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Destination South Africa: comparing global sports mega-events and recurring localised sports events in South Africa for tourism and economic development

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This contribution examines the comparative value of sport mega-events such as the 2010 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup of soccer held in South Africa and recurring sporting events (SPEs) such as the Comrades Marathon held each year in KwaZulu-Natal Province in South Africa. Through an examination of case studies of the World Cup and regional SPEs in South Africa, with particular focus on Durban and surrounding areas of KwaZulu-Natal, we seek to expand debate on the efficacy of various SPEs on tourism and local and regional economic development strategies. We present a detailed literature review of the role of these events to economic development and impacts on tourism and legacy planning then examine extant data produced around the 2010 World Cup (realising that we only have a partial picture to date) and compare that to SPEs held regularly in the region. Our aim is to generate intelligent debate around the role of sports and tourism in economic development strategies and suggest that alternative focus will yield more sustainable and predictable returns that locate benefits in host communities.

Keywords: sports mega-events and tourism development; recurring sports events and tourism development; sports tourism and events; tourism and events in South Africa; 2010 World Cup

Introduction

Since the end of apartheid and the emergence of democratic government in 1994, South Africa has hosted many international sporting events (SPEs) and spent millions seeking others. This has been done in large part to raise external revenues through increased tourism and heightened awareness of South Africa as a destination for tourists and international capital. However, it is clear that the results have been vastly uneven and that the costs have perhaps been far greater than the benefits. Despite this large-scale outward focus, South Africa holds many successful recurring sports events where control is retained locally. These events utilise existing facilities and which have had increasing participation, spectating and media coverage. Yet, the ‘benefits’ of these events and facilities are questionable.

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The sport events industry is growing enormously around the world with an increasing number of events at all levels being held in ever more diverse locations. Billions of dollars are spent on media rights, stadium construction, associated infrastructure, apparel, etc. each year for high-end events, while smaller scale events also require local support. Sport mega-events (SMEs) such as the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup, Rugby World Cup, Olympic Games (OGs) and the Cricket World Cup are widely promoted by associating prospects of facilitating and enhancing economic development. Mega-events like the FIFA World Cup are widely touted for the economic benefits they can bring to a country regardless of increasing evidence to the contrary. International SMEs or hallmark events are thought to enhance host location's position as a destination for international tourism before, during and after the event. Furthermore, SMEs have differential long-term financial and social impact on various groups of citizens and organisations in host communities making the notion of 'benefit' a contested one (Nauright, 2004). Indeed, SMEs often exacerbate differences between regions and classes within host cities and nations. Recently, Perelman (2012) has argued that we are now witnessing a globalised 'sporting mode of production' (pp. 77–80) that is propped up by a universalising discourse that has insidious impact on economies, societies and cultures. Though we do not go as far as Perelman, we do suggest that the role of sport, particularly expressed through SMEs, is significant in the contemporary global political economy and is part of the global sport media tourism complex identified by Nauright (2004).

Alongside the rise of SMEs, small-scale SPEs that are locally organised and controlled have also grown in relevance as a way to promote local and regional economic development (Daniels & Norman, 2003; Gibson, Kaplanidou, & Kang, 2012). For instance Gibson, Willming, and Holdnak (2003) note that these events can raise revenue and create a sense of community spirit, while growing travellers' awareness of the host as a destination. However, they also argue that SMEs may generate more positive effects for host communities, as their control remains localised and any economic benefits often stay within host communities. It is, therefore, crucial to investigate the different political economic contexts and rationale behind the two different types of events and the local impact scenarios they offer. We refer to SPEs as sport events that are smaller in scale and are organised and managed at local/regional (within South Africa) levels and not by international sporting entities, while SMEs are sport events organised and managed by international sporting entities. We use the South African context as a case study investigate SMEs and SPEs to examine the framework behind the two types of events and expose the possible different impact at local levels the two types of events have. The core issue of distinction between the two types of events is based on the ownership process that controls and manages events and the associated political economy aspects of the events.

