mugabe. The operation was led by the military who sought to remove the criminal 'elements' around Mugabe. The criminals are alleged to be the members of the G40 faction in ZANU PF. During Mugabe's reign he used both authoritarian and democratic means to sustain himself and his party in power (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). The liberation parties and their leaders have continuously justified their stay in power on the basis that they fought against white colonial rule and therefore should be the countries' heroes. Masunungure (2004: 149) argues that: "during colonial rule, ZANU saw itself as the political hegemony to the extent that any serious opposition that was organised was perceived as a challenge that was supposed to be swallowed, infiltrated and controlled at all times". Critical voices were thus not given space to be heard. This justification is what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) describes as revolutionary justice. Unfortunately, the liberation they claim to have brought is without democracy. This supports Melber's (2003) observation that there exists liberation minus democracy in most African states in the post-colonial era. Sithole

(1991) notes that, later the revolution began to ‘eat its own children’. This was the mysterious death of the party’s key members who include Nkala and Nyagumbo (Shamuyarira 2014). Political constructs were created to distinguish a genuine patriot from a fake one, for example, patriots versus puppets, freedom fighters versus sell-outs (Sithole 1991, Shamuyarira 2014). The democratic aspirations and values that the liberation movements claimed to have fought for during the colonial period were not or are still to be realised fully in the post-colonial epoch. This shall be discussed later in the chapter.

The then Rhodesian colonial government used force and violence to keep itself in power. Oppressive acts such as the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act: 1960 (LOMA), forced labour and violation of human rights were features that kept the colonial government in power. This pattern of governance was inherited by the new independent government and later perfected post-1980. For instance, the government was intolerant of dissent and their method to thwart this was force or terrible violence (Ranger 2003). The then minister of Industry and international trade, Dr Nkosana Moyo in 2000, cited in Ranger (2003: 1) states that:

We were subjected to coercion by the British and then Ian Smith We told ourselves that this intolerance was not acceptable. In the space of a short 20 years why do we find ourselves with so much violence in a system meant to have removed coercive violence?

I argue that such events signalled the erosion of humanism within the society. The values of civil tolerance were absent in these political cultures (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). Melber (2003: 151) concurs with the view and argues that:

There are many instances in which post-colonial policies lack a commitment to democratic principles or practices. Liberation movements in power tend to deviate in their policies, from implementing originally declared aims and goals in terms of both democratic convictions and even much needed policy initiatives, towards socio-economic transformation of societies with the aim of reducing inherited imbalances in distribution of wealth.

Intolerance and this lack of commitment therefore became or is still a feature of Zimbabwe’s political climate which necessitates calls for genuine peacebuilding efforts. An understanding of authoritarianism and lack of tolerance cannot be complete without unpacking attempts of consolidation of power by the state in the post-independence era.

3.4 Zimbabwe’s Political Terrain since Independence

Liberation movements, which later became liberators or post-independence ruling parties, had adopted a Fanonian style of violence as an antidote to colonialism but failed to refrain from the violence soon after the new nations were born. Post-independence authoritarianism was a product of liberation wars when disagreement could mean death (Ranger 2003). Raftopoulos (1999) in Sachikonye (2012: 7) concurs that “there exists a strong culture of authoritarianism in nationalist and liberation movements.” In other words, the post-colonial environment has been characterised by a situation in which Melber (2003: 150) describes as “victims turned liberators often turned into perpetrators.” Others argue that the

prevailing tyranny or authoritarian rule was a product of power struggles in post-colonial Zimbabwe (Coltart 2016, Bratton 2015). Yet Frantz Fanon in the *Wretched of the Earth* (1963) argues that violence was supposed to be done during colonialism and after its defeat people had to abandon it. Fanon's ideas did not come to pass as the benefits outweighed the cost in the eyes of ruling parties. Such mentality continues to influence the ruling party and has unfortunately become a political culture. In terms of this study, it was designed to map ways of enhancing non-violent approaches embedded in IKS or the local grain⁵ that CSOs can embrace for them to build durable peace effectively.

Independence in Zimbabwe was achieved after a protracted liberation struggle prompted not only by the denial of even basic rights to most of the population, but also on extremely inequitable distribution of economic resources (Munhande and Nciizah 2013). The need to redress these injustices was therefore used by the liberation movements in the country as a rallying point for the masses against the minority white regime (ibid). According to Chiware (2008), the achievement of independence by Zimbabwe was welcomed by the black majority who had suffered from oppression under the Smith regime. From 1980 until the late 1990s, Zimbabwe's history of political transformation was characterised by a continual process of concentrating more and more power in the presidency and the politburo of the ZANU PF party (Munhande and Nciizah 2013). The supporters of the struggle and the ruling party developed a culture of unquestioning support of the establishment (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). This culture falls short in democratically established society where freedom of discussion and constructive criticism should be the cornerstones of participation in politics.

The breakdown from colonial rule to genuine independence was a case of failed transition or the new country started on a faulty path. It appeared power had just been transferred from an authoritarian white minority to another authoritarian black minority (Munhande and Nciizah 2013). Many injustices have occurred in Zimbabwe that many thoughts would end with the attainment of independence.

After independence, the state had a leadership whose legitimacy was derived from the legacy of the liberation struggle (Dansereau 2005). It was against this basis that development was based on a social programme which encompassed free education and health care services. When the government assumed power, it had promised to redress all the colonial injustices and have the land question solved. However, this was not to be as the Lancaster House agreement slowed land redistribution. The inequalities between the black majority and the white minority remained (Bond 1998). At this point in time, the new repressive government's reactions to opposition criticism were not important to research and debate (Laakso 2003).

The political economy of Rhodesia was not only evident in the preservation of colonial property relations but also in the intervening role the post independent government of Zimbabwe continued to play in the economy (Munhande and Nciizah 2013). Sachikonye (1995) attests to this view adding that

⁵ IKS and the term "local grain" are discussed later in this thesis.

the first five years of independence were characterised by the state's dominant intervention in labour relations. Trade unions were politicised and subordinated to the party. This was done without assessing the effects of such patronisation on the civil and individual rights. Mugabe's government was showered with accolades for its reconciliatory politics. The ruling party's actions were not questioned (Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopoulos 2000) as most of the country's influential civil organisations approved ZANU PF's socialist development discourse as well as its message of national unity. Such approval of CSOs then started to dilute the independent status of civil movements. The result was that CSOs began to label themselves as either an appendage of the ruling party or as puppets of the British - (Moyo and Murisa 2008: 69) that is, those that were sympathetic to opposition movements.

The newly elected ZANU PF government did not only inherit the political economy of the Rhodesian government. The economic system was built on capitalism that is matched with exploitation of labour and maximisation of profits. The whites who remained in the country at independence continued to live a colonial lifestyle (Herbst 1990: 222). By and large, the white minority continued to have a foot in running the economy of the newly independent state.

The black government also inherited the colonial government's repressive machinery (Onslow 2011, Coltart 2016). The PF ZAPU and ZANU government in 1980 had the monopoly over the use of force, the defence forces as well as the legislative arm of the state. This meant that the government inherited a well-functioning Central Intelligence as well its surveillance and the Zimbabwe Republic Police was reconstituted from the British South African Police. Therefore, ZANU PF could systematically use disproportionate force to crush opposition or dissent (Laakso 2003) just as the colonial state had done. The above discussion demonstrates that the new black majority government was a mirror of the white minority governance system. While independence brought an end to war, negative peace was achieved but attaining positive peace is yet to be realised under the current system.

The ZANU PF government also mirrored the colonial state's political culture in many other aspects. For example, in the 1980s, there was a systematic failure to democratise the traditional cores of power within the rural areas (Onslow 2011). The village chiefs and headman who were alleged to be aligned to opposition politics were thrown out and replaced with ZANU PF loyalists. Mamdani (1996) lambasted this as a continuation of the authoritarian bifurcated state. The replacement of non-ZANU PF officials with its members created a grassroots network for the party. CSOs were not spared from such tags as "sell-outs" when they criticised the government.

The nature of politics, and the ruling party as well, had a bearing on the formation and operations of CSOs in Zimbabwe. Such efforts became blockages to democratic transition in Zimbabwe. Ranger (2003) argues that the cult of personality, the degree of autonomy of civil movements that include women's clubs as well as trade unions was shaped by the state. It was a situation where either civil movement were co-opted or tolerated by the state or those that were not in line received unfavourable treatment. Such developments occurred and were more pronounced during the one-party wave in the

late 1980s to early 1990s and have continued to feature in the 21st century in Zimbabwe. The continuation of the system is shown in that while there are other political parties, the political system is a one-party dominant state. This feature spilled into a party-state scenario where ZANU PF enjoys monopoly over governance even with the presence of opposition forces and parties. The next section presents attempts made by ZANU to unite in the name of reconciliation with PF ZAPU in the late 1980s.

3.5 Unity on Paper

In the first decade (1980-1990) the regime was in the nation-building gear. Nationalism meant or was interpreted as unity at all costs, the subordination of trade union, churches and other African organisations to its objectives. Nationalism led to the rise of intolerance and a rise to a post-colonial cult of personality (Mhone 1992). However, unity under the one-party state had a narrow political party focus (Sachikonye 2012). The implications of one-party wave were that it led to political complacency, unchecked corruption and government by police (Sithole 1991:77). Sachikonye (2012:12) further refers to Mugabe saying that “there would never be permanent peace, development, democracy and social justice in Zimbabwe for as long as there existed two political parties based upon regional or tribal consideration.” This call has remained a practice as ZANU PF has never tolerated any opposition political party to stand in its way, apart from the 2009-2013 inclusive government which shall be discussed later in this chapter. The one-party efforts created a party-state affair. Masunungure (2004: 149) notes that under this there is a thin line in the relationship between the ruling party and state institutions/organs of the state. For example, Nkomo (2001) argues that cabinet ministers during the first decade regarded their party’s central committee as more important than the cabinet or parliament itself; this belief is one that cabinet ministers still hold and practice up to the time of this writing. While one-party state did not come into force, Zimbabwe has been a one- dominant party state where ZANU PF has remained in power up to the time of this writing. Effectively, any opposing voice has often been suppressed in ways that destroy the fabric of a peaceful society.

National unity has been drawn by the elite for political purposes only and has not emanated from, nor has it cascaded to the grassroots or civil society formations. Sachikonye (2012:13), quoting Mugabe (1989) says that “National unity under ZANU PF discourages the formation of opposition parties by exposing their bankruptcy in political and ideological direction” The unity of two main parties ZANU and PF ZAPU in 1987 was not representative of everyone in the country. It restricted rather than broadened democracy (Moyo 1991). The same approach was adopted in 2008 when ZANU PF went into a marriage with the MDC formations, where a Global Political Agreement (GPA) was pencilled by the political elite. However, in the 1990s democracy was interpreted as unity, peace and development (ibid: 88). Resultantly, opposition forces and their leaders have been branded as empty shells that have nothing to contribute to the well-being of the state or society. Yet, diversity can be a source of strength in the construction of a nation and a state (Sachikonye 2012:13). Suppression of diversity marks the beginning of authoritarianism or authoritarian rule (Sachikonye 2012, Bratton 2015). Suppression has

been one of the instruments used by the ruling party to crush opposition voices within the party and outside. The above shows a decay of political tolerance which forms a breeding ground for conflict. This study sought to find ways through which CSOs can be strengthened in promoting diversity and tolerance within the society to attain durable peace.

To some critics, the unity accord led to the conferring of benefits to the political elites of PF ZAPU but not reaching to the common Ndebele people on the ground (Sachikonye 2012:19). Evidence has shown uneven development or inequitable distribution of the national cake. These inequalities have led to continued disharmony between the Ndebele and Shona, buttressed by the unhealed wounds of *Gukurahundi* atrocities. The *Gukurahundi* was launched in 1983 by Mugabe's military wing called fifth brigade with the intention of eliminating dissidents who resided in the Matabeleland and parts of Midlands provinces in Zimbabwe (Cameroon 2017: 1) The victims of the conflict have not been compensated - for example, widows and children have not received any assistance (Sachikonye 2012: 19). Likewise, victims of the 2000 land reform and electoral violence in Zimbabwe have not yet been assisted or compensated, leaving scars on people that need to be healed to realise positive peace.

Despite the above painful realities, the ruling party has managed to find its way out through reconciliatory messages that have not been acted upon. The use of reconciliatory politics by Mugabe has allowed the ZANU PF leadership to swallow important sections of Zimbabwe's civil society organisations as well as business and trade unions under the government's umbrella (Raftopoulos 2001). Apart from that, reconciliation has appeared to be a political game in Zimbabwe. Reconciliation with whites in the first decade was termed as reconciliation of interests and not of attitudes (Sachikonye 2012:11). The faults of the policy have been witnessed for example in the violent land reforms in 2000 and continued antagonism between the ruling elite in ZANU PF and sections of the white community from the West in the post-2000 period.

Another feature that dominates is the top-down approach to governance which continues to foster negative peace. In the first decade, there were signs of development in areas of health, education and regular elections being held for parliament and presidency. Development was authored and interpreted from above. The government became commandist; later, aims of bringing democratic centralism and one-party state were implemented.

The elitist approach to governance has led to a series of conflicts that CSOs have tried to address through multipronged means. Further, the conflicts in Zimbabwe and subsequent political and economic woes lie, I argue, in the elitist approach of governance. Painful economic policies such as Structural Adjustment Programme in 1991 (SAPs) have been drawn by the elites without the input of the grassroots or other key stakeholders. The SAPs initiatives were from the IMF/World Bank, implemented by the government to open or liberalise its economy and attract foreign direct investments that would lead to economic development (Laakso 2003: 9). While the ideas were noble, sections of labour unions, business and consumer associations were against the policy since they were not involved

in the design (Sachikonye 2012:17). The exclusion resulted in drastic implementation of SAPs by the government leading to rapid deterioration in living standards of the rural and urban people, high unemployment and an increase in crime (Laakso 2003: 9). In other words, the implementation of SAPs are clear signs of exclusiveness in governance which have been the root cause of multipronged conflicts in Zimbabwe.

As noted in the preceding discussions, the study was designed to find ways through which CSOs can fill in the gap in order to realise positive outcomes and to avoid other pitfalls that had led to the CSOs not to achieve all their goals.

3.6 Operation *Murambatsvina* or Clean-Up Campaign

The way the government was conducting state affairs and managing opposition forces further sowed seeds of frustration against the state. With the rise of opposition voices was also the rise of the alertness and reactions by the state to these developments. Around the year 2000 onwards, the ruling party devised a series of campaigns to dilute and wipe out the constituencies that had been infiltrated by opposition forces. A clean-up campaign was launched under the guise of bringing order and sanity in urban high-density suburbs, however, it was politically calculated. The operation, called *Murambatsvina* (clean up or clear the filth), began on the 25th of May 2005 (Bratton and Masunungure 2007, Eppel 2013) with the government declaring that its purpose was to rid the urban settlements of illegal structures as well criminal elements with society. It was a reaction by the state which had run out of options for governing. The operation witnessed the unplanned destruction of poor urban dwellings, livelihoods and confiscation of informal traders' wares (Action Aid 2005). The operation started in Harare but was quickly extended to all urban centres (International Crisis Group 2005). However, because the crisis followed the flawed 31 March 2005 elections, this demonstrated that it was a political move initiated by the ZANU PF government (International Crisis Group 2005; Bratton and Masunungure 2007). There are indications that the ZANU PF party sought to destabilize the opposition MDC's urban support base to suppress dissatisfaction in heavily populated urban centres, similar to what had happened in other popular revolutions in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia (International Crisis Group 2005). Indeed, shortly before the operation began, the then Minister of State Security, Didymus Mutasa, had warned of the risk of urban uprising due to the increased hardship the urban dwellers were facing (ibid). On the 11th of May there were such skirmishes in Mabvuku, when armed police beat protestors who were demonstrating for three days without water. The operation left more than 700 000 people without a livelihood (Tibaijuka 2005). The exercise was condemned internationally as well, as it was inhumane and led to unnecessary human suffering. Like any other campaign in the name of order or state security, the victims of the operation have not been fully taken care of despite the launch of Operation "*Garikai*" in 2008 (loosely translated means operation live well) by the government where new houses were built for the victims (Benyera 2015: 6527). The efforts were made to save embarrassment of the government in the wake of wide condemnation from the international

community. The government had destroyed people's property without having any proper alternative for them. In addition, no notices were given to the people before the Operation was rolled out.

3.7 Diamond Conflicts and the Reactions of the State

Diamonds and diamond mining were not popular in Zimbabwe until the year 2006 when the local people in Marange discovered the precious mineral. Prior to its discovery, the government had granted De Beers a prospecting order (The Zimbabwe Independent, 3 October 2006). However, the discovery of diamonds by locals came at a time when the economy was on its knees; this triggered a diamond rush by anyone who wanted to survive the hardships. Local people began to pan and sell the diamonds through informal systems or to buyers who were in the area (Ntlhakana 2014). Of importance to note is that the government devised methods to restore order in the diamond mining area. Having realised the loss and how the diamond proceeds could be used towards economic growth, the government launched operations that were dubbed *Chikorokoza chapera* in 2006 (no illegal panning) and operation *wakazviwanepi* (how did you acquire your property) (IDMC 2008: 39, Spiegel 2015: 549). These operations brought the attention of human rights groups within and outside the country as the government responded with heavy handedness to the panners using police and the army to drive them out (Eppel 2013: 232). The launching of operation *hakudzokwi* (area of no return) in October 2008 culminated in unprecedented killings (Saunders 2010). The deployment of three Zimbabwe National Army brigades immediately saw extreme violence against anyone in Chiadzwa. This meant that the local inhabitants of Chiadzwa had to be relocated. The relocation brought with it a plethora of challenges (Chimonyo et al. 2013). These included loss of livelihood, food security and inadequate pastures as well as disruption of health and education services. Again, the excessive use of force by the state has left wounds on people who were already suffering from the economic crisis. These bad memories have contributed to negative peace that requires the attention of CSOs and other stakeholders in peacebuilding efforts.

3.8 Electoral Violence

The exclusiveness of the government attempted one-party State and a failed unity resulted in insulation of electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism became a feature from the post 2000 period after the birth of MDC. Feltoe (2004: 195) argues that democratic space has been limited by several political factors in Zimbabwe. Schedler (2006) defines electoral authoritarianism as a situation where elections are broadly inclusive as well as minimally pluralistic, minimally competitive and minimally open. Elements found in electoral authoritarianism include violence and an "uneven playing field" which came in the form of closed media access and arbitrary arrests. Opposition political parties can occupy the peripheral zones which are of less significance to the ruling party. The elections after 2000 have been termed elections without a choice (Masunungure and Shumba 2012) as the electorates were instilled with fear from many forms of intimidation. In other words, the elections had become militarised (Masunungure 2012). The state security institutions and officers were now conducting various

operations targeting opposition groups and critical CSOs. The role of CSOs during this period has been in exposing human rights abuses that were committed by State institutions. Unfortunately, CSOs have not been active on assisting victims of the conflicts and this can be explained, for instance, by lack of funding. Feltoe (2004) notes that in the absence of democracy CSOs cannot flourish. The deficiency of democracy in the country has been witnessed through several electoral operations.

Operation *Makavhoterapapi*, loosely translated as ‘who did you vote for’, was set up to instil fear in the electorate, persuading them to vote for ZANU PF in the 2008 elections (Benyera 2015). The countrywide terror campaign was directed mainly against rural people suspected of having voted for the MDC in the March 2008 harmonised elections prior to the June 27 presidential run-off election (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum political violence report 2008). It was the first time since independence that ZANU PF had lost the parliamentary majority and that President Mugabe had lost an election (ibid). Tsvangirai had 47.9%, Mugabe 43.2%, Makoni 8.3% and Toungana came fourth with 0.6% of the votes (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2008). The parliamentary votes were all released within four days of the election, but it took nearly five weeks for the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to release the presidential race results raising speculation of rigging.

The operation was therefore initiated to ensure that in the run-off presidential election, people would be frustrated to vote for the opposition and ZANU PF would thus win this election, which is what eventually happened. MDC supporters were persecuted and those from ZANU PF accused of voting for the opposition were also assaulted. Most of the beatings were administered in front of the victims’ families as well as at the established community bases that were set up to terrorize non-ZANU PF members (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum political violence report 2008). People were forced to attend rallies and were also forced to sleep at these bases. It was made clear that the victims were being violated for voting incorrectly and they were forced to sing ZANU PF revolutionary songs as well as chanting its slogans. Failure to do so resulted in further torture (ibid). Opposition leaders and agents were also tortured in front of their communities to instil fear (Hickman 2011). The terror campaign was systematically planned, targeted and widespread. A substantial number of senior army officials were the main organisers with the war veterans and the youth militia elements being used as the main instruments of terror (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2008). Many of the victims had their homes ransacked, food reserves and livestock looted and destroyed.

It can also be noted that security institutions were becoming a threat to human security and yet they are supposed to be protecting people. The “securocrats” had become partisan with their support of President Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF before, during and after the 2000 and 2008 elections (Masunungure and Shumba 2012, Hove 2013). The forces were determined to protect the core of political power which is the presidential post. This was evidenced in the 2008 June 27 presidential run-off where there was state sponsored violence that later led to opposition political party leader Tsvangirai boycotting the elections. The violence led to peace talks that gave birth to a political pact known as the Global Political

Agreement (GPA); unfortunately, the talks were exclusive to mainly political parties (Matyszak 2009). For example, CSOs were not given room to make an input. The elitist peace settlement resulted in negative peace and continued resurgence of violence as evidenced by the post-GPA settlement where violence also erupted during consultations of a new constitution (Masunungure and Shumba 2012). The situation in Zimbabwe is evident as posited by Bratton (1998: 52), and in Masunungure et al. (2012), that elections can be held without democracy, but one cannot attain democracy without elections. These were signs that the rule of law had been under attack Feltoe (2004: 194), however, it is one of the essential elements that create a peaceful environment. The way elections have been conducted in the past has left unhealed wounds and unforgettable scars in the electorate which then calls for rebuilding broken relationships by the people themselves and civil societies which are in close contact with the victims.

It can be noted that several conflicts that have prevailed in the country are by and large explained in structural terms. It is from this that efforts to solve the problems should be grounded in structural reforms. Yet the structural measures continue to put the people in the negative peace mode. There have been little efforts that have been initiated to address the conflicts using IKS.

3.9 Conclusion

The chapter surveyed Zimbabwe's post-colonial trajectory. Prior to independence, the black majority was oppressed by the white minority in political, economic and social facets of life. This was through repressive and discriminatory policies that were enacted by the white colonial government. The laws were sustained by a systematic and continued use of structural violence. The effects have not been thoroughly addressed through genuine reconciliatory processes. In the first two decades after 1980 when the country gained independence, the government, political parties and other institutions followed the path or shadows of the former white colonial system. Zimbabwe still mirrors the past and colonial repressive traditions. In the 21st century it can be noted that the colonial grip is slowly eroding with the presence of critical opposition forces. The transition from an elite, commandist or one-party dominant state to an inclusive, democratic and multiparty system requires the partnership of a strong CSOs formation which can effectively address the root causes of the past and prevailing conflicts in the state. Sustainable peace in Zimbabwe remains a dream if reforms are not addressed and if a culture of intolerance and violence remains. Many of the problems in the country revolve around political and economic problems that can be resolved through establishing positive peace when CSOs actively engage the local people using their local knowledge in pursuit of this goal. To this end, an assessment of the instabilities and crises that unfolded was pertinent in that it laid the basis for CSOs' peacebuilding intervention in Zimbabwe. Further, such events have shaped the peacebuilding models that CSOs have pursued. The context describes the desired peace that CSOs have attempted to produce in Zimbabwe. Conflict mapping enabled me and the action team to come up with a way of training community-based CSOs on a peacebuilding approach that is based on IKS or local grain and political intelligence. The

mapping necessitated a design for a model that can strengthen community-based CSOs' peacebuilding efforts in Zimbabwe. The next chapter examines the development and reactions of CSOs in Zimbabwe to the conflicts.

CHAPTER 4: THE DEVELOPMENT AND ROLES OF CSOS IN PEACEBUILDING IN ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter tracks the development and roles of CSOs in Zimbabwe. The activities of CSOs can be traced back to the colonial era. In the post-colonial era, the first two decades after 1980, CSOs' roles have not been directly anchored in peacebuilding activities such as rebuilding relationships. Their goals were rather more inclined to structural issues that included democracy, good governance, human rights and constitutional reform. These goals of peacebuilding can be tied to the political, social and economic peacebuilding dimensions elaborated by Peinado (2003) (see Chapter 5). However, with political violence which was manifest in the form of pre- and post-election clashes from 2000 up to the time of writing, CSOs began to focus more on peacebuilding activities that involved national healing and reconciliation.

CSOs' roles came in the form of monitoring, protection, advocacy and in-group socialisation. Late in the 2009 period, the activities of CSOs focused on weaving a culture of peace by advocating for tolerance and peaceful co-existence. Despite these efforts, there has been continued resurgence of conflict in Zimbabwe. This chapter addresses the following questions: what necessitated the growth of CSOs? What roles and activities have they played that are in line with peacebuilding? What models of peacebuilding have CSOs utilised and how effective have they been in bringing positive change in the country? What are the challenges that CSOs have encountered in delivering their mandate?

4.2 Composition of CSOs in Zimbabwe

CSOs come in different types or categories. Sachikonye (2012:133) groups them as developmental, humanitarian and governance related. DESSE (2012) notes that the types of CSOs range from religious community-based, philanthropic, expert groups or trade unions, hybrid business and government oriented. The composition of CSOs in Zimbabwe ranges from labour groups, student, women and men's groups, faith-based and other forms of associations (Masunungure 2011). The groupings have championed different issues around the following critical matters: democratisation, monitoring human rights, constitutional reforms and governance. CSOs have been more vocal and growing quantitatively in comparison to formal opposition movements (Moyo and Murisa 2008: 69). It can be noted that the topical questions that were dominant in the colonial era continued to feature in the post-colonial period - CSOs during this era were fighting for opening the democratic space and defending human rights abuses for the oppressed black majority. Other constellations of civics that are found in Zimbabwe include media, resident organisations, civic education and professional bodies (Zimbabwe Institute report 2008). CSOs are not a homogeneous society. They come, rather, in the form of grass-root based

societies, church and labour. The forms which CSOs assume shape their mandate in influencing or bringing change within the society.

CSOs in Zimbabwe have also been found in different generations. For example, there is the first generation (1G) that focused on developmental issues and social welfare; the second generation (2G) that focused on governance and constitutional reforms; and the third generation (3G) which has been termed crisis-oriented formations (Masunungure 2014). The generations in which CSOs have come can be explained by the events that occurred in Zimbabwe's past decades. Different organisations have been formed to deal with several multifaceted issues that the state has faced.

4.3 The Development of CSOs during the Colonial Epoch

CSOs emerge in response to problems that are occurring within a state. How CSOs are going to operate and effect desired positive changes depends on the condition of the problems. The condition of the problem shapes the mandate of CSOs. Arguments have been generated on whether the concept of civil society is applicable to African social formations (Spurk 2010). This stems from various interpretations of civil society where the concept has been defined in the Western context and applied in African environments. Other scholars argue that voluntary traditional institutions can be equated to civil society (Spurk 2010), for example, social or women's clubs that worked on promoting women's issues or developmental projects. The Western version falls short in that it often restricts civil society to formal and organised groups yet civil society can also be identified as informal or loosely organised groups (without proper structures). The traditional institutions of civil society can be found in the later explanation of civil society that was present in the colonial period.

During the colonial era, the role of civil society was seen in the people's movements which fought for political independence. These were faith-based groups and other organisations then (Moyo 2013). As a result of the colonial ills, there were also reform minded organisations which were formed. These included Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association, National Home Movement and Southern Rhodesian Native Welfare (Raftopoulos 2000). Apart from the urban based groups, there were peasant associational groups which were work parties, farmers' groups, church groups, sect groups, traditional spirit possession association (Ranger 1992 in Raftopoulos 2000: 27). Some of the features from the rural based associations were borrowed by the so-called urban societies (ibid). In the 1960s and 1970s, church organisations were established to respond to the racist policies, for example, the Christian Council (Raftopoulos 2000). It can be noted that though CSOs were not fully developed elements of their existence was present in colonial times.

Efforts toward building peace were visible through fighting against unjust racist policies that were enacted by the white settler government. The activities that they performed included supporting detainees and their families during the struggle (ibid). Civil society in the 1970s and early 1980s reflected a force against military dictatorships (Edwards and Foley 1998 in Masunungure 2008).

Consequently, CSOs contributed to the dismantling of the colonial and other oppressive forces (Moyo 2013). Such support showcases elements of peacebuilding which were fighting for human rights and democratic reforms with the belief that when implemented or practiced, could lead to peaceful societies. One organisation which performed a visible peacebuilding role was the CCJPZ which monitored the state of human rights. In 1972, the CCJPZ was involved in documenting human rights atrocities committed by the Rhodesian security force (Rich, cited in Raftopoulos 2000: 27). To this end, it can be observed that post-independence civil society drew much from the pre-independence experiences and activities (Raftopoulos 2000). Civil society's growth was reactionary to the colonial ills, and this is also evident in the post-colonial atrocities that have been committed by the state. However, CSOs were weakened by the oppressive structural systems of the successive governments.

The CSOs remained at the infancy stage or from another perspective, had a malnourished growth. The coming of colonisation and the oppression associated with it crushed the progress and spread of civil society - when it developed, it did so in a malnourished state (Masunungure 2008). Scholars argue that traditional institutions that existed had little scope for civil society as the associations that were present were not immune from state control (Taylor 1990 in Masunungure 2008: 59). Accordingly, the associations did not possess the independent status that CSOs are supposed to show though they cannot be purely independent in their formation or organisation. Another view is that though traditional associations were present, African systems did not have room for civil society that focused on participatory governance (Spurk 2010). The British and Rhodesian Front's colonial policies and its attempt to monopolise power, resulted in an undeveloped civil society in Rhodesia as there was no political activity which was essential for CSOs' survival (Moyo 1993). The policies in the colonial era criminalised politics among Africans and the colonial mode sought to restrict blacks to the realm of tribal existence and not define themselves along national identities. This is buttressed by the nature of the colonial state which designated urban power to resembling the language of civil society and civil rights, whilst rural power was to be limited to community and enforcing tradition (Mamdani 1996 in Raftopoulos 2000). The force and visibility of CSOs is seen and more effective where there is a democratic political system (Masunungure 2014). In the colonial system, there was not much democracy outside the white community itself, resulting in an unfavourable environment for CSOs' growth. The activities of CSOs were geared toward structural reform which could lead to a peaceful co-existence within the State. Such an approach has been carried over in the post-independence environment as shall be discussed later. In short, the above factors weakened the growth of CSOs in the pre-independence era though others argue that CSOs were absent during this period. Those that were present had limited understanding on governance-related issues which to some extent negatively impacted on their visibility and effective operations. The study audits the activities of CSOs then and now, then draws a strategy that can build on the activities of CSOs for them to be effective in bringing change or transforming negative peace into positive peace in Zimbabwe.

4.4 Post-Colonial Episode and the Character of CSOs

The formation and objectives of CSOs in the post-colonial era can be condensed into different phases of human rights deterioration: Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPs), democratic reforms, economic ills, land reform, constitutional reforms, election reforms and election violence, then finally reconciliation and transitional justice. Some of the approaches of CSOs were or are based on liberal and sustainable peacebuilding as elaborated in Chapter 5. Often, it can be noticed that CSOs have followed the liberal approach due to the rise of liberalism in the late 1990s which was also coupled by increased donor interests in civil society as a viable alternative (Paffenholz 2010) to the challenges that were being faced all over the world.

The next section summarises the nature and effects of conflicts that prevailed in Zimbabwe after 1980 and how this necessitated the growth of CSOs in peacebuilding. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the conflicts post-1980 and the response of CSOs.

Table 4.1: Summary of conflicts and CSOs' response

Nature of conflicts	Effects	Nature of response
Political violence	Internally displaced persons	Reintegration of displaced persons
<i>Gukurahundi</i>	Trauma, inter-tribal tensions	Counseling of political leaders, peacebuilding
Security sector abuses	Loss of livelihoods	Systemic counseling
<i>Murambatsvina</i>	Loss of homes and shelter	
Events around land reform	Dehumanising acts and loss of dignity	Mediation
Economic meltdown	Insecurity	Emergency relief
Gender-based violence		Civic education
Chiadzwa diamonds		

Source: (National Association of non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO) 2012)

While the above table does not give a full menu of the conflicts that occurred in Zimbabwe, it helps in bringing out intervention measures CSOs can or, in some cases, have rolled out in rebuilding the political, economic, social and cultural climate that could lead to peaceful societies. The study unpacks faults in CSOs peacebuilding activities in response to these conflicts and plot measures that can result in sound intervention strategies. Apart from unbundling the deficiencies, I assessed the strengths or successes of CSOs. A detailed discussion of the conflicts and reaction of CSOs ensues in the following sections.

4.5 First Decade: Nation-Building and One-Party State System

From independence (1980), Zimbabwe was guided by a reconciliation policy which was supposedly to build durable peace, equality, peaceful co-existence between race and groups (Zhou and Zvoushe 2012): one view that has been put forward against the policy has been that it was crafted by the elites thereby side-lining the masses. Augmenting this line of thought is that the Lancaster House Agreement 1979 omitted elements of transitional justice and national healing as the pact was doctored under international pressure thereby relegating women and children born from the war out of the equation of post-State conflict mechanism (Church and Civil Society Forum 2012). The 1979 agreement was an internal settlement which ended the liberation war in Zimbabwe, it did not spell out truth and justice which are essential in achieving genuine reconciliation (Benyera 2015, Munemo 2016). Effectively, this resulted in reconciliation efforts and processes not being synchronised with the realities on the ground. The result was that reconciliation was not accompanied by bringing the perpetrators of the past violence committed during the war to book. Reconciliation in post-colonial era was rather based on reintegrating the Rhodesian Front, ZIPRA and ZANLA forces and creating an inclusive government (ibid). The post-colonial period was thus marked by a false start on reconciliation as it excluded the masses and civil societies that could have been present. The end of the liberation war and the arrival of reconciliation language drafted and driven by elites resulted in negative peace. Failure to address or tackle reconciliation by all peace stakeholders has led to conflict recurrence. I therefore sought to find ways in which CSOs, when included in future peace settlement processes, can effectively contribute to bringing durable peace to the State.

In the early 1980s, peacebuilding was largely elitist and focused on creating stability and strengthening state institutions framed around the principle of forgetting past wrongs under the banner of nation building and unity (Ncube 2014). This wave was supported uncritically by CSOs at that time (Dorman 2001, in Ncube 2014). One reason could be that CSOs were in a celebratory mood of the recently attained independence. The relations that existed between the state and CSOs were cordial, those groups that had directly or indirectly supported the struggle (Moyo 2013). In the first ten years, there was very little overt advocacy towards influencing state policy as CSOs were mostly committed to provision of health care and education in rural communities (Murisa 2010). One explanation is that CSOs lack technical competence on public policy (Masunungure 2008). Despite this, there were notable CSOs that existed which worked on human rights, governance, gender, anti-corruption, development and poverty reduction; unfortunately, these CSOs were subject to material and organisational constraints (Dorman 2001 in State of Civic in Zimbabwe 2008). In this respect, it can be observed that there were few CSOs that were visible in championing the reconciliation process by taking up the input from the grassroots levels. Thus, the study answers the question of how CSOs can be actively involved in championing public and non-public advocacy, based on realistic reconciliation efforts that can bring about positive change and, at the same time find alternatives to some of the challenges that they have faced.

The critical role and visibility of CSOs changed in the few years that ensued. In the late 1980s, the government faced pressure to democratise its functions from organisations such as the labour movements and student groups (Raftopoulos 2000). CSOs were playing the monitoring and protection functions in peacebuilding, though they were few. The CCJPZ and the Legal Resources Foundation documented human rights violations associated with the disturbances in Matabeleland (CCJPZ 1997, in Ncube 2014). Conversely, the state atrocities committed during this period led CSOs to taking a low profile and assuming a complementary function to the state (Raftopoulos 2000). This marked a reversal of the success of the reconciliation drive that was taken by the state (Zhou and Zvoushe 2010). Relations between existing civic groups began to degenerate following the CCJPZ report on the Matabeleland human rights violations (Sachikonye 2012). CSOs that were found in the governance, corruption or human rights ceased their operations or were forced to redefine their roles due to the one-party wave (The State of Civics in Zimbabwe 2008).

From the 1990s onwards, rifts between the two began to widen following the socio-economic stress that began to cripple the state as a result of one-party State and negative economic liberalisation policies. Thus CSOs-state partnership changed to protest and mistrust (Moyo 1993, Murisa 2010, Sachikonye 2012). This study unpacks strategic ways that CSOs can implement in the face of state repression rather than taking a low profile or ceasing their operations in peacebuilding. These actions are grounded in making use of IKS in bringing durable change.

The critical role exhibited during the first decade by the CCJPZ, for example, was, however, diluted by the one-party wave that was creeping into the State at that time. The result was that the few existing and emerging CSOs were either co-opted or substituted under the banner of democratic centralism (Saki and Katema 2011). Democratic centralism was geared to ensuring discipline within the ruling party which then gave authority to the ruler to make decisions alone (Mutiso and Rohio 1975). Associations which refused to be absorbed into the one-party umbrella were regarded as sell-outs, bent on working with the enemy (Moyo 1993). Likewise, this was the case in other single party states in Africa which did not tolerate other centres of power besides the party or government (Chimanikire 2000). This was displayed in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where relations between the state and civil society became strained due to the one-party systems. The party responded by creating its own institutions or groups such as the National Youth Movement in Angola (Moyo 2013). The movement acted as a conduit in recruiting party members in the 1970s (ibid). Automatically, such developments rendered CSOs' peacebuilding efforts ineffective through harsh and soft responses or containment strategies displayed by the State. Civic movements that were accepted were those that adhered to the state's definition of development or those that provided services such as aid. Hakstad (2001: 156) notes that in the first decade some CSOs such as Manicaland Development Association (MDA) educated the people about laws in marriage, inheritance, roles of local authorities and traditional leaders. The issues raised and taught by this CSO was not much of a threat to the political power base of ZANU PF. Apart from this CSO, institutions that were close to the

ruling party enjoyed dominance in the public sphere (Chimanikire 2000, Moyo 2013). The relations became that of a hunter and the hunted (Moyo 2013), CSOs that were perceived or imagined to be on the wrong side of the ruling party. Critical CSOs were branded in what European Union Ambassador to Zimbabwe Aldo Dell' Arricia cited in Masunungure (2014) as Anti-Governmental Organisations (AGOs) or in other words CSOs had assumed the anti-state character (Masunungure 2008). CSOs that received such brandings include NCA and like-minded urban CSOs that were against the shrinkage of the democratic space caused by ZANU PF rule (Helliker 2012: 1). Despite the dilution of their critical voices, struggles arose and were fought by trade unions, students, human rights organisations and other groupings against the one-party agenda (Raftopoulos 2000). One observation is that CSOs' role in peacebuilding functions, protection and monitoring, was hammered as a result of the one-party agenda.

4.6 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and Democratisation Wave (1990s-2000)

The second decade saw the growth in numbers and activities of CSOs involved in peacebuilding related issues. Civil society was geared around democratisation and constitutional reform agendas through organisations such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (Ncube 2014). In states that were in the reform mode, CSOs were needed as cushions against the shocks that came with Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPs) to provide society with safety nets when public services were down and foster good governance. The widening inequalities became top on the priority list of opposition political parties and sections within the civil society (Mazingi and Kamidza 2011). During the ESAP epoch (1991-1995), CSOs mainly played the service delivery function which is sometimes linked to peacebuilding. CSOs started to fill the gap in service provision as the state had failed to take its role in poverty alleviation and improving access to basic needs (Raftopoulos 2000). The service rendered was not tailor-made to meet peacebuilding objectives but rather as humanitarian assistance. Yet, Paffenholz (2010) argues that the service delivery function becomes effective if it is in line with peacebuilding objectives as well as if it is used as an entry to perform the other peacebuilding functions by CSOs.

CSOs and NGOs failed to critique ESAP in a substantial way (Raftopoulos 2000:30). There was a policy advocacy gap as civil society moved to “where money was” or “sexiest areas”, that is, political and civil rights (Masunungure 2008) with an assumption that good governance would result in socio-economic development (Murisa 2010). The reason for CSOs and other actors not being involved in critiquing ESAP can be that CSOs acted as mere agents of delivering services in the interests of the founder and funders, and as such it resulted in their being “socially thin”. Observable attempts to pressure the government around ESAP were made by ZCTU to defend and promote the bread and butter issues of workers who, in this, had been affected the most. For example, ZCTU pressured for people-driven policies which necessitated the “1995 Beyond ESAP” blueprint which saw price control measures being implemented (Mazingi and Kamidza 2011). In addition, ZCTU organized a series of job stay-aways

together with other CSOs mobilising the people to fight against the ruling party's policies and programme (ibid). The influence of the labour movements and CSOs led to the formation of the MDC (Masunungure 2008, Mazingi and Kamidza 2011) which became the major opposition party from 1999 in Zimbabwe's history. CSOs then assumed the anti-state character on political and economic problems that were troubling the country. The anti-hegemonic goals of CSOs became clearer during this period (Zimbabwe Institute 2008 report).

As the state continued to face challenges, other CSOs began to mushroom, concentrating on democratic reforms. In 1997, the NCA was formally launched and was geared towards raising the level of consciousness in creating a new constitution or constitutional reform agenda (Raftopoulos 2000, Ncube 2014). The Lancaster House constitution was now a tattered document (Masunungure 2014) which had gone through several amendments and did not show the input of the majority. Amongst the activities of NCA was the holding of a series of meetings around the country (ibid) with various stakeholders to discuss issues that could be put into the new constitution. Apart from meetings, NCA also adopted informational and educational strategies through media outlets and in some cases, demonstrations were conducted (Raftopoulos 2000) to enhance its visibility. Thus, sharing of information or communication is a central feature of peacebuilding since information is power and the acquisition of it can lead to people making informed decisions. One action that NCA played was when it organised demonstrations for the release of journalists Mark Chavhunduka and Ray Choto for publishing a story on an alleged *coup* due to the grievances of the 1998 Congo war. In this case, NCA stood up for justice in response to arbitrary arrests that the state had made on journalists, which then acted as a restriction of freedom of expression. However, in the ensuing years the NCA became weak. One criticism has been that it was now bent on narrow political ambitions of unseating Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). However, from its inception it wanted to advance constitutional reform issues (Moyo 1999 in Raftopoulos 2000:41).

This study addressed some of these weaknesses and aimed to strengthen CSOs' activities in bringing sustainable change in both crisis times and post crisis periods in Zimbabwe. This is done by firstly strengthening community-based CSOs to work with IKS that are more likely to guarantee durable peace.

4.7 Post-2000 Epoch and CSOs in Peacebuilding Roles

The heightening economic woes from 2000 led to continued activities of CSOs in peacebuilding on multiple issues. The peacebuilding agenda involved mediating the power struggles between ZANU PF and the MDC formations and mediating and transforming conflict at grassroots level. However, CSOs were not included on the negotiating table (Masunungure 2011) in mediating the inter-party conflicts or conflict resolution. The exclusion can be linked to ZANU PF's suspicious of CSOs in that they were sympathetic to MDC and the Western cause; they were agents of regime change. Despite this, over fifty organisations have emerged in peacebuilding functions in this period (Ncube, 2014) that aimed at

addressing broken relationships and human rights abuses. Some of the organisations include CCJP, Bulawayo Agenda, Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum, Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme (ZPSP) and the Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation (CCMT) (ibid). The organisations were later charged with transitional justice and peace discussion (Ncube 2014). The thrust of the study was to find ways through action research on how community-based CSOs involved in reconciliation and conflict transformation can effectively play their functions in rebuilding fractured relationships and economy.

The deepening political and economic crises saw the rise of active faith-based groups responding to the ills that resulted in different forms of conflict. The Christian Alliance organized non-violent prayer meetings together with opposition political party leaders and other civil groups to respond to the 2007 crisis (Chitando 2011). While the meeting was violently cracked down by police, the event led to the growth of international pressure and the subsequent intervention by Southern African Development Community (SADC) to mediate the political impasse between ZANU PF and MDC formations. The intervention led to political stability following the formation of an inclusive government in 2009. One can also note that peaceful prayer meetings or gatherings are effective as a non-violent method in raising alarm or putting pressure on the state when it violates or ignores some of its major responsibilities. The limitation of the faith-based groups is that they often failed to draw a line for opposition political leaders or incumbent politicians to participate in their events. The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference wrote pastoral letters in 2009 where they asked the government to be accountable and respect human rights (Chitando 2011). The developments resulted in conflicts, as the failure of the government to be accountable led to poor economic management, whilst human rights abuses led to a violent political culture which destroyed relationships in the society. To this end, Zimbabwe has been far from experiencing positive peace but rather negative peace and its deterioration.

Economic collapse triggered the formation of CSOs (Spurk 2010) as different groups unite around and advocate for issues affecting a state. Consequently, the socio-economic and political deterioration that heightened from 2006-2008 saw CSOs responding through staging campaigns such as the “Zimbabwe We Want” 2006 and “Save Zimbabwe” 2007, leading to SADC intervention in Zimbabwe (Restore 2007, Chitando 2011, Masunungure 2011, Ncube 2014). For example, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) and Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) were calling for dialogue and an end to the political crisis in the “Zimbabwe we want scripts” (Chitando 2011). CSOs were actively raising their concern on the management of the economy by the state and their approach to peacebuilding was through economic recovery. Emphasis on dialogue lies well in the elements of respect which are present in humanism.

In the economic governance journey, notable developments also took place with regards to CSOs’ involvement. In 2006, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) held peaceful protests against poverty and high taxes (Sachikonye, 2011). The Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ)

embarked on “Save our education” campaign and pushed for teachers’ rights. The actions by labour or teacher groups was in response to the crisis that was hitting the education sector as there were school drop-outs that were becoming a source of potential instabilities in the country.

While the efforts can be applauded, there is need to find ways through which CSOs in Zimbabwe cannot just be reactive but proactive to crisis and move beyond advocating to mapping solutions on issues that might lead to peaceful societies. Such approaches have been achieved through the action research I conducted, as highlighted in Chapters 8 and 9.

The involvement of civic movements in election-related issues is to create a level playing field (Matyszak 2009). This aim feeds into peacebuilding in that free and fair elections lead to peaceful results since most election-related violence has been caused by perceived or actual election irregularities. Due to the involvement of CSOs on electoral issues, Zimbabwe entered a transition period from authoritarianism to a more tolerant and democratic political dispensation as was exhibited in the 29 March 2008 harmonised elections (Masunungure 2009). For example, the Media Monitoring Project in Zimbabwe (MMPZ) managed to press for a relative increase in airtime for political parties in pre-March 2008 election campaigns (Matyszak 2009a). In the 29 March 2008 elections, the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) had long and short-term election observers across the country. While regional observers were present and produced their reports at the end of the elections, ZESN’s report did not tally with some of the regional observers. For example, the South African observer team reported that the elections were free and fair due to the tranquillity that prevailed. The South African team later changed its position stating that the elections were credible after ZESN had reported other electoral and democratic deficiencies that occurred during the elections (ibid). While this study builds on the constructive roles that have been displayed by CSOs at election and post-election times, unfortunately, the turn of events reversed the efforts played by CSOs, in the presidential elections of 2008.

In 2008, the country witnessed serious election-related violence in the run up to the 27 June presidential polls. The elections are described as “a militarized campaign” (Masunungure 2011, Matyszak 2009) or “the days of Armageddon for the Zimbabwean people” (CCJPZ Manicaland report in Masunungure 2011). The situation between March 29 and June 27 was abnormal. For example, there was absence of a functioning CSOs (Ranger 2008, cited in Masunungure 2011). The situation was intense as it could be equated to the Hobbesian state of nature where life is short brutish and nasty (Masunungure 2011). There was heavy interference in human rights movements with their out-reach programme in rural areas being restricted (Ranger 2008 in Masunungure 2011). This was true in that for CSOs to be functional there must be an established democracy, yet during this time it was like the reign of terror where the military was on the driving seat in all governance issues or fronts. Paffenholz (2013) states that CSOs are effective where there is a functioning or mature democratic system. There were, however, a few CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) ZESN and CCJPZ that managed to capture the state’s undemocratic practices. Their reports noted the destruction of property, disappearances, detention of

opposition supporters, hate speech, denial of hand outs, beatings and arson (Matyszak 2009, ZESN, CCJP 2008 reports, Masunungure 2011). Following the negative effects of the violence there is still a gap between counselling the victims and perpetrator, which is what the CSOs should address for there to be positive peace.

4.8 Government of National Unity (GNU) Era

The GNU was a coalition of political parties that was formed out of the political and election impasse of the three widely known parties, namely ZANU PF, MDC-Tsvangirai and MDC-Mutambara (Kriger 2012, McGregor 2013, Raftopoulos 2013). The GPA set the legal framework for the parties and other stakeholders. However, while CSOs facilitated the birth of the GPA through advocacy and demonstrations that led to SADC intervention, they were not given a seat in the formal political agreement processes (Masunungure 2011). Despite their exclusion in the make up to the agreement, opportunities were created for CSOs' input in rebuilding the broken relations due to electoral violence that was witnessed in 2008.