We present arguments made for and against SME development strategies, preliminary data on the impact of the 2010 World Cup and compare this to SPEs operating regularly in the areas in and around Durban, South Africa. Our aim is to generate debate on sustainable strategies for the use of SPEs in local and regional economic and tourism development planning and policy generation that should influence national strategies as well. We provide a careful analysis of the literature on both types of events and then address data on tourism linked to the 2010 World Cup (of football/soccer) examining the type of data produced and measures used, then compare that to data from SPEs to demonstrate the significance of SPEs exceeds that of an SME when measured over time. These results provide the basis for suggesting alternative focus for future economic development strategies linked to sport and sport for generating increases in tourism numbers and tourist expenditures.

Literature review

Sport mega-events

The relevance of both the mega and small sport events industries is their growing connection with other relevant spheres of local and regional political economies. SMEs have been the object of numerous studies in recent years in relation to the political economy of globalisation, and focusing on developing countries and real or imagined attempts at poverty reduction (cf. Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Bohlmann, 2006; Cornelissen, 2007; Cornelissen & Swart, 2006; Giampiccoli & Nauright, 2010; Lee & Taylor, 2005; Matheson & Baade, 2004; Nauright, 2004; Pillay & Bass, 2008; Saayman, Saayman, & du Plessis, 2005). Mega-events are large-scale economic phenomena (Schulz, 2010, p. 1) and have increased their global political economic relevance to become important factors in local and national development strategies. In this process, local community interests and democratic practices are often ignored, and business and governments align in support of events-driven economies as part of growth strategies. In substance, business and political leaders view SMEs as significant channels for local and regional economic development and as a way to facilitate urban redevelopment using the SME as a catalyst to leverage additional resources that might not otherwise be as forthcoming. This strategy is justified as a result of projected increases in tourism, the resulting infrastructural improvements, and the increase in short-term employment opportunities (cf. Schulz, 2010). Tourism and envisaged new investment in the specific locality or nation are key aspects of the heightened interest in hosting SMEs as they lure of large and are thought to be the most expedient way to attract media interest in a host city, which, it is hoped, will translate into an influx of outside capital through tourism and new investment (Nauright, 2004). It is appropriate, therefore, as Nauright (2004) outlines, to analyse mega-events in terms of a sport–media–tourism complex that is at the centre of many local, regional and national development strategies not only in developed countries but also in a number of developing globally focused economies such as Brazil, Russia or South Africa (Nauright, 2004), or as Perelman suggests in terms of an entire mode of production (Perelman, 2012) that has emerged around globalised sport. Therefore, in addition to economic issues, SMEs also need to be understood from political and social viewpoints, because mega-events involve the political leadership of a host country and often shape legacies that governments and leaders envision for themselves. Governments are often keen advocates for promoting the positive impact that these events have, not only on a country's economy, but also on its developmental legacy (Schulz, 2010). While political factors form the power behind the willingness to host SMEs, the hosting itself, beside the usually advertised economic and 'image' impacts, can have a variety of social consequences. Thus, SMEs should examine social impacts on residents and account for their concerns in planning for the event and potential legacies. Examples of social costs that impact local day-to-day life include traffic congestion and overcrowding of roads; increased potential for criminal activity; disruption to daily schedules; and increased pollution (Turco, Swart, Bob, & Moodley, 2003, p. 227). The political willingness to host SMEs can, therefore, involuntarily (or not), ignore negative consequences faced by the local community such as residential displacement, breakdown of historic communities and cost overruns that impact negatively upon citizens' quality of life (Nauright, 2004; Ritchie, 2004).

In general, SMEs – such as the OGs, the Commonwealth Games, FIFA or Rugby World Cups and Continental Championships in soccer – have gained greater significance since the 1980s due in large part to an expansion of global media markets, new technologies enabling great exposure to be achieved, and the profits generated by the 1984 OGs in Los Angeles.

As a result, many countries began to link their economic development strategies to the attraction of major international SPEs that they hoped would leverage exposure into an increase in tourism income and outside business investment while encouraging the rapid development of supporting infrastructure that could be used more widely post-event (cf. Cornelissen, 2004; Nauright, 2004). Therefore, even though mega-SPEs are vulnerable to imprecise impact studies (Barclay, 2009) and much ambiguity exists with the meaning of the concept of SME 'legacy', it is a reality that a continually growing number of cities compete to host large-scale events. As Preuss (2007) has outlined, cities, usually with the support of national governments, base many aspects of their developmental strategies on events, with only a vague ideas about the complexity of 'legacy' and long-term social and economic consequences.

The Olympics provide a prime example of complexities in utilising SMEs as economic development strategies that promote the common good. The concept associated with the creation of the OGs in the latter nineteenth century was associated with the perpetuation of class distinction while shrouding the games with an aura of universalism (Nauright, 2012; Wamsley, 2002). Alternative international sporting movements were marginalised as the governing body for the Games, supported by business and governmental elites established control of the governance and operation of global sport (Nauright, 2012). The rise of neo-liberal economic strategies in the West in the 1980s enabled the Olympic 'Movement' as a single institution with the capital to organise events, to define, delineate and sustain particular meanings about sport and human society to tie human aspirations with economic development issues (Nauright, 2012; Wamsley, 2002). In addition, the hegemonic ideology of Olympism has been coupled with a financial capitalist ideology through association with transnational corporations. Thus, SMEs exist to legitimate political, economic, diplomatic and militaristic institutions that support and gain benefit from them (Perelman, 2012). At the same time, competition in sport event production has led corporate interests to demand that event organisers demonstrate value or return on investment resulting from sponsorship (Turco et al., 2003) and public exposure.

The OGs ultimately are as much about selling endemic consumer processes and dominant political ideologies as they are about promoting peace. The OGs are intensely political; they always have been. Unfortunately, the disturbing testimony to their success is that most people do not complain, and in fact actively support the Games (Nauright, 2012; Perelman, 2012; Wamsley, 2002). OGs are, therefore, historically linked to the process of modern capitalist development, and since the 1980s, and have been rejuvenated by neoliberalism and its connected globalisation processes in a context of total monopoly of the ownership of the concepts and values that have defined and sustained dominant interpretations of 'sport' (Wamsley, 2002, p. 395). The IOC (International Olympic Committee) controls the bargaining power of potential bidders. The situation of monopoly is not exclusive of the OGs, but is evident in all SMEs.

Small-scale sport events

SPEs also have been objects of study; however, the overwhelming majority of work on the operation and wider impact of SPEs have focused on SMEs (cf. Ritchie, 2004). Following Marsh (1984), it is argued that SPEs receive little attention because of the perceived small economic significance. SPEs can allow many smaller communities to organise SPEs and the operation of numerous SPEs on a recurring basis can collectively create significant impact. As a result, following Daniels and Norman (2003), we argue greater recognition should be given to SPEs by city businesses, politicians and tourism planners.

In contrast, SPEs can include a great variety of sporting categories such as regular team or individual sporting competitions in a local, regional or national league or tournament circuit plus outdoor/adventure, distance running, cycling, boating, automobile races, etc. (Yusof, Omar-Fauzee, Mohd, & Kim 2009). As with SMEs, SPEs are closely connected with the tourism sector. Increased tourism is in fact the primary reason to promote SPEs and where consequential economic impacts can be measured (cf. Kotze, 2006; Yusof et al., 2009). SPEs are often repetitive and have close connections to local contexts and opportunities; they are not, like SMEs, a once-off event. SPEs are based on existing local infrastructure, are repetitive, locally connected and evolve in relation to local opportunities and needs. While SME strategies are originated and managed within specific neo-liberal global frameworks and discourses to assist large-scale political, economic and cultural interests, SPEs hold out the possibility of greater local control. As with SMEs, the economic impact and local benefits of SPEs are usually a paramount factor in determining their value. They also rely on sponsorships and local and regional government support (Saayman & Saayman, 2012). Horne (2000) argues that a sustained series of smaller events, often based on amateur sport, can provide wider exposure sufficient to create a 'host' city image and thus increase tourist revenue. The positive impact of SPEs also has been noted by Daniels and Norman (2003) in affirming that recurring sport tourism events have a more sustainable potential for host locales. Following Higham (1999), they suggest that the seven events they investigated had positive outcomes including: zero to low bidding expenses; use of existing infrastructure; little or no burden on public funds or problems for local residents (Daniels & Norman, 2003, p. 221).