The GPA reached by the three main political parties created opportunities for CSOs to be included in peace related dialogue. This was evident in Article 7(C) of the GPA which stated that “there was to be a consideration for the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion, and unity in respect of victims of pre- and post-independence conflicts” (GPA: 2009). The Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) was established (Eppel 2013). Unfortunately, the organisation was marred by many faults such as lack of a clear mandate. Another crack was failure to prosecute perpetrators of violence (Church and Civil Society Forum 2012). To this end peacebuilding through transitional justice had a narrow focus. The ONHR comprised stakeholders such as the CSOs, traditional leaders and the Church and their aim was to create a legitimate transitional process in dealing with past violence (ibid). There was a paradigm shift by the state through inclusion of CSOs on such matters which in the past was not be possible. I therefore sought to enhance CSOs that may be or are included in reconciliation efforts by the state or its related institutions so that they can balance the issues that trickle from the elites with those of the grassroots with which CSOs have close contact. It is also important to note some the challenges that CSOs have encountered in the process of trying to bring positive change in the country.

4.9 Challenges Faced by CSOs and Alternatives in Peacebuilding In Zimbabwe

As with any other CSOs operating in an authoritarian system, CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe have not been spared. It is fair to note that CSOs that encountered many structural hurdles from the state were those that were perceived to be agents of regime change or anti-state movements. The study unbundles these hurdles and navigates alternatives for CSOs to remain strong and effective in their quest to bring positive change or sustainable peace.

4.9.1 Financial Hiccups

The chief constraint of CSOs operations have been the lack of funding, however, funding is the life-blood of any institution. When funding was available, legislative barriers were placed in the path of CSOs that worked on hard or sensitive issues to the state, democracy and human rights. There was the 2004 Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) bill which sought to restrict external funding to NGOs or non-state actors engaged in democracy and human rights projects (Clark et al. 2011, Sachikonye 2012). Though the bill did not graduate into law, its shadow influenced CSOs as they went into a self-regulatory mode (Sachikonye 2012). The NGO bill was drawn to render CSOs that focused on the governance and human rights matters impotent (The State of Civics 2008 report).

CSOs in Zimbabwe are creatures of the international community which provides them with necessary material and funding (Masunungure 2011). The external challenges experienced in the international community have a bearing on the activities and operations of CSOs. One sixth of CSOs in developing countries has felt the negative spill over effects of the Global Financial Crisis yet the bulk part of their funds emanates from the European states that have been hit by the crisis (Clark 2011). In addition, CSOs' muscle and voice have been weakened by little internal accountability and transparency (Clark 2011, Masunungure 2011). The study sought to find ways through which CSOs can reduce their reliance on external funding and boost their internal financial transparency which in some cases have crippled their operations in peacebuilding. The problem of funding also spills over to a dilemma in agenda setting by CSOs.

4.9.2 The Dilemma of Agenda Setting

Lack of or the availability of funding has a bearing on agenda setting by CSOs. Questions and suspicions have simmered over who sets the agenda which CSOs purport to advocate in politics and governance or peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. The question raised is whether CSOs are independent in spelling out the different agendas they pursue. This arises from the adage that one who pays the piper calls the tune. CSOs that receive funding from the Western states and donor communities are at risk of propagating misplaced agendas for locals. Zimbabwe's CSOs have not really been anchored to its domestic constituencies (Masunungure 2011). CSOs have agitated for autonomy *vis à vis* the state but failed to enjoy such autonomy with the international donors and partners (Masunungure 2008:64). As a result of their financial dependence Zimbabwean CSOs swallowed the international donor agenda hook line and sinker (ibid).

One explanation is that lack of finances organically creates a dependence syndrome which therefore reduces the independence of CSOs (Clark 2011). External dependence has resulted in donor-driven projects (Ncube 2010, Murisa 2010). Dosch (2012) argues that, there exists a correlation between CSOs-donor relations and question of legitimacy or ownership/steering of projects (Dosch 2012). Where CSOs have tried to put forward home-brewed agendas, they have not been taken seriously by

the government as they are viewed as external products or pursuing a northern agenda (Mhlanga 1999:9 in Masunungure 2008:64). In this study I addressed the question: how can CSOs balance donor influence and setting of local agendas in peacebuilding efforts in Zimbabwe to counter this challenge?

4.9.3 Romanticising with Political Players or Parties

CSOs' independence has been tainted by the fact that they went to bed with political parties (Masunungure 2011). They had direct or indirect links with political parties - in other words, they romanticised with political gladiators and failed to criticise intra-party democracy in the opposition political parties (ibid). There was a natural link between CSOs and MDC as some of the leadership emerged from these civic formations. The state could not separate MDC and CSOs tackling hard issues such as democracy and human rights. At one point, Lovemore Madhuku, leader of NCA, encouraged his membership within the organisation to vote for the MDC in the elections of 2000 (Matyszak 2009). The NCA no longer demonstrated its impartial or independent role that CSOs are supposed to show. This is unfortunate since constitutional awareness is one of the essential features that can be used in building peace as citizens develop a rights culture.

4.9.4 Containment Strategies

Other challenges have emanated from the state which has not managed to watch critical CSOs doing as they wish. The state reacted through a soft strategic response by demonising CSOs in state-sponsored media, creation of counter CSOs. For example, Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Union (ZFTU) which acted as spoilers to May Day celebrations, Zimbabwe Congress of Student Union (ZICOSU), pro-Mugabe 21st February movements and so forth (Sachikonye 2012, Masunungure 2014). These were containment strategies that were adopted by the State (Saki and Katema 2011). CSOs that proposed for a democratic political alternative were tagged stooges of the West or traitors (ibid). At one point, Mugabe labelled CSOs as hatcheries of political opposition thus viewing them as political opponents who required a political response (ibid). This was a return to the 1980-1990 episodes where CSOs that remained operational were either part of ZANU PF or an extension of the party (Moyo 1993). In view of this, the study sought to find strategic ways through training in IKS and political intelligence that critical CSOs can use in their peacebuilding efforts.

4.9.5 Burnout-fatigue

CSOs' performance has lost momentum in the last two decades (1995-2015). Assumptions were that there was going to be an immediate overhaul of the system beginning from the year 2000. The assumption and euphoria did not match reality. The struggle was prolonged and there was attrition leading to commitment being sapped by fatigue, burnout, reaction (The state of civics in Zimbabwe 2008). CSOs lacked the medium to long-term strategies against the authoritarian state (ibid). CSOs did not realise that the road to politics and democracy was not like thumb-sucking. In addition, CSOs thrive

where there is advanced democracy and where the State is responsive, yet this is not the case in Zimbabwe where democracy is still in its infancy (Masunungure 2014).

4.9.6 Infighting and Loose Coalitions

Polarisation in the country has erected contours which hamper CSOs' effective roles in peacebuilding exercises or campaigns. CSOs have been divided along political lines - on one hand some are pro-ZANU PF while on the other hand others are pro-MDC-T. As a result, conflicts have manifested in labour movements; for instance, the clash between ZCTU and ZFTU and then student union factions (Sachikonye 2011). Power struggles were buttressed by an inflated sense of organisational sovereignty amongst the CSOs which militates against an effective and sustainable collaboration (Masunungure 2011). This results in a situation where each organisation would want to move alone with little interference from another (ibid). CSOs have remained fragmented as they are divided along political lines. While CSOs are supposed to unite on one cause or goal they have spent energy focusing on the perceived differences, thereby drifting from their initial mandates.

4.10 Conclusion

The activities and roles of CSOs in peacebuilding have been shaped by the prevailing episodes that characterised the state during the pre-colonial and post-independence era. Importantly, the energies of CSOs appear to have been bent on liberal peacebuilding models focusing on structural issues. The belief was that the solutions to the country's woes were installation of democratic reforms around civil and political rights, jump-starting the economy and constitutional reforms. While these could be the solutions, CSOs' approach was divorced from the locals' priorities and needs. Part of the explanation for this is that CSOs activities are steered by donor interests. Peacebuilding, peace processes and agreements in Zimbabwe since 1980 have been artificial, politically designed by elites and not in touch with reality or input of the lower echelons. Unfortunately, the amount of peace yielded has been negative as CSOs forgot to address socio-economic issues and the building of broken relationships where they have been fractured by political and election-related disturbances. While these hurdles have existed, CSOs have managed to score successes in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. This has been noted in relation to electoral and political reforms. Non-violent strategies that include peaceful demonstrations, marches, pastoral letters, public advocacy and communication have made such changes possible in some sections of the country. The next chapter makes a comparative assessment of the roles played by CSOs in selected countries.

CHAPTER 5: MAPPING CSOS IN PEACEBUILDING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter traces the roles and effectiveness of CSOs in peacebuilding in selected countries. The countries discussed share a relatively similar political (authoritarian and elitist centralisation) and economic climate (unequal distribution of resources) with that of Zimbabwe. Countries examined are Guatemala, Sri-Lanka and Cyprus. The chapter draws lessons from the experiences of CSOs in the cases examined to strengthen CSOs' efforts in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. The chapter proceeds by outlining the context, roles and functions or response by CSOs to the emerging issues and finally lessons learnt.

5.2 Guatemala Context

Guatemala is a country of contrasts and contradictions. It is in Central America, bordered by both the Pacific and Caribbean oceans. Guatemala which, in the Nahuatl language, is written Quauhtemallan, meaning "place of many trees", is a country with an area of 108,809 square kilometres and a population of around 16 million people, most living in rural areas (Organisation of American States 2015). One of the observable features in Guatemala "is the political organisation, which was hinged on authoritarian system" Kurtenbach (2010: 79). Its history has been characterised by war, domination, subjugation and military dictatorships. The country had its first democratically elected president, Juan Jose Arevalo in 1945. He was succeeded in 1951 by Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Both instituted sweeping educational and agrarian reforms. Arbenz was overthrown in 1954. On the same day, the 27th, a military government was established. After a succession of triumvirates, on July 7 1954, Carlos Castillo Armas rose to power as the head of a new military junta. Afterwards, there was a series of *coups d'état* and a long-term armed conflict (1960-1996) (Louise 1997). The country is further divided along ethnic lines and classes; the major ethnic groups are the Mayas, Xincas, Garifunas and Ladinos (UN peacebuilding report 2012, CONGCOOP 2014). The fractures along ethnic lines have resulted in tensions and violent clashes amongst the people. The next section summarises the nature and time frames of conflicts that occurred in Guatemala.

5.2.1 Phases of Guatemala's Violent Conflicts

The instabilities in Guatemala can be traced back to the 1960s. The conflicts escalated and de-escalated in the following phases as provided by Kurtenbach (2010):

- 1962-1968 - The armed conflicts were at low intensity, the eastern part of the country
- 1969-1978 - Military actions were reduced but there was a rise of opposition voices to speak against repressive acts

- 1979-1985 - There were visible acts of genocide, which came with state repression on the Western part especially between 1981-1983
- 1986-1996 - There was the growth of the democratisation wave which brought negotiations that led to the 1996 accord where Christian churches had an input
- 1996-1999 - Periods of post accord and constitutional referendum
- 1999-2009 - Negative or poor qualities of peace where daily violence and crimes were also on the increase as compared to violence during the time of war, except for 1981-1983.

The conflict revolved around the following key actors: the traditional oligarchy, military and CSOs (ibid). It can be noted that in a state where the oligarchy and military dominate, there is little room or space for CSOs, the majority are suppressed as the regime will be elite-driven to fulfil and protect their self-interest. The society has been characterised by inequalities, which led to the 36-year-old internal armed struggle from 1960-1996 (Louise 1997). The task of CSOs was to deconstruct the authoritarian system of governance and plant a democratic society where the people's voices could be heard. The functions of CSOs were geared around democratisation processes. CSOs' activities in peacebuilding, as in any other authoritarian states, revolved around monitoring, advocacy, protection in some cases, service delivery and socialisation (Kurtenbach 2010).

The CSOs responded to the problems and advocated for national reconciliation, transforming poverty conditions, alienation and political violence (Coordination of NGOs and Cooperatives 2014). CSOs had observed that this would create conditions for peace within the country. Another actor that has had a hand in searching for answers to the Guatemala situation has been the United Nations (UN) which set up a mission to build peace through human rights verification and strengthening Guatemala institutions. Unfortunately, the UN and other related institutions take the top-down approach which in some cases has proved not to be an effective model for building durable peace. It is necessary to understand the nature of CSOs that operated in Guatemala.

5.2.2 Composition of CSOs in Guatemala

CSOs in Guatemala are found in different packages. They appear in the form of membership-based, cause-oriented bodies and providers of services (Coordination of NGOs and Cooperatives 2014, USAID 2016). Cause-oriented, like crisis-oriented CSOs, are products of internal crisis or humanitarian crisis; their formation is created to respond to these problems. Usually their mandate and purposes end when a problem ends. The form in which CSOs manifest follows non-profit making civil associations, peasant associations, cooperatives, churches, foundations and universities (USAID 2016). CSOs in Guatemala are a heterogeneous community with each member playing a different function in peacebuilding. For

example, there was the creation of an umbrella body of CSOs, which mushroomed after the 1996 Peace Accord to address issues of reconciliation within the fractured communities (ibid).

5.2.3 Peacebuilding Roles of CSOs in Guatemala

CSOs in Guatemala have risen to stand for the rights of women which have been violated within the State at different phases of conflict. Women were brutalised, maimed, raped and at worst, murdered (Human Rights Data Analysis Group 2016). Many lost their husbands who were the breadwinners, leaving the vulnerable women with the heavy burden of looking after their families under harsh conditions. CSOs managed to exert pressure for the inclusion of women in the socio-political and economic affairs. The oppression of women triggered the formation of CSOs that pushed for women-related issues, given that the society is male-dominated (Kurtenbach 2010). Such CSOs can be tagged in the cause-oriented organisations that are formed to respond to the ills that hinders peaceful coexistence. Using non-violent peace protests and civil disobedience measures, they managed to make the government revise its policies (CONGOCOOP 2014). Their pressure led to the government amending or passing a law against femicide and other oppressive forms against women. There was the creation of the National Women's Forum to develop a platform for action (Human Rights Data Analysis Group 2016). The use by CSOs of non-violent strategies was of importance in their efforts to bring positive change.

One of the greatest successes of CSOs in Guatemala's history has been the dismantling of the Ubico regime in 1944 (Kurtenbach 2010). The Ubico government was authoritarian in nature as it implemented oppressive labour laws. Much attention by CSOs and other actors during the 1940-1970s periods was given to revolutions and democratisation with little or no attention to peacebuilding issues. However, CSOs that wanted to focus on activities directly linked to peacebuilding were silenced and tagged as anti-state agents. They were equal to communist agents or armed opposition that sought to topple the government (ibid). Despite these challenges it can be noted that from the 1980s civil movements have had different approaches to peacebuilding that ranged from ending war, social justice and rehabilitation following the past 500 years of tensions and oppression (ibid).

In the history of Guatemala, common peacebuilding functions that some CSOs have organised are the functions, during direct state repression and military attacks on civilians. However, CSOs that could effectively play these roles were those that were aligned or had been co-opted by the military regime. This meant that CSOs that were active relied on protection from the military for them to be able to function. Unfortunately, their autonomy was diluted resulting in flawed peacebuilding functions. It can be noted that generally the protection functions that CSOs assume to have or play is limited greatly during violent armed repression or wars. This then leaves CSOs to play other functions that include monitoring and advocacy.

The visible role that CSOs have played whether in war or post-war times is the monitoring function. Monitoring of political developments have been done effectively by independent academic bodies, composed of think-tanks who have done researches that are known internationally due to their professionalism (Kurtenbach 2010: 90). Other efforts have been conducted by the church with the cooperation of international institutions like UN and other donor agencies. In Guatemala, monitoring has been done on assessing the implementation of the 1994 peace accord; CSOs were competent on monitoring issues that were related to their clusters. Their incompetence was lack of comprehensive analysis and failure to dictate interrelated problems (ibid). Such faults make CSOs' roles less effective in addressing the root causes of conflicts.

5.2.4 Challenges Faced by CSOs in Guatemala Peacebuilding Efforts

Social movements, CSOs included, failed to come up with consistent plans as they pushed for both long and short-term peace (Velasquez 2014). In addition, due to their dependence to external donors such as CSOs elsewhere, Guatemalan civic movements have run the risk of disappearing funding dries up. Ideological divisions and political polarisation have also contributed to fragmentation, rendering their peacebuilding activities ineffective (Kurtenbach 2010). The above challenges leave CSOs with the need to come up with strategies that they can use to build peace effectively, for example, building peace using IKS.

5.3 Sri Lankan Context

Sri Lanka's formal name is Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and it was formerly known as Ceylon. Sri Lanka is a pear-shaped island 29 kilometres off the south-eastern coast of India. Its total area is 65,610 square kilometres of which land area is 64,740 (Ross and Savada 1988). There are several ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, and these comprise of; Sinhalese which is the majority then the Tamil, Moor, Burghers, Eurasians, Malay and Vedda which make up the minority. The main languages are Sinhala, Tamil and English.

The dominant issues that have resulted in the resurgence of conflict have been history and ethnicity. Sri Lanka was a colony of Britain. It is composed of two major conflicting ethnic groups Sinhalese and Tamil (Orjuela 2003, 201 Walton 2008). According to Orjuela (2010:298) "ethnicity was a product of British reign where administrative representation was tilted in favour of the Tamil at the expense of the Sinhalese majority". When Sri Lanka attained independence in 1948 (ibid), there was an emergence of a new power or class (Sinhalese government), which began to rule in favour of its class at the expense of other ethnic groups (Tamil). For instance, access to education, public service and state resource was defined along ethnic lines with the Tamils being excluded in the processes (Orjuela 2003, 2010). To this end, the defeat of one dominant group led to the creation of a new dominant group within the state, resulting in continued oppression of and injustices to the new minority groups. Other clashes existed between the government and the separatist Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); and the Buddhist monks

that did not want a peace settlement as they saw it as a threat to Sinhala Buddhist State (Amarasinghe 2006). The above set the causes of conflicts in Sri Lanka and the multifaceted approaches needed in peacebuilding. The next section details the composition of the CSOs around the conflicts that occurred.

5.3.1 Composition of CSOs in Sri Lanka

Sri Lankan CSOs emerged in the 18th century coming in the form of ecumenical movements. Later some groups had the Buddhist background (www.adb.org, Orjuela 2004, Jayasinghe 2007). Apart from these two forms of CSOs, there were traditional community-based CSOs that sought to defend women rights and culture. In 1980 CSOs aligned with foreign governments funding could flourish without any disturbances from the government. In other words, developmental projects are seen to be complementing government's efforts and therefore regarded as soft or less power threatening areas. The composition of CSOs in Sri Lanka, the same as in the Guatemalan case, includes community-based organisations, NGOs (Fernado 2003) a vibrant trade union and several research institutes (Orjuela 2010). Like in any other post-war situation, CSOs risk bias towards a certain political front. For instance, most trade unions have a strong marriage with political parties and have functioned more as industrial wings of the parties (Biyawila 2006). Sri Lankan civics have either been co-opted or tolerated by the state depending on their peace agendas. Naturally, CSOs that are not co-opted are branded as anti- or uncivil society in the eyes of the ruling elite. However, there are exceptions among civic movements that operate at village level whose funding emanates from local contributions (youth clubs) and local co-operatives (Orjuela 2010: 302). Such grassroots groups have remained relatively independent from State or donor influence since their finances are self-generated from contributions. Unfortunately, grassroots formations have not really been effective in building peace.

5.3.2 Peacebuilding Roles of CSOs in Sri Lanka

CSOs have embarked on demobilisation, addressing development grievances, bridging broken ties and structural reforms. According to Walton (2008) the nature of peacebuilding involves creating conditions for peace talks, strengthening public support for peace processes, bridging ties, training and educating people for peace. Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka has revolved around nurturing coexistence between the Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim people (Klem 2009). Civil movements, peace activists and NGOs in Sri Lanka, unlike in Guatemala, have worked to establish peace using the following activities: media campaigns, peace rallies, galas, speeches, appeals, peace education, arts and culture festivals, demonstrations, strikes and peace research (Walton 2008, 2012, Orjuela 2003, 2010).

CSOs have been preferred or trusted as agents of peacebuilding due to several reasons. Local CSOs have been taken as the recipients of peacebuilding aid rather than state actors because CSOs are less visible, more flexible and less expensive and most importantly, they are in close contact with the people (Orjuela 2003). The roles of civic movements have ranged from monitoring, advocacy, communication, socialisation and service delivery. It can be noted that during war times, CSOs have a lesser role to play

as their space for operation is limited. Civic movements during war time were involved in documenting human rights abuses. However, they have been less effective due to fear and insecurity which emanated from abductions, targeted killings and torture of civil society activists (Orjuela 2010). This is a feature, which runs through in most CSOs in peacebuilding.

According to Orjuela (2003), CSOs have engaged mainly in advocacy, negotiations between the government and the LTTE, constitutional reforms through abrogation of the executive presidency, inclusion of minorities, establishing independent commissions and governance-related reforms. Their strategies have been through writing letters to power holders, conducting opinion polls, research on wars, demonstrations and research visits to countries with positive peacebuilding experiences (ibid). It follows that where CSOs embark on non-violent methods, their efforts sail through in bringing positive change.

Walton (2008) articulates that in 2000 during the post-war era, the Tamils' Rehabilitation organisation worked in creating a peace dividend through bringing development in affected societies. This was a realisation that where there is no development there are high conflict risks due to poverty and unemployment levels. Complementing this, efforts have been made to create a peace constituency amongst the communities. For instance, Orjuela (2003) cites one interviewee who notes how CSOs have tried to spread the message: "Don't come asking for our votes unless you show us your plan for peace." This message was passed to the public who would then tell aspiring candidates in their areas. In Sri Lanka, peace activists have encouraged people to vote for people who are likely to work for an end to war and putting pressure on politicians to take a stand on the issue (ibid). The rationale behind peace constituencies has been that public opinion and popular mobilisation have boosted ethnic conflicts. For example, in Sri Lanka, political parties used anti-Tamil sentiments to cause violence (ibid). Establishing peace zones or constituencies through non-violence is an important function that CSOs can take for development to be realised.

CSOs have also embarked on socialisation of the two ethnic groups to build peace. Socialisation has been brought in through holding arts and culture events where platforms have been created for the ethnic groups to be brought together to talk and appreciate that they are all one and the same. For example, the Jaffna-based centre for performing arts arranged performances where artists from the two ethnic groups performed at the same occasion (Orjuela 2003). In one incidence a Sinhalese man sang a peace song in the Tamil language. The interaction of the groups was also extended through youth camps, exchange visits and school projects. The people have also been educated about their history on the root of their conflicts through the retelling of stories, since the history, they were told, had been distorted (ibid). The Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality was heavily involved in educating the people on the root causes of a conflict. Such moves lead to sustainable peace. Education had been used as a tool to oppress rather than enlighten or liberate the people. The socialisation helped to reduce political party violence through seeding a culture of tolerance and constructive dialogues through arts and songs.

CSOs have been effective on several issues in Sri Lanka. Research institutes that include the International Centre for Ethnic Studies and Centre for Policy Alternatives have worked on researches that provide solutions to political conflicts (Orjuela 2010:305). There have been some which provide legal assistance to victims. For instance, the Law and Society Trust and other groups worked to assist victims of war, which include the disabled military officers, relatives of missing soldiers and displaced persons (ibid). Like any civic group, CSOs in Sri Lanka had their own share of challenges they encountered in peacebuilding. The hurdles are explained below.

5.3.3 Challenges Faced by CSOs in Sri Lankan Peacebuilding Efforts

Establishing peace in Sri Lanka has been made difficult due to ethnicity where there is no shared definition or understanding of peace and how it should be attained. On one hand, the Tamil want justice and on the other, the Sinhalese want an end to violence (Orjuela 2003). This division spilled over in the approaches of civil society in peacebuilding. According to Orjuela (2010: 297) the National Bhikku Front advocates for an end to armed conflict - a view shared by the Sinhalese - which is contrary to the Tamils who want to attain self-determination. The fractures in peacebuilding have made their efforts futile due to competition on what to attain. It becomes a source of conflict among the peace actors. Yet CSOs are supposed to be neutral and united for sustainable peace to be insulated.

Apart from lack of consensus on peace, another challenge to building durable peace in Sri Lankan societies has been the concept of “war economy”. This concept has been derived from the fact that there are some sections in the society who benefit from war remittances by sending their children to war for them to survive (Orjuela 2003). In addition, the war has been used to legitimise military leaders (ibid). The situation creates a lot of resistance from the society at large who are in deep poverty as their livelihood and survival are dependent on profits accrued from war. It can also be noted that there is a parochial culture at the grassroots level. People are preoccupied with day-to-day business as opposed to civil society events; they can exercise their political rights on Election Day and leave the rest to politicians (ibid). While CSOs and other actors may call for peace, their message will not be appealing to the people in poverty and who have a narrow understanding of political issues within their communities, making grassroots peacebuilding less significant. It follows that CSOs should devise attractive context-based peacebuilding activities to draw and educate such people.

Related to the impact of crisis environments is the gap that is left in CSOs working on peacebuilding. In Sri Lanka, funding poured in soon after the tsunami of 2004; the funds were directed to NGOs who were working on humanitarian issues (Orjuela 2010: 302). The effect of this was that some committed individuals who had been working in CSOs made an exodus to the NGO sector where there was money or better pay (ibid). The movement of personnel, which can also be worsened when funding is cut or diverted to humanitarian agents, weakens CSOs in peacebuilding.

5.3.4 Legitimate crisis

CSOs peacebuilding role in Sri Lanka has been distorted by a crisis of legitimacy. Walton (2008) argues that the concept of legitimacy has had a bearing on CSOs and NGOs in Sri Lanka. Given the subjectivity of defining and determining legitimacy, CSOs that are perceived as anti-government become tagged as illegitimate. For example, the illegitimacy of NGOs stems from the reason that the sector has an elite bias that is influenced by the LTTE. Due to their links with local political actors and external donors, their agendas have been liberal and therefore in contrast with the local norms and values. For example, NGOs' malpractices were used to delegitimise them as agents of Western culture and interference as well (Walton 2012). Such branding came from the Sri Lanka Freedom party, a nationalist party (ibid). Just as in the Guatemalan case, foreign support in Sri Lanka delegitimises local actors' efforts or actions in building peace (Klem 2009). Assuming a neutral role through working with the local people can mitigate a crisis in the legitimacy of such agents.

Similarly, nationalist parties tend to thwart CSOs that have an association with Western countries using the same tag of anti-government or puppets. A civil movement that has been spared from this is the Sarvodaya which supports traditional values, driven by grassroots who follow Buddhism and Gandhi's philosophy of focusing on spiritual and moral peacebuilding in communities (ibid). Venturing in politically guarded areas lead to different treatment and relations with the government. The 1983 civil wars resulted in a quantitative increase of the CSOs that sought to defend the human rights of the people (Uyangoda n.d., Fernando, 2007). The involvement of CSOs in the civil war was interpreted as political interference thereby erasing their apolitical tag that they are supposed to exhibit. The Sri Lankan authorities reacted by establishing a Presidential Commission of Inquiry in respect of NGOs in Sri Lanka (Uyangoda n.d) that was to investigate on the activities of CSOs then. These developments started to create structural barriers in the operations of CSOs. It follows that, CSOs that work in the human rights or politically sensitive spaces are not tolerated by incumbent political elites. In Sri Lanka, Sarvodaya has not been effective in peace mobilisation as compared to NGOs because it has been more focused on religious rather than political matters. Grassroots-led movements often escape negative branding from the government due to the reason that they do not focus on sensitive political issues or deficiencies of the state, thereby making peacebuilding efforts less effective. They are geared to soft rather than hard issues.

Such developments are common in most environments in which CSOs are found operating. For example, at the height of political tensions in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe once declared that he was now treating CSOs as political party players in the opposition camp. In such declarations legal and non-legal measures are quickly activated by the regime. Despite these external challenges, Sri Lankan CSOs have faced funding problems. Most of the CSOs get funding from overseas countries (Fernando 2007) and this dilutes their operations within the society. The result is that they become supply-driven and accountable to the funders as opposed to the beneficiaries of a programme. In peacebuilding exercises,

negative peace becomes inevitable. Jayasinghe (2007: 50) notes that lack of funding has inhibited CSOs to reach the poorest regions of the country yet 70% of the country is rural and rely on subsistence agriculture.

5.4 Cypriot Context

Cyprus is a vital strategic territory which lies on the crossroad linking Europe, the Middle East and Africa (Yilmaz 2010). In 1571, Cyprus was colonized by Turkey and the Turks brought with them large number of settlers to such an extent that by the end of the seventeenth century 18% of the Cypriot population was Turkish (ibid). The system of government then allowed the Greek and Turkish communities freedom to govern themselves separately. This had a negative impact on the relations between two communities as it created a strong foundation for future ethnic clashes (Necatigil 1982). To exacerbate the situation, the two communities identified with their motherlands, Greece and Turkey. This created tension between the two nations raising a possibility of a war between the two NATO allies (Yilmaz 2010). This forced Britain, Turkey and Cyprus in 1958 to agree on a roadmap which would see Cyprus becoming independent. Cyprus got its independence two years later 16 August 1958 against the wishes of its communities.

The case of Cyprus presents a different perspective from Sri Lanka and Guatemala. The conflicts in Cyprus are mainly over the struggle of nationalism between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, (Cuhadar and Kotelis 2010: 182), unlike the fighting against authoritarian regimes. Given this dilemma in Cyprus, CSOs have also become divided along the nationalist lines making them a fragmented group. The fragmentation of CSOs presents a case relatively like Zimbabwe where CSOs in peacebuilding have also had a disjointed approach due to political polarisation. This study drew lessons on how or where CSOs can converge in polarised environments for them to be effective in building peace. The lessons are presented later in some of the sections of this chapter. The next section discusses the nature and causes of the conflicts in Cyprus.

The conflicts have been fuelled by both internal and external forces. The seeds of inter-communal violence in Cyprus date back to the 1960s and have marks that came from British colonialism, which brought ethnocentric nationalism (Anastasiou 2006 in Cuhadar et al. 2010: 181). Conflicts in Cyprus have also had an external hand with countries such as Turkey and Greece also playing a part (Cuhadar and Kotelis 2010:184). Much of the conflicts have revolved around structural and actor reforms, particularly on political matters. As a result, there has been a divided approach on defining and achieving peace or peacebuilding from the political parties' perspective (ibid: 185). This division has been visible in CSOs as they have been influenced and dominated by political actors due to a patronage system thereby limiting their autonomy. CSOs in both camps have been charged with the role of trying to reconcile the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and fostering dialogue in a State with a democratic deficit (Gillespie et al. 2013, Jarraud and Filippou 2013). At most, the grassroots input had been side-lined in

the peace talks. Where there is division in a state, it becomes difficult for CSOs to reach consensus on defining the nature of peacebuilding as well as the approaches to undertake.

5.4.1 Composition of CSOs in Cyprus

One of the challenges like that of CSOs in Zimbabwe is that in Cyprus, CSOs are elitist and do not have public legitimacy as they are not accommodative of ethnic and linguistic minorities, rural populace and foreigners (Jarraud et al. 2013, CIVICUS 2005 report in Cuhadar et al. 2010:187). Packard (2008:11) in Jarraud et al. (2013:45) argues that bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding had been neglected in past peace-making efforts. This situation renders their peacebuilding approaches less durable in that they are not democratic or all inclusive. Further, there is a low level of voluntarism and civic participation in both CSOs camps that are Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Cuhadar and Kotelis 2010: 188). Yet CSOs' formation and effective functions are based more on voluntarism and independence. The effect of this is that CSOs Greek Cypriot lost legitimacy and recognition from the masses (Jarraud et al. 2013). Such CSOs failed to have publicly owned activities and did not have a credible vision of a united Cyprus (ibid). As a result, CSOs became fragmented and less effective in reconciling the two major communities.

5.4.2 Peacebuilding Roles of CSOs in Cyprus

The realisation of lack of trust and legitimacy among CSOs led them to rebuild and strengthen their networks to regain people's trust. CSOs embarked on bringing communities together, strengthening CSOs using capacity building programme and confidence boosting exercises within Cyprus (Gillespie et al. 2013, Marchetti and Tocci 2009). For example, uniting MC-Med (Turkish Cypriot) and the NGO SC (Greek Cypriot) in building networks in their peacebuilding efforts (Gillespie et al. 2013). The aim was to raise people's trust and visibility and promoting value of CSOs in resolving societal issues within the state (ibid). There was the use of media in trying to sell their message to the people. This role was played by the Cyprus Community Media Centre (CCMC) where CSOs marketed themselves to reach out to the general public; they also had joint activities, dialogues, youth projects working on environmental issues (ibid).

According to Hadjipavlou (1987), in the past, Greek Cypriot children were taught and told that the island was and will always be Greek and the same education was true to Turkish Cypriot. Such negative socialisations led CSOs to react by educating the people about the past in a constructive manner through research (Gillespie et al. 2013). This was complemented by media campaigns where the message was about boosting and raising awareness of communities that they are dependent on each other (ibid). The Association for Historical Dialogue and Research and the Peace Research Institute (PRIO) also conducted historical research in partnership with the academia (Gillespie et al. 2013, Cuhadar et al. 2010, Marchetti and Tocci 2009). However, the emphasis of PRIO is on facilitating dialogues among the communities rather than providing solutions (Cuhadar et al. 2010: 193). Apart from these efforts

there were increased people-to-people contacts, bi-communal interactions and joint declarations by CSOs in their peacebuilding efforts (Jarraud et al. 2013).

The Cyprus conflict presents that in a non-violent context there are certain peacebuilding functions that cannot be played by CSOs. For example, protection, monitoring and service delivery (Cuhadar et al. 2010). Rather, most peacebuilding roles have been concentrated on in-group socialisation, advocacy and communication as well as inter-group social cohesion (ibid). This is an indication that peacebuilding roles and functions among CSOs are specifically contextual and relevant though some lessons can be drawn on strategic engagements with the government and societies as well as the challenges they face in interaction.

5.4.3 Challenges faced by CSOs in Cypriot peacebuilding efforts

Between the periods 1995 to 1997 United Nations buffer zones have prevented CSOs from either side to meet and discuss peace and strategies to attain it (Jarraud 2013). Blue et al. (2005) in Jarraud et al. (2013: 50) articulate that CSOs have been affected by capacity constraints, funding, as they are dependent on payment-in-kind donations from members. The hiccups were buttressed by lack of staffing, failure in maintaining networks, high staff turnover due to lack of job security and lastly, bi-communal activities were affected by language barriers as the non-English speaking people felt alienated in the process (Gillespie et al. 2013). In some cases, there were policy barriers erected for CSOs operating in the Turkish/Cyprus communities (Jarraud et al. 2013). The case of Cyprus presents lessons that can be drawn by CSOs in Zimbabwe as well in their peacebuilding efforts.

5.5 Major Lessons Learnt from the Guatemalan, Sri Lankan and Cypriot Cases

Negative peace is the root to be addressed by peacebuilding efforts, especially when redressing elite oppression of the masses. A bottom-up approach is essential to deconstruct authoritarian regimes, for this guarantees perpetual peace after the conflict is resolved. The peacebuilding efforts should then focus on redressing the inequalities prevalent in the society to ensure that the marginalised groups can self-sustain to avoid the recurrence of the conflict. Women's organisations like Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) can copy the National Women's Forum of Guatemala which, through non-violent protests and civil disobedience, successfully lobbied for the inclusion of women in the political and economic areas previously dominated by men. It is also of paramount importance for CSOs to avoid political patronage in order to be effective in their peacebuilding efforts. In all, CSOs must focus mainly on monitoring and advocacy rather than violent confrontations, since they cannot protect themselves from brute regimes which have the apparatus of the state machinery at their disposal.

CSOs should spearhead efforts for the creation of peace talks by building bridges between conflicting parties and encouraging socialisation by facilitating truth and reconciliation peace forums. This can also be achieved through media campaigns, peace rallies and festivals. Localisation of CSOs is of paramount importance since it breeds social capital which is essential in creating a lasting peace. Working with the

IKS also breeds legitimacy and mitigates some of the structural problems that CSOs might face in their operations. During the conflict phases, CSOs can play a monitoring role by documenting and exposing the human rights violations, abductions and killings of activists. CSOs can also influence government policy by conducting independent researches and professionally notifying the authorities for consideration rather than confronting them. CSOs can also influence the electorate to vote peace advocates into office so they can influence government policy from within.

CSOs-driven research of past historical distortions should be initiated in peacebuilding efforts to correct anomalies and misconceptions on points that are or may be leading to the conflict. This can create more durable peace. The CSOs should not be divided along ethnic or political lines to enhance their peacebuilding efforts. CSOs from warring ethnic groups can lead by example by uniting for a common good and encouraging their members to follow suit. CSO members should derive their legitimacy from the people. Undemocratic peacebuilding efforts create negative peace which leaves room for relapsing back into the conflict.

From the cases it can be noted that establishing sustainable peace is difficult in environments where the root causes and past atrocities have not been addressed. This calls for peace education and revisiting history, which is passed on from generation to generation and can be distorted as new parties in power can construct state friends or enemies. The use of arts and culture is one important way CSOs can help to unite the people while addressing differences in a polarised environment. CSOs' peacebuilding efforts are weakened in that there is lack of unity or consensus and low voluntarism amongst them. CSOs in general need to form coalitions and should try to have contacts with the local people in coming up with thematic issues to pursue in peacebuilding. Apart from coalitions, fragmented CSOs should also embark on youth or community projects that can bring together people of opposing sides to realise their needs and fears as they interact in the projects. However, language barriers are likely to arise in cases where CSOs want to bridge divided communities, which therefore calls for translations of materials to suit the local communities.

It has been noted that peacebuilding themes, for instance in Sri Lanka, have emanated from the CSOs themselves or in some cases they have come from the donors who fund the peacebuilding operations. Such realities have led peacebuilding efforts from CSOs less durable. There has been lack of consensus in defining peace, leading to discord in the approaches of attaining or establishing peace societies. Accordingly, there is need for a common definition and approach of peace in order to avoid contradictions and competitions among CSOs.

Furthermore, war starts from the mind and establishing a peace from the mind is also important in order to have a peace culture. Peace messages must be glued in people's minds as well. In the above case studies creating peace zones and constituency leads to a culture of peace where the people and aspiring politicians must show a commitment to peace and voice their stance on peace in that society. Peace must be embedded in the moral values of the local people; it is an appeal to the spirit that changes the

attitude and behaviour of people within the society. This is achieved through objective education and uniting people through community projects.

CSOs are at risk of being aligned to certain political parties or actors. As a result, they become extensions or agents of the party or government, thereby relegating the views or interests of the people. They are found in a crisis of legitimacy. Walton (2012) argues that they gain legitimacy in the donor's eyes and delegitimised in the nationalist perspective. To this end, CSOs should try to maintain their independent role or impartiality for them to gain legitimacy from the environment in which they work. Further, donors need to give organisations greater space and flexibility in regenerating hybrid peacebuilding models (ibid). Legitimacy is shaped by the practice in relation to time, place and circumstances (Barnett 2009 in Walton 2012).

In the Sri Lankan case, the use of culture and arts shows a powerful non-violent method of bridging ties amongst divided or ethnic polarised climate. Another lesson has been that foreign funding has double effects on CSOs' operations. Firstly, it can strengthen their activities and establishment while on a negative spin their agendas can end up being influenced by the donors at the expense of local realities. During conflicts it can also be noted that CSOs are less effective, their role is limited to monitoring human rights or war crimes being committed. Establishing peace in a war or crisis economy that has high poverty levels is also a challenge as not everyone in the community wants peace. Some individuals gain from a crisis or war; for instance, in Sri Lanka where parents get remittances from their children who will be fighting wars. CSOs will remain with a task of finding how best they can find strategic entry points as well as appealing peacebuilding activities. In this study strategic entry points can be identified using mapping skills embedded in political intelligence. Appealing peacebuilding activities are drawn by embracing IKS among the conflict prone societies.

5.6 Conclusion

The above cases have indicated the multi-pronged roles that CSOs can play in peacebuilding. Challenges faced by CSOs in authoritarian and polarised environments appear to be uniform what differs is the extent or depth of the problems they face. The greatest challenge in polarised climates is that CSOs and other peace actors lack common definition of peace and the approaches to be taken in attaining that peace. External forces have a play in tearing apart or strengthening peace initiatives in most contexts. For example, colonial experiences have contributed to divisions within the communities. It can be observed that Sri Lankan case grassroots-based organisations can also play a significant role in peacebuilding from a moral and spiritual perspective without encountering many hurdles from the state. The CSOs' philosophy is also critical in peacebuilding, non-violence, which has been used in a number of activities. However, grassroots formations have or are lacking in Zimbabwe's CSO movements, which seem to be urban-based as indicated in the previous chapter. The Cyprus cases have examples of how CSOs can be united or strengthened in order to gain public legitimacy and recognition.

This study addresses this lacuna using action research with CSOs in Zimbabwe. The next chapter discusses the research design and methodology for this study.

CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

6.1 Introduction

This chapter pays attention to the research design, methodology, data collection methods, data collection instruments and data analysis that informed this study. The chosen research design and methodology sought to gather data on how CSOs in peacebuilding can be strengthened using action research. The chapter also discusses the merits and demerits of using a research design, methodology and data collection methods. In the process of outlining the design, the chapter weaves in the researcher's experience in collecting and analysing data. Other issues covered in the chapter are sampling, sampling method, population, data analysis procedure as well as to how research ethical principles were adhered.

The research design in this chapter sought to address the following:

Major aim was to:

- Develop, implement and evaluate a peacebuilding strategy that strengthens community-based CSOs in building positive peace in Zimbabwe using IKS and political intelligence.

Specific objectives were to:

- Analyse past conflict cases and nature of CSOs in resolving conflicts that have been witnessed in Zimbabwe and other selected countries;
- Explore past and current peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented;
- Analyse the trend and challenges that CSOs encounter in building peace in Zimbabwe;
- Develop, implement and evaluate through action research an intervention that strengthen community-based CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

6.2 Research Design

A research design is a plan of research that is geared towards arriving at a particular outcome. It is the detailed blueprint used to guide a research study towards its objectives. The design used in this study generated data that was used to develop training intervention based on IKS and political intelligence that strengthened CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. Kumar (2011) defines it as the plan for obtaining answers to the research questions or for testing the hypothesis. The research design sets out the procedures to be adopted by the researcher in answering questions objectively, accurately, validly and economically. It is a compass which guides others to the researcher's decisions regarding the study

design that is to be used, how information is to be collected, how respondents are to be selected, how information collected is to be analysed and how the research findings are to be presented (ibid). Strategies to be used are clearly spelt out in the research design to develop information that is interpretable and accurate. Whatever the case, a research design must enhance precision and minimize or avoid biases that can distort the results.

A research design serves two main functions, the first one being the identification and development of procedures and the logistics needed to carry out the study. The second function is focused on the quality of the procedures as it ensures that the research becomes accurate and objective. The research design therefore provides an outline of what the researcher is going to do in terms of constructing the hypothesis, its operational implications and final data analysis (Pandey and Pandey 2015). The purpose of the research design is to minimise expenditure. It provides maximum information with minimum spending effort. It also makes the research efficient by facilitating smooth scaling. Lastly, the research design ensures that the researcher does not stray outside the research parameters since the research design is a blueprint that provides direction and oversight to other experts (ibid). A good research design is objective, reliable, generalised and contains adequate information.

There are various types of research designs. These include an historical survey, descriptive surveys, scientific research design, in-depth case study as well as the ethnographic research design. The key question in research design would be: What sort of study is the research? This question triggered the plan that I devised to meet the intended goals. My study sought to develop an intervention plan or model that can enhance CSOs' efforts in building positive peace in Zimbabwe through training on IKS and political intelligence. To achieve this objective, my research design was exploratory and action research. The exploratory procedure in action research enabled me to gather data that was used in designing the training. Exploration was done in two phases. Firstly, I explored baseline data by conducting 13 interviews and two FGDs. In the second exploration I interviewed 15 respondents and conducted one FGD. This was done to collect data on the views of the outcome of the training that was conducted to CSO members. The aim of action research is to bring change (Siddiquee et al. 2008) within a context. The design ensures that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible (NYU 2016). For example, if the questions I seek to answer are: "What is the current situation?" then the design would be descriptive, if it is: "Why?" then it is explanatory and lastly if it is: "How?" then the design is action research oriented (ibid). It is necessary to know what type of evidence is needed to support or answer these questions. The evidence was collected through interviews, documentary review, FGDs and interactions with an action team. A detailed discussion on action research ensues.

6.2.1 Action Research

The origins of action research are open to dispute, but the term is popularly attributed to the works of Kurt Lewin, father of social psychology, then Paulo Freire's consciousness-raising work as well as the

liberation schools of thought that include Marxists and feminists (Coghlan and Brannick 2005: 9). This study followed Kurt Lewin's approach that viewed it as an action science, geared to bringing about change to societal problems. The issue in this study was primarily on how CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe can be strengthened to transform a prolonged negative peace to positive peace. Lewin and Greenwood (2007) posit that in action research, local stakeholders become mutual and full partners in the development of knowledge and during the collaborative learning processes. The stakeholders in my action research were CSO members, academics and experts in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

Another definition is that action research is a research design based on democratic and participatory strategies for obtaining required knowledge by working together with the local stakeholders (ibid). In developing an intervention strategy, I worked with an action group which I discuss in detail later in the chapter. Siddiquee et al. (2008:32) note that action research seeks to investigate action, implement investigation by acting and by transforming the research into action. This means that, unlike other designs, action research focuses on the problem and acting upon it by producing a solution with a specific and relevant context. Reason and Bradbury (2009:1) expatiate on the definition of action research stating that "it is a democratic and participatory process whose main concern is the development of practical knowledge while pursuing invaluable human purposes." Key issues emanating from this definition are collaborative democratic ways or partnerships in discovering and devising a model that resolves a problem in society. In this case, my action research was premised on an inclusive way of unpacking a problem, analysing it and drawing an intervention plan with the action group to strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding. A characteristic of action research is that it is more practical as its emphasis is on using action to solve a problem being investigated (Coghlan and Brannick 2005). Action research bridges the gap between theory and practice, which enabled me to develop applicable knowledge in the study. This promotes the already noted social action: that is, change. In my study I worked with an action group that was drawn from CSO(A) in peacebuilding to design and implement a training intervention. By so doing, the collaborative and democratic knowledge-gathering aspect was a specific component of the design.

To enhance the democratic knowledge-gathering for the intervention, I drew information gathered from FGDs and in-depth interviews. The process is described as "joint learning" and deeply collaborative (Lewin and Greenwood 2007, Siddiquee et al. 2008). The emphasis is on "doing with" rather than "doing for" stakeholders, in addition, it credits local stakeholders with the richness of experience (ibid). In other terms according to Reason and Bradbury (2001:2) "the process of action research must involve persons and communities (stakeholders) especially in the sense making and questioning processes which informs the research and action which is its focal point." In the words of Coghlan and Brannick (2005) action research is research in action rather than research about action. It follows that the participants in research are treated as partners rather than subjects or objects. In this way people are drawn into the action of inquiry. To ensure this, we treated each other with respect in our action group,

we accepted diversity and cemented a culture of tolerance. This helped me to tap into their knowledge that we used in the process of diagnosing, planning and implementing the intervention plan.

Action research became fundamental to this study as it brought together “theory and practice, action and reflection, working together with others with the common denominative goal being the pursuit of working solutions to the problems bedevilling” (Reason and Bradbury 2009:1). The design of action research “is premised therefore on the epistemological assumption which holds that the purpose of research is not only for academic reasons, that is, explaining, describing and understanding the world but also to change it.” (Coghlan and Brannick 2005:7). The overall objective of this study was to change how community-based CSOs intended for peacebuilding can design and implement campaigns using IKS and political intelligence.

The aim of action research is expanded as follows by Reason and Bradbury (2001:2):

To produce practical knowledge that is useful to people in their day-to-day lives; contribute through this knowledge, to increased well-being that is economic, political, psychological and spiritual of individuals and communities.


Put together with the summary by Siddiquee et al. (2008) on action research, it involves:

- A focus on practical and (political) issues;
- Reflections on one’s own practices and the involvement of others in the research;
- Collaboration between researcher and participants (action group);
- A dynamic process of going back and forth among reflections, data collection and action cycle;
- Development of a plan of action to respond to a practical issue or to create a change (in my study it is a change in CSOs’ peacebuilding programmes or models).

The above elaboration succinctly points out that action research involves diversity of input from the researcher, experts in a peacebuilding and CSOs who implement peacebuilding programmes. At most, the participatory approach is done for the research to be grounded in the experiences of the participants. The rationale behind including other stakeholders was that the intervention plan or training should continue even after the submission of the thesis for examination. Further, the aim was to create a sense of ownership of the solution reached or model created as opposed to top-down researches that, often, are not synchronised with local realities. Top-down approach has been a practice that has been followed in Zimbabwe but has not yielded sustainable solutions. In action research, the stakeholders that are the CSOs should carry improvements and revisions forward through reflections and evaluations of the training. In the action cycle, continuous communication was constantly maintained with all the actors, as they remained important in generating a practical solution to the identified problem.

Action research goes through four continuous and interconnected phases in any research. It is a four-step cyclical process of consciously and deliberately planning, acting, evaluating the action leading to further planning (Coghlan and Brannick 2005). This comprises of pre-stepping, the plan, action and fact finding (Lewin 1946). Other scholars describe the process as look, think and act (Stringer 1999). The action research steps I adopted in this study are plan, act, evaluate and reflect. With the end of reflection another full or mini action research cycle can begin, depending on the outcome of the first cycle. In theory the process might follow a linear path but in practice action research can start at any stage of the cycle depending on the outcome of the first cycle of the project. Below in Figure 6.1 is a diagram that illustrates these stages in abstract form in the process of action research.

Figure 6.1 Action Research Stages



Source: designed by the author

6.2.2 The Planning Phase

At this stage the groundwork for action is laid. In the first stage, “stakeholders can input their insight for a change laden with positive social value” (Siddiquee et al. 2008:16). Having completed the review of literature, interviews and FGDs, I identified a team with whom to share my findings. This process is termed diagnosing a problem with others (Coghlan and Brannick 2005: 21). Initially, I targeted 10 people to invite to volunteer and make up the action group. The selection of this group was based on purposive and convenience sampling. I chose a purposive method because I wanted people with knowledge in peacebuilding and community-based CSOs. I also used a convenience method so as to have participants who would be present as we carried out the action research processes. One person dropped out as she was transferred to work outside Harare, where the research was based. At the end I managed to work with nine volunteers. These people emerged from the two FGDs. To make the planning collaborative and all-inclusive, I gave the platform to the team to brainstorm on possible

intervention strategies (see Chapter 8). The inclusive and joint learning processes that is embedded in action research and which I also followed, helped to minimise problems among the nine action group members. We viewed each other as teammates and shared a common vision of developing a strategy that brings lasting peace. Their engagement enabled me to design, implement and evaluate with them an intervention strategy through training them to work with the local grain/IKS and political intelligence. The nine participants were also interviewed when I carried out the two post-evaluations of the training. The evaluation was two-tiered and is presented in two Chapters, 9 and 10: Chapter 9 evaluates that training procedure whilst Chapter 10 provides evaluation findings of the outcome of the training.

The techniques used in the initial planning include needs analysis, dialectical inquiry, visioning strategic assumptions testing and appreciative inquiry. I adopted the needs analysis and visioning strategic assumptions testing. Questions I posed included: “What are the needs of CSOs in the process of building peace and what is their vision in their efforts in building peace?” The responses are covered in detail in Chapter 8 on the actual action. Siddiquee et al. (2008) denote an important point on how planning must be devised collaboratively and participatorily. I became a facilitator.

The question however, was how would people that are unfamiliar with each other collaborate and work together to solve a problem? To answer this matrix, there is need to create an open communicative space (Wicks and Reason 2009). The exercise was done with participants of FGDs. The idea was to create positive and associative relations with the relevant people to have easier access to the communities at large. In this way, legitimacy and the capacity needed to convene such relations are developed (ibid). The idea behind this approach was motivated by the quest to improve the quality of relations between the researcher and the participants. As Shani and Pasmore (1985) note, managing relations is of paramount importance as it culminates in trust, harmony, respect and concern for others as well as equality in inputting the research. In my study, I had informal contacts with CSOs through NANGO. Before tackling the major issues, we met and discussed on general peace and security issues that affected our communities and those elsewhere in some parts of the world. Other team members shared the experiences they had in their divided communities. This was done for people to get used to each other whilst we were preparing to work together on a project. After some time, trust and confidence was cemented in the process. The purpose of the inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do (Wicks and Reason 2009). It also brings an element of mutual understanding (Wicks and Reason 2009) and consensus amongst the action group on the way forward. However, this does not mean that differences will be erased but rather in those areas of common life subject to binding norms (ibid). For example, some of the participants had trivial differences over denominational doctrines but it did not affect the discussions within the FGD members and the action group. Having created a communicative space, planning for an action research was made easier. We then reached a consensus to do training with the action team, which we designed to enhance CSO(A)’s peacebuilding

interventions in Zimbabwe. I also noted that managing relations is a continuous process in the action research cycle.

6.2.3 Acting on the Plan

The next stage is acting on the plan. After presenting the findings from baseline data reported in Chapter 7, we met with the action research group to discuss on an intervention strategy that could enhance CSO(A) efforts in building peace. We concluded that there was need for a training of CSO(A) to use IKS and political intelligence in its peacebuilding campaigns. A detailed narration of the planning is explained in Chapter 8. The collaborative planning was meant to get in-depth and rich information that would improve the training. Thus, our collaboration was in the planning, implementation and evaluation. For the implementation we conducted a three-day training with action group members and conducted evaluations that are explained briefly in the next session. Even though action research has more merits in line with this study, it can also be noted that there are some limitations in the design. Coghlan and Brannick (2005: 7) note “action research focuses on acting upon knowledge yet there is a danger that the knowledge may be out of praxis, situational or can be incorrectly interpreted or imbedded as well.” By choosing action research, I noted that it is context specific as the participants define what is supposed to be done, boundaries and the time. I also noted that the findings from this action research cannot be generalised. The findings are applicable to CSO(A) that works with grassroots communities in Mashonaland East province. The outcome of these findings is in Chapter 10.

6.2.4 Evaluation Process

Two evaluations were carried out in this study. The evaluations are presented in Chapters 9 and 10. Chapter 9 presents the immediate evaluation of the training processes. I used the before and after evaluation method where I asked participants to fill in a pre-training evaluation form and later a post training evaluation. The outcome indicated that the training was a success and participants of CSO(A) and grasped the skills of building peace using IKS and political intelligence. To enhance the validity of the findings of the training I conducted a second outcome evaluation. In this, I interviewed 22 participants who concluded that there was an improvement in how CSO(A) conducted its peacebuilding activities which led to tolerance and unity being realised by the community. More detail of the evaluation processes is captured in the respective chapters. The joint evaluation processes were done to promote democratic learning of the outcome of the intervention.

6.3 Methodology

Methodology is understood as an ideal way of carrying out an inquiry. Methodology is a framework of a study. It involves analysing principles and procedures for an inquiry, which in turn determines the application of those methods (Schwandt 1997). Thus, a research methodology is a way of obtaining, organising and analysing data. This becomes the theory of correct scientific decisions. The methodology therefore is how the research was done and its logistical sequence. It includes the design, sample,

limitations and the data collection and analysis techniques to be used (Henning 2004). These methods complement one another and have the potential to deliver data and findings, which reflect the research question. Thus, the methodology becomes a framework of principles and theories on which procedures and methods are based.

While action research can take both qualitative and quantitative methodology, this study was grounded on a qualitative research methodology. The nature of the problem to be solved as well as the outcome of the research required a thorough and in-depth analysis, planning, acting and evaluation of the problem. Qualitative methodology is grounded in an essentially constructivist philosophical position in the sense that it is concerned with how the world is experienced and understood within an environment at a given point in time (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012). Qualitative research describes “life worlds from the ‘inside out’ point of view of the people who participate in it” (Flick et al. 2004:1). These views came out in interviews, FGDs and information-sharing that occurs between the researcher and action group. The inside out point of view is holistic as it involves discovering new information (Williams 2007) and it is an effective model that occurs in a natural setting thereby allowing the participants to add their personal experiences. Thus, there is a strong co-relation between the researcher and the data. In relation to action research, the members of the action group, as well as other stakeholders involved in the action process, described and gave meaning to the problems that they face within the CSO sector.

Flick et al. (2004:5) note that “qualitative methodology is autonomous, more open and more involving compared to other strategies.” Miles and Hubberman (1994:6) argue: “Qualitative research is done through an intense and prolonged contact with a field or life situation. The field or context of study is reflective of everyday life of individuals, groups, societies and organisations.” In my study, I am exposed to the divided society with which CSOs work in order to bring unity. Further, I have maintained constant interactions with CSOs members who share with me their experiences in the peacebuilding programme. The aim is that the researcher attempts to gather data on the views and experiences of local actors from the inside through the process of attentiveness (interaction) of empathetic understanding and suspending pre-conceptions about topic under-study. Unlike quantitative studies, qualitative research provides thick and in-depth data through different data collection methods that can be utilised. In this study the qualitative data collection methods include in-depth interviews, FGDs and documentary search. The assumptions in qualitative research are that “sociality is understood as a shared product and attribution of meaning” (Flick et al. 2004:7). Given that, action research is a democratic and participatory way of knowledge gathering, “stakeholders freely express their opinions on concrete situations within the framework of their experiences” (Ibid: 4). In the process of the research, “the meanings are constantly modified and framed by the people” (ibid). This has been evident in the process of diagnosing the problems that CSOs have in the process of peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. The co-researchers had different views and interpretations. This gave me an opportunity to get diverse input and possibilities on the actual problem that also enhanced the planning process for an intervention strategy. Accordingly, the merits of qualitative data are that the data goes beyond snapshots of how and

what but answers how and why things are the way they are and even assesses causality as it comes out in a section (Miles and Hubberman 1994). This is outlined in greater depth in the next chapter.

6.4 Population

Population refers to “a group that one would work with to come up with conclusions of a study (Babbie 2011: 91). It includes all elements, which meet the criteria for inclusion in a study. Sedlack and Stanley (1992:104) define “population as the total number of elements that possess characteristics of interest to the researcher existing at the time of the study.” The population for in-depth interviews was 50 CSOs in peacebuilding; experts in peacebuilding and academics with experiences on CSOs in Zimbabwe. A sample was drawn from the population and this is “a selected group of participants that is taken from the population” (Babbie 2011, Sedlack and Stanley 1992). It is a smaller number of elements that have been selected for study from the total number of elements contained in the population (Sedlack and Stanley 1992). Boeije (2010:35) defines a sample “as consisting cases (units or elements) that will be examined and are selected from a defined population”. Babbie (1989: 206) further defines it as “a chosen subset representing the total population itself.” The purpose of a sample population is to get a balanced picture of the situation under study (Babbie 2011). I had a total of 43 participants for my study. The breakdown of the sample population is as follows:

- 26 participants were interviewed to gather baseline data,
- 13 were for the in-depth interviews with key informants that included five participants from CSOs in peacebuilding, five from academic institutions and three from research experts in peacebuilding.

Initially my target was to have 17 respondents to make up for the sample population but the other four were not reachable. My sample population for FGDs was 13 participants from CSO(A). In the second outcome evaluation, I had a sample population of 22 participants. From this, I had one FGD with seven members, 10 in-depth interviews with local people and five in-depth interviews with CSO(A) members. All the informants and FGD participants were purposively selected to acquire valid responses from people with knowledge in CSOs in peacebuilding.

6.4.1 Sampling Method

Kumar (2000) defines sampling as a process of selecting items from a population of interest so that results can be generalized from the study of the subset. The aim of sampling was to draw conclusions about the whole population in a more cost effective and less time-consuming way. Sampling technique is used to choose research subjects used to constitute a target population or sample that will represent enough of the whole population. Thus, sampling involves selecting a few from a bigger population to become the basis of predicting the prevalence of an unknown piece of information (Kumar 2011). Sampling saves time, human and financial resources but it has a huge disadvantage of the possibility of having errors in the estimates, which compromise the validity of the findings. There are two types of

sampling namely probability and non-probability sampling techniques. The differences of the two techniques are highlighted in Table 6.1 that follows.

Table 6.1: Summary of the differences between probability and non-probability sampling techniques

Probability sampling	Non-probability sampling
It is probable that the sample represents the population	Absence of probability
It is used to generalise results	Used in action research
Reference is derived from samples	There is no sample
Every individual in an organisation has an equal chance of being part of the sample	There is no probability since there is no sample
It may be representative of the population	There is no limitation
Observed data is used for inferential purposes	Observations are not used
Parametric and inferential statistics are used	Non-statistic and non-inferential
There is a risk in drawing conclusions	No risk in drawing conclusions

Source: Author’s own tabulation

This study adopted the non-probability sampling method. Non-probability sampling is where the likelihood of selecting any element from the sampling frame is not known; the inclusion of the elements selected cannot be determined. The method is suitable to qualitative studies, which are not large scale (Babbie 2011). In addition, the virtues of it are that it is more economic in time, effort and money (Sedlack and Stanley 1992). Non-probability sampling was appropriate to this study in that I retained control over the selection of participants who took part in the interviews and FGDs. There were 50 CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe, as such, chances of having some or all of them being involved in this research were highly unlikely. From this, the non-probability method became more suitable.

6.4.2 Sampling Technique

a. Purposive Sampling

The sampling techniques utilised were: purposive/judgmental, snowballing and convenience. Purposive sampling involves selection of a sample in which one has knowledge of the population, which will be in line with the purpose of the study (Babbie 2011; Flick 2014; Punch 1998). The researcher is free to select any element that he or she deems appropriate or the element which “looks good” to the researcher (Sedlack and Stanley 1992). The selected sample illustrates features in which we are interested (Silverman 2005). The study made use of purposive sampling, which happens to be a non-probability sampling technique that is based on “the researcher’s aims of the study as well on the researcher’s own judgement” (Babbie 1989: 204). Eight informants for the in-depth interviews were selected at the researcher’s discretion based on their experience and expertise in peacebuilding efforts in Zimbabwe

through working with or within CSOs. Seven participants were also selected using this method to conduct the second evaluation of the intervention. These participants were contacted, and I explained the purpose of the study. I consequently obtained their consent to participate. I carefully selected this constituency because I needed expert views. Unlike other sampling techniques, which support general data, purposive sampling provided rich information for an in-depth study. The aim of sampling was to generate depth not width as such there was need for participants to be purposively selected. By depth one aims “to further permeate the field and its structure through concentrating on single examples” (Flick 2014: 177).

b. Snowballing Technique

The study also adopted snowballing technique to solicit information from other CSOs, academics and individuals with expert knowledge in peacebuilding. Referral or snowballing is when a person selected for study assists the researcher by identifying other relevant people and sometimes establishing the initial meeting between the researcher and the referred person (Sedlack and Stanley 1992). It helps in paving the way for identifying the appropriate persons for the study and by helping to establish the researcher’s credibility to the potential respondent. Snowballing sampling therefore is the process of selecting a sample using networks (Kumar 2011). A few individuals are selected to provide the researcher with the required information. The individuals then refer the researcher to other individuals or organisations which may provide the researcher with further data. The cycle goes on and on until the required number is obtained, or a saturation point is reached (Pandey and Pandey 2015). The technique is useful when the researcher knows little about the organisation being studied as the researcher only needs to contact a few individuals who then direct him or her to other members of the organisation who may have information on the research. Snowballing is a useful technique in studying decision-making, communication patterns or the diffusion of knowledge within a group. Snowballing was instrumental especially in identifying and opening ground for interviews with CSO members and experts in peacebuilding. I managed to get five different respondents: three from CSOs and two from experts in peacebuilding through snowballing. The respondents were more open and cooperative; given that I had been referred to them by someone they already knew.

c. Convenience Sampling

Convenience sampling was also utilised to select 13 FGDs participants from CSO(A) that work in peacebuilding programmes based in Harare. This method was also used in identifying 10 FGD members in second evaluation. Convenience sampling involves drawing a sample that is both accessible and willing to participate in a study (Teddlie and Fu 2007). In the process of selection, the researcher also attempts to select typical cases (Sedlack and Stanley 1992). It is also understood as sampling where advantage is taken of cases, events, situations and informants which are close at hand.

6.5 Data Collection Methods

Since the methodology was qualitative, it follows that the data collection methods were also qualitative. The methods used are documentary search, in-depth interviews and FGDs. These methods were used to review and gather data on the Zimbabwean socio-political and economic context, development and role of CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe, case studies of CSOs in peacebuilding in selected countries, unpacking peacebuilding theories that guide the study and designing and evaluating the intervention.

6.5.1 Documentary Search

It is the use of external sources of information to formulate the context and analysis of an academic work. This involves developing, assessing and using documents to carry out the research. There are two types of data: primary and secondary sources. Primary data is collected for the first time and it is fresh and original. Kotler (1999) defines primary data as data that the researcher collects in the field for a research. With the aid of a research assistant, I extracted primary data using FGDs and in-depth interviews. Secondary data refers to data collected by persons or agencies for purposes other than solving the problem at hand. Secondary data was collected through published journals and articles, books, e-research, government and civil society publications as well as through policy and media reports. I made use of secondary data since it was easily accessible, cheap and it also saved time. With documentary search, I managed to gather data on the nature of Zimbabwe's conflicts and the experiences of other CSOs in selected countries. However, the validity of the data was prone to bias since it reflected the authors' views and thus the research relied heavily on the primary sources of data. These are flexible as they allowed me to explore greater depth of meaning. They also allowed me to facilitate co-operation and provided the room to probe for more information.

6.5.2 In-Depth Interviews with Key Informants

According to Bloor and Wood (2006: 104) "qualitative or sometimes referred to as depth or ethnographic interviews have a more informal, conversational character that is shaped partly by the interviewer's pre-existing topic guide and to some extent by concerns emerging in the interview." Interviews involve face-to-face verbal interchange of information whereby the interviewer attempts to obtain information, opinions, or beliefs from other people (Wilson and Sapsford 2006). In-depth interviews with key informants were used in this study to obtain valid data, as the respondents were free to respond in any way towards a question. Interviews provided a greater degree of flexibility for the researcher since the process of questioning and answering was two-way; for example, a participant could ask for clarity on an issue before answering. Punch (1998:180) articulates:

There are key issues that must be considered during interviews. These include: a careful selection of respondents, effective management of the interview and accurately recording.

The researcher must be fully aware of who would be interviewed, for what reason, when and for how long.

I conducted in-depth interviews with key informants between March and April 2016 to get baseline data. The second set of in-depth interviews was done to evaluate the second outcome of the training in July 2017 (see Chapters 9 and 10). Babbie (2011) states that informants are people with knowledge or expertise in the social phenomenon. Five respondents were drawn from CSOs in peacebuilding affiliated to NANGO that include Heal Zimbabwe Trust, CCJPZ, Centre for Conflict Management and Resolution, five academics who specialise in CSOs attached to universities in Zimbabwe, and three experts in peacebuilding in Harare. These were selected through a combination of purposive, snowballing and convenience sampling techniques. I targeted directors and projects co-coordinators who designed and implemented peacebuilding programme in CSOs. This was also the same for academics as I sought people who have researched and written about CSOs or episodes of violence in Zimbabwe. On experts in peacebuilding, I targeted the people who had knowledge of the models that have been adopted to bring peace in Zimbabwe. On average, the interviews stretched between 30 to 40 minutes, given that some of the respondents had busy schedules. During the process, I had an assistant who also took notes which were complemented by a recorder in cases where respondents had preferred the proceedings recorded. The tables below present the composition of the respondents.

Table 6.2: In-depth-interviews with CSO members

Code	Gender	Age
ICSO(A)	M	42
ICSOb	M	36
ICSOc	M	32
ICSOd	F	29
ICSOe	F	33

Source: Designed by author

Key:

ICSO: Interview with a CSO member (a)

M: Male

F: Female

Table 6.3: In-depth interviews with academics

Code	Gender	Age
IAa	M	67
IAb	M	54
IAc	M	45

IAd	F	48
IAe	F	40

Source: Designed by author

Key:

IAa: Interview with an academic (a)

M: Male

F: Female

Table 6.4: In-depth interviews with peacebuilding experts

Code	Gender	Age
IEa	F	40
IEb	M	38
IEc	M	42

Source: Designed by author

Key:

IEa: Interview with a peacebuilding expert (a)

M: Male

F: Female

The tables present the codes of the respondents to ensure anonymity. Further, the respondents highlighted that I should not put their job titles and organisations. This would compromise confidentiality and anonymity in the presenting of the data in the thesis.

In the crafting of the interview questions, I was guided firstly by my topic from where general and specific questions were drawn. Concerns emerging from the interviews were also noted and pursued through probing by the researcher during the interviews. This facilitated thick and in- depth responses from the experiences of the respondents. For example, I managed to pick out the roles played, and interventions made by CSOs in their peacebuilding efforts. I also learnt about some of the challenges that CSOs had faced in bringing change in rural and urban societies. These responses on findings and analysis are further discussed in Chapter 7. Punch (1998:175) notes that “Interviews enable the researcher to access people’s definitions of a situation, their perceptions, definitions and meanings which lead to a construction of reality.” The responses and interpretations of people’s views also assisted in the designing of intervention strategies aimed at bringing positive change in CSOs involved in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

6.5.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

FGDs sometimes referred to as group interviews or in-depth group interviews (Smithson 2008) are comprised of 5 to 12 members and have a facilitator (Alasuutari et al. 2008). These are useful as part of participatory research or action research (Olsen 2012). Prior to the commencement of the actual FGDs, pilot group testing is supposed to be done (Ibid). The pilot group was comprised of five people from CSOs. The purpose was to check on defects that may be present in the guide as well as to obtain experience of organising and managing participants in the process. For example, I discovered that my questions were not clear and consistent. When the testing was complete and corrections were made, the actual FGDs were started. In this study, my actual FGDs were composed of 13 members (seven males and six females) and these were selected purposively and based on convenience. From the 13 members I organised two FGDs which are presented in the tables below. These FGDs were meant for collecting baseline data. I also conducted one FGD to evaluate the second outcome of the training. Detailed description of the FGD is Chapter 10.

Table 6.5: Focus Group Discussion 1

Code	Gender	Age
FGD1a	M	26
FGD1b	M	33
FGD1c	F	25
FGD1d	M	29
FGD1e	M	30
FGD1f	F	27
FGD1g	F	31

Source: Designed by author

Key:

- FGD1a: Focus group discussion 1 participant (a)
- M: Male
- F: Female

Table 6.6: Focus Group Discussion 2

Code	Gender	Age
FGD2a	F	30
FGD2b	F	31
FGD2c	F	29

FGD2d	M	28
FGD2e	M	27
FGD2f	M	34

Source: designed by author

Key:

FGD2a: Focus group discussion 2 participant (a)

M: Male

F: Female

Likewise, I also presented the participants in FGDs with codes to ensure anonymity; for example, “Code FGD2a”. In the discussions, I assumed the role of a facilitator or moderator. I approached the FGDs with an empathetic understanding, fully aware that the discussions could open wounds of the participants’ experiences as some of the participants have been victims of structural violence in their efforts in building peace in Zimbabwe. My role was to ensure and encourage participants to speak rather than to be dominated by one or two participants. In some cases, the facilitator can change the subject when other people do not feel comfortable sharing their ideas within a group setting (ibid). However, in my case such experiences were not encountered. My research assistant helped me in capturing the responses in accordance with a code assigned to a participant. The focus of the FGDs was to validate responses from in-depth interviews as well as the findings from literature review. Another aim was to unpack the deficiencies that CSOs suffer in their attempts to build peace in Zimbabwe. These issues came out in the FGDs as is presented in the next chapter.

It can be noted that issues of confidentiality in FGDs could not be guaranteed since it involved sharing and disclosing information in a group setting where the researcher did not have control after the FGDs of what could happen in terms of disclosure of matters arising from the discussion. To try and mitigate this challenge, I adopted Smithson’s way (Smithson 2008) of setting up rules prior to the FGDs on the “do’s and don’ts” during the process. Some of the “don’ts” were not allowing FGDs members to record with their cell phones during the discussions, as the discussions would be shared without following ethical considerations. On my part, I assured the participants that the information would be treated with confidentiality and would be purely for academic purposes.

6.6 Data Collection Instruments

In collecting data through in-depth interviews and FGDs the researcher utilised an interview guide (see Annexure 1) and focus group discussion guide (see Annexure 2). Paton (2002: 343) explains how important an interview guide is and in the process notes that “its purpose is to list the questions and or issues to be explored during the interview.” It was prepared to ensure that the researcher does not stray or leave out other questions. The interview guide ensured that a similar line of inquiry was pursued for different persons interviewed. This made it easy to process the interview results systematically. The

guide served a similar purpose in FGDs and allowed individual experiences and perspectives to emerge from the discussions. In the process of data collection, I also utilised open-ended questionnaires (see Annexure 3). According to Wilson and Sapsford (2006), a questionnaire is, a research instrument designed to generate the data necessary for accomplishing research objectives. Accordingly, questionnaires are a pre-formulated written set of questions to which respondents record their answers. Open-ended questions were designed to encourage a full expression of knowledge and data from the respondents; hence they enabled the researcher to gather various opinions and analyses from different perspectives. Due to the standardisation and uniformity of the questionnaire, opinions and analysis from different respondents were directly compared thus enabling the researcher “to easily analyse and interpret data collected” (ibid). Questionnaires were mostly sent to participants who were not physically close to the researcher through emails; for example, academics. The participants were purposively selected while in some cases snowballing was also utilised. The qualitative research questions I designed aimed at “giving maximum opportunity for the construction of contextual knowledge by engaging participants to talk through their experiences” (Manson 2004: 65) in peacebuilding efforts of CSOs. The questions I developed were unstructured. With unstructured interviews “the researcher asks the respondents questions and they respond to the questions based on their particular experiences” (Braun and Clarke 2013:78).

6.7 Pre-testing/Piloting

Pre-testing or piloting is defined as a small-scale trial before the main investigation. It is intended to assess the adequacy of instruments to be used in data collection (Wilson and Sapsford 2006). The pilot sample must be fully representative of a variety of individuals, which the main study is intended to cover (ibid: 103). The aims of pilot testing are summarised as follows:

- Does the instrument take too long to complete so that the respondents are still showing patience?
- What is the best order of the questions?
- Do the respondents understand the question as initially phrased? (ibid: 103).

I did pre-testing in February 2016 on interview guide, focus group discussion guide and the open-ended questionnaire. Soon after completing the instruments, I asked two senior academics to check for any defects and make sense of the guides before I did the pilot testing. The respondents for the pilot testing were purposively selected in order to have a representative group of individuals that made up the actual interviews and discussions. The individuals selected came from CSOs and academics. I rolled out four interviews and one FGD to pilot test since the questions to be asked in both were the same. Deficiencies in the guide were noted, mainly on the issue of the order of the questions and putting much emphasis on questions that focused on bringing out what could be done in addressing the problems identified. One of the questions in the open-ended questionnaire was vague and was re-phrased so as not to confuse the respondent. This was important in that most of the open-ended questionnaires were emailed to

respondents and there was a high likelihood that they would not have time to seek clarity from the researcher as they filled them in.

6.8 Validity and Reliability

Validity can be defined as the truth or commonly accepted meaning of a concept (Babbie and Mouton 2001, Silverman 2005). It was important in that it brought to light the degree of trustworthiness of the findings. It is about convincing the researcher and the participants that the findings from the study are genuinely based on critical investigation and not biased or seeking to check whether the findings make sense or are credible to the people we study (Silverman 2005, Miles and Hubberman 1994). The findings from interviews and FGDs were triangulated to ensure validity. Miles and Hubberman (1994: 266) posit that “triangulation is indeed the closest method when confirming findings, as its independent measures do not contradict with each other”. Triangulation is important in attempting to obtain an in-depth understanding of the problem under study (Creswell 2007, Denzin and Lincoln 2011). Triangulation by method was done to enhance internal validity of the findings. The purpose was to minimize elements of bias in the responses that came either from FGDs or interviews. For example, CSOs members during interviews did not bring out issues of mismanagement of funds. This however, came out in in-depth interviews. According to Paton (2002: 343) “it becomes prudent for the researcher to use multiple methods of collecting data so as to obtain the best result.” No single method can adequately provide solutions to the problem of rival explanation; thus it is imperative to triangulate. One of the validated findings, which was elaborated in the Chapter 7, was that the elite tailored CSOs’ peacebuilding programme in Zimbabwe without wider consultation from the local people. This has left CSOs more accountable to their founders and funders as opposed to the recipients of the programme. Such findings emanated from both in-depth interviews and FGDs held between the months of March and April 2016. However, there were conflicting responses on what needed to be done in order to make their programmes more effective. This rivalry of ideas arose as some of the respondents gave prescriptions from an academic point of view while others from an activist point of view. An agreement that came out was to conduct training for CSOs in peacebuilding on working with the IKS/local grain through political intelligence.

Reliability refers to the degree of consistency (Silverman 2005). It is about applying a technique that, if used repeatedly, it will yield the same results as was attained using the first technique (Babbie and Mouton 2001). Reliability involves checking if the process of the study is consistent, reasonably stable over time and along the researchers’ methods (Miles and Hubberman 1994: 278). The question to be addressed is: Have things been done with reasonable care? (ibid: 278). The purpose of reliability is to avoid random errors while validity aims at preventing systematic error (Babbie and Mouton 2001). The degree of consistency of my instruments was achieved through pre-testing or pilot testing of the guides as well as of the open-ended questionnaire. During the process of pilot testing, errors were weeded out thereby increasing the degree of consistency or accuracy. A reliability check was done before the

researcher conducted the actual data collection methods. Reliability check aimed at measuring the consistence of the instruments of collection of data in the interviews and FGDs. The participants were carefully selected as well to have a true picture of the responses that were to come measured against the study's expectations.

6.9 Data Analysis

Many authors in social science research have defined qualitative data analysis differently. Babbie (2008: 415) defines it “as a process of examining and interpreting observed data without using statistical processes with an over-arching goal of exhuming deeper patterns of relationship and meanings”. Analysis of data consists of data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing or verification (Miles and Hubberman 2004). Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes as transcripts (ibid). According to Corbin and Strauss (2008: 65), data analysis involves “collecting raw data and conceptualizing it”. The process proceeds through writing summaries, coding, teasing out themes, making clusters and making partitions (Miles and Hubberman 1994). A different approach is given by Gibbs (2007: 1) that “data analysis must be transformative”. Thus, the process involves collecting qualitative data using different methods, processing the data, analysing it into clear, understandable and trustworthy analysis. Flick (2006: 295) articulates, “Qualitative data analysis is the interpretation of data or text to develop theory as well as the foundation of collecting additional data”. In summary, qualitative data analysis is a process or steps that one takes after organizing raw data, narrating the data, establishing relationships, giving meaning to the data gathered. It is the second step in research that a researcher carries out after the collection of data using different methods and techniques.

Analysis of data depends on several variations, which are tied to the type of research. Thus, the step that a researcher follows is guided by whether it is content, discourse, case and thematic analysis (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 67). In my research, I made use of thematic analysis where the recurring themes emerging from the data on the interview transcripts were noted and interpreted in relation to the overall research problem. For example, the emerging themes on challenges facing CSOs were financial, capacity constraints and unfavourable working environment. The process of data analysis is carried out through thematic coding.

Coding involves interacting with data using techniques such as asking questions about the data, making comparisons between data, deriving concepts to stand for the data, developing the concepts in terms of their properties and dimensions. It can be called mining data, digging beneath the surface to discover hidden treasures contained within it. Gibbs (2007: 38) asserts that “coding enables the researcher to make logic out of the data being analysed”. In addition, it involves thematically sorting data. Codes are the names or labels given to concepts derived through coding (Corbin and Strauss 2008, Punch 1998). They form “a focus or direction for thoughts about the text and its meaning” (Gibbs 2007: 40). As such coding is about building or construction of concept, theories and relationships from the data gathered.

The concepts drawn from the study revolved around top-down and bottom-up peacebuilding approaches used by CSOs. The main concept that informed this study was local grain and political intelligence.

Through coding, a researcher attempts to answer the following questions provided by (Charmaz 2006: 94-5 in Gibbs 2007):

- What is going on?
- What are people doing?
- What is the person saying?
- What do these actions and statements take for granted?

Apart from the questions, it can be noted that the coding process can be broken into 3 phases: descriptive, categories and analytic coding (Gibbs 2007). The first two put across the codes as they are or stating the issues emerging from the data. This was achieved in the Chapters 2-5 in the literature review which generated information on past CSOs' experiences in Zimbabwe and other countries. Analytic coding moves a step higher where interpretation starts to take place. This was done in Chapter 7, 8, 9 and 10. A detailed account of data analysis is provided in the ensuing chapter where thick descriptions from interviews and FGDs were reduced, made understandable, coded, put into themes and analysed in detail in relation to literature.

6. 10 Ethics

6.10.1 Anonymity and Confidentiality

The researcher had a moral obligation to consider strictly and adhere to the upholding and jealousy protection of the rights of the participants. Chikutsa and Chingozha (2011) posit that it is mandatory for researchers to work within a framework of acceptable practices. I guaranteed protection from physical, psychological, social, economic or legal harm to participants for having partaken in this study. In the collection of data there was adherence to several ethical principles. These include confidentiality and anonymity, informed consent principles. Ensuring anonymity and confidentiality in research is morally right and good academic practice. This ensures a proper production of knowledge (Payne and Payne 2004). Anonymity of a participant prevents possibilities of physical, social and psychological harm. Anonymity was important as it protected the participants' identity. In addition, assuring anonymity aided in getting valid responses. I used codes to present the responses of the participants. For instance, in FGDs the code of a participant would be FGD1a, in in-depth interviews with CSOs, I used ICSO(A) then for the action group members I used AGM1. I guaranteed them that participants' codes were not just for the interviews and FGDs but also for the entire study. I also coded the organisation I worked with using CSO(A) to ensure anonymity. Upholding the principle and practice was done to prevent harm to the participants.

Payne and Payne (2004) argue confidentiality enhances the credibility of the findings. Participants were informed before an interview that their responses are confidentially used only for the purposes of the

study. However, anonymity in FGDs and action research group could not be guaranteed. The researcher encouraged the FGD participants and members of the action group not to disclose or discuss the responses of other participants outside the group or context of the study.

6.10.2 Informed Consent

Research ethics were also upheld by seeking informed consent from the participants and respondents prior to the interviews or FGDs. The participants filled in consent forms (see Annexure 4) after having explained to them the nature of the study, interview and FGD procedures. Their participation was on a voluntary basis and I did not offer any monetary rewards or rewards in the form of gifts for people to participate in the procedures. The right to withdraw was also explained and guaranteed to all. In the research process some of the participants had promised to fill in open-ended questionnaires but upon collection they had not done so due to various reasons. In such instances other respondents would then prefer face-to-face interviews. This occurred with two members from CSOs.

6.11 Conclusion

The chapter described the research design that guided my study. Key features in the design were explained. The design used was action research, which married with the overall study objective of finding ways that can enhance CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe through action research. Action research is grounded on practical problem-solving conducted in a participatory and democratic knowledge-gathering fashion. The methodology of the study was qualitative, and I managed to get thick responses on how I developed and evaluated my intervention plan. This was achieved through data collection methods, namely interviews, documentary search and FGDs. I also utilised an open-ended questionnaire, interview and FGD guide. I conducted pre-testing of instruments to ensure reliability while methodological triangulation ensured validity. The selection criteria for participants were non-probability following purposive, snowballing and convenience-sampling techniques. A snapshot of data analysis showing a detailed account of this is made in the ensuing chapter. Lastly, I unpacked research ethics that were followed in data mining processes. The next chapter is the first among the chapters on findings and analysis.

Chapter 7: The Experiences of CSOs in Peacebuilding in Zimbabwe

7.1 Introduction

This chapter details the research findings from interviews, FGDs and makes a comparison with relevant literature. I used this strategy for “methodological triangulation to improve the quality of the qualitative research” (Flick 2014: 183). The findings gathered highlight the trend and path that CSOs have taken to build peace in Zimbabwe. The focus of the chapter is on the post-independence environment where CSOs’ activities have been more visible around the political, economic and social problems that have affected the country. In addition, I discuss the peacebuilding models and roles that CSOs have used to bring change in the country. Emerging themes from the findings include the experiences of CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe, models of peacebuilding and challenges they encountered in their peacebuilding campaigns.

The chapter presents responses from two FGDs and 13 interviews conducted with members of CSOs, independent experts and academics specialising in CSOs and peacebuilding. The first FGD was comprised of four males and three females, the second FGD had three males and three females. Codes were used to present participants’ views. The profiles of the participants that include age, gender and code are presented in detail in Chapter 6.

7.2 Participants’ Understanding of Peacebuilding

The following section presents the different definitions of peacebuilding that emerged from the key informants interviewed. The informants included academics, CSOs members and some experts in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

7.2.1 Peacebuilding as an Art of Building Relationships

Peacebuilding has been defined and interpreted differently. The definitions provided fit squarely with a peacebuilding model (for example, liberal or sustainable). The section highlights the various definitions that respondents have on peacebuilding. The definitions help to note if CSO members have a common understanding and follow a common approach in building peace in Zimbabwe. Participant ICSO(A) defined peacebuilding as:

The art of bringing reconciliation between two or more parties.

Participant ICSOc argued that:

It is a process of bridging ties and bonding amongst people in divided communities.

The ideas resonate with the definition that peacebuilding involves building broken ties or relationships (Lederach 1997; Paffenholz 2014). Participant ICSOe observed that:

The process of rebuilding relationships and healing past wounds occurs after an end to a conflict. A third party usually takes the role of bringing conflicting parties together.

In the past, the process of peacebuilding was elitist, involving professional diplomats (Berman and Johnson 1977). However, in the present era, the process involves multiple actors and can be carried out at different levels, which shall be discussed in the later sections.

From the above definitions, one can deduce that peacebuilding is a process of bringing victims and perpetrators together following a fashion. In the process, CSOs assume the healing role. As an art, it also requires CSO members with skills and strategies that would enable them to bring peace between conflicting parties successfully. The skills and strategies are of prime importance to CSOs; lack of it may result in a spoiled or temporary peacebuilding outcome.

7.2.2 Creating Conditions for Peace

Other actors in peacebuilding also amplified the definition of peacebuilding from a different viewpoint. Participant IAa argued that:

Peacebuilding is a process of creating conditions for peace. It is a process that suggests that there have been challenges or conflicts and, as a process of building peace, it is not done in a vacuum but happens when one conflict has happened before. Peacebuilding cannot be done where there is peace.

The underlying factor in the above definition is that peacebuilding involves creating conditions of peace. The conditions might be interpreted from a liberal peacebuilding point of view. Participant FGD1a stressed that:

Liberal approaches encompass democratic reforms such as free and fair elections;

Participant FGD1b cited: “Rule of law”, while Participant FGD1e noted:

“Security sector reforms and strengthening institutions that can guarantee peaceful coexistence within the society”.

Other conditions that create space for peace are:

Jumpstarting the economy through fiscal reforms, social reforms that include rehabilitating vulnerable groups, sustainable environmental management of resources and the military dimension which can be done through demilitarisation, disarmament and reintegration of combatants (Peinado 2003).

Such conditions remain visible even in post-war situations. For example, Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 but there are continuous calls for security sector and economic reforms from the voices of CSOs in governance-related areas. Participant IEa postulated that:

The rationale behind implementing these reforms is that it would engender a peaceful environment.

At the heart of peacebuilding is that of addressing the root causes of a problem (Paffenholz 2010: 43). To this end, creating conditions for peace through reforms addresses the systems of inequality and oppression which perpetuate human suffering in societies. Complementing the definition of creating

conditions for peace is the UN definition adopted in the 1992 *The Agenda for Peace* report, which holds peacebuilding to be the measures that solidify sustainable peace and prevents the recurrence of conflicts (Ryan 2013, Paffenholz 2010). According to participant IEB:

The UN model saw states opting for cooperation, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping for international peace to be realised. The model was and is relevant in so far as it addresses inter-state conflicts rather than intra-state tensions.

This study is based on the argument that peace at the international level can be realised if states are internally peaceful. At the same time, national peace can also ensue if communities are at peace with each other. Therefore, building peace should start from a grassroots level.

In justifying the need to create conditions for peace are the events that have occurred in Zimbabwe's past. Participant IAC propounded that:

Zimbabwe has been torn by a plethora of conflicts, particularly politically-driven as well as economic. These have left scars that demand processes of creating conditions for peace and reconciliation within the state. Such inopportune episodes include but are not limited to the violent colonial struggles between the blacks and the white settlers, post-independence conflicts such as election related violence, economic meltdown and mismanagement which have triggered demonstrations and a harsh response from state institutions.

The net effect of these conflicts has been hate, intolerance, polarity and mistrust between and among citizens and the government.

7.2.3 Social Cohesion as Peacebuilding from Negative to Positive Peace

Another participant sought to define peace first and then devise his definition from that understanding. Participant ICSOb posited:

Peace is not the absence of war like what is happening in South Sudan. Defining it as absence of war is a narrow conceptualization and, at the same time, it is an interpretation from the national level of peace from the level of violent conflicts. The level of political polarization in Zimbabwe has made people think of peacebuilding from a political violence point of view. However, some grassroots-based community's point of view of peace is that, it is not the absence of violence and tensions, but they view peacebuilding as cohesion that exists among people within defined communities. People working together collaboratively, valuing one another and being able to diffuse existing tensions into positive relationships.

In the above interview response, peacebuilding is read through the lenses of the grassroots approach or model. This was contrary to participant IAB who had argued that:

Peace is the absence of war and as such there is no need for peacebuilding in Zimbabwe at the moment as there are no wars taking place.

Nonetheless, participant ICSOd observed:

This definition of peace cannot be dismissed as wrong, it is only myopic, narrow and it falls short in the context of peacebuilding where peace is not defined from the national level or as negative peace, which is the absence of conflicts.

Participants FGD2a and FGD2B concurred with this view, noting that peacebuilding initiatives are aimed at creating positive peace which is not only the absence of war but the establishment of concrete strong foundations which frustrate and deter the emergence or recurrence of conflicts.

The main objective of peacebuilding is to strike a balance between “negative” peace and “positive” peace. Negative peace implies the end of war or violence and positive peace is the absence of structural violence or cultural violence, it presupposing that justice exists (Gawerc 2006). Participants FGD2c, FGD2d and FGD2f propounded that peacebuilding at community level involves unity, rebuilding broken relationships and working together to address societal problems. It injects elements of tolerance and valuing each other as human beings. Participant FGD2e cited:

This kind of peacebuilding at most yields positive peace as it creates a peace culture within the society. A common sense of social capital is consequently built within the society and it naturally leads to mutual respect and tolerance of the individual as well as dependence on one another.

This creates positive peace which is the goal of peacebuilding initiatives which can only be attained by creating a culture of peace amongst societies.

From the above definitions, a comprehensive understanding of peacebuilding then becomes a multipronged process that is aimed at creating conditions for peace, bringing conflicting parties together, and transforming their relationships from negative to positive, which requires a third party with skills and strategy. As a process, it can be done by multiple actors and at various levels depending on the scale and level of a conflict. It is a continuous process that begins with the end of a conflict into the post-conflict environment. The task therefore is for CSOs to have a common understanding of the root causes of a conflict which, at the end, can shape their peacebuilding approaches. Common understanding will in a way strengthen their peacebuilding interventions. The next section presents experiences of the respondents from CSOs involved in peacebuilding processes in Zimbabwe.

7.3 CSOs’ Roles and Functions in Peacebuilding Programme in Zimbabwe

Below are views expressed by respondents on the assumed roles and functions that CSOs have played in the process of building peace or bringing change in Zimbabwe. The roles outlined tally with the emerging conflict situation that CSOs attempted to address.

7.3.1 The Nexus between Mandate and CSOs’ Roles

The roles of CSOs in peacebuilding are outlined in their mandate. According to participant ICSO, “Mandates are drawn from a CSO’s understanding of a conflict situation. It is from these mandates that their agendas are drawn.” For example, the CCJPZ draws its mandate from the Zimbabwe Catholics Bishops Conference (ZCBC). The organisation tackles peace issues based on Christian teachings and values. Based on the values, it attempts to perform the following roles:

- I. Monitoring and documenting the human rights situation in the country for appropriate action
- II. Research, investigate and publish situations of injustice and violence and use the information to promote justice and peace
- III. Inform the laity and clergy of their responsibilities to work for justice and peace as Christians
- IV. Promote informed decision-making among the clergy and the laity to influence public opinion according to the Social Teachings of the Church
- V. Make constructive suggestions and input for the enactment of just civil laws and their impartial administration and implementation. (Social Teachings of the Church Training Manual 2014:8)

Evident from the mandate above, it shows that the major role that CSOs prioritise the most is the watchdog. As shall be explained, CSOs critically check against the powers of a government over the governed.

7.3.2 Watchdog Role

The crucial roles that emerge from the above list are as stated by Participant ICSOe: “monitoring and documentation of violations in human and civil rights”. This gives CSOs “a watchdog role or status in guarding against abuse of power by the State on its people” (Participant ICSO(A)). A conclusion drawn by participants FGD1c, FGD1d and FGD1f was that the monitoring and documentation of abuses is one common role that is performed by CSOs despite their orientations and the context in which they operate. The roles are, at most, performed by CSOs that pursue the liberal peacebuilding model that seeks to promote human rights, democracy and rule of law (Donais 2012). The monitoring is also done on social, political, economic and environmental issues. Much attention has been “on the political and economic issues where most funders have an interest” (Participant IAc). Participant FGD1g argued:

States are sceptical of being monitored; being held accountable is seen as a threat to state power than a practice that promotes transparency and good governance. This has resulted in CSOs being perceived as agents working against the state.

Apart from this, CSOs can be credited in the partial human rights reforms that the state has made through their campaigns and advocacy. For example, CSOs have been vocal in cases where human rights activists have been arbitrarily arrested by the police. To this end, the CSOs’ presence has to some extent deterred the state in openly abusing the rights of citizens.

To understand the link between the role and function of CSOs in peacebuilding, I interviewed officials from CSOs. In this way, responses from academics were left out as they had the knowledge from a

theoretical point of view without facing the reality on the ground. Respondents from CSOs had direct involvement in peacebuilding projects in Zimbabwe.

7.3.3 Prevailing Context and its Impact on CSOs' Role

Most of the interviewed participants from CSOs highlighted that their organisations began peacebuilding programmes in the first decade (Participants ICSO(A), ICSOb, ICSOd and ICSOe) when the country attained independence between the years 1980 and 1990. Participant IAd gave an explanation to this, noting: “During this decade there were fewer CSOs as the economy was still small. Their increase was seen with the expansion of the economy and the emergence of multiple issues in the nation.” From another angle, Participant ICSOe pointed out that:

We were part and parcel of the CSOs that were involved in documenting human rights violations during the *Gukurahundi* era. The findings of their report are still relevant in the present day as some CSOs and state officials are using it to pressure the government to carry out genuine reconciliation in Matabeleland region. Some victims are still struggling to get death certificates of their loved ones, which affected them in accessing other necessities.

CSOs played the role of rebuilding broken ties and addressing human rights atrocities (Ncube 2014) committed by state institutions. Participants IAe and IEc noted that “the period of *Gukurahundi* was the time when the army descended on the Ndebele people on political grounds in the Matabeleland region”. Participant ICSOc postulated:

While the state has not acted much on the report findings, the CSO managed to document the abuses which are being used by some organisations to assist the victims through various projects. The findings, though hurtful, also tell a story to the living of the effects of violent methods in resolving conflicts.

In this way, they have an educating effect or role to assume for the benefit of the current and future generations to come.

7.3.4 Training and Educating Role

Seeding a culture of peace within societies has been pursued through several activities by CSOs, amongst which include training the people on how to react to conflict through non-violence. Participant ICSOc summarised his experiences in peacebuilding as follows:

In our efforts to build peace in Zimbabwe we have conducted several efforts and activities in communities. Some of our energies were spent on conducting peacebuilding workshops, peace games and peace marathons. Out of these we found out that holding peace games such as soccer have been effective in uniting victims and perpetrators together.

Such experiences exhibit that CSOs assume the role of educators or peace promoters through training workshops and sport. Participant ICSOc noted that in the initial stages of the soccer matches “there was rivalry within members of the same team based on past grudges as they didn’t pass the ball to each other” but due to the need of working together, which is one attribute of sporting disciplines, the team

members naturally became inclined to work together for the common cause of the team. Similar sentiments were shared by participant ICSOe citing:

Even the supporters of different political orientations cheered their teams together and the differences were temporarily erased. During the awarding of trophies to the winning teams, CSOs would take the opportunity to spread the messages of peace, using the benefits of tolerance and reconciliation exhibited during the games as points of reference.

In this respect, CSOs have used sport to pull people together and spread the messages of peace. Introducing games and sports in peacebuilding activities has proven to be an effective strategy in reaching out to communities.

Participant ICSOb articulated that:

Sports, such as soccer, prove effective and strategic in that there is a belief that men are the perpetrators of violence and as such soccer is one of the main attractions to men in society. The game had a lot of buy in from the community members and people managed to get entertainment and peace education at the same time. The themes for the games revolved around creating peaceful societies. The communities targeted were those that were affected by the 2008 election-related violence.

From the views expressed above, one can note that sporting activities contributes to the creation of zones of peace, peaceful constituencies and peace clubs within the societies. Participants FGD1d and FGD1e noted that the rationale is for the people to learn each other's needs and fears which can help bring about tolerance. Games glue people together despite their differences. This becomes a strategic entry point for CSOs to spread the message of peace as exhibited in the above situation. In some constituencies where such programmes have been rolled out, participants FGD1f and FGD1g added that, a culture of tolerance has been sowed to the extent that the 2013 election were not marred by intense violence as was seen in 2008.

Like this approach were the activities undertaken by another CSO after the 2008 election violence. Participants FGD1a, FGD1b and FGD1c highlighted that since 2009, CSOs have coordinated dialogue projects. Participant FGD1c specifically pointed out that "the emerging peacebuilding themes for our projects revolve around methods of conflict prevention, meet your leader, peace concerts, prayer rallies, sports for peace, transitional justice programmes and conflict mapping".