The measurement of impacts of SMEs and SPEs and related issues

Researchers often legitimate the sport–media–tourism complex through the production of reports suggesting expenditures on mega-event infrastructure should be considered investments that generate long-term growth (Barclay, 2009). As Barclay (2009) and others argue, these reports are commissioned by stakeholders, with political and economic interests in legitimating the hosting of the SME in order to maximise personal or organisational benefit. As early as the 1990s, researchers began to suggest the dangers inherent in SMEs (Baade, 1996; Baade & Dye, 1990; Baade & Matheson, 2002; Coates & Humphreys, 1999; Porter, 1999). As early as 2000, Siegfried and Zimbalist found no statistically significant correlation between sports facility construction and positive long-term economic development (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000, p. 103). In 2002, Baade and Matheson applied the same statistical techniques directly to SMEs. Yet, numerous promotional studies continue to appear, conducted by well-compensated consulting firms, using unrealistic assumptions about added local value, spending estimates that exclude many added costs and inflate associated multipliers used as indicators of value added by tourists and spectators before, during and after an event. Public spending and 'biased' estimates are important factors in SME legitimisation. Indeed, these are really not economic indicators but political tools to legitimate public support and limit protest (cf. Chalip & Leyns, 2002). While there have been multiple reports of how successful the 2010 World Cup was as a sports event itself, as well as its positive impact on the economy and South Africa's tourism industry, there are many who doubt the reliability of projected numbers and assessment methods of measuring the impacts of SMEs on tourism and business industries (Lee & Taylor, 2005).

A number of authors, such as Saayman, Rossouw, and Saayman (2008), Ritchie (2004), Yusof et al. (2009), Yusof, Shah, & Kim (2012), Wilson (2006) and Gibson et al. (2003)

have started to produce an increasing body of research suggesting regular local SPEs can produce substantial economic benefits for a host community (Daniels & Norman, 2003), such as the Argus Cycle Tour in the Western Cape region of South Africa. Saayman et al. (2008) using an input–output and multiplier analysis found the 2008 Tour cost R80.7 million yet generated R131 million in expenditures yielding a 1.40 multiplier effect. Additionally, 1403 jobs were present due to the event.

Kotze (2006) studied the Two Oceans Marathon in the Western Cape and discussed other SPEs in South Africa. He found more value in SPEs for development compared to SMEs. He argues governments in developing countries do not have the capital to chase SMEs and should rather concentrate on smaller scale SPEs. South Africa, he suggests, has not done enough to leverage SPEs in international tourist promotion:

Some of these events, such as the Two Oceans and Comrades marathons, the Cape Argus cycle race, and the Dusi and Berg River canoe marathons, are presented in some of the most scenic areas of South Africa. Thus sport tourists could also engage in tourism when they come to South Africa to attend, or participate in, these events. (Kotze, 2006, p. 292)

In addition, Gibson et al. (2012) studied six small-scale sports events and the work of a local sports commission in the context of the three pillars of sustainability – economic, social and environmental. They argued that small-scale sports events are consistent with a community’s infrastructure and conclude that human and cultural capital may be a feasible form of sustainable tourism development. Wilson (2006, p. 70) while elaborating on the different typology of events, and proposing a new one focused on smaller and less visible events, conclude that the ‘so-called small scale events, generating limited economic benefit can, in fact, produce some worthwhile gain to host communities’.