Further experiences were also shared by other FGD participants. Participant FGD2a, whose CSO is based in Harare and Bulawayo, noted: "They played the role of influencing policy-making processes through advocacy to the communities and policy makers". The role and function of CSOs then revolved around informational and educational strategies (Raftopoulos 2000) within a community. On one occasion the participant FGD2a highlighted that:

Our CSO had a programme directed on working with the local people, policy makers and the commission on National Peace and Reconciliation bill (NPRC). The commission was established with the end of the June 2008 bloody elections.

Their activities in the peacebuilding process included, but were not limited to:

Training members of parliament, researching, influencing the mandate of the NPRC, linking policy makers with external experts on transitional justice and raising awareness for the reconciliation bill. The logic behind the idea is that people and decision makers can learn to make informed decisions on matters affecting their constituencies. From this, our CSO successfully criticised the bill that was proposed in parliament for having several defects. It resulted in the bill not being passed into a law (Participant FGD2a).

The grounds for rejection of the NPR bill was that too much power was invested in the state for monitoring and controlling the commissioners, seeing as how the NPRC would be accountable to the minister and not the parliament (Newsday 2016). The rejection of the bill is a repeat of successful lobbying methods that CSOs have used in Zimbabwe when they campaigned for the ‘NO’ vote of the 2000 referendum, which was spearheaded by the NCA 2005 peaceful prayer vigil by the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) and the Save education campaign in 2008 (Sachikonye 2011). Participant FGD2b observed that this demonstrates that “CSOs have been instrumental in lobbying, educating and advocating for the passing of bills that do not infringe on the people’s civil and political liberties as enshrined in the constitution”. According to participant FG2d, “the presence and voices of CSOs have been enough for checking against the abuse of power by the State”.

Education through workshops and training has proven to be effective towards raising awareness to the ordinary people on matters that affect their day-to-day lives. As an operational strategy, participant FGD2b noted:

Our organisation has nine local independent experts, on issues to do with peace. To complement their input and strategy, he cited that they also link with other experts outside the country, for example an Indian expert Yusuka who deals with transitional justice matters. Further, to make their messages legitimate, they abided to international and regional transitional justice standards.

In this way, CSOs have managed to work well with the state and other stakeholders in peacebuilding. However, the state remains cautious when engaging with CSOs in politically-related peace exercises.

Apart from national peacebuilding efforts, other CSOs have been active in grassroots or community-based peacebuilding programmes. Participant ICSOd postulated that “they developed models that incorporate the local communities” and in doing so, women have been the most important actors involved in CSOs’ peacebuilding campaigns.

7.3.5 Building Peace with Women

Women have more positive potential towards cultivating a culture of peace in a society. Women are natural educators, and this becomes one of the key features required for building peace. Participant ICSOd summarised one of the programmes they have run in building peace with rural women as follows:

'Creating space for women'. In designing the project our CSO borrowed from the Shona proverb that '*Musha mukadzi*'. Loosely translated 'the woman makes the home.' Women are also targeted in peacebuilding programmes as they often are the victims of conflicts. Women have also been excluded as a result of the chauvinist nature of the society. Women are left out from decision-making processes in the rural communities, yet they have potential in building peace. At most they are the ones who work hard for their families. In the program women are invited to discuss issues affecting them and the society. In the discussions they also try to prescribe solutions that can mitigate the problems.

The activities resonate well with what Graham et al. (2006) articulate when explaining the roles of women in peacebuilding. Women constitute half of every community and the task of peacebuilding, a task which is so great that it must be done in partnership with both women and men (ibid). Women play important roles in peacebuilding as activists and advocates for peace and they wage conflict non-violently using democratic means and pursuing human rights; as peacekeepers and relief aid workers, women contribute to the reduction of violence; as mediators, trauma healing, counsellors and policymakers, women work to transform relationships and address the root of violence; and lastly, as educators and participants in the development process, women contribute to building the capacity of their communities and nations to prevent conflict. The "*Musha mukadzi*" theme is a noble community-based peacebuilding initiative.

7.3.6 Working with Grassroots Indigenous Values in Peacebuilding

The process of building peace is spread to embrace the values, beliefs and cultures that are shared by people within a community, not limited to individuals. Despite working with women, the CSO respondent noted that the organisation also works on rebuilding broken ties within the communities after a conflict ends. In their efforts the CSOs consider the cultural practices that are performed by a community when conflicts occur within the society. Participant ICSOc explained that:

We conduct memorialization, in which memorial services are conducted with the families that lost their loved ones in conflicts, and ritualization, in which we perform traditional practices that are done to bring peace to the deceased as well as those who remain in the conflict's aftermath. We also conduct clean up campaigns involving cleaning the environment, which symbolises the extrication of violence within the community. The organisation takes the Rwandan *Gacaca* system of solving conflicts. However, their model is not court-based but rather based on the Shona concept of '*Dare*'. This is a forum for discussion within rural or traditional communities.

The application of the two peacebuilding approaches demonstrates grassroots peacebuilding models. In the above noted cases, CSOs tap into the local knowledge and practice. For this reason and approach, there has been a lot of "buy-in" from local stakeholders. "People have interests in things that they know and practice daily," echoed participant IEc. A sense of ownership of the projects is established and when ownership is created so is sustainability of the project with the community.

Participant ICSO(A) shared a different experience in peacebuilding. He noted that:

While local traditions and practices have been used, there are other people who lack interest in the project. Some people place more value on tangible things than being empowered through education or raising awareness on the effects of violence and methods that they can use in resolving the violence.

One of the explanations behind some people losing interest in traditional peacebuilding approach is religious beliefs. Given that Christianity is one of the major religions followed and practiced in Zimbabwe, people tend to distance themselves from traditional ceremonies as they hold the belief that they are unholy. To this end, traditional approaches become less appealing, particularly in urban areas. Such beliefs have been aggravated by the harsh economic climate that is sweeping across the country. In support of this observation, participant IEa notes, “In an impoverished society like Zimbabwe, it is difficult to convince people to leave their income generating activities for peacebuilding programmes which do not equip them with income generating skills”. The prevailing economic environment has a negative bearing on the programme of CSOs in peacebuilding and due to this, they designed another project that had some incentives for those who participated in it. In this scenario, FGD2f summarised their intervention as follows:

The organisation used the Shona practice of *Nhimbe*. In this practice, local people come together to work on developmental projects like community farming. The produce is either sold or shared amongst the people who participate in it. It is in these projects when people work together that relationships are built or strengthened. The effect of this is that, come election times when acts of violence are high, one community member will not go and beat up someone that they have been working with during peaceful periods. Creating peace clubs also complements the *Nhimbe* concept. To complement the concept of *Nhimbe*, they trained people in conflict mapping and resolution. On resolution, a peace club can identify the best person to resolve an issue, for example land disputes can be referred to the village head or the councillor who are the custodians of the land.

Participant FGD2f noted that there has been great success and achievement as there was great interest and participation by the communities. For example:

The local key stakeholders that include the paramount chief, chief, ward coordinator, councillor, and village head had to encourage their people to attend and, in some cases, the chief could also make presentations to his own people around the themes of peace (participant FGD2f).

This shows the merits of embracing local culture in CSOs’ peacebuilding efforts. Participant FGD2b pointed out that the crisis of legitimacy of peacebuilding programmes is thereby erased. Participant FGD2c further advocated that this breeds a viable constructive engagement between CSOs and the local people or between CSOs and key stakeholders. This can be termed peacebuilding from below, unlike peacebuilding from above which focuses on national institutions, structures and processes. However, it should be noted that the processes of peacebuilding have not been rosy throughout. Both, CSOs’ top-down and bottom-up peacebuilding models, have encountered some challenges, as will be presented below.

7.4 Challenges Faced by CSOs in Peacebuilding

CSOs in peacebuilding have not been spared from the plethora of challenges faced by other CSOs working in other sectors. The extent of the challenges depends on the type of peacebuilding project they will be implementing. For instance, participant IAa argued:

Community peacebuilding projects that involve discussing and training on non-violence in domestic and community disputes receive few to no challenges from the State. CSOs' activists involved in grassroots projects are at most spared from bans or arbitrary arrests by State institutions. The cases in which CSOs face the greatest resistance is where peacebuilding models are directed towards addressing violence committed by State institutions or structural violence.

The general view adopted in FGD2 was that: “on soft issues peacebuilding projects sail through while on hard and sensitive issues to the State, CSOs face a mammoth task.” Concurring with this are the views of Sachikonye (2011), that CSOs that were active in governance and human rights issues were subjected to different forms of violence which came in the forms of harassment, surveillance and detention.

Participant FGD2d noted, “CSOs face hurdles from the State but also from the people themselves who, not only have different insights but also, different priorities in the problems the community faces.” Similar comments were raised by FGD2e, who stated, “Some of the challenges are internally generated within the CSOs themselves.” These experiences are discussed in greater detail from the experiences of CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. The environment in which CSOs operate has placed huge barriers to their peacebuilding programme. An unfavourable environment creates barricades that make it difficult for CSOs to enter and reach out to the affected communities. Even when permitted, the local people are hesitant to cooperate fully due to fear of the unknown as shall be indicated in the areas below.

7.4.1 A Violent Political Environment

From the collation of responses from FGD1, the major challenge facing peacebuilding CSOs in Zimbabwe seems to be the chronic and widespread political culture of the state which is often paired with the resort to violence as a means to an end. Participant FGD1a explained, “The history of Zimbabwe is one of the wars of *Chimurenga*. The spirit of *Chimurenga* has become an accepted national war cry”. The word *Chimurenga* implies a spirit of resilience and fighting against an unjust system – this fighting is often associated with violent uprising. The fighting spirit emerged during the liberation wars that were fought by Black people against the white minority rule. Unfortunately, it carries marks of consequentialism where the means to an end does not matter yet, to maintain peace and order through violence, a negative violence culture will be sown. True to this sentiment, participant FGD1b argued, “The Zimbabwean society believes in *Chimurenga* as a means of freeing themselves from any bondage, be it political, social or economic”. “The liberation wars,” explained participant FGD1b, “were known as the ‘*Chimurenga* 1 and 2 wars of political freedom’ and the fast-track land reform programme was also touted as ‘*Chimurenga* 3 which was a fulfilment of the grievances of *Chimurenga* 1 and 2’. The indigenisation policy was also touted as ‘*Chimurenga* 4’.

In support, participant FGD1c lamented:

Peacebuilding initiatives in Zimbabwe face what I can term a psycho-political challenge. It is not evident, but it is there. There is general intolerance towards opposing views and its presence is felt only prior to elections. It is like there is a spirit which awakens, the spirit of *Chimurenga* maybe, and as soon as it awakens, all peacebuilding efforts go to waste.

Participant FGD1d also concurred with the above view, saying, “One of the major political parties which forms the government uses the slogan ‘*Pamberi ne Chimurenga*’ even during times of peace.” This, he argued, “is a clear admission by the State that the absence of war is not necessarily the presence of peace, given that the slogan is an open endorsement of not just the values and ethos of, but also the violence, that characterized the liberation war”. The same was noted by participants FGD1e and FGD1f in relation to the major opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change – the Tsvangirai-led faction (MDC-T) whose slogan is ‘*Chinja maitiro. Maitiro chinja*’ which means ‘change the system’ without elaborating the means to achieve the intended change. This makes the big political parties in Zimbabwe, ZANU PF and MDC, the major culprits hindering and slowing down peacebuilding activities. “As long as they oppose instead of complementing one another,” participant FGD1f noted, “Peacebuilding initiatives in Zimbabwe will go in vain due to the age-old play on society’s political intolerance.” “Be it due to racial, tribal and ideological grounds, intolerance has decreased the chances of creating positive peace,” says Participant FGD1e.

Even social and economic policies are carried out violently in the name of the *Chimurenga*. Mhanda (2011) has this view along with most of the respondents in FGD1, who agreed with the notion that violence is a political language in Zimbabwe, and this violence peaks during election times. Commenting on this, participant ICSOc noted,

“The pent-up fear during the election period is strong to the point where the peace structures that will be put in place will not be able to withstand the pressure, leading to another spiral of electoral conflicts”.

Concurring with this view were responses from participant ICSOe:

Parts of the Zimbabwean society have been affected by violence to the extent that, when the state draws closer to elections, campaigners of political parties threaten people to remind them of the horrors of past electoral conflicts. These threats have led to vote apathy or if they do vote, their choices have been altered by fear.

This validates Masunungure’s conclusion regarding the 2008 elections, that the elections were without a choice (Masunungure 2009). Not only does violence affect the electorate but also CSOs. According to participant IAa,

“The 1980’s Matabeleland bloodshed, to some extent, resulted in some CSOs redefining their roles and character. They chickened out, moved from critical watchdogs to sympathisers of the State thereby becoming toothless bulldogs, and worse, without eyes”.

CSOs took a low profile and began to play a complementary role (Raftopoulos 2000) to the State’s position and activities. The effect was that some CSOs were then co-opted by the State while only a few remained, sticking to their principles.

7.4.2 CSOs’ Dependence on Political Parties and Polarisation

A major disabling factor within CSOs’ operations in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, has been their lack of independence or autonomy. “CSOs have at times assumed the roles of mouthpieces or extensions of

political parties' ideologies; some being pro- or anti-political parties," Participant IAb elaborated, showing that some CSOs have failed to stick to the principles that they were supposed to uphold in society. Concurring with this, Masunungure (2011) argues, "CSOs' independence had been tainted by the fact that they went to bed with political parties". During FGD1, the major conclusion drawn was that:

CSOs' direct or indirect alignment with a political party has been worsened by the prevailing polarised environment.

This has made it difficult for peacebuilding CSOs to carry out their activities meaningfully and sustainably. In such operating environments, civil society can emerge as either constructive or destructive forces in bringing any change (Paffenholz 2010, Peinado 2003). CSOs can therefore either be good or bad in any political system. Participant IAd also observed that, "because of polarity some CSOs' activities have to be treated with caution".

It is also necessary to note the situation in Zimbabwe:

CSOs have become attached or are, in some cases, working as extensions for monetary rewards or to seek relevance. "It is clear in the Zimbabwean context that we have pro-ZANU PF and anti ZANU PF CSOs instead of having impartial peacebuilding CSOs," participant IAd added.

In a similar case, Lovemore Madhuku, leader of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), at one time encouraged his membership within the organisation to vote for the MDC in the elections of 2000 (Matyszak 2009). The NCA no longer demonstrated the impartial or independent role that CSOs are supposed to show. As a result of being swallowed up by political parties, Zimbabwean CSOs have lost relevance as their peacebuilding activities, compared with the messages carried by political parties, do not appeal much to the grassroots.

On the contrary, participant IAc noted:

There was a correlation in the messages that CSOs had with that of opposition political parties and this led to the misinterpretation of CSO's activities that were advocating for democracy and human rights, saying that they were conveyer belts of parties that talked of such ideologies.

Participant IEa had added that the position of peacebuilding CSOs was a compromised one; this came out as follows:

The CSOs in peacebuilding are caught between a rock and a hard place. The state which is represented by the ZANU PF government, views the CSOs as opposition regime change pawns while the opposition parties also view the CSOs as their political pawns whom they can use to enhance their political ambitions. CSOs are political agents no matter the perspective and this limits the scope of their activities as they are often thwarted or hijacked by political parties.

The polarisation and failure to distinguish CSOs' voices from political party ideologies results in a situation where CSOs are treated as political actors; no longer viewed as neutral entities but seen as agents that are competing for political office.

Participant ICSOb stated:

Such problems have led to repression and violence waged by state institutions. At one point, when the opposition political party (MDC) lost the 2013 elections, so too did the CSOs that sympathised or shared the ideologies of the party.

People's perceptions are affected in that they no longer want to associate themselves with certain CSOs. When a CSOs comes in with a peacebuilding project, people are now hesitant without relevant background knowledge. According to Participant IAe, "In constituencies of ruling party strongholds, CSOs are denied access or if they are, the locals associating with them are harassed".

7.4.3 The Regime Change Tags

From the in-depth interviews it emerged that peacebuilding CSOs in Zimbabwe face another challenge. Participant IAb stated it as being the "Branding of their organisations as political parties when embarking on peacebuilding activities in pro-ruling party constituencies". There was general agreement among members in FGD2, that the CSOs are having sinister regime-change motives by the ruling party which they labelled as "autocratic". Peacebuilding CSOs, though well-intentioned, are not left out in this crucifixion crusade. Where CSOs have tried to put forward homebrewed agendas, they have not been taken seriously by the government as they are viewed as external products or pursuing the Northern agenda (Mhlanga 1999:9 in Masunungure 2008:64).

Participant ICSOe further postulated:

Members of most CSOs in peacebuilding were manhandled by the youth militia in the run-up to the 2008 run-off presidential election and were accused of trying to infiltrate their constituencies despite their efforts being focused on promoting political tolerance and peaceful co-existence. The situation is not only limited to this constituency (name withheld) but also to other rural and peri-urban constituencies, where the ruling party holds the fort. Loosely linked to the above scenario is another unfortunate situation where the police deny certain CSOs the right to hold public gatherings and demonstrations, using the fear of the emergence of violence as an excuse.

Thus, even though the intentions of the peacebuilding CSOs are noble, their efforts are greatly thwarted by the State as well as members of the party which forms the government.

In support, participant ICSOc noted:

The scale and intensity of violence unleashed upon CSOs is great, particularly on CSOs that work on hard or sensitive issues to the state. For example, the treatment and perceptions of CSOs working on developmental and humanitarian issues are different to those that focus on democracy and human rights abuses that are committed by the state.

In 2006, ZCTU membership held peaceful protests against poverty and high taxes which lead to the top leadership being arrested and detained in 9 locations around the country (Sachikonye 2011). Apart from the violent environment they operate from, the economic challenges facing the State have created stumbling blocks for CSOs' peacebuilding messages and programmes to be effectively heard.

A detailed presentation and analysis of the economic challenges follows.

7.4.4 The Harsh Economic Environment

The continued economic hardships in Zimbabwe have impacted on the mentality and priorities of the citizens, both in urban and rural communities. The notion that “time is money” seems to be driving Zimbabweans away from peacebuilding programme which they regard as time wasters. “People want livelihood projects as opposed to peacebuilding. They would rather have employment in a violent community. The priority of people is that they want employment and more food as opposed to security or safety,” admits Participant ICSO(A). The thought that runs through people’s minds is that, with the end of violent conflicts, they see no need for any peacebuilding. “To many rural folks, peacebuilding projects are not bringing food to the table,” added participant ICSO(A). Their focus is on survival in terms of having a job or establishing a project that can sustain their families. They see no relevance in rebuilding broken ties, yet these continue to be the very ingredients for future conflicts like the violent culture that resurfaces during the election period. This mentality is shared by individuals as well as the government itself. This is highlighted by CCJPZ in its response to government’s priorities. “CCJPZ has advocated for the peace and reconciliation bill to be debated in parliament. Unfortunately, the president prioritised the passage of other bills that include economic bills,” (Mhotshwa 2016). The rebuilding of the economy is another form of creating conditions for peace, however, meaningful development cannot take place in an environment where people have unhealed wounds from past conflicts such as the 2008 election violence.

Participant ICSOb added, “In rural communities when people see a gathering they quickly rush to join. Upon finding out that it is a peace programme they start to disappear”. This priority dilemma has also been witnessed in urban areas. Participant FGD2e stated:

At one community meeting it was announced that there was a CSO working on peace issues that was visiting their area and wanted to train people. The organisation wanted those willing to register their names in advance for logistical purposes. Unfortunately, when the meeting ended not even a single person had bothered to register their names for the training. This would be different if a list of names were to be compiled for people to access food hand-outs or jobs.

The priorities of people render CSOs’ peacebuilding programmes as less than appealing, especially to those who find themselves facing economic woes, despite peacebuilding encompassing ways of jump-starting the economy. Economic revival is a major instrument for building peace and enhancing social recovery. The priority for most people would at most be the re-engagement in income-generating activities to support their families and restore their living standards. Obidegwu (2004) explained that if the restoration of peace was a priority, as it often is, the initial efforts should be targeted on meeting the needs of the people.

7.4.5 Limitations of Incentives

In some cases, CSOs have reached the extent of bringing incentives to lure people into their programme. This has attracted multitudes to meetings called by the CSOs providing incentives, which generally work by drawing awareness to the CSOs and their peacebuilding activities. According to participant

FGD1g, “The disbursement of incentives could be the panacea to ending the poor attendance problems associated with peacebuilding programmes”. “Indeed, this is true” agreed participant FGD1a, before carefully dismissing the point arguing on the downside of distributing incentives to lure people to the meetings. He asked, “If people ignore one peacebuilding meeting and then attend the other that is giving incentives, what does that entail?” The general conclusion on this matter in FGD1 was that the people’s intentions and attentions were focused on incentives and not on the peacebuilding education and awareness programme in place. Thus, the downside of the practice is that an element of voluntary participation is erased.

This view was also validated by participant ICSOd who explained that: “personally as a former university student I used to attend peacebuilding meetings because I knew I would be given allowances”. At most the message vanishes as soon as that person leaves the meeting or workshop. Another interviewee noted that “in some cases more people would attend the meetings compared to the available incentives” (Participant ICSOb). In fact, the inadequate incentives, in comparison with the demand, resulted in the occurrence of violence at a peacebuilding programme. “The overall goals of that meeting were vanquished by the crowds who were fighting for the 10kg packets of mealie-meal the CSO had availed,” confided participant ICSOb.

In some cases, providing incentives has created challenges for other CSOs without incentives to launch and have their programme accepted by the people. This has seen people flocking to meetings where they get incentives and shunning those that do not provide such incentives, as noted above. The major problem resulting from such a scenario is the emergence of competition among peacebuilding CSOs.

7.4.6 Competition Overfunding and Budgetary Constraints

In some cases when the economy is not performing well, CSOs will compete to seek for funding. This competition occurs when some founders become entrepreneurs through starting a CSO, leading to demand in donor funding by old and new organisations. Instead of working together, CSOs in Zimbabwe, “are competing with each other for mileage to get more resources. Peacebuilding meetings have been turned into a numbers’ game,” noted participant IAa. This may explain why the CSO uses incentives to lure crowds. “Though some may end up getting the message when they receive the incentive, an element of sustainability is challenged,” confesses Participant IAe. Unfortunately, the competition that CSOs enter affects their unity in addressing the socio-political and economic problems the communities will be facing. CSOs in peacebuilding end up being fragmented. They ignore the real issues affecting the people and, in most cases, they will be seeking attention and access to money from one source, as shall be highlighted below.

As a direct result of the economic meltdown, the activities of most peacebuilding CSOs have been hampered greatly by a limited budget. CSOs in Zimbabwe are creatures of the international community which provides them with the necessary material and funding (Masunungure 2011). The external

challenges experienced in the international community have a bearing on the activities and operations of CSOs. One sixth of CSOs in developing countries have felt the negative spillover effects of the Global Financial Crisis yet most of their funds originate from the European States that have been hit by the crisis (Clark 2011). For example, participant IAc noted,

Most CSOs have shut down or are downsizing in Zimbabwe as a result of financial hiccups and the prevailing economic environment.

Financial constraints have also caused logistical constraints within CSOs since funding is the life-blood of any organisation.

7.4.7 Funding with Stringent Conditionality

In addition, it can be observed that where funding has been available it has come with strings attached. This means they set the agendas which might not be in touch with the realities of the local communities. The downside of external funding is brought out in the research done by the department of international development 2013, “it leads to the proliferation of donor dependent advocacy and CSOs with weak links to ordinary citizens. This leads to weak sustainability of citizen engagement beyond the period of donor funding.” From this, external funding becomes a problem as an attempt to buy durable peace in cases where CSOs’ agendas are externally crafted by the funders, who then become the founders of some CSOs.

Participant ICSOd highlighted that, “CSOs are molded by the environment rather than following a particular ideology. They rush to where money is and don’t understand the political economy.” Weak financial muscle has led CSOs failing, to spread across the country or even to reach out to some of the communities. I noted that most CSOs in peacebuilding are either based in Harare or Bulawayo which are urban settings. There is lack of representation of peacebuilding CSOs in most parts of the country.

7.4.8 Brain Drain Effect

Most respondents bemoaned the financial gap as a major setback which has resulted in the loss of skilled personnel. Participant ICSOc says it as follows:

We are losing highly qualified and highly skilled personnel in our organization due to the delay of payments as well as the lack of funds to meet the set goals. Most of our top managerial staff resigned citing the absence of motivation as well as the operating environment which they said was not conducive as they were failing to meet the set goals due to non-availability of the funds to carry out the planned activities.

Indeed, brain drain has been the major Achilles heel for the peacebuilding CSOs who are losing professionals to other CSOs as well as other organisations which are more rewarding and more appealing to the general masses.

Participant IEc reprimanded CSO peacebuilding directors labelling them as “lazy cry-babies who just want to be spoon fed”. She went on to highlight that most CSOs were not innovative in the wake of the

financial hiccups they are facing. One example, she noted, was the personality and technical acumen of Mawarire whose peaceful civil disobedience agitations were graced by the multitudes who heeded his stay away calls. Participant IEc further argued:

If a single individual could overcome the financial hurdles by using very cheap and easily accessible social media platforms, what are full organizations with degreed professionals crying about? If a single individual can think outside the box to cause peaceful civil disobedience, then we expect fully-fledged organisations not just to think outside the box, but to smash it.

Nonetheless, the financial hurdles are truly deterring the activities of many other peacebuilding CSOs.

7.4.9 Rigid Mandates

CSOs that are tightly and formally organised fix themselves to strict mandates that a funder or founder would have laid. In this respect they are not flexible in adjusting towards the changing realities within their operational environment. When change occurs, it does so at a tortoise pace, yet problems will be escalating before they intervene. In FGD2, I specifically brought the issue of Mawarire (#This Flag⁶) into the discussion to get the views of the participants on why they were being outclassed by an individual in mobilising the civilians for a common cause, yet the individuals and the organisations were operating in a similar financially crippled environment? From the eye-opening discussions I managed to discover that most peacebuilding CSOs are limited by their mandates. As the FGD2 respondents aired out their views, one fact stood out - that it was a complex task to run an organisation compared to going solo. There are professional, ethical, institutional and strict rules and laws that govern their operations. Participant FGD2c noted that, “At most CSOs are not flexible to carry out their operations.” This point was also succinctly put across by participant FGD2a. She had this to say:

As a CSO director I cannot just wake up and deviate from the set goals and procedures we set at the beginning of the year. Our budgets are distributed according to the goals we set and how we are going to meet those goals. Bending the goals in reaction to certain environmental changes will, in the long run, financially cripple our operations. We have human resources that need to be paid and projects that we would have set in motion which need to be completed. Peacebuilding CSOs are not meant to please the audience, our job is to gradually instil peacebuilding values and ethos in the grassroots so that in the long run we achieve positive peace which is sustainable peace.

Following this it becomes apparent that CSOs are at times handicapped by organisational mandates to the extent that even when they are in the field, they may negate a problem that will be occurring, arguing that they cannot act on it as it is outside their mandates. It follows that they need to be flexible in carrying out their operations in the field; for example, while they might have a mission of educating people, they might encounter situations where there is the need for reconciling or healing.

7.4.10 Mismanagement and Internal Corruption

Apart from following their mandates strictly, CSOs sometimes have weak internal management systems. It was also noted by participant IAc that “closely related to the financial challenges is the rise

⁶ A social protest movement in Zimbabwe (https://www.pindula.co.zw/This_Flag_Movement).

in corruption and mismanagement of funds by the CSOs which is also limiting their operations”. Although corruption is difficult to trace and nail down, I managed to gather from the interviews I had with academics that perhaps there were some elements of corruption and mismanagement of funds by the CSOs’ officials. Accordingly, CSOs’ political muscle and effectiveness have been weakened by little internal accountability and transparency (Clark 2011, Masunungure 2011). During the in-depth interviews, I carefully interrogated the alleged issues of mismanagement of funds and most CSO respondents strongly refuted the allegations.

7.4.11 Limitations of Elitist Peacebuilding Approaches

Top-down approaches do not translate into sustainable outcomes. Most programmes that are crafted from top and implemented in a commandist style lose relevance among the communities. Chances are high that there will be a mismatch between the solutions offered and the root causes of the problem in the society. The conclusion reached in FGD1 was:

Top-down peacebuilding is problematic in that it is often characterized by internationally backed mechanisms, structures and ideas that lack indigenous legitimacy since they are not a product of internal inter-subjective understandings. At most they are used for political campaigns where messages of peace are used in party slogans when the election period is over and so is the message of peace. A comparative look at war torn societies like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Rwanda shows that the war years were synonymous with a violent imposition on society and culture.

Participants FGD1f and FGD1f articulated that, “Bottom-up approaches therefore become more effective in that there is the participation of the people with the use of their culture”. It is not an imposition from above, concurred participant FGD1e. DFID (2013) describes the process as working with the local grain or culture. It facilitates locally-owned processes of change. This calls for CSOs to design demand-side peacebuilding programmes as opposed to supply-side (ibid). To reinforce this, one can note that when a CSO project ceases people can carry on with it, which results in durable peace.

Participant IEb submitted,

“In Zimbabwe, politicians have used people’s emotions to achieve a particular end and have subsequently hijacked top-down approaches. Top-down peacebuilding models have worked in monitoring or checking the powers of the government”.

In some cases, “CSOs’ reports have been ignored by the State,” added participant IEc. Concurring, participant ICSoB noted that “At most the State hears and not listens to the voices or calls made by middle-out actors leading to no changes or improvements being done in some communities.” From the above, CSOs’ roles and functions have revolved around documenting and monitoring, education campaigns and training, research and advocacy. All the functions have been carried out using non-violent means such as community projects, sports and peaceful campaigns.

The above challenges are the most common that are faced by CSOs following either liberal or grassroots peacebuilding models. Most hurdles emanate from external factors rather than those within the CSOs.

Despite this they all influence CSOs' peacebuilding programme. To understand the way forward the respondents aired out some of the views of what can be done to mitigate the challenges.

7.5 Strengthening CSOs in Peacebuilding

There are many issues which need to be addressed and these include enhancing the financial capacity of peacebuilding CSOs, engaging the grassroots, improving relations with the State and other stakeholders, enhancing internal governance systems, agenda-setting, and programming activities as well as capacitating the institutions. The findings and analysis of these and more is thematically presented below.

7.5.1 Financial Capacity

Many peacebuilding CSOs were greatly affected by the global financial crisis and some are on the verge of winding down. It has been noted in the presentation that most of these organisations are financially crippled and this has been limiting the effectiveness of their programmes. It is therefore, imperative for peacebuilding CSOs to be innovative and embark on major fund-raising activities to overcome this financial limitation. Most respondents in FGD1 noted that the CSOs needed to merge their franchises just like the private companies do when they are faced with dire financial constraints. Participant FGD1a noted:

“Peacebuilding CSOs have to be innovative and instead of carrying a begging bowl to external funders, they should develop mechanisms that enable them to become self-sufficient.”

One of the suggested measures for CSOs to become self-sufficient which came in one of the interviews was the need for CSOs to engage in income generating projects such as commercial farming. Participant IAe pointed to the fact that:

Most universities in Zimbabwe had acquired farms to reduce their operational costs. The same could be done by the peacebuilding CSOs. He also encouraged CSOs to establish housing gardens in the low-density suburbs for example where they can be able to collect monthly rentals which can also contribute to their budgets instead of just waiting to be spoon fed by donors.

By gaining financial sustenance, participant ICSOc noted that, “they can embark on low cost livelihood projects. In these projects, messages of peace can then be spread.” The thinking was that livelihood projects become a pull-factor in constituencies which are hard hit by economic woes. Participant ICSOc adds that, “in their effort to source for funding, CSOs should not be seen competing but rather playing a complementary function.” DFID 2013 highlighted that there is a need for developing peacebuilding partnerships. In this way they can be united and be able to influence with a strong voice.

In FGD1, it was also noted that CSOs needed to have stronger internal governance systems to curtail the abuse of funds. Participant IEb urged CSOs to reduce the numbers of their permanent employees, a majority of whom are redundant and “chewing up the already constrained budgets of their organisations”. Participant IEb encouraged the peacebuilding CSOs to engage volunteers, when

embarking on their peacebuilding activities, to reduce labour-related expenses. I also managed to conclude from the field research that, generally, the operating costs of the CSOs were exorbitant and therefore, from the responses, it was evident that the CSOs must use cheaper means of reaching out to the grassroots. They can make use of adverts in the public media as well as making use of social media platforms to convey their messages.

7.5.2 Capacity Building

A collation of responses from the findings shows that most peacebuilding CSOs were affected by a brain-drain. A majority of highly qualified experts left their jobs in search of greener pastures locally and outside Zimbabwe to countries such as South Africa, Senegal, South Sudan and Namibia. According to participant ICSOb, “This left an expertise vacuum which has impacted negatively on the activities of a number of CSOs which are now redundant”. This point was supported by participant FGD2b who stated:

Most of the CSOs are clueless on how to adapt to changing times. There are no innovative and talented individuals within the CSOs besides the armchair directors whose mandate these days is to fleece the organizations’ funds through salaries and benefits for no work done.

It is therefore, prudent for peacebuilding CSOs in Zimbabwe to hire experts in peacebuilding to manage and run their organisations.

Another finding drawn from participant ICSOe was that CSOs lack political intelligence. This means that they fail to act strategically when engaging in their peacebuilding programmes. In an article, DFID (2013) states that:

CSOs need to understand the realities of power relations that shape change in their societies. It entails understanding things from the politicians’ point of view or the mind set of people who are in power. Having done this, they will know where to pitch their tents from.

To this end, I noted that the lacuna in political intelligence has crippled CSOs in peacebuilding since all the problems they attempt to address are caused by politics. They therefore need such an intellectual capacity. Other CSOs have embarked on training the trainer for sustainability to be realised in some communities. Further they can solicit for what the people want so that their views can be captured in their peacebuilding programmes (Participant ICSO(A)).

7.5.3 Engaging the Grassroots

For a peacebuilding programme to be effective there is need for the greater involvement of grassroots voices. In other words, the process of building peace must be democratic and sensitive to local views and perceptions. Participant IEa explained, “The overarching goals of all CSOs are to reach out and have an impact on the civilian population. Without these there are no CSOs.” There is need for a bottom-up approach when CSOs craft their programmes so that they are not lost from reality. This view merges well with the views of Burton (1990) who explained that it is the grassroots which suffers directly the

ills of conflicts and therefore it is that part of the community which must play an active peacebuilding role in order to foster human security. The Department of International Development 2013, has it that CSOs must work with the grain of local culture and facilitate locally owned process of change. This creates a sense of ownership that is crucial for the viability of any peacebuilding project. A communal approach to peacebuilding translates into building peace from the bottom. Engagement with the grassroots can be achieved through embarking on road shows, public gatherings, having community suggestion boxes and engaging the public vigorously through the media and social media platforms so that they play an active role and indirectly run the peacebuilding initiatives.

7.5.4 Improving Relations with the State and Other Stakeholders

The major challenge limiting the effective operation of the peacebuilding CSOs in Zimbabwe is their broken relationship with the state. There is suspicion and a general mistrust between the state and civil society. From the FGD2 responses they noted that there is a general agreement among stakeholders that peacebuilding CSOs, by virtue of their field which involves healing, reconciliation and tolerance of diverging views, must be at the forefront of mending relations with the state instead of being confrontational. Members in FGD2 argued that they wished to have a working relationship with the state, but their activities were hampered by the state itself which treats them with suspicion. Participant IEc noted that

The problem with the state is that it wants to manipulate and patronize the CSOs into submitting to its dictates.

Herein lies the problem noted by participant IEb, that because the CSOs are of their own making therefore the state is of the people's making. However, there is a need for the peacebuilding CSOs to find ways of addressing this impasse and open discussion was a solution that came of the interviews. Participant IAd also highlighted that, "CSOs have to have good rapport with other stakeholders; for example, community-based groups and so forth".

Peacebuilding CSOs must engage with other stakeholders and arrive at a common engagement plan with the state. "After all," noted participant IEa, "the state has created a parent Ministry which deals with issues pertaining to peace and reconciliation". Therefore, this would be a good platform for effective engagement. For peacebuilding to be effectively instilled within society, the interviewee argued,

"Peacebuilding has to be a matter of policy and as we all know, policies are crafted by the state. Therefore, there is a need for peacebuilding CSOs to engage meaningfully with the state to catalyse the initiatives of peacebuilding CSOs".

Participant IEc quipped that

peacebuilding efforts should begin at an early stage in infant life and one way of doing so would be the State incorporating peacebuilding studies in the schools' education curriculum. This can only be done when the State-civil society relations are mended.

Another important contribution, which came from participant IEc, was the need for peacebuilding CSOs to engage with other stakeholders. These stakeholders are not necessarily other peacebuilding CSOs but can be other private sector players. A good example which emanated from FGD1 was the need to merge big companies like Delta Beverages with peacebuilding CSOs when embarking on road shows. Private companies can also sponsor peacebuilding CSOs' activities instead of the foreign donors who then set agendas for the civil society organisations. Private telecommunication companies can also help this cause by spreading the CSOs' peacebuilding messages on their networks. From the discussions, interviews and the information gathered from FGDs, CSOs in peacebuilding have to do more to improve relations with the state and other stakeholders.

7.5.5 Agenda Setting and Programming Activities

Most CSO representatives said that they created their own agendas and were independent from their funders. In FGD2 they said that "they programmed their own activities but with limited input from funders who have foreign expertise having gained experience from their activities in other countries." However, participant IEc argued that the CSOs are not independent from their donors. Participant FGD2b noted that the "CSOs' agendas were set by their external funders who dictated their pace and the scope of their activities hence they were out of touch and not appealing to the general masses." True as it maybe, questions and suspicions have simmered over agenda setting of CSOs in politics and governance in Zimbabwe. This view was also aired by Ncube and Murisa who explained that external dependence had resulted in donor-driven projects (Ncube 2010, Murisa 2010). It was thus recommended from the discussions that the agendas, programmes and activities of CSOs be based on a bottom-up approach whereby all their projects are spearheaded by the locals so that they are acceptable to the grassroots.

7.5.6 Network with Other Peacebuilding CSOs

There are various peacebuilding CSOs in Zimbabwe but what I gathered from the two FGDs was that there is no visible interaction amongst these CSOs. In fact, there are loose coalitions and infighting amongst the peacebuilding CSOs. Power struggles were bolstered by an inflated sense of organisational sovereignty amongst the CSOs which militates against an effective and sustainable collaboration (Masunungure 2011). This results in a situation where each organisation would want to move alone with little interference from another (ibid). CSOs have remained fragmented as they are divided along political, ideological and tribal lines which have made them ineffective (Magaisa 2009). This loose relationship between CSOs in peacebuilding needs to be mended for their intervention to have a greater impact and durable outcome.

7.6 Conclusion

The chapter has navigated into the journey of CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. It emerged that there was a quantitative and qualitative growth of CSOs in peacebuilding with the increase of socio-

economic and political problems since 1980 up to the time of this writing. CSOs' roles and functions have mainly been in political and economic sectors. Both the liberal and grassroots peacebuilding models have yielded significant success in different types and scales of conflict. However, a general observation noted is that, CSOs have not had a rosy path in their efforts in building peace in Zimbabwe. The state and its institutions have descended heavily on CSOs that are involved in hard issues that appear to threaten the political power of the ruling elite. CSOs focusing on grassroots projects have been subject to a fair share of problems due to a harsh economic environment. It has emerged that under economic difficulties, peacebuilding projects are not attractive to the populace. There is need for continuous engagement and enhancement of CSOs and their peacebuilding activities to prevent the recurrence of violent conflicts in Zimbabwe. The country needs vibrant CSOs to transform the prevailing negative peace to positive peace. An elaboration of such an enhancement ensues in the next chapter, which takes on board the challenges and possible recommendations aired out from the findings above to present an intervention plan.

CHAPTER 8: INCORPORATING INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS (IKSs) IN PEACEBUILDING THROUGH POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

8. 1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the intervention strategy that I designed with members of the action group. The aim of the intervention was to strengthen CSOs' peacebuilding programmes in Zimbabwe. In this study, the CSO of interest is CSO(A). The central objective of this chapter is to unpack a peacebuilding model that is demand-driven rather than supply-driven. Demand-driven implies that the peacebuilding programme must originate from the needs and priorities of the local people or the beneficiaries of the programme than originating from external sources or organisations. A demand-driven model is context-specific, embracing local ways, needs and priorities that communities understand and prefer in their peacebuilding efforts.

The intervention strategy was drawn from the gaps identified in reviewed literature and findings from interviews and FGDs on the roles, functions and strategies that CSOs have utilised in their efforts to bring about change in conflict-prone societies. As noted previously, CSOs' peacebuilding models have often been designed and steered by supply, that is, their founders and funders, as opposed to the demands that emanate from the local environment.

It is from this research that I designed peacebuilding training incorporated with local grain, a concept borrowed from Booth (2011). The term local grain was used interchangeably with IKSs: these concepts can be used in rebuilding broken societies by CSOs in peacebuilding. Local grain is a broad concept that embraces local traditions, culture, language, resources and people within a defined environment (Booth 2011). argues that local grain is the local way of doing things, or a grain of the local culture. Osamba (2001) posits that it involves using indigenous approaches with the wider involvement of the communities, in other words, it can be understood as peacebuilding from the ground up, with the resources that are located within a context. Such an approach brings durable peace and sustainable development since the local people are directly involved in the peacebuilding efforts.

The training equipped CSO(A) members with the knowledge and skills that they used in designing, implementing and evaluating their peacebuilding programme. The themes that emerged during the training were cross-referenced with literature. The comparison was done to enrich the content of the training and to validate the findings.

This chapter is arranged as follows: an analysis of the CSO(A) (the organisation I worked with for this study); input of the action group on pre-intervention and a detailed account of the intervention procedure.

8.2 The nature of CSO(A)

CSO(A) was created in 2009 with the purpose of building peace through addressing past injustices, healing and reconciliation in various communities in Zimbabwe. CSO(A) is a humanitarian community-based organisation that work with grassroots structures and groups using peacebuilding exercises. Its establishment came in the post-election related violence that the country underwent in 2008. The organisation has also worked on several programmes to equip CSO members and communities in peacebuilding. For example, it conducted capacity building workshops for CSOs, policy makers and local political leadership. It has also supported victim mapping exercises as well as early warning systems to avert violence.

8.3 Observations, comments and analysis by action group members on the findings presented in Chapter 7

Having presented the findings drawn from the documentary search, interviews and FGDs, I conducted a pre-intervention interview with each action group member. The purpose of these interviews was to capture their views of the capacity gaps that needed to be addressed in order to strengthen CSOs' efforts in peacebuilding (see Annexure 5 for the interview guide). I then used their responses in developing a training manual on how they could best address the deficiencies. I also conducted a needs analysis and visioning strategic assumptions testing. For example, I raised questions which included: "What needs to be done to strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding?" and "What is their vision on building peace?" After going through the process, we reached a consensus on an intervention strategy, which is presented later in this chapter. Table 8.1 below presents an age and gender profile of the members of the action group drawn from CSO(A). Each member was assigned a code: Action Group Member 1 (AGM1, etc.). Details on how the action team was formed and challenges encountered were provided in a preceding chapter, Chapter 6.

Table 8.1: Action group members

Code Action Group Member (AGM)	Gender Male/Female	Age
AGM1	M	26
AGM2	M	33
AGM3	M	29
AGM4	M	30
AGM5	F	25
AGM6	F	27
AGM7	F	31
AGM8	F	29
AGM9	F	33

Source: Author

8.3.1 Mapping CSOs' Deficiencies

The findings obtained (Chapter 7) were presented to members of the action group so that they could pose suggestions on how best to improve the roles and activities of CSO(A) in designing and implementing peacebuilding models. The deficiencies raised in Chapter 7 were also applicable to the peacebuilding experiences of CSO(A). The objective of the process was to have democratic knowledge-sharing that richly enhanced the proposed intervention strategy. Below are some of the themes and responses that came out of the discussions.

8.3.2 Lack of Common Understanding of Peacebuilding

CSOs' peacebuilding programmes have been less effective due to disjointed approaches. This has led to competition and lack of unity among CSOs in addressing root causes of conflicts. In discussions held by the action group on 10 November 2016 in Harare, participant AGM1 noted that from the onset:

There is lack of consensus on how peacebuilding is defined by various CSOs in Zimbabwe.

Participant AGM5 concurred that

This problem is not only in Zimbabwe but is also evident in other conflict-torn countries where CSOs are involved in peacebuilding.

This showed that arriving at a shared peacebuilding model seemed to be an unattainable task. Each CSO initially acted in accordance with how they defined peacebuilding. Participant AGM4 added,

Other CSOs follow the liberal or sustainable model or both in their interpretations which then feed into the peacebuilding programmes they design and implement in conflict hotspots.

Participant AGM9 said that,

Peacebuilding is broad. Some CSOs work on rebuilding a collapsed economy, another on political reforms (democratisation) and others on social rehabilitation.

CSOs design and implement what is in line with their mandate which might be different from other CSOs operating in the same environment. Participant AGM8 noted that:

There is need for CSOs in one way or the other to have an agreed understanding of the kind of peacebuilding that Zimbabwe wants now. With this, they can pull their resources together and address the pressing matters affecting the societies. It gives an element of common understanding that end up uniting them to pursue a well-defined model.

The views gave insights on how CSOs can best be strengthened in carrying out their peacebuilding programme. The solution is elaborated in the intervention which follows in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

8.3.3 Lack of bottom-up peacebuilding approaches

From another perspective, CSO efforts have been curtailed by the exclusion of the voices from below. Participant AGM9 highlighted that,

“there is a deficiency of demand-driven peacebuilding programmes”.

In other words, CSOs follow top-down and middle-out approaches. Participant AGM2 cited that,

“Bottom-up initiatives are absent or scantily applied in the design and implementation of peacebuilding programmes in various communities”.

The implication of this is that:

in as much as a CSO has a good peacebuilding programme there is no buy-in from the local people, argued participant AGM8. Bottom-up initiatives have been side-lined by funding that comes with strings attached. This view came from participant AGM3 who postulated that:

While CSOs face financial constraints, the situation is made worse when funders determine the agenda of a programme. This defeats the whole purpose of having an agenda being set by the people from below.

The effect is that local ownership is distorted which then compromises the viability of an intervention by CSOs. Apart from financial constraints, CSOs have been further affected by the loss of experts within their organisations.

8.3.4 The Brain-Drain Effect on CSOs

As discussed in the literature chapter, CSOs in peacebuilding have been crippled by a brain-drain effect in Zimbabwe. Several CSO members have left their organisations when they started to face financial challenges. This left a gap in skilled personnel running their peacebuilding programmes. Participant AGM3 argued that, “

In Zimbabwe, CSOs just as other organisations have been rocked by brain drain to the extent that they have lost experienced experts or personnel.

Participant AGM9 supported this view and noted that:

“this has continuously led the country to be or remain in negative peace mode”.

Such a loss has left them with new and inexperienced personnel who at times end up making faulty peacebuilding strategies. Brain-drain weakens CSOs’ internal capacities to build peace effectively in various communities. To address this, participant AGM8 noted that,

“There is need for capacity building where CSOs’ project officers or managers are trained on how to carry out, for example, political economy analysis and conflict mapping exercises”.

These skills would enhance CSOs efforts in effectively addressing the causes of conflicts rather than the manifestations.

8.3.5 Strained state-CSO relations

The relationship between CSOs and the state is characterised as a mutually limiting affair, where each actor relies on the other as they operate within the state. The relations can sometimes be strained. CSOs in peacebuilding have not been spared from strained relations with the government. Critical voices or checks against the state have resulted in conflict between CSOs and government. Participants AGM1, AGM2 and AGM8 agreed that CSOs face structural hurdles where the government has labelled active and critical CSOs as political puppets used to further the interest of the Western countries. Participant AGM1 specifically said:

Such branding has resulted in CSOs being suspected as political opponents and have been cautiously engaged by both government agencies and some local communities that have succumbed to the regime change gospel.

AGM9 further explained that:

This challenge has been faced by CSOs in the Matabeleland who work on trying to reconcile the victims and perpetrators of the 1980s disturbances. Some CSO members have even been arrested or their programmes have been intruded by state agencies.

Critical voices are “anti-state”, and do not supposedly complement the state effort of creating civil or healthy community relations. This raised the question of how to address the negative perception that the government and other local communities have when they see certain CSOs.

8.4 Brainstorming Solutions

After noting and discussing the factors that inhibited the effective operation of CSOs in peacebuilding, the action group then suggested possible ways through which these challenges could be mitigated. The suggestions were as follows:

8.4.1 Forming Strong CSOs Alliance

To address the problem of financial constraints participants AGM5, AGM6 and AGM9 noted that there was need for CSOs to form strong coalitions. According to participant AGM2:

Financial hiccups can also be mitigated by involving the local people; for them to be involved from the design and implementation process of peacebuilding programmes within their communities.

In this way, they can pull their resources together and address the common and most threatening issues affecting the country. Good networking can also be spread to actors outside CSOs such as the local community leadership and having a good rapport with strategic and influential government officials.

8.4.2 Inclusive Peacebuilding Approaches

In response to the challenge of limited demand-side programme, members noted that local views and resources should be taken on board by CSOs. Participant AGM1 noted that, “most programmes are designed in Harare in the offices of CSOs, packaged and taken into different communities with little or no involvement of the local people”. Participant AGM1 articulated that, “Involving the local people has a double effect of cutting budgets and also generating buy-in from the local people”. This implies that if the local people are involved, it leads to sustainable peacebuilding programmes that can be carried and run even when a CSO vacates the community due to foreseen or unforeseen circumstances.

8.4.3 Making use of Local Celebrities and Entertainment in Peacebuilding Programmes

Working with the local voices in peacebuilding can also be strengthened by involving strategic local celebrities within communities. These celebrities can positively influence people in building peace. Participant AGM7 suggested that:

CSOs can make use of art where they can involve local celebrities in sports, music and street theatre. The advantage being that the people are easily accepted in their communities as they are already known. This is different in cases where a CSO brings its own team to advocate for issues.

Participant AGM6 concurred, stating that:

Given the polarisation in Zimbabwe when advocacy programmes are done involving local people chances are that the programme is less likely viewed with political party lenses. This is comparable in cases where CSOs can use local political leadership for example councillor, headman or chief in that community.

As such, by bringing in a relatively neutral person there is the possibility that anyone can also attend without fear of being labelled as a supporter of the political leadership at an event or gathering. Doing so can undo negative tags of regime-change agents, as they will not have links nor association with political leadership in the area.

As a team, we then concluded that CSOs need to play a role of writing peace messages in consultation with the local people who are aware of the issues affecting their communities. Such messages can be brought out through music, drama and art to which the local people are attracted. We also predicted that

their activities were bound to be successful given the high unemployment rates in Zimbabwe. People are attracted to entertainment, and in this entertainment, they can learn something about peace. For example, participant AGM9 argued that,

street theatre clips with peace messages can be circulated through social media platforms.

Such methods are different from the traditional methods used by CSOs, where they distribute hand-outs and pamphlets which are not even read.

8.4.4 The Way Forward

Following the above process, we then reached a point of considering how CSO(A) members can utilize the above points in their peacebuilding programme. To achieve this, I made two suggestions, which were firstly to conduct workshops and then hold outreach meetings for CSO members on the issues raised. Participant AGM1 then suggested a “training seminar” which was like the workshop I had suggested. From the points discussed, members of the group agreed to start with peacebuilding training that CSO(A) could follow in its peacebuilding programme. The training focused on strengthening CSO(A)’s programming activities in peacebuilding. It was from this agreement that I then designed training sessions, as well as a training manual for members of CSO(A). This was to ensure that once they were trained and had understood the concepts, they would incorporate them in their peacebuilding projects and train other CSO members in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. In developing the training manual, I was guided by the needs raised by action group members. I also expanded on the recommendations that members of the action group had suggested. This process facilitated a form of joint learning and deeply collaborative processes used in action research, as highlighted by Lewin and Greenwood (2007) and Siddiquee *et al.* (2008). We then reached an understanding that we would conduct a three-day training exercise, starting on 23rd November 2016. Efforts were made to ensure that all members would be present and would reserve part of their time for the training exercise.

8.5 Intervention Process: Training on the IKS/Local Grain and Political Intelligence

The following sections explain how the training process was conducted with the nine action group members from CSO(A).

8.5.1 Pre-Training Planning: Weeding Out Errors

On 21 November 2016, I met up with my two co-facilitators to map out the procedure that we were going to follow during the training. We assigned each other tasks to perform during the sessions. The assistants would take turns in writing the responses that would emerge from the proceedings. This was done to ensure that we minimised errors during the training. We arrived at this decision as some members of the action group were not comfortable with being recorded by a voice recorder during the sessions. We also assured ourselves that our duty was to use a participatory and democratic way of discussing and sharing knowledge.

8.5.2 Commencement of the Training

The co-facilitators and I conducted the training from 23 to 25 November 2016. On day one, participants filled in the attendance register (see Annexure 6). This was done mainly to capture contact details that were used to send them training materials and to schedule follow-up interviews. In terms of the duration of the training, the group agreed that we stick to a maximum of three training days. Each session was from 09h00 to 12h00 on each day. We noted that we could not carry out a day-long training exercise as we had limited financial resources. We also took into consideration the participants who had cited that they had busy schedules and would not be able to commit to a full day of training sessions.

8.5.3 Creating an Open Communicative Space

We began the training by allowing members to introduce themselves and briefly share their visions of peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. This was done to create an open communicative space and trust amongst the participants. We stressed the task of creating an open communicative space in order to demonstrate what a participant is supposed to do when carrying out future trainings or peacebuilding campaigns. According to Wicks and Reason (2009: 248), creating open communicative space is done to:

Create positive and associative relations with the relevant people to have easier access to the communities at large. In this way legitimacy and the capacity needed to convene such relations are developed.

In order to fulfil this vision, each member was given time contribute. For example, participant AGM9 stated that her vision was to see CSOs creating a peaceful and tolerant community.

We also asked members to suggest “dos and don’ts” during the training exercise. For example, “No cell phone use” and “Resolving tensions in a peaceful manner” (Participants AGM8 and AGM7). After introductions were done, we asked participants to fill in pre-training open-ended questionnaires (see Annexure 7). The purpose was to use the responses from the open-ended questionnaires in evaluating the training process. This was to be done by comparing the pre-training responses with the post-training views of the participants. A detailed evaluation process and outline are explained in Chapters 9 and 10.

8.5.4 Overall Training Objectives

From the introductory exercise we highlighted the objectives of the training, which we also fitted into the subsequent training sessions. The objectives were as follows:

Central Objective: The training sought to develop, implement and evaluate a peacebuilding strategy that strengthened community-based CSOs in building positive peace in Zimbabwe using IKS/local grain and political intelligence.

- CSO members should be able to define and understand IKS/local grain and political intelligence.

- Use political intelligence in mapping out conflicts and peacebuilding programmes that are grounded in the IKS/local grain.
- Identify through political intelligence the IKS/local grain and effectively incorporate it in peacebuilding programmes.
- Understand the role of CSOs when working with the IKS/local grain.
- Design and implement peacebuilding activities using the IKS/local grain and political intelligence concepts.

8.5.5 Training Methods

Our training was based on participatory methods, raising questions and encouraging participants to give their thoughts. One of the methods included a participant sharing his/her experiences in peacebuilding and comments, then following from other participants. In the process, learning would take place. We believed that participants would learn through self-discovery. This embraces the “learning by doing” concepts. We also used a role-play approach. Blanchard and Thacker (2007: 234) define role-playing “as an enactment of a scenario in which each participant is given a part to act”.

8.5.6 Training Materials

The materials we used during the training exercise included:

- Pictures and video clips.
- Writing pads and pens.
- Flip chart and markers.
- Local grain hand-out (see Annexure 9).

Each session began by stating the objectives and ended with a summary of the main ideas that emerged. In the 2nd and 3rd day we would start with a recap of the main lessons that were drawn from the preceding sessions. In each session we would take breaks either by playing a game or singing a song with peace related messages. A highlight of the training session and proceedings follows.

8.6 Session One

8.6.1 Aims of the Session and Activities

Participants should be able to define local grain or IKS and political intelligence and understand CSOs’ role when working with the local grain or IKS.

Activity A (Individual exercise)

- Participants are asked individually to define IKS/local grain and give examples.
- Describe how they can identify and involve IKS/local grain in their peacebuilding campaigns or programme.
- Illustrate merits of using the IKS/local grain.
- Define the role of CSOs when working with the local grain.
- Participants are given an opportunity to brief on their exercises.
- The facilitator or any other participant leads in taking note of the main points that emerged during the exercise.
- The facilitators give hand-outs of demand driven programme that members can further learn from.
- The participants are also given an opportunity to comment on the session highlighting strengths, weaknesses and areas of further improvement.
- Session one ends

8.6.2 Responses or Views Expressed by Participants in Session One

This section presents and discusses the views of the participants that were captured by facilitators on a flip chart. Due to time constraints a core-facilitator took note of the main points from the responses that were given by the participants. Another core-facilitator would also capture responses on a notepad in case the first facilitator missed out something or was not able to capture all the details on the flip chart. The second facilitator would write down the responses by citing the codes we had tagged on each participant. The responses were also categorised in themes that emerged during the sessions. I adopted a thematic analysis approach as explained in Chapter 6.

8.6.3 Defining IKS/Local Grain and Political Intelligence

A. Local Grain as Bottom-Up Peacebuilding Initiatives

The idea of IKS/local grain rests on bottom-up approaches in peacebuilding. It is the antithesis of top-down models that are grounded in liberal peacebuilding. IKS/local grain peacebuilding programmes are then suited and crafted to meet the contextual realities. Participants had different terms of defining local grain in peacebuilding. The major points on defining IKS/local grain were as follows:

- grassroots peacebuilding models (AGM1)
- these are home-grown strategies and methods that are used by actors in peacebuilding (AGM2)
- these can be local initiatives that are used in trying to bring change in a society (AGM3)
- Local grain is something not foreign or a practice that is locally designed by the people in an effort to address pressing challenges they will be facing (AGM4)
- Local grain goes hand in hand with indigenous knowledge systems; for example, an indigenous tree which grows out naturally responding to the climatic conditions to which it is exposed (AGM5)

- local grain is understood as initiatives that have deep roots or foundation in the local environment (AGM9)

From the responses it can be noted that participants viewed local grain/IKS as a practice that captures needs and priorities of the local people, which integrate with their own environment. In short, working with the local grain resonates with the concept of citizen peacebuilding, which involves people from the conflicting society (Graham *et al.* 2006).

For peacebuilding programmes to be attractive and effective, they must be rooted in the IKS/local grain. This means that demands are supposed to emanate from the environment and CSOs are then supposed to consult or work with the people from below. Funk (2012: 392) argues that “External players are supposed to localise peace through networking and partnering with local actors, tap into indigenous peace resources”. Maphosa and Keasley (2014) view it as peace from within. For sustainable peace to be realised, peacebuilding programmes should be sensitive to the local needs and work with resources from within. When local input is captured in a programme sustainable peace and development can be realised.

In assessing participants’ knowledge of IKS/local grain, we asked them to cite examples. The examples of IKS/local grain were as follows:

- chiefs (AGM1);
- ward, district and provincial development coordinators (AGM3)
- village heads (AGM4)
- members of parliament (AGM5)
- business people (AGM6)
- local people that include local pastors and teachers (AGM7)
- councillors. (AGM8).

The examples show that the participants were more familiar with individuals with whom they work with in their own peacebuilding programmes - they have a narrow understanding of the local grain or bottom-up approaches. Funk (2012) states that bottom-up approaches embrace local skills, knowledge, indigenous culture, local symbols and local talent. CSO members had negated such elements yet they are pertinent in designing and implementing sustainable peacebuilding programmes.

8.6.4 Political Intelligence as Analytical Skills

I introduced this concept to the participants. I realised that whilst it was important to have knowledge of local grain/IKS there was need for members to have skills that they could use as they built peace in communities. Political intelligence is central in unlocking the way CSOs can penetrate a community effectively and work with the local grain/IKS. CSO members had to embrace skills in analysing the context and be able to sensitise their programmes in line with the contextual realities. Participants gave their views on how they understood political intelligence. Participant AGM7 noted it incorporated skills

that were used in political analysis and employed the ability to question issues that were arising in society. Participant AGM4 noted that it involved, “being able to be an intelligent observer”; whilst Participant AGM9 added that it required “the ability to make a needs-assessment or analysis of a socially organised setting.” Other participants noted that their difficulty in describing it but acknowledge its linkage to good analytical skills. It is a process of understanding stakeholders and influencing strategies. As previously noted, TTM Associates (2017) write that political intelligence

is the achievement of organisational aims by using appropriate skills, behaviour and strategies, not only an awareness of political landscape but more specifically the skills to manoeuvre through political minefields.

Without a clear understanding of these skills, CSO members cannot be effective in working with the IKS/local grain. Political intelligence comes with context and stakeholder mapping skills. CSOs will be able to know where to create a base and with whom to partner in building peace.

8.6.5 The involvement of local grain in peacebuilding campaigns

A. Exclusive Peacebuilding Programmes and Challenges of Working with Local Actors

As noted in the case studies reviewed (Chapters 3 and 4), past peacebuilding programmes have often failed to produce durable outcomes, one reoccurring observation was that there was little involvement of IKS/local grain. This is explained as resulting from CSOs’ programmes being steered by supply rather than demand: the agenda is driven by a donor. This was the approach by CSO(A). Unfortunately, they ended up addressing the manifestations rather than the causes of a problem. Several participants indicated that:

they work with the local leadership firstly in seeking permission to operate in their area as well as working with the local people (AGM1, 2, 3, 4 and 6).

Participant AGM4 posited: “Once permission is granted, they can work with enlightened individuals to implement their peacebuilding programmes”. Participant AGM6 articulated:

In some cases, during the selection process the local political leadership can impose upon their own children or relatives to work with the CSO. This normally occurs when the local leadership is aware that the CSO is giving out incentives to project members.

CSOs “are caught between a hard rock and a hard surface, as they cannot deny such impositions; denying can lead to their being denied access to the community” (Participant AGM2). On this issue, participant AGM9 argued that “a programme will then be compromised at the initial stages”. Working with the elite and enlightened and imposing upon people in their programme defeats the element of inclusiveness. People who are left out might have local wisdom that is crucial to addressing the roots of a conflict.

Once other local people know that “a certain politician is involved, they may decide not to attend the function due to political differences” (Participant AGM1). In our discussion, members noted that local

pastors were also invited to participate in reciting opening and closing prayers for an event. Participant AGM3 postulated that “CSOs also involve the police within an area, depending on good relations that particular CSO has with the police; they can provide officers to maintain peace and order during an event”. However, “if the police have a negative view of a CSO they may not even provide their personnel, citing logistical constraints” echoed participant AGM4.

According to participant AGM9:

It is becoming normal for people to conclude that if an event is covered by the police it is associated with a government or ruling party and where the police is absent at most the event or organisation will be anti-government event.

It also showed that CSOs fail to draw large crowds, yet Lederach (1995), cited in Graham *et al.* (2006: 20), argues that “effective and durable peacebuilding can be realised through the wide selection of citizens from all the warring parties coming together and create their own peace”. From experience, attracting all warring parties is difficult due to the polarised environment. This is a barrier that CSOs must address for them to bring positive change smoothly into various communities.

Participants also noted some setbacks when working with the IKS/local grain. Participant AGM8 cited that, “The polarised political environment in the country has resulted in local communities being suspicious of CSOs. People may view a CSO as pro- or anti-government even before it starts engaging the people”. Concurring with this AGM5 noted that, “People will be gripped with fear as they can be attacked or victimised by other people if they are seen to be associating with a CSO”. He called it “guilty by association”. “This creates a hostile operating environment that CSOs find when trying to reach out to the local people,” argued participant AGM1. According to participant AGM4:

It might also be difficult to find committed local people on a particular project unless if there are some incentives a situation similar to that of some CSOs who the passion might not have to bring change unless the donor releases funding.

Participant AGM1 further posited that “at times local people are uncooperative, gripped with fear and resistant to working with CSOs”. The focus of the participants was on working with individuals rather than trying to work with the non-human aspects like culture, language and tradition.

8.6.6 Merits of the IKS/Local Grain

For CSOs to fully appreciate working with the IKS/local grain they need to understand the advantages. We asked members to outline the merits. The responses are listed as follows:

- Creates trust and builds relationship between a CSO and local communities (participant AGM2).
- Buy in of a CSO’s idea or campaign (participant AGM9).
- Easy to work with and minimises logistical costs (participant AGM8).

- They have local knowledge which can enrich CSOs' peacebuilding models that they might have drawn without their input (participant AGM7).

Thus, the participants' views indicate that working with the IKS/local grain has the effect of generating legitimacy and local ownership. The two concepts become relevant in building durable peace. Inclusion of local realities heightens prospects of sustainability and satisfies the local people (Funk 2012). The capacity to continue the programme is promoted when people own a programme. Once this has been achieved it becomes easy for people to accept and practice peace messages that a CSO would have spread in the communities. This interest is key in seeding a culture of peace.

8.6.7 Understanding the Role of CSOs When Working with the IKS/Local Grain: from Experts to Facilitators in Peacebuilding

The role that is assumed by CSOs in building peace counts in making the intervention more effective. In liberal peacebuilding models, CSOs are the advocates, educators and trainers on conflict resolution and transformation. In a way, CSOs see themselves as experts who have solutions to all conflict situations by virtue of their experiences in building peace. The responses captured include: "educate" (Participant AGM1), "train" (Participant AGM3), "consultation on particular issues" (Participant AGM4), "participant observers" (Participant AGM2). Unfortunately, assuming these roles when working with the IKS/local grain may not be effective. Failure to note and align their roles to a peacebuilding model can lead to a weak peace intervention programme that can fail to bring change in societies. Funk (2012:392) argues that when engaging the bottom-up voices, CSOs must be "facilitators or midwives rather than headmasters in building peace". Following this approach, CSOs move away from prescriptive to elicitive. When CSOs become experts, this can be a barrier as the local people may not be cooperative in sharing their experiences which might be helpful in mitigating the problems. Through elicitive models they can get rich information as participants see their views as equally important in solving a problem. The approach is embedded in sustainable peacebuilding and development models explained in Chapter 2.

Session one ended with a song on unity, participants engaged in open discussions. Participants were given hand-outs on building peace with the use of IKS/local grain and political intelligence skills (see Annexure 9). A detailed evaluation of the sessions is discussed in Chapter 9.

8.7 Session Two

The aim of session and activities was to identify the IKS/local grain and political intelligence in CSO(A)'s peacebuilding experiences

Activity B

Sharing and learning CSO(A)'s peacebuilding experiences

- Recap of session one, highlighting major lessons learnt.
- In-pairs participants narrate how they have engaged local community views in their peacebuilding programme.
- Volunteers are given an opportunity to share their peacebuilding experiences,
- From the stories, participants try to identify IKS/local grain and elements of political intelligence in their peacebuilding programme.
- Have an open discussion on the stories told, noting strengths, weaknesses and areas for future improvements.

8.7.1 Session's Proceedings

Activity B1

Two volunteers were given a chance to summarise session one. AGM2 and AGM6 gave the summaries. AGM2 noted that,

“political intelligence is the key to understanding the IKS/local grain within a particular community. Further, all local people who are influential in a society form part of the local grain”.

AGM6 stated that,

“CSOs, play multipronged roles in peacebuilding such as educating and training people on how to manage or resolve tensions. However, when working with IKS there is a need for CSOs to be facilitators”.

Activity B2

Members were put in pairs to share their peacebuilding experiences. After sharing, the facilitator asked volunteers to share their stories whilst the rest of the participants listened. In listening we asked participants to take note of IKS/local grain, elements of political intelligence as well as how the local views were used. Two people volunteered and a summary of their experiences ensues in the next sections.

8.7.2 AGM4 Peacebuilding Experience 1: Working with Local Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms

Participant AGM4 was the first to present his experience. AGM4 participated in a peacebuilding programme on mapping local conflict management and resolution. The programme was launched in rural areas of Zimbabwe with the aim of understanding causes of local conflicts and how they can be resolved through creation of enduring safe spaces for dialogue. In reaching out to the communities they decided to carry out FGDs comprised of between 10-15 participants. Participant AGM4 was one of the facilitators from CSO(A) who initiated dialogue on the conflicts that occurred within the societies. As

participants narrated, they unearthed the type of conflict, causes and how they were resolved within the community.

The types of conflicts ranged from household level to the community level at large. At household level, conflicts could be between parents, then parent/s and children or children having conflicts themselves. Outside the family, conflicts would be found at community level. In mapping out the root causes they noted the following: husband/wife misunderstandings; parents and children where one child might complain about parents favouring another child; community conflicts could be caused by boundary disputes; for example, in agricultural-based communities or pastoral disputes, unfair allocation of land portions by village heads, conflicts that would emerge when another person's livestock had grazed on one's fields and in some cases there would be a clash between traditionalist and emerging Christian individuals. Participant AGM4 noted that their role in these discussions was to pose questions and probe, in order to hear more on an issue. At most, they would just listen and record the responses. They explained to the participants that they wanted to find out how they resolved their conflicts and how they could best improve or strengthen their ways of resolving conflict. At the end of the FGDs, they would then ask participants to highlight non-violent methods that they can best use in resolving tensions rather than some violent ways that certain individuals resorted to in some of the conflicts.

Participant AGM4 indicated that in resolving conflicts at community level, people would resort to the local leadership; for example, if it was a boundary dispute the village head would preside over the case. In this case, conflicting parties would be called, then the fields would be re-measured where the person who would have over-pegged would be asked to revert to the original positions. However, such cases would be problematic if the offender would be the village head himself. At this point, the facilitator would suggest other ways of resolving the conflict such as approaching chief and, in the event, that the chief is biased, approaching the local courts was another alternative. CSO(A) would also encourage family and community members to engage in dialogues that aim at building broken ties when a conflict occurs. At one point, participant AGM4 narrated, they would also share the experiences of other communities, modern practices such as making use of lawyers and sharing pamphlets on local ways of resolving conflicts.

8.7.3 Responses from other Participants on AGM4's Experiences

A. Conflict Mapping and Facilitating Dialogue with Local People

CSOs can thoroughly engage local people in analysing and assessing the root causes of a conflict. This is contrary to generalising causes of conflicts and then bringing a pre-tailored solution without the involvement of the local views. From the experience shared, participant AGM7 observed that "There was wide consultation with the local people through facilitating FGDs". Participant AGM8 noted that "AGM4, by being able to hold discussions on local conflicts and mapping best ways of resolving them, the CSO managed to create spaces for dialogue in the community". "The process is broad based and

gives a chance for people to express their views and approaches in resolving conflicts”, noted participant AGM7. Participant AGM9 indicated that “The CSO did not assume the role of experts but rather facilitated dialogue amongst the people”.

Dialogues are key in bringing people together. According to participant AGM1:

It was through dialogue in FGDs that the CSO managed to understand the types of conflicts ranging from household to community. The conflicts were as a result of poor communication, unfair allocation of land and greediness on the part of the local leaders.

Mapping and facilitating dialogue with local voices generates rich knowledge on how to understand and come up with context specific solutions. Funk (2012) argues that “peace must be constructed locally on a foundation that is recognised as legitimate”. Maphosa and Keasley (2014) posit that local actors are strategic and vital vehicles for driving lasting conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Creating spaces for dialogue makes the peace process legitimate. Addressing the root causes of a conflict and creating legitimacy from the people resonates with IKS which leads to sustainable peace and development.

Participants observed that AGM4 managed to work with the IKS/local grain in their peacebuilding exercise. Concurring to this, participant AGM1 pointed out that, “Dialogue was being encouraged and cemented through local solutions as the FGD participants would air out how they resolve a different type of conflict”. Participant AGM3 stated that, “IKS was found by following the local practices, traditions and resources that the people made use of in resolving conflicts”. Such a peacebuilding approach yields more durable results. Participant AGM6 noted that:

The CSO was not bringing foreign ideas on how people could resolve differences but rather they were learning and reinforcing positive measures that the local people have been familiar with in their day to day activities.

This demonstrates that CSO(A) managed to use some of the political intelligence skills which enabled them “to move from best practices to best fit models” (Menocal 2014). It is a shift from State-building, which is driven by institutions targeting structural issues, to people-led peacebuilding programmes that improve societal relationships.

8.7.4 Improving Rather than Imposing Solutions

Like conflict mapping, sustainable peace is possible when CSOs in peacebuilding work with the people to improve their existing knowledge of resolving conflicts. Participant AGM5 postulated that:

During the FGDs the CSO located how the people resolved different conflicts in their area. It is evident that each conflict type has its own actors and ways through which communities can make use of in resolving conflicts.

Participant AGM6 propounded that:

The CSO did not seek to reinvent the wheel but sought to improve with the people in discussing alternatives in resolving conflicts for example emphasising on non-violent approaches through dialogues. The CSO made suggestions on improving conflict resolution by pointing out the use of lawyers or modern courts in cases where community leaders are corrupt in settling land disputes.

Participant AGM1 indicated that “local solutions to local problems strengthen peacebuilding efforts”. People have faith and trust more in their own ways of dealing with conflicts than being taught how best to settle their differences. It is investing in trust that can make peacebuilding effective and durable. The process of improving what is already there confirms Graham *et al.* (2006), who noted that people should be able to build relationships, rid themselves violence and its effects, build better ways of managing conflicts. This approach creates a sense of local ownership where the people have control in the design and implementation of peacebuilding (Donais 2009). Accordingly, CSOs need to shift from exporting and imposing solutions as this can breed more problems than resolving what is already there.

8.7.5 Participant AGM7’s Peacebuilding Experience 2

a. Building Sustainable Peace and Development

Participant AGM7 presented a different peacebuilding programme where people were educated on the nexus between peace and development in their communities. In her case they researched familiar peace messages found within a community and engaged experts in designing a peacebuilding manual. The manual was used in training or workshops on the importance of having peaceful societies. The theme they used was called *Soft Strength* and they discussed how it could be used to bring about positive change. The concept of *Soft Strength* lies within the realm of non-violent ways. Their argument was that what people sow is what they reap; for example, one cannot plant a noxious weed expecting to get a rose. In this way when people understand and practice soft strength, the result is a peaceful society. They noted that where there is peace there is development.

Participant AGM7 highlighted that in their training workshops they would make use of pictures and posters with images about which they would ask people to think and link with their day-to-day experiences. The posters would show the power of soft strength in the face of any situation. For example, one poster had a hard rock which was slowly being eroded by a stream of water. The water resembled soft strength and the hard rock the difficulties one could face in life. They argued that though soft strength might be slow in bringing change, but it had a long-term positive effect that would eventually lead to the hurdles being washed away. Each picture or poster had a theme that was linked to peacebuilding.

AGM7 gave examples of themes that included the importance of unity and working together, the power of the people in electing and keeping leaders in power and lastly, encouraging people to build bridges and not to put roadblocks in the way of others. On the topic of unity, they used a Zimbabwean proverb that says, “A person is a person because of other people”. Using familiar proverbs easily reached out to the people during the trainings. On non-violence and civil disobedience, they also cited Tolstoy, the Russian author, “Violence can never destroy what is accepted by public opinion”. With this they encouraged people to find ways to “stand up against unfair treatment, violence and destructive behaviour”. Another image had a woman and a lion sitting together. In the poster they used the African

proverb, “Kindness can pluck the hairs of a lion’s moustache.” With this proverb, they would pose questions to the people to describe their experiences with people whom they fear in their communities. They would also ask them to find ways in which they can mend their relationships with these people; for example, by being kind. Participant AGM7 also echoed that they, too, would also cite examples of sayings by local leadership that had peace messages.

8.7.6 Responses on Participant AGM7’s Peacebuilding Approach and Experience

A. Reaping Durable Peace and Development through Non-Violent Means

In their efforts to cultivate durable peace, CSOs can embrace non-violent approaches that are rooted in local knowledge. There is a link on the means used in resolving conflict and the outcome that can be achieved. From the exercise Participant AGM2 concluded that “non-violence which was termed soft strength is effective in creating peace and development”. He further articulated that “non-violence has the potential of uniting people and through this unity a bond is created that can bind people to work together on a common understanding”. Participant AGM9 learnt that:

The force of non-violence or soft strength rests with people-power in that, if people are united, they can be able to stand for justice and do away with oppressive systems. This came out in the proverb that violence can never destroy what is accepted by public opinion.

From the discussion it can be observed that using non-violent methods can have multiple positive effects in peacebuilding. If CSOs adopt such ways together with the people lasting peace and development can be realised.

8.7.7 Building Peace Using Local Language: Proverbs

Another core element that lies in IKS is the use of local language. Peacebuilding programmes must be in the local language. Language makes a programme more appealing and leaves permanent marks in people’s lives and communities. This approach can also be tapped by CSOs in their peacebuilding exercises. Participant AGM5 stated that:

The use of local idioms in the peacebuilding campaign was a sign that the activities were sensitive to the local context. For example, people are familiar with idioms like “a person is a person because of other people”. This brings an element of tolerance and valuing another person within the community.

Participant AGM4 also gave a similar local Shona idiom, *kugara hunzwana* meaning “people can live together well if they understand each other”; this also encourages cooperation within communities. For example, for a community to be called a community the people within it are supposed to be understanding and tolerant of each other. This comes as an individual realises that people are not able to live and survive in isolation. According to participant AGM3 “the use of local language demonstrates that local grain cannot be restricted to local people only”. Tapping into local language is a realisation that every community has its own ways of starting and ending conflicts through their own language. Local language leads to easy understanding and appreciation of a peacebuilding campaign. Maphosa

and Keasley (2014) argue that using local words like *Ubuntu* in South Africa makes a peacebuilding approach effective. *Ubuntu* “is a sense of duty to care for those in need” (ibid). It follows Kant’s model of acting dutifully. Funk (2012) postulates that: peace has a cultural dimension; every cultural community has its own vernacular language for conflict resolution and the use of it gives peace substance and legitimacy. It follows that CSOs’ peacebuilding approaches have to have the presence of the local language for the outcome to be appealing and durable.

8.7.8 Exploring the Potential of Women in Peacebuilding

Building peace with women has shown positive results in conflict situations. While women are the worst affected when a conflict takes place in societies (Issifu 2015), conversely, they have great potential in building peace or relations within the family and community at large. In post-war situations women take care of the orphans by providing shelter. They also participate in advocacy programmes that can lead to dialogues (ibid). Given women’s potential, CSOs need to involve them in the process of building peace. According to participant AGM6 “past patriarchal beliefs had placed women to the periphery in resolving community or public conflicts. Women had no place or voice, yet they can constructively build broken relationships”. Participant AGM3 articulated that:

From the experience shared the woman managed to pluck the hairs of the lion’s moustache. A lion represents powerful and fearful persons in society, but the woman managed to use soft strength successfully in approaching the situation.

Participant AGM1 concurred that “women are naturally non-violent and kind, which is essential in building lasting peace”. The potential of women is highlighted in a Shona idiom that *musha mukadzi* meaning that a woman makes a home. If CSOs include women there are greater chances that they can get rich knowledge on how best to deal with conflict situations. CSOs also need to have the analytical skills embedded in political intelligence to note that while local culture may produce positive outcomes, there is need for careful selection as some past practices like patriarchy have neglected women. In working with the local grain/IKS CSOs should not be rigid but also wean off the bad practices in local cultures.

8.7.9 Blending Bottom-Up and Middle-Out Peacebuilding Approaches

CSOs’ peacebuilding approaches can also be strengthened by merging bottom-up and middle-out efforts. The weakness of one model can be strengthened by another model. Participant AGM1 noted that, “There was a blend of peacebuilding models that included bottom-up and middle-out approaches.” On the bottom-up, participant AGM7 managed to research on the local wisdom with which the people were familiar and blended it with their peacebuilding theme. The middle-out emanated from the experts that were engaged by participant AGM7 in designing their peacebuilding manual and activities. In this way participant AGM4 cited that, “Bottom-up voices become the local grain which would then make the trainings more attractive as there will be some element of inclusion and ownership of a programme”. “The use of the local grain is also shown during the training with reference to local proverbs that carried

peacebuilding messages” (Participant AGM5). According to participant AGM2, “Such an approach demonstrates an element of political intelligence on participant AGM7 as they blended local and foreign proverbs to emphasise a particular theme”. This is further shown when “they used pictures or animations then probed people to relate to their daily experiences” (Participant AGM2). Participant AGM3 argued that “posters have an effect of making peacebuilding training unique and more appealing to the participants”. On the other side, AGM9 postulated that: “posters of animations used during training might not be appealing to adults as they might feel they were being reduced to nursery school students”. These responses demonstrate that participants had a grasp of the local grain/IKS concept in peacebuilding programmes. The question remaining was on how participants could put the theory into practice in their day-to-day programming activities. To achieve this, session three was designed in a way that could gauge the practical element of the participants.

Session Two ended with a Christian song on love and unity.

8.8 Session Three

Aim: Participants design and perform a peacebuilding activity that incorporates local grain concept.

Activities

- Recap of session 2
- Conduct conflict mapping, then design and perform a role-play on a peacebuilding intervention
- Discussions

8.8.1 Session Proceedings

We began with a recap of session two. Participant AGM8 noted that, “In peacebuilding CSOs can embrace both local and modern ways in bringing change in particular communities”. Participant AGM9 highlighted that, “The use of local language in designing peacebuilding programmes would make a programme more attractive”. This approach becomes a key to CSOs peacebuilding activities.

At the end of the recap, the facilitator explained the purpose of the session. I indicated that the session demanded four participants to do a role-play on a peacebuilding programme they can implement through working with the local grain/IKS. Blanchard and Thacker (2007: 234) note that in role-plays “trainees are provided with a problem or context; their roles are described as well as objectives”. The volunteers were assigned roles to act. I also gave participants a conflict story that they would use as a basis for developing a peacebuilding intervention strategy that encompassed the concepts, we had covered in session one and two.

8.8.2 Conflict Scenario

Muchokomori is a local community in one of the high-density suburbs in Harare. The place is commonly known as one of the violent residential areas. Many of the youth are unemployed. A lot of political violence occurs there, and it is believed that political parties and any other people can hire thugs to go (from here) and beat other people elsewhere. The area is highly polarised where even wearing a T-shirt with either colour red or green will be associated with a certain political party, even in cases where one is just a visitor in that community. The people believe in mob justice. Where there are problems, they prioritise quarrels and fights as a way for settling the dispute. They may also use channels such as police but only as a last resort to handle certain conflict cases. Some of the perpetrators are known and sometimes arrested, later released by the police after a day, upon paying a fine - or bribing the police, it is alleged. There are also churches within the community and prayer days are usually held for the community. They also engage in clean-up campaigns, music galas and door to door outreach programmes. The task of the participants was to intervene in such a community.

8.8.3 Intervention Activity-Role-Play

Participants AGM2, AGM3, AGM6 and AGM7 volunteered to perform an act on how they would intervene in the above scenario. The title of their intervention was *Prayer Day for a Peaceful Society*. A breakdown of their roles is stated below:

- Participant AGM2 was a CSO representative.
- Participant AGM3 represented a resident within the community.
- Participant AGM4 another expert in youth's projects.
- Participant AGM7 was a Pentecostal local pastor.
- The audience represented the community (Muchokomori).

8.8.4 How the Role-Play Unfolded

Participant AGM2 works for a CSO called Peace Works International. They run peace programmes in urban communities. Participant AGM2 reads about the violent events in Muchokomori community in a local newspaper and starts to think of how they could intervene. Participant AGM2 visits the area. Through informal networks participant AGM2 manages to get contact details of influential people in the community. These people were participants AGM3 and AGM7. Participant AGM2 introduced himself to these people and discussed the nature of their organisation. Participants AGM3 and AGM7 briefly discuss the issues that occur within their community such as high unemployment, crimes, drugs, political violence and intolerance. From the discussions, participant AGM2 also procured contact details of other local experts who have worked on youth projects through research and publications about the area. Upon engaging this local expert, they also held meetings with the participants AGM3 and AGM7.

They then did an assessment of the needs in the area and conflict mapping. They discovered that youths were victims of unemployment and at the same time perpetrators of political violence.

In their meetings they thought of an intervention strategy to bring change to this community. Participant AGM3 suggested that they needed to organise a prayer day with the help of the local pastors. Participant AGM4 noted that prayer days had been problematic in that some of the local pastors were biased towards certain political parties. Participant AGM2 suggested that they engage respectable and more objective pastors who have not been known to participate in political activities. Participant AGM3 also said that in the past, prayer days would be held at a Methodist church in the area which had a big praying facility. Learning this, the team suggested that in their next prayer day they needed to find a neutral venue - for example, a community hall. Participant AGM7 supported the idea, highlighting that in the past large numbers could not attend the meeting as they felt that it was a denominational project owned and facilitated by the Methodist church.

With these deliberations, the participants designed another prayer day meeting. Participant AGM2, with the help of the local pastor, managed to identify and engage another local pastor who was known by many, including the youth. The pastor helped the team to secure a community hall at no cost through his popularity with the local authority. As a way of advertising their campaign, they also engaged their local radio station. Other local pastors were also asked to relay the message in their churches, emphasising that it was an all inter-denominational prayer day. Participant AGM2 using his experiences in running peace projects suggested that the peace day be held on Saturday when most people are free. Further, he emphasised that if politicians were to be invited, they were to come as ordinary members and not be given room for making speeches. Participant AGM3 supported this view, stating that once politicians are actively involved, the event could be read from the political lenses by citizens, thus making it unattractive. Participant AGM2 also suggested that there was a need to invite musicians to perform to make the meeting more entertaining, also bearing in mind the theme of the prayer meeting. Participant AGM2 added that his organisation would also distribute flyers and pamphlets with peace messages. The team agreed that peace meetings should always be held and not only arranged in a post-conflict period, as had been the case. Having discussed their intervention, they then continued with discussions about the improvements on prayer day meetings that they had conducted as a team. This marked the end of their peacebuilding plan and their intervention in the conflict scenario.

8.8.5 Comments from the Audience on the Intervention

A. Working with Local Networks or Stakeholders in Peacebuilding Interventions

Sustainable peace is realised through opening and reaching out to local stakeholders. A good collaboration is reached by doing stakeholder mapping prior to an intervention. This will enable CSOs to separate good and strategic people from the bad or the peace spoilers. The situation is rife with such people in polarised communities. From the role-play, participant AGM1 noted:

The peacebuilding intervention was inclusive of other people's views and experiences. AGM2 who represented the CSO managed to tap into the local knowledge and practices about the Muchokomori community.

By so doing, "it can be credited that they managed to use the local grain" added participant AGM5. "Participant AGM2 also managed to create networks and a good relationship with the community members they wanted to work with, thus creating trust that made the CSO fully accepted and integrated with the rest of the people," noted participant AGM9. Further to that participant AGM6 noted that:

The CSOs did not do a top-down approach; rather the CSO brought an idea into a conflict-ridden society and helped in suggesting ways on how to improve the efforts that have already been done to address their concerns.

Lederach (1997:33) argues that, "bottom-up approaches are necessary for durable outcomes, politicians cannot move peace without the public". As such, Lederach places emphasis on organic rather than top-down approaches in peacebuilding. Local networks strengthen CSOs' efforts in building lasting peace.

8.8.6 Placing Limits on the Role of Local Politicians in Building Peace

Most conflicts have been driven or instigated by politicians who are often driven by selfish objectives such as power and employ dirty tactics to get the people to vote them into power. In post-conflict situations they also want to hijack a programme by pretending that they initiated it in order to get votes from the electorate. Participant AGM7 applauded the CSO in that:

AGM2 (CSO) managed to place limits on the role that politicians had to play during the meetings if they were to attend. They also managed to carefully invite neutral people who would lead the prayers as opposed to invite biased leaders who are affiliated or associated by known political actors in the local area.

CSOs good practices are to work with neutral people; in cases where they think of inviting political leaders, their roles should be limited. Most peacebuilding campaigns have failed to attract numbers when a politician leads the process. Involving politicians also taints a CSO's image and perhaps confirms Masunungure's (2009) statement that CSOs went to bed with political parties and have become agents of political parties in the process.

8.8.7 Using Social Media in Peacebuilding

Modern technology is becoming a viable alternative in enhancing broad and fast communication with people. Bock and Lederach (2012) posit that people should own methods of violence prevention rather than rely on external actors. They can make use of technology in the form of local social media platforms to communicate and campaign as was the case of Arab Spring, where social media was used in Tunisia and Egypt to light up a revolution against authoritarian regimes (ibid). Towards the end of the training, we engaged in a small activity that involved circulating video clips of street theatres that have been spread via social media to reach out to the people. The point we were stressing was that CSOs can also make use of such platforms and actors and involve themselves in writing peacebuilding scripts.

Participant AGM9 also gave other examples that can become methods that CSOs can make use of in their peacebuilding campaigns in urban areas:

CSOs could make use of placing images of brand ambassadors with peace messages on billboards. This was like cases where companies market their products using local brand ambassadors.

8.8.8 End of the Training sessions.

The role-playing activity marked the end of the training session. Facilitators distributed reading materials and post-training evaluation form, analysed in the next chapter (see Annexure 8). A song was performed, and a closing prayer read by participant AGM7.

8.9 Conclusion

The chapter captured a democratic way of enhancing CSO(A) in peacebuilding through the discussions and intervention procedure carried out with members of the action group. The first section unpacked the discussions of the baseline data. This was followed by detailing the intervention procedure which was conducting three-day training on peacebuilding with volunteers from CSO(A) who made up the action group. From the discussions, members agreed that designing peacebuilding programmes with the IKS/local grain and strengthening participants' skills in using political intelligence can help in mitigating several challenges that CSO(A) had been facing. For example, working with the IKS/local grain can minimise costs for CSOs during an intervention. This is because the local grain embraces local knowledge, resources and practices that just need improvement rather than starting afresh. It also has the merits of creating local ownership and sustainability of a programme even when the project initiators decide to go to other communities. Further, collaborative approaches through uniting and establishing networks with other stakeholders within the community enrich a peacebuilding programme. The training also exposed CSO(A) members to concepts, such as political intelligence, which is further discussed in the local grain hand-out attached (see Annexure 9). In short, political intelligence minimises error through the selection of genuine stakeholders in peacebuilding within a setting before a programme is launched. The next chapter details the evaluation of the intervention strategy.

CHAPTER 9: OUTCOME EVALUATION ONE OF THE IKS/LOCAL GRAIN PEACEBUILDING TRAINING

9.1 Introduction

In the foregoing chapter I outlined the intervention process that was carried out with members of the action group. The aim of the chapter was to devise and implement an intervention plan that can enhance CSO(A) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. It is against this background that this chapter evaluates whether the training managed to meet its intended goals. It also questions if CSO(A)'s peacebuilding programme will improve following the training. This question is answered in Chapter 10.

The evaluation responses were sought from the nine action group members. A table with the codes was displayed in the previous chapter. The outcome of the training was as a result of action research, where there was deep knowledge, sharing and learning that occurred in view of strengthening CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. The evaluation was carried out using the before and after method. Before the training, I conducted pre-training interviews. After the training I conducted post-training interviews. In the post-training phase, the first evaluation was carried out to gauge the participants' perceptions on the training exercise. This was followed by a second evaluation which was carried out through interviews with participants of the training. The interviews were designed to measure the outcome of the training in line with the participants' work experience. Comparison of the pre and post participant's responses tells whether the intervention made an impact or not on CSO(A)'s peacebuilding programme. This chapter is organised as follows: it begins with a discussion on the research problem, followed by debates on evaluation (focusing on definitions, justification and approaches to evaluation) and finally responses from participants interviewed.

9.2 Brief of the Research Problem

Peacebuilding efforts in Zimbabwe have failed to transform negative peace into positive peace, with a resurgence of conflict during peacebuilding efforts by actors that include CSOs. Stakeholders in peacebuilding, amongst which CSOs are included, have had numerous challenges that have limited their roles in bringing positive change. Notable obstacles have been lacking of funding, lack of unity amongst CSOs, political intelligence deficiency, lack of consensus in defining peacebuilding and the approaches to follow, a polarised political climate buttressed by high unemployment, and peacebuilding programmes that have been drafted and steered by supply rather than demand. CSOs have mostly followed a top-down and middle-out approach without a full intake of the initiatives from below. The effect of this has been that CSOs' peacebuilding programmes have been less appealing to the local communities which then lead to lack of local ownership of the programme.

Societies continue to remain in the negative peace mode rather than moving towards positive peace. When a CSO initiates a programme within a community, people might be drawn by the incentives on offer but once the incentives and CSO move out, the project ceases. With the realisation of these deficiencies, I designed and implemented a peacebuilding training on working with the IKS/local grain and political intelligence with CSO(A) members. The intervention was two-fold: firstly, it was designed to equip CSO(A) members with peacebuilding skills through training that incorporated IKS, and secondly to enhance their intervention programme in peacebuilding. To evaluate the intervention, I carried out pre- and post-interviews with action group members.

9.3 Defining Evaluation

Before outlining the evaluation procedure, it is important to understand the meaning of evaluation. Taylor *et al.* (2005) define evaluation as a process of assessing the effectiveness of a piece of work, project or a programme. Rossi (2003: 2) defines evaluation as “a social science activity directed at collecting, analysing, interpreting and communicating information of how a programme has worked or its effectiveness”. According to Blanchard and Thacker (2007: 337) evaluation is, “measuring the degree to which objectives are achieved”. From the definitions, evaluation implies measuring the outcome or impact of an intervention against its intended objectives. In other words, it measures the extent to which objectives have been met or how a problem has been addressed.

There are two types of evaluation designs. The first is formative, which refers to the process of identifying strengths and weaknesses of a programme. The second is summative, which focuses on outcome research, with the aim of addressing questions such as “Does the programme work?” and “What are its effects?” (Sarantakos 1998, 2005). In this study I adopted the two approaches. The formative was carried out to check on the strengths and weaknesses of the training. The summative evaluation was applied to check the outcome of the training on CSO(A)’s approach to peacebuilding. The findings of the summative are presented in Chapter 10.

9.4 Rationale for Evaluation

Research projects or interventions are evaluated for several reasons. Rossi (2003:2) argues that research evaluations are conducted to:

Assist whether a programme should be continued or not, to assess whether improvements should be done on a intervention, to determine decisions of expanding or curtailing a programme, lastly to fulfil and accounting to the donor’s demands.

Taylor *et al.* (2005) argue that evaluation helps understand whether the project has been an outstanding success, dismal failure or something in between the two, which is a neutral zone. Sarantakos (1998:108) asserts that: “evaluation is done to assess quality and effectiveness of a programme”. Blanchard and Thacker (2007:337) note that “evaluation is done to check whether a programme occurred as planned”. For Singleton *et al.* (1993:238) evaluation is carried out to “analyse the extent to which social

programmes achieve particular effects”. In this study, the aim of the evaluation was to gauge the short-term outcome of the intervention (training of CSO(A) to embrace IKS and political intelligence in their peacebuilding activities and programmes). The ultimate objective was to determine whether CSO(A) members were strengthened. Given that the study was based on action research, evaluating an intervention is one component of an action cycle. Taylor *et al.* (2005: 71) note that “evaluation results are used as the basis for taking the work forward”. Findings in this evaluation can be used for planning purposes or as baseline data for another action research cycle in future studies.

9.4.1 Evaluation Indicators

In an evaluation process there are certain indicators that are sought to determine whether change occurred or not. The intervention was carried out to enhance ways that CSO members can utilise IKS and political intelligence skills in designing, implementing and evaluating effective peacebuilding interventions. In this evaluation process the pointers I sought were the elements found in IKS or local grain and political intelligence skills in the CSO’s peacebuilding efforts. For example, whether participants understood and were considering incorporating local people, local culture, local language, local resources, knowledge and skills. Further, participants should demonstrate understanding of conflict and stakeholder mapping skills; lastly, whether participants had knowledge of the roles that they were supposed to play when working with the local people in building peace.

9.5 Approaches to Evaluation and the Process

There are two main approaches in evaluation, namely the experimental and non-experimental. In experimental evaluations, study groups are randomly assigned to a group that receives intervention and another that does not (Blundell and Dias 2000). Non-experimental designs are made with an intervention group only. The most effective method in my intervention was the non-experimental design. Within this, I used the before and after approach: a comparison is made on the views of participants prior to and post-intervention. I used in-depth interviews in probing responses and later did an outcome analysis of checking whether a programme had achieved the intended result (Sarantakos 2005). In the pre-training interviews, I was exposed to the participants’ knowledge on the roles and experiences of CSO(A) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. In the post-training, two assessments were done. The first was on getting the participants’ perceptions immediately after the training exercise. In this exercise, participants filled in open-ended questionnaires which were handed over to the facilitators (see Annexures 7 and 8).

In the second exercise, I carried out in-depth interviews with individual participants using an interview guide (see Annexure 10). The interviews were done eight weeks after the training to assess the outcome of the training on the participants’ peacebuilding activities in their organisation. Since the training method was based on participatory and self-discovery, it was in the post-training interviews that participants would self-reflect on their past peacebuilding models and envision how they would improve

their future programme after the training. However, I acknowledge that other factors could have influenced the way CSO(A) conducted its peacebuilding activities. For example, the members could have been exposed to other literature like the training. To ascertain this, I would first ask participants whether they had been exposed to other materials related to the training. The respondents noted that they had not encountered any other trainings or literature.

9.6 Participants' Responses to the Training Process

This section presents the views of the action team on the training process. The training evaluation is important in that it can give a picture of how successful the training was conducted. It pays attention to the training goals, organisation and the training procedure. The findings can be of use to future facilitators who might want to conduct a similar training. They can learn and improve on the weaknesses noted by the participants. The evaluation of the training was done on the last day of the training (25 November 2016). Participants were given open-ended questionnaires to fill in their responses. The emerging views expressed are presented in themes. The evaluation exercise started by probing participants' views on whether the training had clear objectives and if the training process managed to meet the intended aims. A brief highlight of the training objectives is presented below followed by participants' views.

Recap on training objectives:

- Members from CSO(A) should be able to define and understand IKS/local grain and political intelligence.
- Use political intelligence in mapping out conflicts and peacebuilding programmes that are grounded in the IKS/local grain.
- Identify, through political intelligence, the IKS/local grain and effectively incorporate it in their peacebuilding programme.
- Understand the role of CSOs when working with the IKS/local grain.
- Design and implement peacebuilding activities with the IKS/local grain and political intelligence.

The training was designed to equip CSO(A) with strategies that they can use towards improving their peacebuilding programmes in Zimbabwe. This talked to the general objective of the study of strengthening CSOs in peacebuilding using IKS and political intelligence through action research.

9.6.1 Training Objectives

To determine the success of training intervention, there was need to understand if the training objective was clear. Participant AGM1 noted that, "The training aims were clear, starting from the first session

to the last day”. “Each session had specific aims that were consistent with the overall objective of the training” (Participant AGM8). From the onset, one could note that the objective was to improve the existing knowledge that CSO members had in their peacebuilding efforts (Participant AGM4). According to participant AGM9, “The training objectives were well organised in that they began from the basic concepts moving towards to the more complex issues”. The stated objectives “kept a participant eager to know or learn what was to come after a particular session” (Participant AGM2). Participant AGM5 noted that:

The other aims in the last session appeared to introduce new issues for example peacebuilding through entertainment, however, at the end of the session I ended up linking the aim to methods that CSOs can use in trying to build peace.

Based on the responses, I deduced that we managed to develop clear and straightforward objectives that the participants were able to grasp. It appears that the training needs were able to be translated into sound objectives.

9.6.2 The Training Atmosphere

One of the features that can make or break training or workshop is the training atmosphere. In cases that the training environment is tense, participants will not open or learn on the issues to be covered and the opposite is true. Participant AGM7 commended the facilitators for “creating a free and open platform through opening up a communicative space”. This “lightened the environment and created training relationship amongst the participants”, added participant AGM7. According to participant AGM9, “participants opened up when they were assured that their views were to be kept anonymous in the reportage of the findings through the use of codes”. To complement this view, participant AGM3 highlighted that, “encouraging participants to mend differences peacefully created a good training environment. This was also cemented by the rules of conduct during the training”. Participant AGM1 observed that the seating arrangement gave some sense of equality amongst members. On the other side, participant AGM9 observed that:

While a good training environment had been created, there was need for the trainers to raise questions that can further probe the points raised by participants. This will lead into in-depth knowledge during a training session.

The last contribution showed some of the weaknesses or oversight that we, as facilitators, had during the training and hope to improve on it in future exercises. A good training atmosphere complements a clear objective in broadening the participants’ knowledge and interest on themes.

9.6.3 Relevance of Training to Participants’ Work

All the participants highlighted that the training experience was relevant to their day-to-day peacebuilding work. The outcome seemed inevitable as the training was designed to target CSO members who are hands-on in peacebuilding activities. Two participants elaborated their views on this. Participant AGM3 postulated that, “my main tasks were organising and facilitating trainings and

workshops both for workmates and the communities”. To this end, she managed “to pick out some training skills which could be used in future” (Participant AGM8). Participant AGM8 also noted that, as a project coordinator she found “the training fruitful on how they can widen their influence through linking up with other CSOs and relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding”. By managing to identify key members within the CSOs, the content of the training became relevant to their day-to-day peacebuilding experiences.

9.6.4 Ability to Share Training Experiences

In this section I asked the participants whether they would be able to share the lessons they got from the training. Ultimately, it sought to examine whether the participants had learnt from the training and would be able to share their training experiences with other people who had not received the training. Participant AGM2 confessed that he needed some time to fully comprehend the contents of the training manual; once this comprehension was complete, he would be more confident to impart the knowledge to other people. The rest of the participants said that they were able to discuss and enlighten other CSO members on how best to improve their peacebuilding programmes. Participant AGM7 indicated that he would make copies of the hand-out and share with some of his contacts.

9.6.5 Adequacy of Training Time

In training exercises, or any interventions, allocating adequate time on critical activities matters, as this has a bearing on meeting the intended goals. Participant AGM6 indicated, “Under the circumstances that were prevailing, the time allocated for the sessions was sufficient”. For example, she added: “Other people had work commitments and could not afford to have much time to spare for the training”. Participants AGM5 and AGM7 noted that with future trainings, more time is needed for practical experiences. For example, when sharing peacebuilding experience, there is need for almost every participant to give their own stories. This would further enrich the knowledge of CSO members’ peacebuilding experiences. Participant AGM1 concurred and pointed out that:

On role plays, there was need for more than one case study that participants were supposed to act upon. This would also give an opportunity on how other members could intervene under a different circumstance.

I noted the need to have more diverse case experiences, which could be used to test participants’ ability to design effective peacebuilding interventions in future trainings. With all the adequate resources available, training should take a day’s duration.

9.6.6 Training Strengths

It is also important to understand the strengths of training. If more strengths are recorded regarding the project training, it feeds into a successful outcome of the intervention. Participant AGM1 observed that “there was adequate training material in the form of hand-outs, video clips and pictures”. “These broadened the understanding of the discussions that were underway” (Participant AGM8). From another

perspective, participant AGM7 propounded that “the training methodology was effective; it was participatory which encouraged participants to learn by doing and engaging in discussions”. She further stated that self-reflection could also be practised in their peacebuilding work or activities. Buttressing her observation, participant AGM3 pointed that:

This was contrary to classroom or lecture type of trainings where participants are empty bodies without any knowledge to contribute. This fell in line with the training theme of how CSOs can work with the IKS/local grain in their peacebuilding efforts.

Lastly, participant AGM4 articulated that “group work encouraged participants to work together and solve problems in a more democratic manner”. The responses indicate that the training was a two-way process which allowed participants to exchange views in a participatory manner with the facilitators.

9.6.7 Weaknesses and How They Can Be Rectified

The major comments that participants raised on this was that there were a few reading materials (Participants AGM1, AGM3, AGM4 and AGM5). Participant AGM3 recommended that “there is need for more published literature on the cases that are happening in other countries in future”. Participant AGM9 pointed out that “there was lack of training equipment such as projectors. Such devices are vital when sharing video clips in future”. But overall, there were more strengths than weaknesses. This signifies that there was a smooth sharing of thoughts on how CSO(A) can be strengthened in their peacebuilding exercises. Some of these weaknesses can be overcome such as providing literature, but others are more challenging when there are limited means to purchase equipment. Groups therefore need to be innovative and make use of what is available. This would help resolve the weaknesses and confirms that using local standards and resources helps make such trainings work even with limited equipment.

9.7 Views and Comments on the Outcome of the Intervention

The next section presents the views of the participants on whether there were changes to their working experiences and their organisation. The questions triggered the utility responses of the training material by the participants. Utility questions focus on the value of the training on a participant, as opposed to effective questions that trigger responses of participants’ feelings towards training (Blanchard and Thacker 2007). In noting their comments, I held in-depth interviews with the participants eight weeks after training (23-24 January 2017). I assumed that this time period would have given participants an opportunity to see how they could adopt what they had learnt during the training into their various work-related responsibilities. I did this as an attempt to maximise the validity of the training process. Furthermore, before the post-training interviews, I asked each participant whether they had participated in any other peacebuilding trainings, as this would also compromise the outcome. The responses are discussed in themes comparing the participants’ views before and after the training.

Below is a summary of the responses that were made by CSO(A) members before and after the training. The tables (Table 9.1 and 9.2) show how participants rated themselves prior to the training and how their knowledge had broadened after the training. The major themes that were covered during the training were used in carrying out the outcome analysis. The pre- and post-ratings are presented in the tables below.

Table 9.1 Before evaluation ratings

Theme	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor	Total
IKS/local grain		6	3		9
Political intelligence		3	4	2	9
Examples of IKS/local grain		6	3		9
Merits and demerits of using IKS/local grain		6	2	1	9
Role of CSOs in working with IKS/local grain	1	5	3		9
How to incorporate IKS/local grain in peacebuilding programme	2	4	2	1	9
Design IKS/local grain peacebuilding programme through art	2	4	2	1	9
Methods and channels of distributing peacebuilding programme that are context relevant	3	4	2		9

Source: Designed by author

Table 9.2 After evaluation ratings

Theme	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor	Total
IKS/local grain	5	4			9
Political intelligence	2	6	1		9
Examples of IKS/local grain	7	2			9
Merits and demerits of using IKS/local grain	6	3			9
Role of CSOs in working with IKS/local grain	5	4			9

How to incorporate IKS/local grain in peacebuilding programme	5	4			9
Design IKS/local grain peacebuilding programme through art	5	4			9
Methods and channels in distributing peacebuilding programme that are context relevant	7	2			9

Source: Designed by author

A summary of the pre- and post-training scores

The pre-intervention ratings show the following results on the IKS/local grain theme,

- six participants said their understanding was good and three said it was fair;
- Eight weeks after the training five participants had moved to very good rating and four were now on good;
- On political intelligence prior-training three were on good, four on fair and two on poor;
- After the training, two were on very good, six on good and one on poor;
- Identifying examples of IKS/local grain prior training, six said good and three said fair. In post-evaluation, seven were on very good and two were on good;
- In noting merits and demerits of IKS/local grain pre-evaluation ratings, six were on good, two on fair and one on poor. After evaluation, six were on very good and three were on good;
- The roles of CSOs in working with the local grain before ratings were, one on very good, five on good and three on fair. After training, five were on very good and four on good;
- How to effectively incorporate IKS/local grain in peacebuilding: In the pre-training phase two were on very good, four on good, two were on fair and one on poor. Post-training it emerged that five were on very good and four were on good;
- On the theme of designing IKS/local grain peacebuilding programmes through art, two were on very good, four on good, two on fair and one on poor before the training. After the training, four were on very good and four on good;
- On the last theme of the methods and channels of distributing a peacebuilding programme, before training three were on very good, four on good and two on fair. After the intervention, seven moved to very good and two to good.

To understand fully how the participants' views changed, the next section presents in-depth responses on how the training had an impact on their work experiences. The views were obtained through in-depth interviews.

9.7.1 Perceptions on the IKS/Local Grain Concept: From Top-Down, Middle-Out to Bottom-Up Peacebuilding Programme

Prior to the training, participants had expressed that their understanding of IKS/local grain was based on bottom-up peacebuilding approaches. For example, participants AGM2, AGM3, AGM6 and AGM7 had noted that the concept was closely linked to a grassroots-based programme. In my post-interview, participant AGM8 indicated that her understanding had broadened, explaining that “the concept covers local people, knowledge, practices and culture or ways of doing things.” She added that

After the training, I engaged with some of my teammates and started to think of a peacebuilding programme that embraces all the elements of IKS and political intelligence skills. Amongst the elements included are a culture of peace, love, respect and dignity.

As an organisation, they had not considered designing a peacebuilding programme that integrated the local culture of a community. This realisation becomes a task that they would want to pursue in their future interventions.

The concept of IKS/local grain is becoming increasingly vital considerations in building sustainable peace and in sustainable development, increasingly, IKS/local grain are described as a precondition for sustainability. When reviewing several case studies of sustainable development, Carm (2014: 70) noted that

Sustainable development and change have proven to depend upon a local commitment and involvement. Experiences from Zambia and Lagos show the importance of including participatory and inclusive methodologies.

In the Zimbabwean context, in Shona culture, IKS is rooted in the concept of *Hunhu* or *Hunhuism*. The concept is moulded on an African vision that strives for an upright and virtuous individual (Sibanda 2014: 26). To be virtuous in the Shona context, one must respect the cultural values, morals and norms. They are uncoded laws that are embedded in natural law. Sibanda (2014: 26) argues that *Hunhu* is being human. It implies rationality and recognises that one cannot exist without the other or the society as whole. In building peace, CSOs need to consider such elements as breeding peaceful coexistence and acknowledging the value that everyone has in life. The spirit of *Hunhu* is understood best by the local people with the use of their own language. For example, a Shona idiom which says *Mwana ndewa amai kana ari mudumbu asi kana abuda ndewe munhu wese* loosely translated means: “A baby belongs to the mother whilst it is still in the womb but once it is born it belongs to everyone”. This shows that everyone has a duty to look after and take care of the other in the community. To this end, messages of love and caring are critical in peacebuilding.

9.7.2 Designing Context-Specific Peacebuilding Activities

CSO(A)’s peacebuilding programmes have been fragile as the interventions were not grounded in the local realities. CSO(A) had done transplants of models that have worked elsewhere without a thorough mapping on what suits an environment. Participant AGM8 who propounded that:

Our past peacebuilding programme seemed to be weak in terms of failure to include the broader views and aspects of the local initiatives. The training came at the right time as CSOs like other organisations will be evaluating their yearly programmes. This means that with the start of a new year we would also consider designing and implementing context specific programmes in consultation with the local people.

As noted, it would take some time to see how members of CSO(A) implemented the IKS/local grain and political intelligence ideas. Such results are best tested from the end of the first quarter, when most organisations conduct their first evaluations. Such results are presented in the ensuing chapter. At this stage, I then wanted to find out how members had considered the training outcome in their peacebuilding plans for 2017.

9.7.3 Harnessing Local and Modern Peacebuilding Knowledge

During the training, I noticed that CSO(A) did not fully incorporate local knowledge into their peacebuilding programme; they had a prescriptive approach in reaching out to communities. Their peacebuilding models were rooted in modern peacebuilding approaches that follow best practices as opposed to addressing contextual realities. Participant AGM4 noted that as a CSO they did conflict analysis prior to an intervention but would not have explored the local ways of dealing with a conflict. In their past peacebuilding exercises they imposed dispute resolutions that would have worked elsewhere. He said that the training challenged them to consider the root causes and local dispute resolution mechanisms. Participant AGM7 stated that:

In a way we need to build upon the existing systems that people are more familiar with rather than bring something new. At best to balance foreign and local approaches would be a noble idea. To improve their programmes, they would consider blending local initiatives and other foreign best practices.

Participant AGM7 further postulated that:

As an organisation we held the belief that involving many actors in designing and implementing a programme would spoil the outcome. Yet, developing an all-inclusive intervention grounded in the local knowledge can enrich a peacebuilding intervention.

What can be drawn from participant AGM7 is that there is a positive response in considering local knowledge for designing dispute resolution mechanisms. It is evident that there is now a big generational gap between the original holders of indigenous knowledge and practices, and the generation of the contemporary era who have adopted some Western values. For example, there is an erosion of *Hunhuism* in the face of Christianity which despises some of the traditional practices like *kurova guva*, yet these past practices are still relevant in building peace. *Kurova guva* is a Shona practice where the spirit of the dead is brought back home to take care of the living ones. CSOs must balance past and modern knowledge systems in their efforts to build durable peace.

Raising similar views, participant AGM8 noted:

In future we can also embark on training the local leaders to conduct peacebuilding both in local and modern ways. The rationale is that people prefer and trust their local leaders as opposed to

CSOs directly engaging the communities. Thus, embracing the local grain promotes ownership and legitimacy of a peacebuilding intervention.

Participant AGM3 highlighted that:

We relied much on independent experts to design their intervention programme. From this experience, they had much faith in the models developed by professionals or experts in peacebuilding. Not to undermine their expertise, but we failed to realise that at times they have a generalised understanding of problems facing the communities. It was upon implementing the pre-tailored intervention that as a CSO we would experience some problems.

From the training, I noted that there was a need to combine the knowledge from external advice, or peacebuilding templates, and the views that the local people had. Such an approach pays attention to the details of the local needs. Emphasis was on working with the local people and knowledge. This also indicated some positive lessons that members drew from the intervention.

9.7.4 From Liberal to Sustainable Peacebuilding Models

CSO(A)'s peacebuilding models were grounded in liberal approaches negating sustainable peacebuilding models. Their energies were on addressing structural matters through security sector reforms and promoting rule of law. CSO(A)'s models had not thoroughly embraced people-oriented peacebuilding models. Participant AGM5 postulated that their peacebuilding programmes had been guided by liberal approaches. She noted that they had followed the democratisation wave, which then informed their agenda in peacebuilding. This approach does not fit well with local priorities in some contexts. With the local grain, she highlighted that:

Though there might be nation-wide wave of democratisation, some areas need healing, for example Matabeleland which still has unhealed wounds of *Gukurahundi* and yet they seem to have overlooked this and implemented democratic reform projects. For example, as a CSO we have been engaged in the trying to create an equal electoral environment for political parties. Much of our energies have not gone towards the electorate. In which case if they have unhealed wounds, they might not see a need to vote even when the playing field is put on an equal footing. In some way this could explain why there have been continued broken relationships amongst the Shona and Ndebele people.

During the training she learnt that

If we engage IKS/local grain they might tell us that they prioritise healing than democratic reforms. The views from the people will inform the CSO's peacebuilding role, in the above case they can engage in healing peacebuilding campaigns than advocating for democratic reforms.

She therefore appreciated the need of fully engaging the people in order to design and implement programme that they prioritise the most.

In healing, CSOs can make use of traditional practices that are followed if people are murdered or died in mysterious ways. In Shona culture healing can be achieved through a process of *kuchenura* or cleansing ceremonies. *Kuchenura* is done after a crime of murder has been committed (HZT and ZIMCET 2016). It rests on the belief that murder can bring bad luck to the community - for example, having droughts and famine. Such bad luck can only disappear when *kuchenura* is done, where a beast

must be slaughtered, and the blood is spilt on the land to appease the spirits. Designing peacebuilding approaches embracing IKS and political intelligence has merit in that people have knowledge of what they want as opposed to a situation where CSOs impose foreign ideas.

Participant AGM5 also confessed that she had a narrow understanding of peace. She had the understanding that the absence of physical violence alone constituted peace. This assumption had led them to focusing on liberal peacebuilding models without exploring sustainable models that were grounded on people's relationships, rather than reforming state institutions. Participant AGM5 added "Following and imposing liberal peacebuilding models is like trying to remake communities in the liberal image which might be contrary to their ideologies".

The above sentiments point out that CSO(A)'s peacebuilding programmes have not had a huge impact in yielding positive peace outcomes. Participant AGM1 echoed, "This points out the flaws that come with supply-side rather than demand-side peacebuilding initiatives and activities". The task, therefore, was to check if participants had learnt skills and methods that can effectively embrace the IKS/local grain and political intelligence.

The ensuing section discusses participants' comments on ways to effectively work with the IKS/local grain and political intelligence in designing and implementing peacebuilding programmes.

9.7.5 Ways of Effectively Working with the IKS/Local Grain and Political Intelligence in Peacebuilding

Knowing IKS/local grain alone is not enough, but rather CSOs need to have knowledge on how best they can incorporate them in their peacebuilding activities. According to participant AGM2, while they have peacebuilding programmes that incorporate local views, such as involving women in rural areas, he noted that much still needs to be done. Their projects have been selling - especially to local women - but have not had a wider impact on men and the youth. He noted that "the problem has not been on the CSO failing to work with the local grain but changing the perceptions within the local communities". For example, "due to hunger and famines, people in rural areas now have a mentality that when a CSO comes to their area it has come with food and other humanitarian aid". From the training, he realised that "Political intelligence skills can help in addressing this challenge. There is a need to carry out collaborative exercises to design an all-appealing peacebuilding programme. It follows that I will seek, together with other stakeholders, ways of designing low cost economic activities that can draw the attention of all". For example, this could be identifying local projects that can pull and push communities to work together and, in the process, seed a culture of trust and interdependence.

9.7.6 Designing compatible local low-cost economic projects

In their efforts to effectively build durable peace, CSO(A) members noted that it was pertinent to embark on low cost economic projects. This would reduce financial burden on their part as well as the

communities. The communities would be able to self-sustain such initiatives even in the absence of the CSO. Like the points raised by participant AGM2, participant AGM4 asserted that:

We would also give incentives to the participants such as washing soaps. We faced challenges in that these incentives were misinterpreted, towards election times, to the point that it was being alleged that their organisation was using the soap in campaigning for a certain political party.

It can be noted that incentives have a danger of being politicised and thereby distorting the whole intention of their campaigns. Participant AGM4 elaborated that “soaps were used as a symbol of washing away violent episodes that had rocked communities”. Further in their evaluation they also noted that “some of the participants during their campaigns would come for soap and not really for the peace campaigns” (AGM4). From this experience and the exposure of the training, it enabled him to think of other alternatives that can lure local people and at the same time build peace amongst them. To this end, he noted that embarking on local community projects can be effective in peacebuilding using IKS with the local people.

Participant AGM4 further noted that:

It was our task through political intelligence skills to identify low cost local economic projects and work with the local people. An example could be reviving food for work projects which helps in rebuilding the infrastructure within local communities. The effects of these projects are that they create a sense of unity and interdependence even in polarised communities.

The local communities can develop a mentality that they need one another for the community to develop. “People will be united through working together on a particular project and in this way a bond will be created. Such bonds will continue to bind people together even in cases where someone might want to instigate violence within the community” (participant AGM4). This is a situation which is possible in divided communities. It shows that sustainable peacebuilding models which are people-oriented can effectively bring positive peace. The ability expressed by participant AGM4 to think of other peacebuilding alternatives with the local grain demonstrates to some extent that the training had a positive impact. Building peace with IKS is less costly and promotes greater ownership (HZT and ZIMCET 2016). Once ownership is generated people easily learn the issues that CSOs will be channelling to them.

9.7.8 Local Language and Community Elders as Pillars in Building Peace through IKS and Political Intelligence Skills

The ability to capitalise on local wisdom and language can strengthen CSOs’ peacebuilding activities. In effectively using IKS/local grain and political intelligence skills in peacebuilding, CSOs need to have a strong link with local elders who have rich knowledge on the best practices and experiences that have been or can be used in building peace within their communities. Identifying the elders requires stakeholder mapping skills embedded in political intelligence. In past peacebuilding projects rural areas, participant AGM8 indicated that they had engaged, for example, the youth in assessing the local needs and possible solutions. They managed to get rich information on the problems affecting the community

but would face challenges in designing and implementing effective intervention strategies”. They noted that they did not fully consider embracing the local language. CSOs need to work with community elders who have wisdom on local language and practices that promote, for example, a culture of tolerance and unity. In identifying these people, I noted that CSOs must have members with good stakeholder mapping skills. As highlighted in the training, there was the use of local language through idioms with which people are more familiar. Such idioms have rich meanings that can be used in peacebuilding activities by CSOs. The task therefore is to identify such community individuals who have knowledge of local languages and idioms with whom CSO(A) can work in designing and implementing peacebuilding interventions. The individuals are known, respected and seen as apolitical by the local communities.

One can also work with them in implementing their peacebuilding campaigns. For example, have them on banners or posters with peace messages, added participant AGM8. They can also incorporate their knowledge in writing up booklets or pamphlets which are designed specifically for that community (ibid). This demonstrates her knowledge that local grain does not involve people alone but goes further to encompass language in the form of idioms.

Tapping into the wisdom of the elders in peacebuilding can prove to be effective in getting messages to reach other people. It follows that imparting *hunhuism/ hunhuness* was and is a task that has been performed by elders through their own means. In the past, elders could teach about good environmental ethics of preserving the environment by not cutting down trees. For example, community elders would tell the young ones, “do not stone a fruit tree in the bush as this would lead to a bad omen happening to the person”. Noting and implementing this in peacebuilding is also vital as sustainable environmental management leads to peace as well in societies. It can be noted that past conflict cases in Zimbabwe have been biased towards formal and government structures and negating other informal channels such as the knowledge of the elderly, not unlike many countries that had been colonized. Despite this, CSOs also must recognise that local wisdom from elders might also be an obstacle to building peace. For example, past cultural practices oppressed women by not actively involving them in settling disputes, even when they were the victims.

9.7.9 Forging Networks and Establishing Neutral Peacebuilding Spaces

Strengthening CSOs’ activities in peacebuilding can be done through establishing strong collaborations with like-minded partners. CSOs can learn of appropriate methods or ways they can use to reach out in a community through partnership. For example, community-based organisations are more familiar with IKS than other CSOs that might not have a bond with the communities. If CSOs have fragile and weak links, it becomes difficult to have long-term impact in their peacebuilding efforts. Participant AGM4 noted “They had tried to form coalitions with other CSOs in peacebuilding, with the aim of enriching their experiences in peacebuilding but it proved to be a challenging task”. While the training emphasised

building networks, challenges arise because CSOs follow different mandates as provided by their founders and funders. Participant AGM4 observed:

Some CSOs have a competitive mentality of wanting to outdo others in peacebuilding rather than working together for a common objective in communities. To this end, their approaches become incompatible to work together in bringing peace in a community. This might then call for another training or workshop that addresses such kind of networking barriers. CSOs do not want to walk the talk. They conduct campaigns on unity, tolerance and power of diversity in communities and yet they do not want to form strong coalitions amongst themselves in pursuit of a similar objective.

Despite this limitation, participant AGM4 noted “They will make efforts to carry out collaborative projects with the local people so that change can be realised”. In collaborations he observed that:

Stakeholder mapping or screening is vital as members can separate seasoned CSOs from fly by night organisations that are not genuine or uncivil. In polarised environments, our organisation needs to identify neutral stakeholders and work with them in building peace. From the training, I noted that there is need for us to create an environment of trust, mutual respect and shared aspiration. Following this, we can be able to effectively conduct durable peacebuilding programmes.

The observation by participant AGM4 demonstrates that the process of networking cannot be done randomly. It requires careful analysis and understanding of the partners with whom an organisation seeks to engage. The ability to analyse is therefore rooted in the political intelligence skills.

It also transpired that CSOs should not only collaborate amongst themselves but also with other actors outside the CSO family. Participant AGM9 added, “Establishing networks with key stakeholders outside CSOs in peacebuilding was also important in effectively building durable peace in communities”. In future peacebuilding programmes participant AGM9 noted:

We need to establish good rapport with local celebrities or brand ambassadors. The merits of working with these are that societies view them as neutral. Collaborating with them can help in breaking a ground in polarised environments or in deconstructing regime change images on CSOs. It follows that in stakeholder screening, we can also identify such people to work with in their peacebuilding efforts. This could be through songs or poetry that can be performed at public events. I learnt that working with right and relevant local grain our peacebuilding programmes can become more effective.

Working with local celebrities enhances the chances of creating a neutral ground in peacebuilding. Where neutral people feature in peacebuilding, it increases the turnout of the people towards a programme. Local celebrities become strategic partners in cases where the political environment is highly unstable or risky for people to be seen at gatherings. CSOs should find ways of establishing neutral spaces (UNESCO 2002) to attract people to their peacebuilding exercises. Neutral spaces encompass the people and the places where a campaign can be hold. The responses from the action group members show that participants see the importance or relevance of stakeholder-mapping and breaking some of the peacebuilding hurdles they have experienced. Broadening and inclusion of other players in building peace can enrich their knowledge about a community which they can include in their designs and implementation.

9.7.10 Timing and Establishing Strategic Entry Points

Another key element in building peace amongst communities is timing and identifying strategic entry points. Participant AGM7 highlighted that “We have not managed to bring meaningful change in some societies due to faulty timing and failure to identify strategic entry points”. She highlighted “Our peacebuilding campaigns have not attracted huge numbers due to mistiming.” By this, she meant that they would conduct some campaigns and activities on days when most people would be busy. The training gave an insight into carrying out a peacebuilding programme. For example, “in rural areas, there was need to know days when people will not be engaged in their day-to-day farming business such as the Sabbath day that the people respected and rested” (Participant AGM7). Such mistakes could be averted through conducting an all-inclusive problem analysis. Through involving local actors CSOs can learn some of the days that the communities will be having free times. In rural areas or agriculture-based communities it will be a Friday whilst in urban areas it can be Saturday or Sunday. On these days, peacebuilding programmes are bound to be attended by huge numbers.

9.7.12 Pro-Active Peacebuilding Mind-Set

Addressing the root causes of a problem can be done when CSOs have a pro-active approach. Often, they end up “fire-fighting” the manifestations of a problem. Being successful in putting out a fire does not entail dealing with the problem. Participant AGM9 noted:

We have been reactive to conflict issues and not able to have a foresight of problems to come. The problem arises in that we await funding for us to launch a programme. For example, we carry out post-election peacebuilding campaigns after electoral violence has taken place, yet we could have established measures to counter such conflicts prior to election times.

If funding is not available, CSOs at times become bystanders in the face of conflict situations. She further noted that:

It is through conflict mapping with the local grain that they can be able to foresee some problems to come and do proactive peacebuilding activities. This realisation can then be used to source for funding in training on conflict prevention or early warning systems. We can work with the local communities and build peace constituencies before elections are held. Such faults have led the country to continue to witness a spiral of election related violence. It also follows that we should be able to redesign our roles of building peace in this case move away from monitoring and documenting electoral violence but build peace constituencies.

The above entails that the participant seems to have had a change of mind-set in planning the peacebuilding programme. It is a realisation that peacebuilding is a continuous process which can be done before and after a conflict has erupted. For example, CSOs should be creating zones of peace, now, before the next 2018 Zimbabwean presidential elections. They should watch and act on the problems at the same time rather than just assuming a watchdog role.

Apart from timing, other participants noted that community and stakeholder mapping is pertinent in peacebuilding interventions. According to participant AGM7, their organisation has been viewed “as one of the regime change agents. In this way we have not managed to penetrate some ZANU PF

stronghold communities, facing resistance, starting from the chiefs in the area”. After the training she noted that, “It is through conducting a rigorous community- and stakeholder-mapping that they can be able to know how to access and work with the local communities in their peacebuilding exercises”. This experience, if implemented, is likely to address some of the challenges that members of CSO(A) have been facing in making head way in polarised environments. This is despite the fact that, they will be having genuine peacebuilding programme.

9.7.13 Implementing Appealing Peacebuilding Activities through the Arts

This section presents views of participants on methods that they have used and could use to effectively reach out to the communities. It follows that a peacebuilding activity can either draw or push away people within a community. It then becomes important to know the activities that are liked most by a community or past activities that they used to do that are of interest to them. Participant AGM6 argued that:

For a peacebuilding programme to be more durable they need to be delivered in a more appealing and context sensitive way. CSOs that have followed liberal peacebuilding models have been absorbed with the placard carrying mind-set, holding peaceful demonstrations especially in urban settings. Continuing with this mind-set results in temporary and less appealing outreach. The reasons are that the government has not been tolerant to demonstrations led by CSOs. People fear for their lives and property in conducting demonstrations and have resorted not to participate in such activities. It is from the training that I realise that we can engage in other activities that are more appealing to the people and less threatening to the government. As a CSO we have faced a mammoth task to get clearance from the police just to have a peaceful demonstration. Noting how cumbersome and time-consuming such exercise is, we are considering building peace through entertainment. I have realised that entertainment is both appealing in urban and rural settings.

CSOs can thus embrace building peace with music in their programmes. Brown *et al.* (2016: 16) argue that: “music forges inter-communal relations. Powerful messages in songs have led to the dismantling of oppressive practices, that is the emancipation of the colonised people”. In addition, “music heals the body when it hurts and re-activates the mind” (ibid: 18). Music can be used in healing those who would have been traumatised by violent episodes. It can also be noted that while songs are sometimes used to fuel hatred and cause conflicts, they can equally be used to expose violence and unite people once more. The shift in thought by participant AGM6 to start planning how to embrace entertainment forms that can be used by their organisation in building peace, can be credited to IKS/local grain and political intelligence peacebuilding training.

Furthermore, it can be observed that building peace through IKS is more effective using non-formal channels. Sibanda (2014:28) argues that *Hunhu* is not best transmitted through conventional but unconventional means.” The unconventional ways include but not limited to community gatherings, field days, games, folktales and the use of idioms. Informal means are more effective, given that imparting *hunhu* is an appeal to the heart and spirit as opposed to rational and practical means that are followed in Western cultures (July 2004). In some areas, the people value traditional dances called *muchongoyo* as a way of uniting and entertaining people. In these dances, people sing songs that also educate the people on features of *hunhu*. From this, CSOs need to find ways through which they can

convey peace messages effectively in ways that are tailored to the interests and practices of the local people.

Participant AGM2 shared their past peacebuilding activities. He illustrated that:

We have organised sporting activities such as peace marathons. The community would participate in these competitions and win small prizes in the form of school fees vouchers or food hand-outs. At these events they would also provide t-shirts, food and refreshments to participants. The t-shirts would have peace messages which would be complemented by distributing flyers with ways in which communities could live peacefully together.

From the training, he noted some of the weaknesses of such games. For instance, “they can be costly and become unsustainable to run given the financial challenges that our organisation has been facing”. As an alternative in future peacebuilding programmes, he indicated that they would consider other events such as drama with peace messages. On this issue participant AGM2 highlighted that:

Bringing dramas could be more effective as schools can adopt and conduct them with similar messages. Their role as an organisation will be to partner with local schools and embrace this concept. This could mean that even in the absence of the CSO, the schools could carry on with the activities. Bringing this in school can help build peaceful learning environments. Students may also take up the lessons to their families and communities at large. This would have a far-reaching effect than just peace marathons. Drama can have a greater impact as people can act on their life or community stories.

Drawing from the response, it can be noted that members from CSO(A) have now developed a new mentality of asking about the life after a CSO vacates a community. This creates an element of designing programmes that can be sustained by the people themselves without any external hand. Peacebuilding through entertainment becomes a viable and effective option. People can also identify their talents for their future careers.

Participant AGM4 indicated, “In designing an intervention strategy, we should also carry out an assessment of the activities that people are more familiar with and can draw large numbers”. As an organisation participant AGM2 thought that “any sport or form of entertainment can attract people, yet some events or sports are not appealing. This goes back to challenge CSOs to understand fully the local activities that are done within a particular community”. This demonstrates that members of CSO(A) had broadened their understanding on how best to work with the home-grown activities in their peacebuilding outreach programme.

9.7.14 Building Peace beyond the Traditional Communication Platforms

Appealing peacebuilding programmes can be complemented by designing effective distribution channels such as the use of social media. One of the strategies that participant AGM5 had used in the peacebuilding campaigns was distributing booklets to communities during peace campaigns. She postulated that:

The booklets should have been translated in the local languages so that people can fully understand the messages. After some time, we noted that randomly distributing booklets was not an effective

strategy. Some recipients of the booklets would not use them for the intended purpose. For example, women who sell tomatoes in one community were seen wrapping tomatoes to clients using pages from the booklets. This was a setback in that printing and translating the booklets demands a lot of finances on the part of the organisation. As an alternative we thought of distributing the booklets in schools where we felt that students can read and learn. Upon doing this, we also noted that in some schools the booklets will be piled in one corner without being given out to the students.

Following this experience, participant AGM5 noted that they had to think of other platforms to effectively reach out to the people in a more cost-effective and environment-friendly manner. It was through the training on IKS that

I learnt to make use of social media platforms like WhatsApp with which most people seem to be more familiar in both urban and rural settings. Future trainings should focus on how CSOs can design and make use of technology in building peace.

From such an experience, distribution of peacebuilding material must be relevant to a context. In some cases, people prefer to be educated through story telling or folk tales. The literacy levels of a community can inform CSOs of the right ways to use in peacebuilding. Social media might not be relevant to people in the rural communities where they might not have access to the technology or even network. CSOs then need to be flexible in their efforts to reach out to communities.

One of the ways through which broken ties can be mended is building peace through non-text forms or materials. Apart from the fact that textbooks might be costly in printing, they might not be appealing to a community. This was the case of one community-based organisation (*Moving the Goalpost*)⁷ in Kenya that wanted to empower girls in 2014. The organisation sponsored a project where they had noticed that several girls and women were illiterate. They introduced a football league in which the women were encouraged to take part. As they played the game they started to unite and share knowledge. The organisation also carried out beads and soap-making projects that empowered women to start businesses alone and become financially independent. Other means of learning that CSOs can conduct include debates, role-playing and traditional games (UNESCO 2002). Taking note of such initiatives demonstrates that CSOs can also reach out and educate the people beyond booklets. Even in cases where the people are literate, the booklets must be appealing to the people. For learning to take place, a booklet or text must portray life-oriented experience and must be enjoyable (ibid). Failure to input this might lead to the text being used for other things not intended. In some cases, printed documents might not be sensitive to persons with disabilities, unless they are converted into other disability-sensitive formats.

Participant AGM3 also raised a point that in distribution of peace messages, CSOs need to go beyond the traditional forms. Participant AGM3 noted “CSOs could work with the local grain, record video or audio clips and circulate them via WhatsApp platforms. Though they cannot be certain that everyone will read and learn from the clips, chances are high that the messages will reach out to many in a short space of time with little cost incurred in the process”. Participant AGM3 had learnt from the example of “Pastor Mawarire who used social media to reach out to many Zimbabweans in a short space of

⁷ MTGK.ORG – Moving the Goalposts Kikili

time”. However, participant AGM5 argued that “there is need for CSOs to have the intelligence of properly packaging their messages in a less provocative manner.” She considered use of street theatre acts to be more effective educating people on peacebuilding issues. The discussions on other strategies of reaching out to the communities more effectively can show that participants learnt something from the training exercises. Effective peacebuilding activities should be widely sent and spread to other communities so that they can also learn from them. Social media then complements other channels of communication that have been used in reaching out to communities on peacebuilding issues.

CSOs can also make use of placing peace messages on billboards, especially in urban areas. Participant AGM1 noted that “During the training it came out that CSOs, like other business companies, can tap into this form of marketing”. Whilst it might be expensive in placing such adverts, he noted that they “can do collaborations with the city or rural councils and design posters with peace messages”. He added that “people could learn about certain peace issues when they will be passing through the areas with these bill boards. The intention is to get the messages to reach the people and transform their communities. The billboards could have messages that link peace and development; such message will trigger people to see the importance of peace”. Participant AGM1, however, commented that “it might be difficult to evaluate the impact on the community using the billboard”. The above thoughts indicate that members of CSO(A) had identified a wide variety of approaches they can use in reaching out to communities with peacebuilding messages.

9.8 Comments on Future Trainings

9.8.1 Internal Management Systems

“How can CSOs be strengthened in their future peacebuilding programmes?” This question was meant to generate participants’ views on future efforts that need to be made in strengthening CSOs in peacebuilding. According to participant AGM9,

The training on local grain exposed members on how best they can design an effective peacebuilding programme. However, there is need to design future trainings on enhancing CSOs’ internal management systems. For example, some programmes have been weakened by corruption, fraud and nepotism.

CSOs’ top leadership “has sought to employ incompetent relatives at the expense of qualified personnel with appropriate and relevant peacebuilding skills” concurred participant AGM8. The result is that “we continue to develop faulty interventions,” added participant AGM8. Weak internal management can compromise CSOs’ peacebuilding programme; for example, if funding is not accounted effectively some goals may not be achieved when a programme is implemented.

9.9 Conclusion

The conclusion drawn from the evaluation was that the training made a positive change on the participants’ work-experience in peacebuilding. Indications are that the training process itself was a success starting from the planning, implementation and evaluation. The faults brought out in the

evaluations can be used in future trainings. Participants from CSO(A) managed to gain new insights on how they can effectively strengthen their peacebuilding programme. However, the generation of new knowledge cannot be solely attributed to the intervention. I acknowledge that there are other unforeseen circumstances that could have caused the positive changes. These could be a participant who might have read about the bottom-up peacebuilding approaches from other literature during the times of evaluation or they could have had a new manager who came with closely related issues to their workplace. The response confirms that the participants had broadened their knowledge in identifying the IKS/local grain and the forms in which it comes. They also had acquired skills of effectively working with the IKS/local grain through political intelligence skills. The next chapter provides responses of a second outcome evaluation of the training to CSO(A) members and local people in the community who participated in their peace campaigns.

CHAPTER 10: SECOND OUTCOME EVALUATION OF THE TRAINING

10.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the views of members of CSO(A) who received training in peacebuilding using IKS/local grain and political intelligence. It also outlines the views of the local people who were recipients of the CSO's peacebuilding campaigns. The purpose was to establish whether CSO(A) had embraced and implemented the skills they got from the training. I also wanted to test whether CSO(A)'s approach to building peace had been enhanced in a manner that brought durable peace and development. This was achieved through evaluating findings from both the members from CSO(A) and recipients of their programmes (local people). The findings are drawn from one FGD with the local people which had seven participants, ten in-depth interviews with the local people and five in-depth interviews with members of CSO(A). In presenting the findings from CSO(A) members I used the codes presented in Chapter 8 (AGM1). In the second evaluation, I did not manage to interview all the nine participants who were in the training since four of them had not gone into the area where the peace campaign was held. The composition of the interviewees is described in one of the later sections in this chapter. The structure of the chapter is as follows: I present the context of the area that CSO(A) operated, followed by the experiences of the members of CSO(A) in their peacebuilding campaign, then I present the views of the local people, and lastly a discussion of the findings from the intervention.

10.2 Responses on Outcome Evaluation of the Training

This section presents responses from members of CSO(A) and the local people who have been recipients of CSO(A)'s peacebuilding programmes. The rationale was to evaluate the outcome of the training on building peace using IKS/local grain and political intelligence. The main goal was to measure the extent to which CSO(A) had been enhanced in their efforts to build peace. To achieve this, I conducted five in-depth interviews with CSO(A) members who had received training from 23-25 November 2016. In this chapter I present the views of participants AGM1, AGM2, AGM4, AGM6 and AGM9. These participants had been interviewed on the 23rd of January 2017 to assess the outcome of the training. During the first evaluation interviews conducted in January 2017, most participants indicated that they had not implemented the skills learnt from the training. As a result, I decided that after five months, that is the period from 10 February 2017 to 30 June 2017, I should conduct in-depth interviews to check whether CSO(A) had been strengthened in its peacebuilding programmes. To enhance the validity of the findings from CSO(A), I also decided to go to the rural community where they have been conducting their peacebuilding exercises. I spent 12 days in the area, from 17 to 28 July 2017. During the first five days, I was establishing consent (see Annexures 13 and 14 for the Consent Letter and Letter of Information) from the local leadership whom I had managed to get contact with before the visit. After

establishing a good working relationship with key stakeholders, I then conducted 10 in-depth interviews with key informants (see Annexure 12 for the interview guide) and held one FGD comprised of seven members. Some of the key informants included village heads, school teachers, a local pastor and a shop owner. For the FGD, I managed to get four voluntary females and three males, all aged from 20-35, who had, had the opportunity to interact with CSO(A) in their area. The participants were purposively selected whilst others were referrals from the key respondents. To ensure anonymity, I assigned codes to each participant. Examples of the codes are presented in the Tables below.

Table 10.1: Codes for the local people

Code	Gender	Age range
IP1	M	25-30
IP2	M	25-30
IP3	M	18-24
IP4	M	30-35
IP5	M	18-24
IP6	M	40-45
IP7	F	30-35
IP8	F	25-30
IP9	F	45-50
IP10	F	40-45

Table 10.2: Codes for FGD members

Code	Gender	Age range
FGDP1	F	18-24
FGDP2	F	25-30
FGDP3	F	18-24
FGDP4	F	30-35
FGDP5	M	25-30
FGDP6	M	25-30
FGDP7	M	25-30

Keys to the above tables:

IP1: in-depth interview with participant 1.

FGDP1: Focus Group Discussion participant 1.

10.3 The Context of the Rural Community

The second evaluation was conducted in the rural community that lies in Mashonaland East province of Zimbabwe. I present the rural area using the pseudonym, ‘Land of cattle’. The province and ‘Land of cattle’ is home, mostly to Shona people. Furthermore, the area has been known to be a ZANU PF stronghold and prone to political conflicts, mainly between the ruling party and the MDC-T. The people

in the area were also affected by the 2008 election related violence (detailed in Chapter 3). Other conflicts are based on land disputes amongst the locals. With the end of the election violence several peacebuilding programmes have been rolled out by state organs and CSOs, which includes CSO(A). The original intention was for peace and sustainable development to be realised. CSO(A) aimed to build broken ties, cultivate a culture of peace through respect and tolerance of divergent political views and interests among the people in the Land of Cattle. The post-2008 election violence left the community polarised. Polarisation affected the social, political and economic relations of the people. Food aid would be distributed based on party lines. There was continuous mistrust and suspicion that some people could not greet each other or even drink together community brewed beer at community functions. People were divided and could not work together even on developmental projects like road and bridge maintenance. There are still unhealed wounds on the part of the victims of the 2008 election violence. Some of the known perpetrators have been left scot free, while some of them have been rewarded by the political parties they support through patronage benefits such as pieces of land. This reality coupled with the forthcoming 2018 harmonised elections motivated CSO(A) to build peace to avoid the resurgence of electoral related conflicts. This was done using political intelligence skills and IKS concepts that CSO(A) members had been trained with. Despite the peacebuilding programme interventions (and presence of CSOs). The prevailing climate is not conducive for sustainable development to be realised. In terms of building peace, the local people in the area have generally relied more on cultural dialogues and courts, although in some cases they have been adopting conventional practices such as reporting cases of violence to police. Traditionally about 60% of the people are bound by beliefs in the spirit mediums, respect community shrines and graves, believe in the supernatural forces (Response from IP9). They believe that if the gods are not happy there will be bad omen such as droughts or crops will be affected diseases. The other 40% of the population believe in Christianity and other local religious doctrines (ibid). The Christians use prayers, dialogues and in some cases resort to modern ways of resolving conflicts. For example, they can seek third parties (local pastors) or in some cases approach the police and courts (response from IP10). The background of peacebuilding models used by the local people informed members of CSO(A) to adopt IKS/local and political intelligence skills in their peacebuilding interventions. The IKS model embraced the traditional and the modern approaches to peacebuilding that was in line with the contextual realities in the Land of cattle. In other words, CSO(A) designed a hybrid, democratic peacebuilding approach that holistically addressed reconciliation, healing, uniting the people, lack of respect and tolerance that caused violent conflicts and perpetual strained relations within the community. One of their peacebuilding main theme was 'Creating conditions of durable peace and development in divided communities'. To this end, an outcome evaluation in this area on the training of CSO(A) members in peacebuilding using IKS and political intelligence will indicate the extent of success of the action intervention. The responses are presented thematically.

10.4 Comments and Lessons from the Training

10.4.1 Creating Strong Linkages with the Local Community

Question asked was directed to CSO(A) members who had participated in the training: “What do you still recall from the skills you got from the training on building peace using IKS and political intelligence?” I posed this question to establish whether participants recalled what they had learnt from the training on building peace using IKS held in November 2016. The responses were positive. Participant AGM2 highlighted that:

Before the intervention, I noted that there is need for a thorough conflict and stakeholder mapping exercise. This enables one to have a smooth entry into an area that you intend to carry out your project or campaign.

Participant AGM1 raised a similar view and noted that:

Any organisation cannot bring durable results if it does not include the beneficiaries of the programme. In other words, CSOs should ensure that a project is done by the people who have better knowledge and priorities on their societal needs.

Participants AGM4 and AGM9 raised similar points and emphasised that:

When working with the communities there is need to create strong links and collaborations with the benefactors. They further indicated that strong bonds lead to trust, which is key when people are working together on peace matters.

The central idea that emerges from the responses show that peacebuilding approaches should be driven by the people or should take a bottom-up approach. Aall (1996: 439) cited in Kelleher and Ryan (2012: 63) states that indigenous people should be the primary actors in conflict resolution, the people can come up with solutions that suite their local areas. This resonates with Lederach’s view (1997: 94) that local people and their culture are the greatest resources for sustaining peace. Failure to connect with the people often leads to frustrations and failures of an intervention (Kelleher and Ryan 2012). The approach adopted by members of CSOA is grounded in sustainable peacebuilding and development theories. Sustainable peace and development come when a peace campaign or project involves the consumers from the drafting, implementation and evaluation. This approach can be realised when stakeholders work closely with the local people as evidenced from their responses. I noted that the participants had memory of our training and this triggered a question on how they influenced peacebuilding strategies within their CSO.

10.4. 2 Designing and Exploring IKS in Peacebuilding Programmes

The success of the training would not be noted without assessing the actual changes that CSO(A) had done in its peacebuilding activities. Participant AGM6 articulated that:

The training came at the right time. We received it at a time when we were reviewing our projects at the end of 2016. We have been very quick to adjust to the new initiatives on how to effectively build peace using IKS and political intelligence skills. At the start of 2017, we devised a project that

embraces concepts found in IKS and improving on building ties as well as strategic partnerships with key local people.

Participant AGM1 postulated that:

Following the fruitful engagement and exercises that we had, I have started pushing for a workshop that can include other CSOs working with the grassroots in peacebuilding projects. The workshop can further strengthen the ideas that we got from the training. Through workshops we can also learn from other practices of CSOs in peacebuilding that have made use or make use or that may consider using IKS in their peacebuilding programmes. It is from this that our director has begun dialogues on how best and where such a workshop can be held. The proposed topic is 'Using IKS in building lasting peace in Zimbabwe'.

The two responses indicate that members of CSO(A) were now translating the training concepts into reality. This signals that members together with their CSO have learnt other ways that can bring positive peace in conflict ridden areas. In this case, dialogues and collaborations are key in building durable peace. A single actor or CSO cannot fully attain positive peace alone.

Other participants further described their experiences and feedback on how their CSO received the findings from the training sessions held. Participant AGM4 had this to say:

Noting the importance of good mapping exercises, we started engaging key influential people that we can work with in conducting peacebuilding programmes. It is from the observation that any key local person can be able to effectively convey a peace message in one way or the other. In April, we engaged local musicians, pastors, sportspersons and village heads to share knowledge on how best peacebuilding exercises could be done in 'Land of cattle'. For example, we are working together with a local musician in writing peace songs that relate to conflict issues in their area. The idea is to promote ownership of programmes by the local people.

This extract is a testimony from participant AGM4 explaining how they grasped the concept of political intelligence which calls for CSO members to have stakeholder mapping skills to identify strategic partners. CSOs like any other organisation cannot be able to effectively build durable peace without partnerships with local artists.

Participant AGM2 who is a project officer articulated that:

Since the training, we have developed key interests in IKS. I advised other members to further mobilise past research that have done on IKS. Despite these resources, our research department tasked two colleagues to conduct field researches on peace practices that are done in Mashonaland East province. This is not to suggest that we did not incorporate IKS in our projects but somehow, we sought to revive it and deepen our knowledge.

By asking how the training had influenced their peacebuilding approaches, I sought to understand whether they had managed to implement any peacebuilding programme using IKS/local grain concepts and political intelligence skills.

a. Experiences of CSO(A) in Implementing an IKS Peacebuilding Campaign

In this section, I present the experiences of members of CSO(A) who directly conducted a peacebuilding programme in the 'Land of Cattle', in Mashonaland East. These experiences were shared by members of CSO(A) and I present them thematically below.

Following the training held in November 2016, members of CSO(A) implemented a peacebuilding campaign that embraced IKS and political intelligence. The results of the campaign demonstrated whether CSO(A)'s approach to building peace had been enhanced. Participant AGM9 indicated that:

Our organisation adopted a project entitled *Reviving local culture and languages for building peace in rural communities*. We came up with this theme after consulting the people residing in the 'Land of cattle'.

The approach shown by CSO(A) in designing an intervention theme is a sign that they had evolved from the tendency to draw agendas and themes from their offices, without the involvement of the recipients of a programme. This came out from participant AGM1 who asserted that:

In our consultations we sought to find out whether people value or still see the relevance of indigenous culture and language in creating harmonious relations within their societies. From the general responses we noted that the majority still have faith in traditional local knowledge.

The engagement of a programme with the local people generates a sense of ownership right from the design up to the implementation. Inclusion of local realities heightens prospects of sustainability and satisfies the local people, exclusion of the people leads to frustrations and failed peace or interventions (Funk 2012, Kelleher and Ryan 2012). This is a democratic way of building peace with (and within) communities. It is a leap away from elitist to grassroots peacebuilding models.

Successful incorporation of the local views was as a result of political intelligence skills. The skills call for members to be diplomatic, flexible, credible and trustworthy or being genuine and not self-serving as they engage communities (Taliadorou 2015, Adams and Zanzi 2006, Ferris et al. 2001). Such skills aid CSOs to conduct thorough stakeholder mapping that they can include in designing a peacebuilding campaign. Participant AGM4 noted that:

Through stakeholder mapping, we discovered that the reservoirs of IKS were the community elders who were not actively involved in politics. In our engagements, with the local people we noted that some of the community elders that were involved in politics that is, those who occupied leadership positions had mischievously twisted some of the indigenous beliefs to justify some bad practices. For example, local proverbs could be used to promote immoral things. One proverb that emerged was that *chawawana idya nehama mutorwa ane hanganwa* loosely translated means what you have you should share it with you kin and not strangers. This adage promoted selfishness and corruption which is another source of tensions amongst the people.

The screening enabled CSO(A) members to separate elders who would impair their peacebuilding campaign. In conflict mapping, one can understand the history, actors involved, facts, needs and fears, mapping alternative solutions to a problem (Hocker and Wilmot 2001, Hipel 2009). It shows that not all elders in a community can positively contribute to building durable peace. Some elders or members to a community could be part of the problem that will inhibit the building of positive peace. Avoiding them together with negative IKS enables a peacebuilding campaign to be effective and be accepted genuinely by the local people. Negative IKS ideas have, to some extent, caused the decay of *hunhuism* or *ubuntuism* leading to an increase of conflicts or their resurgence in the community. To mitigate the negative that can be found in IKS participant AGM2 said that:

As an organisation we then saw it fit to engage elders who are apolitical. We identified eight respected men and women who then took us through some proverbs and past cultural practices that united people and brought harmony among the Shona communities.

As posited in Chapter 2, most peacebuilding campaigns by CSOs have failed to yield positive results since they involve politicians in their design and implementation. Politicians have in most cases been the perpetrators of violence and it is unwise to involve them, especially in polarised political environments. Such previous acts by politicians are understood in mapping processes where a CSO can learn the styles and tactics that were used before by the parties (Hipel 2009) and try to design different peacebuilding models: in this case, a hybrid and inclusive peacebuilding model was created and implemented by CSO(A).

The engagement of CSO(A) with apolitical elders enabled them to get constructive proverbs that they used in their peacebuilding programme. Participant AGM1 summarised the examples of the Shona proverbs they used in building peace in Land of cattle:

1. *Dare harizvondi munhu rinozvonda mhosva*: loosely translated it means that a traditional court does not hate the offender rather it hates the offence or crime committed. This proverb demonstrates the principle that guides traditional African court system (*dare*). To this end, the message restores the confidence of the traditional courts in addressing conflicts within the society.

2. *Kupa kuturika*: means that to give is to hang up or store. The emphasis is that when one gives to the needy they will be seeding for future blessings. In this way people should be prepared to stretch out their hands even to strangers. There is more gain in giving.

3. *Kandiro kanoenda kunobva kamwe*: a small dish goes whence comes another small one. In other words, one good turn deserves the other. The proverb brings out message of reciprocal relationships among the Shona people.

4. *Atswinya arwa*: which means that every little input from anyone matters. Any contribution from anyone in the society counts no matter its size. In this way people learn to value and appreciate anything that comes from anyone in the society.

The proverbs carry with them rich and positive messages that are relevant in building peace. This shows that IKS breeds context specific solutions in building peace in societies. Members of CSO(A) demonstrated a midwifery role in designing and implementing a sustainable peacebuilding using the skills they got from the training.

b. Effect of Traditional Proverbs in Building Sustainable Peace

In this section I present the views on whether the traditional proverbs had an impact in bringing positive change in the Land of cattle. The positive impact of proverbs would mean that CSO(A) and others

should embrace and continue using them in building peace among the communities. Participant AGM1 articulated that:

The proverbs had positive meanings that brought in a sense of unity, tolerance, respect, and valuing of institutions that dealt with tensions within the society. As an organisation, we believed that if these virtues are embraced conflicts can be minimised. By the time we started our peace campaign in the area we saw people uniting in campaigning against political violence in the area.

The realisation of the positive effect of proverbs resulted in CSO(A) devising interventions that could lead to continuities of peace education through proverbs. Mapara (2009: 257) gives an example that in Nigeria's rural and peri-urban areas conflicts are effectively resolved through proverbs. Such a situation is valid in cases like 'Land of Cattle' where 60% of the people believe in the traditional system or values. Proverbial statements come through oral tradition, they remind people of their moral and value codes that are essential in maintaining peace and stability within communities (Mapara 2009). Proverbs strengthen the moral fabric of a society. The greatest challenge that people in the rural areas face is that their knowledge is undocumented.

At times, when the people who possess it die, so does the knowledge that they have. Participant AGM6 highlighted that:

As an organisation we also realised that while the people had local knowledge in most cases it was not documented. The elders used to pass this teaching orally through folktales they held with their families. To this end, we saw the need to write short pamphlets in consultation with local teachers that could be used in schools.

The approach of writing and designing pamphlets in local language and proverbs by CSO(A) is one that leads to continuity of such ideas in rural communities. Local people will see the relevance of such material, even when the pamphlets are circulated outside schools the recipients will value them more than a pamphlet written in English. The continued engagement with local people proved to be a success in CSO(A)'s peacebuilding approach. One view is that they managed to learn modern proverbs that can also be used in rural areas to build peace.

c. Fusing Traditional and Modern Proverbs in Building Peace

Societies are not static. As generations come and go, so do ideas, values and traditions. Despite the fluidity in the environments that people live in, societal values cannot be eroded completely. In most cases for sustainable change to occur there is need to merge past and present ways of building peace, not as a rigid either/or choice, but one of adaptation. Mawere (2012: 8) argues that indigenous knowledge remains indigenous despite it being modified or contemporary. It remains so, if the contemporary knowledge continues to serve the indigenous people's end, in other words, it must remain with a local cultural meaning (ibid). Despite this, there are always challenges and tensions between the "old" and "new", but such challenges, when managed sensitively, provide people with the opportunity to reflect on such challenges and dichotomies, resulting in using the good of past and present. In this case, members of CSO(A) managed to add a dimension of modern proverbs, that the youth in 'Land of

cattle' could relate to. Participant AGM6 noted that "we managed add to the list of traditional proverbs with modern ones". The addition was possible through wider engagements with the local people in the area. Participant AGM2 said that:

One of the teachers brought in the idea of modern proverbs. For example, the teacher highlighted that through contemporary music new proverbs have been emerging: *uchazoyeuka chikorobho warasa mvura* loosely translated means one will know the importance of a mop when you spill water on the floor. The message that came out was appreciating the importance of anyone and everything around us and in some cases when one commits an act of violence or murders someone, they will think of them in time of need.

The modern proverb demonstrates how Shona culture can be effectively used in promoting messages of tolerance in a community. Tolerance and respect are the key elements found in *hunhuism* which can bring sustainable peace when practiced by people in each area. The use of songs with proverbial meanings resonates with Mawere's (2009) observation that IKS is known better through entertainment, this can be through children playing games. Millar (2017: 185) concurs that indigenous epistemologies are known through dance, songs and ceremonies. This approach can be learnt and embraced by CSOs in enhancing how they can build peace through proverbs.

It is evident that the teacher cooperated very well with CSO(A) since trust had been created between CSO(A) and the local people. Through political intelligence, members of CSO(A) played facilitatory roles in the process. It is this facilitatory role that enhanced CSO(A)'s trust and legitimacy in the people. Political intelligence skills helped CSO(A) to design effective trust creating strategies (Higashi 2015: 47) and was able to get people's confidence in building peace. Less imposition of solutions increased legitimacy (Roberts 2016: 17) among the people. Civil society have been perceived to build peace that is internationally backed without the blessings of the local in other words they failed to represent the citizens' interests (Puljek-Shank and Verkoren 2017: 184). Yet legitimacy is based on the ability of CSOs to skilfully interact with ethnically divided societies and political structures (ibid). Given the polarisation in the Land of Cattle, some CSOs had been viewed as anti-government, answerable to the funders and thereby losing trust and legitimacy among the locals. A crisis of legitimacy makes it difficult for an organisation to carry out a project. Trust is broken when a programme by a CSO fails to solve the problems of the local people (Roberts 2016: 17). In some cases, local people were losing trust and confidence as CSOs would impose solutions that were not addressing the local problems. In some cases, imposition becomes a threat rather than a solution. In this case CSO(A) members averted this through the training skills they acquired. They did not impose rather they worked together with the local people. This resulted in smooth collaboration between CSO(A) and the local people. The CSO managed to get 'strong public support' (Higashi 2015: 47) which is essential in building durable peace. For example, the teacher gave them another modern proverb, then AGM9 gave another example of a modern proverb that embraces peacebuilding as follows:

The proverb was *tsitsi dzei harahwa kuperekedza mwana kucreiche*, loosely translated means, what mercy does an old man have to accompany a girl child to pre-school. The message being portrayed shows how Shona language protects the rights of girl child from abuse in the society. This was

another form of violence that was prevalent in the community and as such it could be shunned through educating people with proverbial statements.

Both traditional and modern proverbs have rich meanings that effectively contribute to building durable peace. The input from the teacher is an indication that people have their own solutions or ways of building peace. The problem was directed to some of the girl child abuses that were prevailing in the local community. The use of modern proverbs demonstrates how CSOA and the local people were improving on the existing knowledge which inevitably creates local ownership and attract more people in an area. Rogers *et al.* (2008: 60) posit that when people are given an opportunity to take an active role in planning, implementing and monitoring projects that affect their own development the people will develop a sense ownership and thereby motivates them to ensure the success of a project. CSO(A) managed to have a deep knowledge gathering which resulted in the success of its peace campaign. This ability was enhanced through political intelligence skills that members of CSOA received during the training.

d. Engaging Key Local Stakeholders and Ways of Building Peace

From these experiences I posed another question on whether the training on IKS had enhanced the CSO's approach in peacebuilding. The key issues that I sought to establish were how CSO(A) incorporated IKS and some of the concepts that lie in the political intelligence concept. Engaging local stakeholders was pertinent in this exercise since the training was based on bottom up peacebuilding models. Maphosa and Kearsley (2014) view it as peace from within. Osamba (2001) posits that it involves using indigenous approaches, with the wider involvement of the communities. Participant AGM2 postulated that:

The major lesson we noted and implemented was on consulting the local people on what exactly they want and would prefer in terms of building peace. Through stakeholder mapping we noted that not all elders constructively build peace rather some can abuse local language in pursuit of their selfish interests. The mapping exercise therefore helped us to identify local people who had the wisdom and knowledge about the community. Apart from the wisdom from elders we noted that proverbs were now changing to meet the new understanding of the current generations. Further deep engagement of the locals enhanced our strategies of spreading peace education in schools, clinics and shopping centres. By the time we distributed the pamphlets there was more legitimacy on our campaigns since the materials reflected the local culture and values of the people.

The comment demonstrates that CSO(A) had embarked on bottom-up approaches to building peace. In this way, the peace education was a product of the views and practices of the people. Wider consultations breed local ownership of peace processes. Where ownership is created, so is legitimacy. Despite this positive development, the CSO faced challenges in the implementation of the training.

e. Clash of Values and Beliefs in Peacebuilding

The experiences of CSO(A) members was not short of challenges. The challenges emanated from the clash of values and beliefs within the society. For example, "some chiefs see CSOs programme as threatening their values, culture and practice" (Maiese 2004). The concept of IKS borrows heavily from

the traditional culture within a society, yet there are some people who have different religious beliefs that contradict IKS. Participant AGM1 noted that:

The challenge arose was that some people within the community were resistant to some of the local ways of building peace. This challenge emanated from a few radical Christian groups who did not believe in the teachings of the elders. One of their views was that part of traditional knowledge was anti-Christian values in patriarchal beliefs. Yet the community is dominated by people who still believe and follow past traditional practices. Despite this, in our campaign we had tried to sift some of the negatives that could come with traditional knowledge. For example, we called for the greater inclusion of women in decision making and peace processes. This followed our inclusion of female elders in the consultation on the ways to build peace in the community.

In any society, conflicts or frictions are bound to occur when change is initiated in an area. While IKS is firmly held in rural areas, rural urban migration has brought in new perceptions and values. The elderly and older generations tend to resist new values imported from Christianity, whilst the younger generations tend to do away with the past traditional values. Such realities must be noted and addressed by CSOs in their efforts to bring durable change.

f. Alternatives to the Challenges

To mitigate the challenges above, there is need to merge IKS with the modern practices in building peace. This can come through engaging multiple stakeholders to be peace ambassadors in their respective groups within the community. For example, local pastors should also work closely with community elders in finding ways of building peace. There should also be workshops that are designed to encourage tolerance and unity of all peace actors in rural communities. This may help in minimising tensions in their efforts of building peace. For example, this was demonstrated through the tensions between Christian and traditional elders in the rural community. CSOs that have different agendas should incorporate elements of peacebuilding and sustainable development that will be in line with the preferences of the local communities. Peace messages or education should be spread to all age groups and be gender sensitive.

Apart from the views of CSO(A) on its experiences of using IKS and political intelligence in building peace, I sought to get the views of the local people in 'Land of cattle'. In this part, I present the views from 10 in-depth interviews with local people in the area and one FGD comprised of seven participants. Responses from local people are presented in codes such as participant IP1 and for FGDs I used participant FGDP1. Interviewing local people was meant to validate the findings from CSO(A). The perceptions of the local people confirmed whether the training enhanced CSO(A) in bringing positive change in the community. The responses are presented in the following sub-themes.

10.4.2 Awareness of Peacebuilding Activities by CSO(A) in the Land of Cattle Community

Another question asked was: "Are you aware of peacebuilding activities done by CSO(A) in your community?" This question sought to verify whether the CSO(A) members conducted peacebuilding campaigns in the area. In some cases, an organisation can claim to have implemented training outcomes

when have not done so. The general responses from the in-depth interviews and FGD confirmed that the CSO(A) members did come to their communities and their approach to building peace had significantly changed. Participant IP1 noted that “for the past two years the CSO has been operating in their area. It was in July that they intensified their work through peace education”. Participant IP2 concurred by saying that “Early this year the CSO embarked on a different approach through which they consulted the elderly people. In the past, these people were left out as they were seen to be of no importance in peacebuilding projects”. One participant from the FGD had this to say, “CSO(A) brought in a new approach where they placed emphasis on reviving local languages in building peace and sustainable development” (participant FGDP2). Participant IP8 highlighted that “they saw CSO(A) members with t-shirts with printed peace messages, advocating respect and tolerance of opinions”. The responses provided confirmation that it was not only the presence of CSO(A) in the area, but that it that changed the modus operandi. The fact that CSO(A) engaged local people shows that their peacebuilding approaches were now grounded in local realities. Such issues emerged from the training on the importance of stakeholder mapping and inclusion of local people by CSOs in building peace.

10.4.3 Peacebuilding Programmes Implemented

In the evaluation process, I also sought to understand the nature of peacebuilding programmes that CSO(A) implemented. Prior to the training, CSO(A) would implement supply side rather than demand driven peace programmes. This resulted in continued conflict resurgence, indicating as they were out of touch with the demands of the community. On this theme, several responses came out from the interviews and FGD. Participant IP6 acknowledged that

CSO(A) came in at the right time with peacebuilding exercises in our community. As we approach elections, incidences of violence scale up. In this case, we will be having elections in 2018 and the community required such programmes.

From another viewpoint, participant IP10 noted that

members from CSO(A) had been engaging local community elders and later implemented a peacebuilding project that was embedded with traditional practices that lies within our Shona culture.

Participants FGDP3, FGDP4 and FGDP7 noted that CSO(A) was actively involved in a peacebuilding programme that incorporated local values that practiced most of the Shona people in the community. Participant IP9 concurred: “In 2017 a unique peacebuilding approach was brought in by CSO(A). It was unique in that we were used to it bringing peace messages tailored in the urban language which was not consistent with the local practices in the community”.

Participant IP5 noted that

amongst the people in my community, I was the first to encounter the CSO which is involved in peacebuilding. They met me at the shopping centre and wanted directions to the house of one of the community elders.

According to participants FGDP1, FGDP6 and FGDP7, CSO(A) carried out peace education campaigns in schools, clinics and shopping centres. Lastly, participant IP2 posited that

I heard that there was a peacebuilding programme that was being carried out in our community. This programme was run by a certain CSO, local elders and input from school teachers who taught the secondary levels.

The responses indicate that CSO(A) was present in peacebuilding in the communities. In addition, the CSO embraced IKS and political intelligence through its engagement with key stakeholders. The stakeholders were identified using mapping skills, CSO(A) worked with neutral people that had knowledge in the peace practices in the area. These stakeholders helped in identifying strategic entry points that generated legitimacy of the CSO amongst the community. The next task was to determine how the programmes reflected the views of the local people.

10.4.4 Presence of Local Input in the Peacebuilding Programme

During the training on building peace using IKS we aimed at enhancing the local ownership of peace projects. One way of creating local ownership is the inclusion of people's views in any programme by CSOs. Once local ownership is guaranteed, peaceful outcomes can yield positive peace and sustainable development. The participants had different views to comment. Participant IP10 noted that

when I heard of the theme, I realised the difference from past CSOs' approaches to build peace. In the past peace messages and campaigns were coloured with urban or foreign practices. This time CSO(A) was using proverbs which are part and parcel of our local culture.

Participants FGDP7, FGDP1 and FGDP3 shared similar views, noting that 'the peace campaign reflected our local way of educating people through proverbs'. Participant FGDP4 noted that "Proverbs have deeper messages that unite the Shona people and at the same time educate them with values that make one virtuous in their conduct in the community". Participant IP2 postulated that "when I read one of the peace posters at our local clinic, I noted that the message was by and large stemming from our common community proverbs". Participant IP5 supported noting that:

I was quickly attracted using proverbs in creating good relations among our communities. It was like the resurrection of past folktales that we used to be told by our elders at night. The folktales had messages of tolerance, love and respect. The CSO members managed to bring back these ideas through peace education that was in the pamphlets written in our own language.

The views show that when an organisation embraces local language it attracts local people to participate in a programme. CSOs' peace campaigns lost relevance since they were not attractive to the people. In this case, CSO(A)'s approach was sensitive to the local proverbs which they used in designing their posters. Peace messages that are conveyed in this way have a great impact on the people which will eventually create a culture of peace. The use and acceptance of proverbs in peacebuilding reverses moral decay which has been a major cause of conflicts in whatever form in the community. When societies appreciate *hunhuism* sustainable peace and development can be guaranteed and this was achieved using

IKS by CSO(A). Sibanda (2014: 26) argues that the African philosophy of *hunhuism* is moulded on an African vision that strives for an upright and virtuous individual.

Participant IP9 commended the efforts of the CSO by highlighting that “Evident from the CSO’s peace materials was our indigenous knowledge. They managed to bring it out through consultations with our elders and removed negative elements of our culture that had contributed to moral decay”. For example, there is a belief that woman’s place should always be in the private sphere and that a girl child is subject meant for marriage. Such beliefs are difficult to remove but CSO(A) managed to enlighten some of the community leadership through collective sharing of social problems associated with such beliefs (ibid). Removing such barriers require dialogue, which is a mutual process that requires open communication, active listening and mutual respect (Deutsch and Coleman 2012: 9); dialogue goes further to include joint learning in finding a common ground. It can be noted that negative elements in IKS prevents a society from attaining durable peace. The dangers of IKS is that societies can have deep-rooted cultural practices that create barriers to the education of girls or in some cases prevent women in building peace (Manojlovic 2018). The approach of separating negative and positive proverbial statements by CSO(A) and community elders ‘enables the generation of conditions for sustainable peace’ (Ibid). Deutsch and Coleman (2012: 9) argue that sustainable peace can be achieved through a society of network relationships that seek to promote justice and address the root causes of conflicts. In a way networks build civic relations necessary for joint problem-solving activities (Saunders 2003). Such a network of relationships was made possible in dialogue and inclusive consultations between CSO(A) and members of the local community. Effective dialogue and networking can be attributed to the skills that CSO(A) members acquired under the political intelligence concept. Participant IP5 also noted that:

The approach taken by the CSO was an all-inclusive. It was sensitive to the old and young generations who all believe in proverbs and local ways but the later have modified their understandings. For example, how the CSO incorporated modern proverbs captured the attention of the youth who are mainly used in perpetrating violence by politicians.

Emerging from the views presented is that there was input of the local people that CSO(A) embraced in its peacebuilding campaign. In some cases, CSOs can either have wrong peacebuilding initiatives or have the right initiatives but little idea of the implementation of such programmes that lead to durable peace (Langer et al 2016: 2). To avoid this pitfall, CSO(A) learnt much from wider consultations with the local people. The people informed the organisation on the best ways of implementing their ideas of building lasting peace. In so doing, CSO(A) managed to attract the interests of both the young and old in their campaign. This leads to more inclusive programmes that creates conditions of realising sustainable peace and development. Sustainable peace is a critical ingredient necessary for sustainable development to be realised in a society. It is impossible to achieve the later before the former. According to Strange and Bayley (2008), sustainable development involves developing in a way that benefits the widest range of sectors, across borders and even between generations. Sustainable development can also be understood from a normative perspective. It involves a set of goals to which the world should aspire (Sachs 2015: 3). Economic growth should be widespread, elimination of poverty, cultivating

social trust and environmental protection (ibid). This process can be achieved through good governance, social inclusiveness and resolving conflicts sustainably with the local communities. Without the involvement of the local consumers sustainable development cannot be attained. While the input of the local people was evident, I sought to establish the extent of success of the peace campaign by the CSO from the local people or recipients of its campaign. The discussion on this point is presented below.

10.4.5 The Effect of the CSO(A)'s Peace Campaign

The success of a peacebuilding training can also be measured by the positive and negative responses that emerge from the people. Positive responses come when the people acknowledge their input and the approach that a CSO would have implemented in its campaigns. The approach should ultimately bring positive change, in this case rebuild the broken relationships among the people and breeding a culture of tolerance. There were positive reactions to the CSO(A)'s peacebuilding approach and exercises it had carried in the "Land of Cattle". Participant FGDP1 noted that:

The use of local proverbs in peace campaigns coincides with the educational curriculum review underway. In the review elements of *hunhu/Ubuntu* are now being embraced in the educational system from primary level. In this way local proverbs are key in shaping people in line with good cultural practices that are of essence in rebuilding broken ties and uniting divided societies.

Elements of *hunhu* embedded in IKS is an essential step in realising durable peace. The good cultural practices encourage people to mend relations and unite as they interact on different platforms in society. That good, or positive, cultural practices are stressed can be utilized effectively. There are no perfect forms of any culture, instead, the community draws upon the positive aspects and deemphasizes the negative. In support of FGDP1, participant IP2 postulated that

"The charts or posters at shopping centres attracted people from different political parties to start engage in discussions. It is through discussions that a culture of tolerance was seeded. The currency of proverbs in building peace is gaining momentum among all age groups".

The approach by CSO(A) and the local people was informative and provided informal education that created good relations within the society. Education, whether formal or informal, has a double effect. It can be used as a strategy for peace or in some cases it can be used negatively as a strategy for conflicts (Manojlovic 2018). In this case, CSO(A) used it as a strategy of creating conditions for lasting peace. This type of education leads to sustainable harmonious peaceful relations and the mutual ability to resolve problems in the society (Deutsch and Coleman 2012). Peace education designed and implemented from a local perspective empowers and transforms an individual through acquiring knowledge of virtue. Knowledge virtue enables one to judge what is ethical. The result is that the stronger an individual is, the stronger the community is, the less likely they are to regress back to violence. CSO(A) achieved such as goal using positive proverbs that are a foundation in transforming negative to positive human behaviour.

This transformation was witnessed even with the change of perceptions between the CSO and the local people. Participant IP6 observed that "there is greater acceptance and reduction of cautious engagement

with CSOs that find their grounding with the local realities. This CSO is like family to us and we have found one another in the name of peace education”. The results demonstrate that building peace using IKS and political intelligence creates harmonious relations between the people and CSOs. This relationship is vital for positive collaboration in building durable peace in communities.

Furthermore, participant IP5 noted that

“I encountered one active political youth leader who appreciated the approach of CSO(A) and had changed their perception about CSOs in peacebuilding in the area. CSO(A) is no longer being viewed as a competitor or anti-government but as a partner in creating conditions of peace”.

The conclusion reached in the FGD was that a sense of legitimacy was created. Lederach (1997) argues that CSOs’ legitimacy stems from its ability to deliver services or resources on issues of concern that arise from its local membership. The absence of legitimacy makes reconstruction and peacebuilding less durable (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007). In short, ensuring legitimacy can lead to sustainable peace, engagement and development in an area.

CSO(A) increased the legitimacy of its programme by designing and implementing a campaign with people who were not active in politics. Participant IP7 added that

“CSO(A) demonstrated that they were apolitical, and this is plausible given that we are heading towards elections where CSOs’ campaigns have been associated with political parties. This came out when CSO(A) excluded political activists in drafting their peace campaigns”.

The exclusion of politicians was a clear sign of how CSO(A) used political intelligence skills in screening partners in building peace in the Land of cattle. Participant FGDP7 noted that,

“there was low participation in past peacebuilding exercises however, what we see this time is different. There has been increased involvement and interests from most people as they were familiar to the ways of building peace that CSO(A) had brought in”.

The increase in the number of people in attendance of a peace campaign shows that people began to value peace education or programmes. This was different from the past due to the top-down approaches that CSO(A) used to use which saw a few people engaging in their campaigns.

One major challenge that CSO(A) had been facing with regards to its peacebuilding programmes is the imposition of ideas on the people. When they adopted a sustainable peacebuilding framework, CSO(A) changed its approach. They became midwives of ideas that can build peace in the area. Funk (2012) argues that when engaging bottom-up voices, CSOs must be “facilitators rather than headmasters in building peace”. Participant FGDP6 asserted that “the CSO assumed a facilitatory role as opposed to imposing or showing the character of being experts in building peace”. The responses demonstrate that CSO(A) identified two issues: embracing IKS and political intelligence in its campaign led to the increase of tolerance amongst the people, secondly, the engagement of CSO(A) with local elders and neutral leaders rebranded their image from negative to positive in society. There was the erosion of cautious engagement to a perception that CSO(A) was now being viewed as part of the family in addressing its challenges.

In the next section, I present a summary of discussions of the findings from the CSO members and the local people.

10.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings

The findings from the members of CSO(A) and local people suggest that there were significant changes in the way that CSO(A) was carrying out its peacebuilding programmes. There is reflection of the use of IKS and political intelligence that was infused among members from the CSO during the training. The findings validate that local ownership and legitimacy of a peace project can be generated when CSOs engage the local people in designing and implementation. Murithi (2008: 16) notes that drawing upon IKS generates more customary support than compared to external concepts.

Legitimacy came in two forms:

- firstly, CSO(A) was accepted as apolitical through consulting and locating their programme within the context of the area. It also played a facilitatory role as opposed to being experts in peacebuilding;
- secondly, legitimacy of the programme was achieved through the wider consultations from the elders, teachers and part of the youths. Furthermore, the democratic knowledge gathering done by CSO(A) enabled them to map neutral and respected people who knew about the communities.

Consultations carried out by the CSO enabled them to design context specific measures that could be used in the peacebuilding. Jenjekwa (2016) notes that foreign prescriptions do not lead to durable change. Sabera (2007) concurs, noting that exogenous methods in conflict resolution have not jellied well in African contexts; they have not yielded lasting peace. From this, CSO(A) made use of proverbs in their campaigns. The rich sources of local proverbs came from stakeholder mapping where the CSO identified the community elders. Rather than incorporating all the local proverbs, CSO(A) managed to separate good and bad proverbs that could be used towards building peace in the community. Positive proverbs are therefore vehicles of *hunhuism* (ibid: 194). Proverbs are products of a people's history and culture. To this end, *hunhuism* in Shona embodies virtues that celebrate mutual responsibility, mutual assistance, forgiveness, trust, sharing, love and caring (Mandova and Chingombe 2013, Jenjekwa 2016). The virtues are essential for a society to realise peace and sustainable development. The virtues can effectively be incorporated when individuals within a community are educated in a way that they can understand.

In the past, there was a great use of folk tales by community elders. The CSO revived this approach through conducting campaigns in peace education which were held at strategic community centres. Ndlovu and Svodziwa (2017:2) argue that the practice of IKS in the Zimbabwean context dates to the pre-colonial era. Conflicts were resolved by community elders through indigenous mechanisms such as dialogue. Despite the external forces (colonialism and modernisation) against IKS, it remains relevant

(Mawere 2012: 8) in peacebuilding in rural communities. Resuscitating and strengthening IKS was done through merging traditional and modern positive proverbial statements. The peace campaigns managed to attract many people from diverse background as their approach incorporated past practices. The context sensitive and relevant approaches managed to generate social capital necessary for sustainable peacebuilding (Brown 2016). For example, people that share different political ideologies also managed to talk at a shopping centre when they saw one peace poster with a Shona proverb. Apart from that, the peace campaigns drew the attention of the youth. The attraction arose from the fact that the CSO incorporated modern proverbs that were understood and were more appealing by the younger generations. This ability is found in the political intelligence concept whereby through conflict mapping, alternative solutions to a problem can be realised (Hipel 2009). The incorporation of old and new proverbs shows that IKS is not static, rather, there is both change and continuity in the new generations. The greater involvement of the local people strengthens CSO(A)'s peacebuilding approaches. This is different in cases where a CSO would impose or bring its own ideas to a peacebuilding programme. Such changes to some extent demonstrate that the training on building peace using IKS and political intelligence can contribute to conditions leading to sustainable peace and development.

It can also be noted that the campaign run by the CSO(A) was inexpensive. The costs were reduced in that instead of engaging in consultations with experts from outside the community, the CSOs obtained information from the local people through referrals. Further, there is a high tendency that such an approach can result in sustainable peace projects by the people without the CSO. To enhance continuity of the peace education members from the CSO used pamphlets and charts written in the local languages of the people.

Ndlovu and Svodziwa (2017) note that the lack of written rules or no standardised IKS frameworks had resulted in inconsistencies in the use of IKS in peacebuilding. This deficiency was addressed by the CSO members in their campaigns by documenting proverbs. The documentation leads to continued implementation of the ideas by the local people even in the absence of the CSO. Continuity was achieved by instilling a sense of ownership of the peacebuilding project by the local people. This gave the people a shared responsibility to address challenges collectively. The people were involved from the beginning to the implementation of the peace education campaigns.

The findings tally with the concepts that lie within the sustainable peacebuilding and development theories. For sustainable peace to be realised there must be locally grounded solutions. The solutions were driven by the local people. This approach leads to continuity and sustainable development in an area. According to Augsburg (1992 in Osamba 2001: 20), designing a peacebuilding programme rooted in local culture is like following path-ways in ethnic wisdom. CSO(A)'s campaign in the "Land of Cattle" was a success since they embraced elements found in political intelligence, for example, the members of CSO(A) increased their trust through diplomatic engagement with genuine community

stakeholders. Nonetheless, there is need for continued efforts to address some of the limitations that come along with IKS. For example, clash of ideas among generations can be mitigated by further depending their consultations and inclusion of generations in the peacebuilding process.

10.6 Conclusion

The chapter has noted that the training on IKS and political intelligence in building peace was a success. This emerged in that members from CSO(A) implemented the ideas from the training in “Land of Cattle”. There was greater participation of local people in the peace campaigns. CSO(A) moved from top-down to bottom-up or best-fit practices in the peace education campaign. The practice is in line with sustainable peace and development: through stakeholder mapping, CSO(A) identified neutral people who contributed with positive proverbs that were essential in building sustainable peace. When resistance was encountered from the religious sects, it can be noted that through wider knowledge sharing among the local people and the CSO, people will come to accommodate positive elements found in IKS in peacebuilding programmes. From the exercise a culture of peace was seeded, people from “Land of Cattle” began to respect, tolerate and unite as they could join and learn how to relate in a peaceful manner using proverbs. The ensuing chapter concludes the study and recommends on what needs to be done to further enhance CSOs in peacebuilding to realise positive peace in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11.1 Introduction

In this chapter I present the conclusion and recommendations of the study. The chapter is organised according to the following themes; restatement of the aims of the study, limitations, summary of the study and contribution to knowledge, conclusion of the chapter, recommendations and areas for further research.

11.2 Study Objectives

The overall objective of the study:

The study sought to develop, implement and evaluate a peacebuilding strategy that strengthens community-based CSOs in building positive peace in Zimbabwe using IKS and political intelligence.

The motivation to do this study was based on the weaknesses that were found in CSOs' peacebuilding approaches in Zimbabwe, CSO(A). While several CSOs are involved in building peace there have been continued reoccurrence of conflict in the country. The country has witnessed structural-related violence, thereby remaining in negative peace. There has been broken ties among the people, lack of tolerance, respect, love and unity. All this stem from a breakdown of *hunhuism*. *Hunhuism* is a Shona version of IKS in peacebuilding. The solutions to *hunhuism* lie in the local people, yet, CSOs had been attempting to build peace using foreign templates. In other words, CSOs' approaches were hinged on liberal or elitist models that has not bring sustainable peace and development to communities. To effectively design and implement IKS-based efforts, CSOs need to embrace political intelligence skills, which include conflict and stakeholder mapping, building trust, being flexible and collaborating with a wide number of key stakeholders within a community.

This study identified CSO(A), which works on building peace in rural communities in Zimbabwe. CSO(A) engages in reconciliation, healing and rebuilding broken ties among divided communities. Most of these problems have been as a result of structural conflicts that are manifest through politically related violence and other social and economic tensions in societies. To address this, I engaged members of CSO(A) from discussions of baseline data (detailed in Chapters 2-5), we discussed a possible intervention plan that could be used to strengthen its peacebuilding approaches. One of their weaknesses has been that their peacebuilding projects were supply rather than demand driven. The agenda was not inclusive enough of the local needs and priorities. To this end, their intervention models were faulty and did not seed conditions of sustainable peace and development. This was coupled by negative perceptions that CSOs are political agents of opposition parties seeking to overthrow the government. From the input of CSOs and responses of interviews I designed a training manual that incorporated IKS and political intelligence skills. IKS was meant to increase legitimacy, trust and ownership of

peacebuilding programmes and the CSO. Political intelligence equipped CSO(A) members with stakeholder and conflict mapping skills that enhanced their abilities to engage the communities successfully and identify critical problems that affect them. Evaluation results demonstrated that the training was a success. To check further if CSO(A) approaches had improved I conducted interviews with members of the organisation as well as with local people in the 'Land of Cattle'. The local people observed that there was an increase in the participation of people in peacebuilding projects by CSO(A). This was attributed to design and implementation of a project that embraced local knowledge and practices. CSO(A) worked together with key community members versed with the conflict resolution strategies used by the people. While IKS had been affected by forces of colonialism, globalisation, modernisation and family disintegration, CSO(A) through combining traditional and modern practices managed to revive IKS in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This was effectively achieved using songs and other local friendly entertainment platforms that were well received by the people in 'Land of Cattle'.

Through political intelligence they managed to separate some of the local values that negatively affected genuine peacebuilding for example the exclusion of women due to patriarchal tendencies. With stakeholder mapping, found in the political intelligence concept, CSO(A) identified people who were apolitical and helped them to design inclusive and context sensitive peacebuilding programme. The 'Land of Cattle' had been severely divided and affected by polarisation. Working with politicians would continuously affect the peacebuilding efforts by CSOs. The intervention by CSO(A) resulted in people tolerating each other, working together on developmental projects and valuing peace. These results are critical in creating sustainable peace. While sustainable peace and development cannot be immediately measured, I can say that CSO(A)'s efforts leave conditions that result in the realisation of durable peace and development in the area. The ability to change negative perceptions to smooth collaboration with the local people demonstrates that CSO(A) had been empowered through the training in IKS and political intelligence skills. The challenge that I encountered in the research process was time. I had limited time that prevented me from covering a wider geographical area outside the 'Land of Cattle'. CSO(A) members also noted that they failed to generate more depth on IKS. The proverbs gathered and used in peacebuilding in this study are only applicable in the context of Mashonaland East where the Land of Cattle is located. This is the only province that had people consulted and interviewed to evaluate the impact of the training of CSO(A)'s intervention. Given the time and resources, CSO(A) members and myself wanted to cover other Mashonaland and Matabeleland provinces and consult on the IKS they use in building peace. This enhances the ability to generalise the practice and effect of IKS in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe's ten provinces and how CSOs can further be strengthened.

The specific objectives (further discussed in section 11.5) that guided this study were to:

- Explore past and current peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented;

- Analyse past conflict cases and nature of CSOs in resolving conflicts that have been witnessed in Zimbabwe and other selected countries;
- Analyse the trend and challenges that CSOs encounter in building peace in Zimbabwe;
- Develop and evaluate through action research an intervention that strengthen community-based CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

11.3 Summary of Methodology and Theoretical Framework

The research design used in this thesis was two-tiered. It was exploratory in gathering baseline data and validating findings that emerged from interviews and FGDs. The second part of the design was action research. This was done to enhance democratic way of gathering data, designing, implementing and evaluating the training on building peace using IKS and political intelligence skills. Given that the study was qualitative, I used qualitative data collection methods. These include documentary review, in-depth interviews and FGDs. Content and thematic analysis was carried out to analyse the findings.

To successfully strengthen CSO(A) and the outcome of its peacebuilding, I relied on sustainable peacebuilding theory. Main emphasis was on engaging bottom up initiatives in building peace in the Land of cattle. Adoption of IKS or *hunhuism* concept by the CSO tallied with demands sustainable peacebuilding theory. The use of proverbs in building peace changed the attitudes of people from a culture of intolerance to tolerance, love, respect and unity among the people in the Land of cattle. The approach enabled CSO(A) to generate legitimacy and local ownership of the programme and this leads to sustainable development within an area. The increased participation of the local people through political intelligence skills result in continuity of a peacebuilding programme. To this end, continued use of sustainable peacebuilding model leads to a break of conflict resurgence.

11.4 Limitations

The limitations encountered include failure to access conventional literature on CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe that makes use of a sustainable peacebuilding framework. Much of the literature is in the form of primary sources, that is, CSOs' annual reports and booklets. The data emerging from these sources could be biased since there are a few organisations that can fully criticise their own projects and publications. In overcoming this limitation, I relied on methodological and data triangulation. I used in-depth interviews with key informants on CSOs and peacebuilding issues. Complementing interviews were FGDs during which questions would be raised to validate or invalidate some of the emerging findings. I also managed to read widely on other case studies of CSOs that have used liberal and sustainable peacebuilding models in selected countries. The analysis and comparison of data then enhanced validity. Another limitation is that the findings from this study cannot be generalised the evaluations that came CSO(A) in its peace campaign in the Land of cattle. This can be addressed by other researchers of CSOs who might want to carry out a similar approach in other parts of the country.

11.5 Summary of Findings

In this section I discuss the summary of findings in relation to the overall and specific objectives of the study. Chapter 1 introduces the nature of the study. The chapter outlines the rationale of conducting the study and the approach that I took in strengthening CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. It focuses specifically on the background of the study, statement of the problem and justification of the study. In the background of the study, CSOs have emerged as viable alternatives in bringing positive change. They have become bridges between the elite and grassroots in states. This has made them strategic actors since state-led interventions have proven not to yield durable results. Issues that emanated in the statement of the problem are that CSOs in Zimbabwe have failed to transform the negative peace in Zimbabwe to positive peace. This is evidenced with the continued conflict resurgence in Zimbabwe, yet there are CSOs that have been present and are working on trying to build peace in societies. CSOs appear to have failed to address the root problems in Zimbabwe that stem from the colonial period and were carried over into the post-independence era. They have been reactionary forces attending to the symptoms rather than the root causes. Their agendas have, at most, been driven by supply rather than demand. The effect has been lacking ownership and legitimacy by the ordinary people. In cases where the demand feeds into their agendas, CSOs' efforts have been fragmented due to competition and lack of agreed definitions and approaches to building peace. It follows that CSOs' main weakness lay in their ways of building peace that did not fully embrace IKS found in various communities. These problems justified the need to develop a model that strengthens CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. To achieve this and close a lacuna in conventional literature, I conducted training on the use of IKS and political intelligence in peacebuilding. The training was based on action research with members of CSO(A). The training benefits CSOs' members in peacebuilding, academics and researchers with an interest in peacebuilding. The overall objective and specific aims were achieved as follows.

- Explore past and current peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented

In Chapter 2, I highlight the peacebuilding theory that guided my study. This chapter forms the theoretical basis that strengthened CSO(A)'s mode of building peace which leads to sustainable peace and development. In short, the chapter answers how CSOs in peacebuilding can be enhanced from a theoretical perspective. CSOs' peacebuilding activities have revolved around two major theories, namely, the liberal and sustainable peacebuilding. In Zimbabwe CSOs' role have been anchored in the liberal school which places emphasis on socio-economic and political reforms. The roots of liberal views are in the Western models that prescribe democratisation through rule of law, security sector and constitutional reforms. The assumed roles that CSOs have played include but are not limited to monitoring, protection, in-group socialisation, training and providing services. The cracks in the liberal approaches are its failure to achieve positive peace in Zimbabwe and justifies calls for different sustainable peacebuilding models on which this study is grounded. Sustainable peacebuilding aims at addressing the root causes, with a focus on building broken relationships and seeding a culture of

tolerance. While there are liberal views on structural reforms, sustainability is important in people's relationships or non-structural issues. My study locates the IKS concept within the sustainable peacebuilding process. Core elements in the IKS discourse involve embracing local culture, people, language, knowledge and experiences. At the heart of IKS in the Zimbabwean context, I locate CSOs' peacebuilding approaches within the concept of "Hunhuism" or "Ubuntuism". This concept centers on making people morally upright through inculcating a culture of respect, love, unity, constructive tolerance or peaceful co-existence amongst the people. A breakdown of these values has led to moral decay which breeds a menu of socio-economic, political and even environmental conflicts in Zimbabwe. Members of CSO(A) managed to build sustainable peace using Shona proverbs through political intelligence skills. It was evident that IKS/*hunhuism* is not static, there is change and continuity of culture and ideas. CSO(A) blended traditional and modern proverbs to effectively build peace in the Land of cattle. This leads to sustainable peace and development given that their model was sensitive and all-inclusive to the local realities in the community.

- Analyse past conflict cases and nature of CSOs in resolving conflicts that have been witnessed in Zimbabwe

Chapter 3 narrates the past conflict episodes that Zimbabwe has witnessed. Conflicts have been caused by a breakdown of moral values that lie in IKS. The conflicts justify the need for peacebuilding efforts in the country through several both State and non-state actors. I gave a highlight of the colonial system and its effect that it had in amplifying a culture of violence in the country. The colonial political system was highly oppressive. Politically there were unjust punitive laws such as the Law and Order Maintenance Act, economically there was gross unequal distribution of resources where blacks were alienated from their land and socially there was discrimination as blacks received poor social services as compared with the white minority in the health and education sectors. The colonial system was uprooted in 1980 through both violent and non-violent means by ZANU and PF ZAPU political parties who were representing the blacks. The colonial past and the means to dismantle it have been used, to critical voices, as a justification to shrink civil and political space by the incumbent government. Though a new government was formed in 1980 it was more a change on paper than practice. The new black government continued with the colonial oppressive system. The dark cloud of the past continues to hover in the post- independence epoch.

This has manifested through the *Gukurahundi* ethnic cleansing in the late 1980s. However, no meaningful reconciliation efforts have been made at the national level apart from some CSOs that work in the affected communities. In the early 1990s there were efforts to establish a one- party state. Fortunately, this did not see the light of day as CSOs and student movements blocked the establishment. The critical forces emerged at a time when the democratisation wave was sweeping across the continent threatening the legitimacy and power base of liberation-led governments then. At this time the State began to have sour relations with critical civil movements. In this decade the State began to experience

economic turmoil caused by bad governance, failure of structural adjustments and huge unbudgeted pay-outs to war veterans. The economic problems were worsened by the 2000 land reform which saw blacks repossessing land from the whites. Political tensions heightened with the emergence of a strong opposition political party (MDC). Due to intolerance and a culture of violence, election-related clashes were noted, the darkest moments being the 27 June 2008 presidential elections. Like the wounds left during the colonial epoch, the post-election wounds have not yet been healed. There still exists negative peace in the form of broken relationships amongst the communities in Zimbabwe. The remedy to this lies in building peace using IKS and political intelligence. The involvement of the local people and their knowledge led to durable peace and development.

Building up on Chapter 3, Chapter 4 tracks the development and reaction of CSOs to the woes that the State has undergone. The chapter draws on the activities of CSOs from the colonial era. The CSOs have responded to the oppressive colonial system by documenting human rights abuses. However, there were very few CSOs during this time. One outstanding CSO that performed this task was the CCJPZ. In the first decade after attaining independence a few CSOs were present. The State was still in the glory of independence and most activities were geared towards nation building. While political reconciliation was done by the political elite, the process did not reach out widely to the ordinary people on the ground. For example, black government announced that they had forgiven the white and were ready to work together, after the *Gukurahundi* reconciliation was made with the political elite of ZANU and PF ZAPU. CSOs activities were not visible in healing the past wounds. CCJP also appeared in the first decade by documenting the killings and human rights abuses that occurred during *Gukurahundi*.

As the country moved into the democratisation mode, CSOs began to mushroom and grow in the second decade after 1990. Critical civil voices emerged and fitted in the governance cluster. The activities of CSOs revolved around the structural issues such as rebuilding institutions through democratic reforms, good governance and constitutional reforms. CSOs organised demonstrations and strikes in response to the economic problems that had been caused by the failure of ESAP. Around 2000 CSOs' voices had been amplified on liberal democratic concepts with calls for free and fair elections, transparency, rule of law and respect of human rights by the State. These efforts have resulted in piecemeal reforms or successes. For example, CSOs campaigned for a "No" vote in the constitution referendum in 2000s. Later, as human rights deteriorated, civil movements responded with pastoral letters on "Zimbabwe, We want", for example. Some CSOs have participated in voter education or observing elections. These efforts have not, however, managed to prevent a resurgence of conflict. With this realisation some CSOs are now geared to conducting reconciliation and rebuilding broken ties. They have performed roles such as protection, in-group socialisation and advocacy. The roles and activities that CSOs have exhibited lie in the liberal peacebuilding models. The chapter outlines the challenges that CSOs have faced, ranging from financial, legitimacy crises, and weak links with the people and amongst CSOs themselves, agenda-setting, arrests and detentions. The challenges and weaknesses of CSOs' peacebuilding models informed the alternatives that I adopted for CSOs to bring positive change in

Zimbabwean communities. The alternative was for CSOs to build peace using IKS and political intelligence.

- Unpack experiences of CSOs in peacebuilding in selected countries

Chapter 5 navigated on the road that other CSOs in peacebuilding have taken in selected case studies that include Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Cyprus. The main aim was to draw lessons on how other CSOs building peace in other countries. Lessons drawn from these cases helped in designing approaches that CSOs in Zimbabwe can apply to build sustainable peace. The countries were selected based on the similarities in terms of conflicts and a political system to that of Zimbabwe. For example, the countries have been affected by colonisation and the former colonial masters continue to sponsor and shape CSOs' peacebuilding activities, effectively bringing out an element of top-down peacebuilding models. Furthermore, the CSOs have been subjected to an authoritarian political system which has closed their spaces in building peace especially on structural problems that emanate from their environments. Lessons from Sri Lanka show that bottom-up approaches are effective in bringing positive change. This was the case through grassroots communities embarking on moral and spiritual campaigns that were less threatening to the government's authorities. They also made use of non-violent peacebuilding campaigns. The case also challenged the need for CSOs to move from being urban-biased to spreading into rural settings. The case of Cyprus exhibits the importance of CSOs working together and gaining public legitimacy in divided communities. The lessons drawn were used in developing a broader intervention strategy that strengthens CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 6 forms the research design that guided my research. My study was exploratory and based on action research. Exploration was used in generating literature on the conflict cases, emergence and reaction of CSOs in bringing change in Zimbabwe. In addition, I explored the experiences of CSO members and other key informants in building peace through in-depth interviews and FGDs. The study relied on qualitative methodology since it sought to get an in-depth understanding of CSOs' experiences in peacebuilding. The data collection methods were also qualitative and included documentary review, FGDs and in-depth interviews with key informants. The use of various methods was done to enhance validity of the findings. 43 people participated in the in-depth interviews and FGDs. The participants for interviews and FGDs were purposively selected and these were academics, CSOs members and experts in peacebuilding. I used open-ended questionnaires, interviews and FGD guides in collecting data used in planning and evaluating the training on CSO(A). These tools were pre-tested to enhance reliability. In analysing data, I used content and thematic analysis. Findings from respondents were presented in thematic form. To adhere to research ethics, I used codes for anonymity purposes. On confidentiality I assured the participants that the research was mainly for academic purposes. However, I could not guarantee confidentiality in FGDs as members could share issues discussed. I emphasised that participants should not share the discussions outside the FGDs and up to the time of this writing no information has leaked out.

Action research was used to design, implement and evaluate an intervention that was aimed at strengthening CSO(A)'s peacebuilding programme. The action team constituted a nine-member action team from CSO(A). I worked with the action group together with my two research assistants to design and implement training on working with the IKS/local grain through political intelligence. The training was held from 23-25 November 2016. I developed a training hand-out with the major training concepts. To measure the success of the training I held two evaluations. The first evaluation was on the immediate outcome of the training and the results indicated that it was a success. The second was an outcome evaluation which sought to find out whether CSO(A) had been enhanced in their effort of building durable peace and development. In the second evaluation I interviewed CSO(A) members and local people from the "Land of Cattle". The action component was done to merge theory and practice of building peace and strengthen CSO(A). Action research enabled me and the action team to design, implement and evaluate a training on building peace using IKS and political intelligence.

Chapter 7 focused on the baseline data that was gathered through in-depth interviews and FGDs. The emerging views were that CSOs have recorded partial successes in bringing effective change in Zimbabwe. From the interviews it also emerged that CSOs had also worked with the women to bring peace by conducting trainings and clean-up campaigns. Other CSOs carried out sports within the local communities in the form of peace marathons. Despite these interventions CSOs' efforts in building peace are based on a rigid liberal peacebuilding approach; for example, monitoring and documenting human rights abuses. This has failed to translate the negative peace into positive peace. CSOs have not fully incorporated contextual views and realities. CSOs' peacebuilding efforts have been affected by financial hiccups, fragmented peacebuilding approaches, high unemployment and a polarised society. These challenges presented informed the action team in designing and implementing an intervention that can strengthen their efforts in building durable peace. The findings informed on how best we could strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding through our action intervention that we designed and implemented.

- Develop and evaluate through action research an intervention that strengthen community-based CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe

One of the components of action research is designing and implementation of an intervention. Chapter 8 addressed the objective of designing and implementing training of members of CSOs in building peace. In the chapter I presented the intervention procedure that was designed and implemented together with action group members. I began with the planning procedure that was taken by members of the action team before we arrived at an intervention. The meeting on 10 November 2016 led members to discuss the baseline data. The findings from chapter 7 and the pre-intervention interviews enabled the researcher and the action group to form training for members of CSO(A). The theme for our training was "Building peace with the IKS/local grain through political intelligence, an action intervention with CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe". The training took place on the 23rd November to the 25th November 2016. I had two facilitators whom I had given a pre-training planning as a way of minimising

errors in the process. The overall aim of the training was to strengthen members of CSO(A) in their approach in building peace using IKS/local grain and political intelligence. The specific aims of the training were to train CSO(A) members on IKS/local grain, political intelligence, merits and limitations of working with the IKS/local grain, role of CSOs, and incorporating IKS/local grain in peacebuilding programmes and how to deliver effectively peace messages to communities. Our training methods were based on participatory self-discovery methods. We also used role-playing. In session 1 we began by understanding the basic concepts, the second session was on sharing peacebuilding experiences and the last day was on putting the theory into practice through designing a role-play. All these activities aimed at enhancing CSO(A)'s modus operandi in building peace in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 9 was based on an evaluation of the training on CSO(A) in building peace using IKS/local grain and political intelligence skills. This first evaluation meets the last element in action research on reflecting on the intervention. The intention was to check on the value that the training had on CSO(A)' peacebuilding engagements. In the evaluation exercise I used the non-experiment design. Within this, I did the "before and after" interviews with the participants. For the outcome evaluation, I made a comparison of the pre- and post-responses. I used an interview guide and open-ended questionnaires to gather the responses. To maximise on validity, I held two post training assessments. The first one was on assessing the training process and the second one, which I did on the 23 January 2017, was on checking the utility of the training outcome on participants' day-to-day work. In the second follow up I would also ask a participant if he/she had undergone any training or meeting on similar issues we had covered, as this would distort the outcome. Overall participants indicated that the training was successful as members managed to get knowledge on *hunhuism/ubuntuism* and skills in building peace. They also noted that their understanding of IKS/local grain had broadened by not focusing on local people alone but also their culture, history and tradition. The indications were that the action members would incorporate it in their peacebuilding programme. These were the first indications that the training was a success and that members felt empowered or improved in the way they can build peace effectively.

Chapter 10 discusses the findings from the second outcome evaluation. The evaluation was carried out to assess the actual effect of the training on CSO(A)'s peacebuilding programme and its impact on the society (Land of cattle). In the second evaluation, a total of 22 participants were interviewed. Members of CSO(A) confirmed that they implemented a peacebuilding exercise which incorporated IKS and political intelligence skills. This came out through the inclusion of local people in designing and implementing a peace education campaign that embraced indigenous proverbs. The Chapter shows that culture is dynamic as the local people modified traditional proverbial statements with modern proverbs that are known and embraced by the current generation. Such a campaign yielded positive results in that it united the local people, there was ownership and buy in of the CSO programme since the people felt involved in the peacebuilding efforts. In this case, bottom-up initiatives provided a reasonable alternative to past CSO(A)'s peacebuilding efforts that were designed without the engagement of the

beneficiaries of a programme. In other words, building peace through IKS follows the demand-driven approaches or context specific models. The people in the Land of cattle started to show more love, respect, tolerance and unity which are the key ingredients that can prevent conflicts leading to sustainable peace and development. Findings from second evaluation validates that building peace using IKS and political intelligence strengthens CSOs' approach to yield sustainable peace and development.

11.6 Implications of the Findings

The findings from this study indicate that the approach of CSOs in peacebuilding can be enhanced using IKS and political intelligence. The adoption of such a method led to generation of legitimacy, ownership, trust and greater involvement of people in peace campaigns. Ultimately a culture of tolerance, respect and love was created in "Land of Cattle". The presence of a peace culture lies in the sustainable peace and development theories which are crucial in mitigating conflict resurgence. Sustainable peacebuilding approaches addresses the root causes of a problem as the solutions are context specific. In this case a decay of moral values or *hunhuism* led to conflicts and could only be addressed by resuscitating the use of Shona proverbs in building peace.

In the long term, with the continued efforts on working with the IKS/local grain through political intelligence, CSOs in peacebuilding can effectively bring positive and durable change in Zimbabwe's communities. This will be through designing context specific peacebuilding models together with the people, developing a people- and culture-sensitive elicitive approach. Sustainable peacebuilding models and sustainable development require CSOs in peacebuilding to migrate from experts to become facilitators of building peace in various communities.

11.7 Contribution to Knowledge

The contribution of this study was the ability to integrate theory and practice of peacebuilding by CSOs within the sustainable peace and development framework. Building sustainable peace and strengthening CSOs in peacebuilding was achieved through the action research component of this study. Action research made the study unique in that I did not end at giving recommendations to CSOs in peacebuilding, but I developed and implemented an intervention plan which can be used by other CSOs or academics in their studies. The study becomes the first academic research to engage and collaborate with CSO(A) in strengthening its efforts in building peace in rural communities in Zimbabwe. I achieved this through the training of CSO(A) members on the use of IKS and political intelligence skills in building peace. The result of the training and subsequent intervention by CSO(A) proves that rooting peacebuilding efforts in local realities brings positive outcomes. Firstly, it increased the legitimacy and trust of CSO(A) among the people in the 'Land of Cattle'. Increased trust builds on the confidence in the peacebuilding projects that a CSO can have. Secondly, the local people are more open to work together with the CSO in identifying the exact problems and solutions within their communities.

Inclusive approaches result in a sense of local ownership which ensures the continuity of peacebuilding activities even after the departure of a CSO. From the study, IKS still remains relevant both in theory and practice of peacebuilding. CSO(A) together with the people managed to design and implement a hybrid model that encompass traditional and modern proverbs. Lessons from the proverbs are critical in restoring and strengthening ubuntu or hunhuism which is a critical ingredient in building lasting peace and development. Hunhuism embraces a culture of unity, tolerance, love and respect which are the building blocks in establishing harmonious societies.

Existing literature demonstrate that CSOs have been active in the democratisation agenda. Much literature on CSOs in Zimbabwe focuses on CSOs-state relations, challenges faced in addressing structural problems in Zimbabwe. Literature on CSOs in peacebuilding is available in grey primary sources in the form of reports and publications by practitioners in peacebuilding. This study bridges the literature gap and provides a model that strengthens CSOs in peacebuilding within the sustainable peacebuilding framework. I followed the argument by Lederach (1997) that sustainable peacebuilding is intended to mend or rebuild broken relationships from below. The approach departs from the liberal or internationalised approaches that CSOs in Zimbabwe have followed. In pursuit of this wave, CSOs have been defined and assumed roles of experts in bringing this change. I argue that CSOs' activities can be effective and strengthened by adopting elicitive approaches in building peace with the IKS through political intelligence.

The study managed to bring the concept of political intelligence in strengthening CSO(A)'s efforts in peacebuilding. Political intelligence skills are key in strengthening how leaders or members of CSOs can effectively work with people in post-conflict zones. The skills that were gained through training include conflict and stakeholder mapping which are essential when engaging people in polarised societies. In other words, CSO members are equipped with knowledge on where to pitch their tents prior to an intervention in mitigating or resolving conflicts. The concept acknowledges that the main causes of conflicts are political and therefore requires CSOs to think politically and act strategically. In this study, harmonious networks and legitimacy from the people was achieved by the CSO leading to effective joint problem solving. Action research was key in realising this goal. An in-depth and democratic knowledge-sharing was achieved with the action group. We located the broader sustainable peacebuilding elements of working with, but not limited to, local people, language, culture and tradition to bring change. Broadly I noted that CSOs' peacebuilding efforts have to be canalised within "*hunhuism*" or *Ubuntu* concept which seems to be waning in the Zimbabwean rural societies. Studies show that CSOs have been influenced by supply rather than demand. Working with the IKS provided an alternative of how CSOs in peacebuilding can bring durable peace to Zimbabwe. In other words, transforming negative to positive peace.

11.8 Recommendations

Following the successful intervention that was carried out with the action team, I recommend that there is need for continuous training of CSO members in other locations outside Harare. The trainings should be done noting the context specific needs. The trainings should be aimed at how best to empower CSOs to become effective agents of bringing positive change, that is reflective and driven by local needs and priorities. The continuous training will feed into the next cycle of action research that aims to further improve CSOs' knowledge on working with the local people, strategic partnership and tapping more into the potentials of women in peacebuilding programmes. Further, CSOs should be trained on how to develop peace education that meets the needs of all learners and contexts. Peacebuilding efforts of CSOs should embrace the history, value systems, ethnic beliefs, literacy levels within a conflict area. This becomes possible with the mapping skills that were discussed in training of CSOs using IKS and political intelligence in Chapter 8.

There is need for further exploration of IKS and how best they can be incorporated in a peacebuilding programme in line with the prevailing realities in different parts of the country. CSOs need to explore peacebuilding practices that are synchronised with rural, peri-urban to urban knowledge systems or cultures. Peacebuilding activities that are sensitive to local realities are more sustainable and appealing to the people. It marks a shift from blanket models that are crafted without the knowledge or input of the local people to a more democratic and inclusive peacebuilding model. CSOs should also attempt to devise models that can combine IKS and modern peacebuilding approaches. This will mitigate the limitations of one model against the other.

There is need for CSOs to embrace multiple roles in their efforts. I discovered that CSOs have a bias against monitoring and protection functions in peacebuilding. From this, they have remained rigid in their interventions. CSOs must be flexible to adjust and emerge as critical eyes and ears, at the same time assuming the roles of positive schools for socialising people in line with humanism or *hunhuism*. The deficiencies of the values have caused a moral decay that has led people to be intolerant of others and engage in all kinds of malpractice in pursuit of their self-interests.

CSOs need to assess other cost-effective projects that they can introduce within communities. While sports, drama and *nchimbe* approaches have been used, CSOs can also empower or train people to do self-income generating projects such as soap-making, basket and bead crafting. The small projects can bring people together to cooperate, unite and tolerate one another. At the same time, they can economically empower people leading to peacebuilding through economic inclusion. And when this has been seeded it also becomes difficult for instigators to recruit people to abuse or invoke violence to another person within their society.

For the next action cycle, I recommend that there is a need to find an action team that is composed of CSOs and other non-CSOs members. This can allow more discussions and solutions to be proffered

from other voices outside CSOs. Such information can enhance CSO efforts in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. I also recommend that CSOs should explore more sustainable peacebuilding models by focusing their efforts on addressing root causes of a problem than its effects.

11.9 Areas of Further Research

Further research studies should focus on how CSOs' programmes can be enhanced in peacebuilding within the sustainable peacebuilding framework. Future studies can be carried out using the same design and tools with a different context to establish whether the same outcome can be realised.

11.10 Conclusion

The study demonstrates that CSO(A)'s approach to build peace has been enhanced through the training on the use of IKS and political intelligence in peacebuilding. Prior the intervention, CSO(A) modus operandi was informed by liberal peacebuilding which led to a continued spiral of conflict resurgence in the country. Their approaches were driven by supply rather than demand, resulting in peace campaigns that were out of touch of the local realities. The training we conducted together with the action team addressed this weakness within the sustainable peacebuilding and development theoretical framework. The adoption of IKS or the Shona concept of *hunhuism* through political intelligence skills enabled CSO(A) to bring positive change in the Land of cattle. Greater inclusion and participation of the local people created a sense of legitimacy and ownership of the peace campaign. These elements lead to continuity of a peace campaign even in the absence of a CSO. The bottom-up approach enabled CSO(A) to address the root causes of the conflicts in the Land of cattle. Moral decay was addressed through the peace education that used local Shona proverbs. The consultations conducted by CSO(A) indicated that culture is not static, there is change and continuity. CSO(A) embraced this by merging traditional and modern proverbs that the local people were familiar with. Through action research I managed to come up with a training model that strengthens CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

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Schedule for Interviews and FGDs

Interview with ICSO(A) 1 March 2016, Harare

Interview with ICSOb 1 March 2016 Harare

Interview with ICSOc 1 March 2016 Harare

Interview with ICSOd, 3 March 2016 Harare

Interview with ICSOe 3 March 2016 Harare

Interview with IAa, 3 March 2016 Harare

Interview with IAb, 15 March 2016 Harare

Interview with IAc, 15 March 2016 Harare

Interview with IAd, 23 March 2016 Harare

Interview with IAe 23 March 2016 Harare

Interview with IEa, 6 April 2016 Harare

Interview with IEb, 6 April 2016 Harare

Interview with IEc 7 April 2016 Harare

FGD1 16 March 2016 Harare

FGD2 31 March 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM1, 8 November 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM2, 8 November 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM3, 8 November 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM4, 8 November 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM5, 9 November 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM6, 9 November 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM7, 9 November 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM8, 9 November 2016 Harare

Interview with AGM9 9 November 2016 Harare

Interviews with Action group members on evaluation of training 23-24 January 2017

Interviews with Action group on second evaluation 22-28 July 2017

Interviews with local people and FGD in second evaluation 22-28 July 2017.

Annexure 1: Interview Guide One

Title: Strengthening CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: an action research project

Introductory question

What is your understanding of peacebuilding?

Have you been involved with peacebuilding programme(s), either directly or indirectly?

What have been your experiences with such programme(s)?

Objective 1

- **Examine the nature of CSOs and the extent of their participation in peacebuilding**

1. What is your understanding of civil society organisations?
2. Explain the role of CSOs in peacebuilding and cite examples of CSOs that you know?
3. Outline the extent of their programming activities in peacebuilding efforts?

Objective 2

- **Explore past and current peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented**

4. What approaches or models (liberal or sustainable peacebuilding) have the civil society utilised in their peacebuilding programme?
5. How effective have been these models towards building peace?

Objective 3

- **Examine cases of CSOs in peacebuilding in selected countries**

6. What roles have CSOs played in peacebuilding in countries of which you are aware?
7. In what ways have CSOs in peacebuilding been effective in other countries?
8. Under what political and economic environments have these CSOs been subjected?

Objective 4

- **Analyse the trend and challenges that CSOs encounter in building peace in Zimbabwe**

9. What has been the trend of peacebuilding efforts in Zimbabwe since 1980?
10. What factors undermine CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe?
11. To what extent have these challenges affected CSOs, specifically those in peacebuilding?

Objective 5

- **Outline the measures that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding**

12. How can CSOs in peacebuilding be strengthened to enhance their impact in peacebuilding?
 - a. Financial capacity
 - b. Capacity-building (experts in peacebuilding)
 - c. Engaging the grassroots

- d. Improving relations with the State and other stakeholders
- e. Enhancing their internal governance systems
- f. Agenda-setting and programming activities
- g. Infighting and loose coalitions amongst themselves, networking
- h. Institutional capacity

Concluding question

13. Do you have any other comments to add on this topic?

Annexure 2: Focus Group Discussion Guide

Title: Strengthening CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: an action research project

Introductory question

What is your understanding of peacebuilding?

Have you been involved with peacebuilding programme(s), either directly or indirectly?

What have been your experiences with such programme(s)?

Objective 1

- **Examine the nature of CSOs and the extent of their participation in peacebuilding**

1. What is your understanding of civil society organisations?
2. Explain the role of CSOs in peacebuilding and cite examples of CSOs that you know?
3. Outline the extent of their programming activities in peacebuilding efforts?

Objective 2

- **Explore past and current peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented**

4. What approaches or models (liberal or sustainable peacebuilding) have the civil society utilised in their peacebuilding programme?
5. How effective have been these models towards building peace?

Objective 3

- **Examine cases of CSOs in peacebuilding in selected countries**

6. In what ways have CSOs been effective in peacebuilding in other countries?
7. Under what political and economic environments have these CSOs been subjected?
8. What roles have CSOs played in peacebuilding in countries of which you are aware?

Objective 4

- **Analyse the trend and challenges that CSOs encounter in building peace in Zimbabwe**

9. What has been the trend of peacebuilding efforts in Zimbabwe since 1980?
10. What factors undermine CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe?
11. To what extent have these challenges affected CSOs, specifically those in peacebuilding?

Objective 5

Outline the measures that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding

How can CSOs in be strengthened to enhance their impact in peacebuilding?

- i. Financial capacity
- j. Capacity building (experts in peacebuilding)
- k. Engaging the grassroots
- l. Improving relations with the State and other stakeholders
- m. Enhancing their internal governance systems
- n. Agenda setting and programming activities
- o. Infighting and loose coalitions amongst themselves, networking
- p. Institutional capacity

Concluding question

12. Do you have any other comments to add on this topic?

Annexure 3: Open-Ended Questionnaire

Dear Participant,

Thank you for taking an interest in participating in my research. My name is Ashton Murwira. I am currently pursuing my doctoral studies in Peacebuilding with Durban University of Technology. Below are the details of my study which can give you clarity on its content.

The title of my study is strengthening Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: an action research project

Questions of how to strengthen CSOs effectively in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe remain important given the recurrence of conflicts and the continued absence of peace. CSOs have played pivotal roles in peacebuilding dating as far back as the colonial times to the present day. However, this study aims to explore and implement effective strategies through action research that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding to yield durable peace. Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. There will be no negative consequences should you decide to withdraw from the study. You will not be paid for participating in the study and you will not be expected to pay anything to take part in the study. Your name and other personal details will not be used during the study. For data presentation I will use pseudo names.

Below is a list of questions for which I kindly seek your responses. NB you are not required to answer all, but only the questions with which you feel comfortable.

Personal details

1. Age
 - a. Under 30
 - b. 31-40
 - c. 41-40
 - d. 51-60
 - e. 60 and above

- 2. Gender
 - a. Male
 - b. Female

- 3. Highest Academic Qualification
 - a. Diploma
 - b. Degree
 - c. Masters
 - d. PhD
 - e. Other

Open ended questionnaire

Title: Strengthening Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: an action research project

Introductory question

What is your understanding of peacebuilding?

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Have you been involved with peacebuilding programme(s), either directly or indirectly? (If yes, how?)

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What have been your experiences with such programme(s)?

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Objective 1

- **Examine the nature of CSOs and the extent of their participation in peacebuilding**

1. What is your understanding of civil society organisations?

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2. Explain the role of CSOs in peacebuilding and cite examples of CSOs that you know?

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3. Outline the extent of their programming activities in peacebuilding efforts

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Objective 2

- **Explore past and current peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented**

4. What approaches or models (liberal or sustainable peacebuilding models) have the civil society utilised in their peacebuilding programme?

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5. How effective have been these models towards building peace?

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Objective 3

- **Examine cases of CSOs in peacebuilding in selected countries**

6. What role have CSOs played in peacebuilding in other countries?

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7. In what ways have CSOs in peacebuilding been effective in other countries?

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8. To what political and economic environments have these CSOs been subjected?

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Objective 4

- **Analyse the trend and challenges that CSOs encounter in building peace in Zimbabwe**

9. What has been the trend of peacebuilding efforts in Zimbabwe since 1980?

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10. What factors undermine CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe?

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11. To what extent have these challenges affected CSOs, specifically those in peacebuilding?

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Objective 5

Outline the measures that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding

12. How can CSOs in peacebuilding be strengthened to enhance their impact in peacebuilding?

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a. Financial capacity

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h. Institutional capacity

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Concluding question

13. Do you have any other comments to add on this topic?

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Thank you for your cooperation

Annexure 4: Consent Letter One

Durban University of Technology

Faculty of Management Sciences

Department of Public Management & Economics

Date:

Dear Participant

Thank you for taking an interest in participating in my research. My name is Ashton Murwira. I am currently pursuing my Doctoral Peacebuilding studies with Durban University of Technology. Below are the details of my study which can give you clarity on it.

The title of my study is strengthening civil society organisations (CSOs) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: an action research project

Questions of how to strengthen CSOs effectively in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe remain important given the recurrence of conflicts and the continued absence of peace. CSOs have played pivotal roles in peacebuilding dating as far back as the colonial times to the present day. However, this study aims to explore and implement effective strategies through action research that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding to yield durable peace. Your participation is voluntary, and you can withdraw at any time. There will be no negative consequences should you decide to withdraw from the study. You will not be paid for participating in the study and you will not be expected to pay anything to take part in the study. Your name and other personal details will not be used during the study. For data presentation I will use codes to ensure anonymity.

Kindly go through the consent form below. If you are satisfied, please append your signature at the end.

CONSENT

Statement of Agreement to Participate in the Research Study:

- I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, _____ (Ashton Murwira), about the nature, conduct, benefits and risks of this study - Research Ethics Clearance Number: _____,

- I have also received, read and understood the above written information (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.
- I am aware that the results of the study, including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials and diagnosis will be anonymously processed into a study report.
- In view of the requirements of research, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerised system by the researcher.
- I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study.
- I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research which may relate to my participation will be made available to me.

_____	_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Participant Thumbprint	Date	Time	Signature / Right

I, Ashton Murwira, herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study.

_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Researcher	Date	Signature

_____	_____	_____
Full Name of Witness (If applicable)	Date	Signature

Student

Contact Details

Supervisor / Promoter

Contact Details

Co-Supervisor/Co-Promoter

Contact Details

Annexure 5: Pre-Training Interview Guide

Date.. **Title or position of respondent..**

Questions that were asked to participants before the training was conducted.

1. Of which peacebuilding models are you aware?
2. Which models has your organisation used in a peacebuilding programme?
3. How effective were or are models in bringing change?
4. What challenges have curtailed the effectiveness of your efforts in building peace?
5. What steps have you taken in a move to address the challenges?
6. To what extent has your programme involved local communities in the design and implementation?
7. Are there any efforts that your organisation has done in carrying out capacity-building programme for their members?
8. Do you have any other comments to add on improving CSOs in peacebuilding?

Thank you

Annexure 6: Participants' Registration Form

Title: Peacebuilding with the IKS/local grain and political intelligence training

Venue: Harare

Date: 23-25 November 2016

Name and Surname	Gender Male or Female	AGE	Email address	Contact Number	Organisation	Title	Signature

Source designed by author

Annexure 7: Pre-Training Evaluation Questionnaire

(This must be completed before the start of the training and forwarded to the facilitators once completed)

Date: 23-25 November 2016

Venue:

Tick appropriate response

Participant's bio-data

Code: ..

Gender: male female..

Age: .

1. What peacebuilding models has your organisation followed and implemented?
2. Briefly explain the roles that your organisation has played in a peacebuilding programme?
3. Describe the methods that your organisation has utilised in building peace?
4. What challenges have you faced in carrying out peacebuilding campaigns?
5. Outline and explain steps that you have taken in order to address the challenges you have encountered?
6. Generally, how can peacebuilding by CSOs be enhanced?

Kindly tick your rating of understanding the following concepts or themes

Theme	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor
Local grain				
Political intelligence				
Examples of local grain				
Merits and demerits of using local grain				
Role of CSOs in working with local grain				

How to incorporate local grain in a peacebuilding programme				
Design local grain peacebuilding programme through art				
Methods and channels distributing a peacebuilding programme that are context relevant				

Table 9: Source designed by author

Annexure 8: Post-Training Evaluation Form

(This must be completed at the end of the training and forwarded to the facilitators once completed)

Date: 23-25 November 2016

Venue:

Tick appropriate response

Participant's bio-data

Code: ..

Gender: male female..

Age: .

Kindly tick your rating against a particular theme

Theme	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor
Local grain				
Political intelligence				
Examples of local grain				
Merits and demerits of using local grain				
Role of CSOs in working with local grain				
How to incorporate local grain in a peacebuilding programme				
Design a local grain peacebuilding programme through art				
Methods and channels distributing a peacebuilding programme that are context relevant				

Table 10: Source designed by author

1. Did the training achieve its objectives?

2. What were the strengths?

.

3. What were the weaknesses and how can they be corrected?

4. Do you feel able to share what you have learnt with others or encourage them to participate in a similar training? Explain.

5. Do you have any other comments on the training?

Thank you for taking part in this evaluation.

Annexure 9: Training Manual/Hand-Out

Building peace using IKS/local grain through political intelligence hand-out

By Ashton Murwira

Purpose of the hand-out

This hand-out is designed for CSO members who work in a peacebuilding programme. It specifically targets project managers and co-ordinators that design, implement and evaluate peacebuilding outreach and campaigns, trainings or workshops within communities. The aim is to enhance CSOs' capacity to identify and include local views and practices in their peacebuilding programme. It has a background which excludes local views, traditions, culture and experiences which have made peacebuilding projects less appealing and not sustainable once a programme end. Such deficiencies can be mended by creating alliances or networks among CSOs themselves and constructively engaging other actors to strengthen a programme. Emphasis is also made on the importance of political intelligence in designing an intervention programme by CSOs in peacebuilding. In cases, where CSOs have no members with political intelligence skills they can consult or engage experts before launching an intervention. CSOs in Zimbabwe appear to be lacking this capacity as some of their working staff migrated to other areas in search of greener pastures.

How to use the manual

During the training sessions, the facilitator needed to make comments or additions on the points raised in a session or activity. For example, at the end of discussions on basic concepts the facilitator also needed to bring in different views that are captured in this manual. At the end of the training, facilitators should also distribute the hand-out to the participants.

Understanding the basic concepts

Peacebuilding can be understood as a process of identifying and addressing the underlying causes of a conflict (Paffenholz, 2010) by using constructive non-violent ways. It also embraces concepts such as reconciliation, forgiveness and transitional justice. The sole aim is to transform relationships, rebuild broken ties, and move from negative peace to positive peace and effect positive change in all aspects of human life that include but are not limited to political, economic, social and cultural aspects.

Peacebuilding models

There are two major models that are followed in peacebuilding and these are liberal and sustainable peacebuilding models. Liberal models follow the approaches that include promotion of rule of law, free and fair elections, and security sector reforms, civil and political liberties and economic reforms (Donais 2012). In other words, focus is on democratisation and constitutional reforms. Sustainable models are grounded in rebuilding broken ties, creating zones of peace and transitional justice (Lederach 1997). They involve training people within a generation. The concept of the local grain lies in the sustainable

peacebuilding model which yields positive peace outcomes. The argument in this manual is that whatever model a CSO chooses, their programme should embrace the local grain.

IKS/Local grain

Local grain is a broad concept that embraces the local tradition, culture, language, resources and people within a defined environment. Booth (2011) argues that local grain is the local way of doing things or a grain of the local culture. Osamba (2001) posits that it involves using indigenous approaches, with the wider involvement of the communities. In other words, it can be understood as peacebuilding from below. Bottom-up approaches involve utilising traditional customs and values that have been marginalised overtime (ibid). CSOs can design effective bottom-up peacebuilding models if they are active, organised and locally grounded (Donais 2012). With this concept, CSOs and other peacebuilding actors are supposed to work with the initiatives that emanate from the environment. That is, their programmes are supposed to address specific needs that arise from the environment. Once this has been identified, CSOs are also supposed to work with the local people, other CSOs with a similar mandate of building peace and other experts on a matter. This will stir a bottom-up approach, rather than waiting for a peacebuilding programme that is funded already by a donor. Lederach (1997) argues that, “bottom-up approaches are necessary for durable outcomes, politicians cannot move peace without the public” and so are CSOs. As such, Lederach places emphasis on organic rather than top-down approaches in peacebuilding. Booth (2011) also terms it “locally driven” change. This change is more desirable than a programme that would have been pre-fabricated or else without extensive consultation with the local people. According to Osamba (2001), indigenous approaches address the root problems as opposed to symptoms of a conflict. Graham et al. (2006) note that people should be able to build relationships, rid themselves of violence and its effects and build better ways of managing conflicts. This takes place when CSOs work with the local grain through elicitive as opposed to prescriptive approaches.

Merits of IKS/local grain

The advantages of working with the local grain are but not limited to:

- Simple, cheap and easy to follow, especially on the part of the local people who will be aware and familiar with their own ways of addressing an issue. It breeds context specific and relevant solutions to a problem. For example, in certain conflicts there are specific people who can resolve them - it might be domestic violence where, in a Zimbabwean setting, an aunt can discuss the problems with the family and the conflict subsides.
- It can also strengthen or bind relationships between the people and CSOs working in an environment. Once the bond is created, so is trust. In this way local people will cooperate or have a “buy-in” on a programme brought in by the CSOs. Building trust is also a key to breaking ground in polarised communities.
- Local grain initiatives work as an antidote to donor-dependent programmes or activities which in the long run have the effect of creating a dependency syndrome. Donor dependent programmes can be hijacked by professional CSOs who are driven by money rather than

committing themselves fully on a project. In such cases, where funding has “dried up”, the programme and CSOs implementing it die a natural death.

- Working with the local grain promotes ownership of a programme. It follows that the local people can then be able to drive it alone with their local means and knowledge. This is called self-sustaining peace (Maiese 2004). To this end, there will be continuity of a programme even when a CSO decides to cease its operations.
- In addition, working with the local grain has an effect of strengthening public opinion on an issue. Once people have a common understanding of peace issues it is easier to create peace constituencies or zones of peace that can counter any violent forces that might want to come into their societies.

Limitations

CSOs can find it difficult to work with the grain of the local community in cases where there is high unemployment. This challenge is met by peace builders as their programme might be less useful. This comes when the people would be asking for immediate priorities such as employment, yet not knowing that without a peaceful society it is hard to attract investors let alone build the economy of a State. In this environment CSOs need to find a strategic way of engaging the local people and be part of their peacebuilding programme.

Political Intelligence

This involves analysing and understanding the realities of power relations that shape a State (DFID 2013, Menocal 2014). For example, in addressing problems of violence one needs to identify the perpetrators, question their source of power, understand their mind-set as to why they behave the way they do and lastly, their way of life. Apart from understanding individuals, one also needs to understand fully the issues they want to change within a community. Thinking politically involves asking hard-hitting questions about how change happens, understanding the role of external players in supporting change followed by defining the appropriate programme, funding and staffing needed (Menocal 2014). This promotes depth analysis as opposed to breadth and this enhances the understanding of contextual realities (ibid). Political intelligence is also defined as, “the achievement of organisational or personal aims by using appropriate skills, behaviours and strategies, not only an awareness of political landscape but more specifically the skills to manoeuvre through political minefields” (TTM Associates 2017). In a way, with political intelligence CSO members could be able to carry out effective conflict-mapping exercises. In this way they can rate the types of conflicts happening within a community and determine the level and intensity of the conflicts. Once this is done, CSOs can devise a peacebuilding programme that addresses a conflict. For example, Zimbabwe is rocked by politically related violence in the form of electoral tensions; the task therefore would be to come up with an intervention plan that seeks to address such conflicts. Political intelligence enables one, or the CSOs, to “move from best practices to best fit models” (Menocal 2014). They can shift from State-building, which is driven by institutions

targeting structural issues, to people-led peacebuilding programmes that improve on societal relationships.

With political intelligence, they can also conduct stakeholder-mapping. This is a process of understanding stakeholders and influencing strategies (TTM Associates 2017). Having done this, there is also need to identify alliances or networks with which to work in addressing certain issues; for example, constructively engaging the media, other local influential people and experts on that particular issue. The networks can be used to get more information and advice (ibid). CSOs in peacebuilding may have a theme of “Peace as a way of life” - with this they can identify neutral church leaders, CSOs working on peace projects, women, youth and so forth, who can strengthen their campaign. Amongst the CSOs themselves one might also separate genuine peace builders and peace spoilers; these are typically found in polarised environments like the current situation in Zimbabwe. Some organisations claim to be CSOs, yet their actions are uncivil as they do not stand for the right things in society. Once one has good analytical skills, they will know with whom to partner and where they can pitch their tent. To this end, political intelligence can help fill in the lacuna left by some CSO members who might have migrated abroad for better opportunities. This helps also in minimising errors in designing and implementing peacebuilding interventions.

Role of CSOs in a peacebuilding programme with the IKS/local grain

For CSOs to engage successfully with the local people they need to assume key roles that can enable a democratic way of working together with the people. CSO members need to create an open and inclusive platform for the views of other people. They can do this by, “creating an environment of trust, mutual respect and shared aspiration in which all can contribute fully and openly in achieving collective goals” (TTM Associates 2017). At least CSOs need to assume the role of facilitators or catalyst (Maiese 2004) in their peacebuilding programme. They should not assume that the local people have no useful input but rather should demonstrate their willingness to learn and work together on what they already know. Through facilitation, they become bridges to connect people with other stakeholders, using their local ways towards addressing a problem. Where they fail to facilitate a programme, they can also act as advisors who only make recommendations in consultation with local people rather than imposing pre-tailored ideas. By demonstrating these roles, the local people and other stakeholders feel involved and that they own a programme that a CSO might have. It brings in a collaborative process that can enrich a programme. Collaborative processes incorporate diverse ideas from other stakeholders in the peacebuilding process, bearing in mind that it must be grounded in the local grain. In this way, a demand-side peacebuilding programme can be realised as opposed to a supply-side initiative.

How CSOs can utilise political intelligence skills when working with the IKS/local grain in peacebuilding

CSOs need to begin by carrying out a thorough analysis of the needs and fears within a community. This minimises the chances of coming up with a faulty assessment, plan and intervention by CSOs in local communities. Sustainable change can be reached through uniting with other CSOs, local people and experts. On working extensively with the local communities, Osamba (2001) notes that, “emotional wounds and injured relationships are healed within the context of emotional unity of the community”. Further CSOs can build coalitions or networks to help address financial challenges. Members can pull resources together and conduct an intervention. This is unlike a scenario where CSOs have been competing for funding to carry out the same programme though using different methods.

In deconstructing a biased perception CSOs need to be sensitive to issues like dress, especially campaign colours. In some societies it has come to be known that certain colours resemble a political party; for example, red, green and yellow. CSOs should put on neutral colours such as white or blue that are not associated with a certain political party. By doing-so they would do away with the brand of being affiliated to a certain political party. This can also lure many diverse local people to work with them on a programme. Quite often, where a CSO has been associated with a certain political party the attendance of their programme has also been defined along party lines thereby failing to have an impact and drawing many people. Being colour sensitive should also extend to their campaign materials in cases where they would want to use banners, posters or flyers in reaching out to the people.

Peacebuilding through entertainment

In environments where there is high unemployment, CSOs can devise a programme that can attract the local people. They can first identify local celebrities in the area. These people might have a talent in music, art or drama. CSOs then need to work with them in developing a peacebuilding script that suits the environment. For example, they can compose songs displaying the importance of peace, unity, tolerance and love. When this is done, they also need to identify a strategic area where they can perform; for example, in schools or busy shopping centres. By organising this, people will be drawn, first by their local celebrities whom they will be used to seeing performing other acts on different themes. Secondly, making use of local celebrities can attract more people as they are known to be neutral rather than making use of political leaders who have certain agendas. Osamba (2001) argues that “a carnival type of atmosphere should be created that involves diverse activities to meet a diverse population”. To this end, people will be entertained at the same time as being educated on peace issues. The acts should also reflect the problem issues that will be happening in that area. Drama and music can be performed in both urban and rural settings. Such methods can do away with the usual placard-carrying mind-set of CSOs which might seem to be provocative to politicians who can send police to block their programme. In addition, CSOs can also organise music, drama, poetry and art competitions that involve peacebuilding messages in line with the local grain.

Reaching out through social media platforms

CSOs can distribute peace messages on flyers or booklets. However, with the popular usage of social media this has become a more effective platform to reach out to people. CSOs can organise drama and music events then record and circulate the video or audio clips via WhatsApp or Facebook platforms. Video clips have been circulating widely via WhatsApp; for example, individuals such as pastor Mwarire with his “This flag” campaign and other short comedies addressing the problems facing the country. Social media can be far-reaching and is cheaper than printing and circulating flyers. As has been observed, flyers or pamphlets have been used for wrapping goods, starting a fire, rolling tobacco thereby polluting the environment, yet peacebuilding also encompasses good environmental practices or management. CSOs can also consider making use of bill boards where they can engage brand ambassadors who can be pictured with peace messages. Brand ambassadors, like local celebrities are neutral people. These are people who might include sports personnel who can easily be identified and capture the attention of people when they see the bill boards. In this way people can become educated on an issue.

Harnessing local tradition

Maiese (2004) posits that culture is a seedbed for the development of a peacebuilding model. Burton (1990) in Osamba (2001) argues that culture is a satisfier which makes it a critical part in conflict resolution. When working with the local grain CSOs may also want to understand and learn the local culture, tradition or practice within a context. This should then be incorporated in their peacebuilding campaigns. For example, local idioms, language, folktales, symbol and sayings that have elements of peacebuilding. Again, chances are high that there will be buy-in from the local people. In some cases, where CSOs have been denied access to a rural community it can be explained in the sense that “some chiefs see CSOs programme as threatening their values, culture and practice” (Maiese 2004). Designing a peacebuilding programme rooted in local culture is like following path-ways in ethnic wisdom (Augsburger 1992 in Osamba 2001). Donais (2012: 58) argues that the “State is about order, civil society is a producer, repository and distributor of social norms and practices that generate community”. It is the richness of local wisdom that makes a programme more appealing and effective in bringing change within communities.

Low cost income generating activities

Another major component of peacebuilding is jump-starting the economy. In some communities, people have small income-generating projects into which CSOs can tap and support. These are not capital-intensive projects such as craft where people use local resources or materials in creating products that they can resell. CSOs can have themes such as crafting for peace; then people work in groups on a project. Once people start to work together, they unite, create a bond and trust which is key to creating

peaceful societies. As the projects grow so employment opportunities open for people. Through these efforts they can rebuild their economy and bring positive change to many people's lives.

In rural settings people also engage in community projects such as food for work and “zunderamambo”. Zunderamambo is a system where local communities farm produce that can be used as reserve food in times of hunger and droughts. The programme will be headed by a local chief together with his or her people. In food for work people repair roads and bridges in return for food. CSOs may provide safety ware or bins with peace messages that can be used by people during the projects. In the zunderamambo they can also donate inputs or farming equipment that people will always remember as they carry out the work.

Conducting trainings

In cases where CSOs would want to engage in group discussions, trainings and workshops they also need to be aware of sitting positions. For example, in trainings people must be in a horse shoe sitting arrangement. Facilitators should also sit amongst the participants to show that everyone is equal. Further, there is need for proper timing in conducting trainings and workshops. If it is in the rural areas most people observe holy days once a week which can be Tuesday or Friday. On these days people do not work and they call it “chisi” in Shona or it can be understood as Sabbath day in Christian teachings. Such days can work well when conducting peacebuilding campaigns in rural settings, as people will be free.

Programme evaluation and reporting findings

CSO members should not only involve local people during planning and implementation of an intervention. Rather the democratic and all-inclusive process should be carried over to evaluation of a project. When evaluation is done with the people and there is feedback, they will know how to improve their peacebuilding exercise. If a CSO decides to leave an area, the people can sustain themselves. In some cases, a CSO can go further to publish their findings for the benefit of other CSOs or interested stakeholders who may want to carry out future peacebuilding exercises in the area. This creates continuity and sustainability of a programme. The emphasis on local grain is that CSOs cannot build peace alone but they build with others comprised of the local people, researchers and other experts in peacebuilding.

Annexure 10: Interview Guide for Evaluation One

Post-training interview guide

The questions were a follow-up to the immediate post-evaluation exercise that was done on 25 November 2016.

Date

Code

1. What do you still recall from the IKS/local grain training that you underwent?
2. How will your work change as a result of the training?
3. Explain the specific ways in which your work in your organisation will enhance effective peacebuilding?
4. What measures did you draw from the training that you can use in trying to mitigate the challenges that CSOs face in peacebuilding?
5. How effective do you think are the peacebuilding methods that you have learnt towards enhancing CSOs in peacebuilding?
6. Explain the skills that you think your organisation will benefit from, in designing, implementing and evaluating a peacebuilding programme?
7. Do you have any other comments on how CSOs can be strengthened?

Thank you

Annexure 11: Post-Training Interview Guide for Evaluation Two

Post-training implementation evaluation guide on building peace with IKS for CSO(A) in peacebuilding in Land of Cattle.

These questions were aimed at exploring the impact of the training on the CSO(A) members that were trained on building peace with IKS through political intelligence

1. What do you still recall from the skills you got from the training on building peace using IKS and political intelligence?
2. How have you managed to influence your organisation's peacebuilding programmes?
3. Have you managed to implement the lessons you got from the training on building peace using IKS and political intelligence?
4. How effective has been the training on IKS and political intelligence in strengthening your peacebuilding programmes and brining sustainable development in communities?
5. What challenges have your organisation faced in implementing lessons from the training?
6. In what way can IKS in peacebuilding be improved through action research among CSOs in Zimbabwe?
7. Do you have any other comments on outcome of the training?

Thank you

Annexure 12: Interview and FGD Guide for Second Evaluation to the Local People

1. Are you aware of CSO(A) within your community?
2. What kind of peacebuilding projects or programmes have they implemented?
3. In what way and to what extent has your community been engaged in designing, implementation and evaluation of the programmes?
4. Do their programmes reflect your local knowledge or ways of building peace?
5. How effective do you think their peacebuilding programmes have brought about positive change and likely to yield sustainable development in your community?
6. What challenges have you encountered in the way CSO(A) have engaged your communities in building peace?
7. In what way do you think CSO(A)'s peacebuilding programmes can be enhanced?
8. Do you have any other comments on CSO(A)'s peacebuilding operations in your community?

Thank you

Annexure 13: Consent Letter for the Local People

Durban University of Technology

Faculty of Management Sciences

Department of Public Management & Economics

Date:

Dear Participant

Thank you for taking an interest in participating in my research. My name is Ashton Murwira. I am currently pursuing my Doctoral in Peacebuilding studies with Durban University of Technology. Below are the details of my study which can give you clarity on what it is about.

The title of my study is strengthening civil society organisations (CSOs) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: an action research project

Questions of how to effectively strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe remain important given the recurrence of conflicts and the continued negative peace. CSOs have played pivotal roles in peacebuilding dating as far as the colonial times to the present day. However, this study aims to explore and implement effective strategies through action research that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding to yield durable peace. Your participation is voluntary, and you can withdraw at any time. There will be no negative consequences should you decide to withdraw from the study. You will not be paid for participating in the study and you will not be expected to pay anything to take part in the study. Your name and other personal details will not be used during the study. For data presentation I will use codes to ensure anonymity.

Kindly go through the consent form below, if you are satisfied could you please append your signature at the end.

CONSENT

Statement of Agreement to Participate in the Research Study:

- I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, _____ (Ashton Murwira), about the nature, conduct, benefits and risks of this study - Research Ethics Clearance Number: _____,
- I have also received, read and understood the above written information (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.
- I am aware that the results of the study, including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials and diagnosis will be anonymously processed into a study report.
- In view of the requirements of research, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerised system by the researcher.
- I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study.
- I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research which may relate to my participation will be made available to me.

Full Name of Participant Thumbprint	Date	Time	Signature / Right
--	-------------	-------------	--------------------------

I, Ashton Murwira herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study.

Full Name of Researcher	Date	Signature
--------------------------------	-------------	------------------

Full Name of Witness (If applicable)	Date	Signature
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Student
Contact Details

Supervisor / Promoter
Contact Details

Co-Supervisor/Co-Promoter
Contact Details

Annexure: 14 Letter of Information



Dear Participant

Thank you for taking an interest in participating in my research. My name is Ashton Murwira. I am currently pursuing my Doctoral in Peacebuilding studies with Durban University of Technology. Below are the details of my study which can give you clarity on what it is about.

The title of my study is strengthening civil society organisations (CSOs) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: an action research project

Questions of how to effectively strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe remain important given the recurrence of conflicts and the continued negative peace. CSOs have played pivotal roles in peacebuilding dating as far as the colonial times to the present day. However, this study aims to explore and implement effective strategies through action research that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding to yield durable peace.

If you choose to participate in the study you will:

- Be required to complete a consent form

- You will be part of the participants who will make up the interviews or Focus group discussions discuss issues that emerge and participate in workshops related to this study

- You may also be part of ten action group as a volunteer that will undertake an initial group and workshop feedback evaluations on the peacebuilding strategy

Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. There will be no negative consequences should you decide to withdraw from the study. You will not be paid for participating in the study and you will not be expected to pay anything to take part in the study.

Your name and other personal details will not be used during the study. For data presentation I will use pseudo names. Your responses will be only be seen by me. However, if you participate in the action

team to develop and implement inter-civic engagements then you will be known to everyone in the team.

Should you have any problems or queries then please contact me (0773671261), my supervisor Dr. Sylvia Kaye (031 2603126) or the Institutional Research Ethics administrator on 031 373 2900. Complaints can be reported to the DVC: TIP, Prof F. Otieno on 031 373 2382 or dvctip@dut.ac.za

Yours Sincerely

Ashton Murwira

Annexure 15: Letter of Information Two



Faculty of Management Sciences

Department of Public Management & Economics

The Director of NANGO: Dr C Zinhumwe

REF: PERMISSION TO UNDERTAKE RESEARCH WITHIN YOUR ORGANISATION

Dear Sir

I am currently pursuing an academic research on peacebuilding programmes in civil society as part of my studies towards a Doctoral degree in Peacebuilding at Durban University of Technology. My research title is strengthening civil society organisations (CSOs) in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: an action research.

The aims of the study are to: examine the nature and extent of CSOs and the extent of their participation in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe; explore the past and current peacebuilding models that CSOs have implemented; analyse challenges that CSOs encounter in building peace; design and implement a peacebuilding strategy that specifically enhances the role of civil society in peacebuilding and undertake an initial evaluation of a peacebuilding strategy that can strengthen CSOs in peacebuilding.

I have chosen to work with your organisation because your organisation has an on-going peacebuilding programme it runs in collaboration with CCSF. This collaboration is of importance to my study as it covers a wider geographical area on CSOs in peacebuilding in Zimbabwe. I intend to have interviews with you and access to other relevant peacebuilding materials. For confidentiality purposes pseudo names or codes will be used.

Your permission to undertake the study would be greatly appreciated.

Should you wish to discuss the study further, do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisor.

Yours Faithfully

Ashton Murwira

Doctoral student: Peacebuilding

Email: murwirashie@gmail.com

Contact number 0773671261

Dr. Sylvia Kaye

Supervisor

Email: sylviak@dut.ac.za

Contact number 031 373 6860