Another way to compare relative costs versus impact is to examine *leverage ratios* of public sector input versus private sector response. The leverage ratio is illustrative of the amount of money that is accrued by the private sector with every unit of currency spent by the public sector. The leverage ratio does not consider overall tourist spending, or other general multiplier effects such as revenue from transport, external financial transactions, product suppliers, tours or ongoing businesses and informal traders (Turco et al., 2003). It is worth noting that a number of studies since 2000 have departed from the calculation of aggregate economic impact, but rather explore the reasons that a particular event has or has not lived up to expectations for its projected economic impact (cf. Chalip & Leyns, 2002).

South Africa as a destination for SMEs and SPEs

Post-apartheid South Africa provides an instructive example of how large-scale SPEs have been sought in the hope of promoting tourism and economic development. South Africa has bid for and hosted an array of different SMEs in terms of scope and global awareness/impact. Since 1995, South Africa has hosted the Rugby World Cup (1995), the Cricket World Cup (2003) and the FIFA World Cup (2010). Though the OGs have yet to come to Africa, Cape Town bid unsuccessfully for the 2004 Olympics (after winning a national competition with Johannesburg and Durban, which also wanted to host the Games). At the time of writing, Durban is seeking the right to host in 2020. In a situation where many African countries have bid for SMEs, only South Africa was successful as of 2012 with no other nation on the immediate horizon of SME hosting. As a result, South Africa has become representative of the entire continent of Africa as to whether major

events can be successful or not. This pressure provides a rationale for overriding traditional participatory planning processes, and, while the corporate sport–media–business alliance has never been open, countries and cities themselves have operated in a covert manner, continuing the undemocratic process running mega-events (Tomlinson, Bass, & Pillay, 2009).

Studies of SPEs in the South African context have emerged alongside those examining SMEs. Kotze (2006) investigated the impact of the Two Oceans Marathon in Cape Town; Turco et al. (2003) analysed the impact of various sport events of different size and local/international exposure at municipality level in Durban. Saayman et al. (2008) examined the economic impact of visitor spending at the Cape Argus Pick'n Pay Cycle Tour; Sookrajh (2008) researched the relationship between nature-based sports events and the physical environment using the Halfway-Telkom Midmar Mile sport event as a case study; and Saayman and Saayman (2012) explored determinants of visitors spending in three major sport events within South Africa, the Two Oceans Marathon, the Argus Cycle Tour and the Midmar Open Water Mile. Many SPEs have been around for years in South Africa, particularly expanding during the 1970s. For example, the Pick n Pay Argus Cycle Tour started in 1977 to raise awareness of the need for cycle paths to be built in Cape Town (Saayman & Saayman, 2012). From that start, the Cycle Tour has developed into an entire week of activities including the Mountain Bike Challenge, the Tricycle Tour, the Junior Cycle Tour, the Giro del Capo, the Expo, and finally the Argus Cycle Tour. By 2008, the number of entries in the event exceeded 32,000 (Saayman et al., 2008). The Telkom Midmar Mile race began in 1973 when petrol restrictions limited travel to events further afield (Saayman & Saayman, 2012; Sookrajh, 2008). The Old Mutual Two Oceans Marathon, perhaps the most scenic marathon in the world first appeared in 1970 (Saayman & Saayman, 2012). The most famous SPE, however, has a much longer pedigree. Vic Clapham, a returned soldier from World War One, initiated The Comrade Marathon in 1921 as a way to remember his fallen comrades. The race was organised over the 56 miles from Pietermaritzburg to Durban. On Empire Day, 24 May 1921, 34 runners took to the line outside the Pietermaritzburg City Hall. The race has been held every year since, with the exception of 1941–1945 during the height of World War II, alternating starting points each year between the two cities. The Comrades is now the largest ultra marathon event in the world (Tourism KwaZulu-Natal, 2006). More recent is the Cape Epic, which began in 2004. The Epic is a mountain bike race that is becoming an iconic endurance event well known around the world and one that connects the usually remote sport of mountain biking with the urban environment of Cape Town. Participants and the community work together to coordinate events in and around the race, dramatically different from the secretive manner in which Durban organised the FIFA World Cup locally (Sole, 2010).

Yet, South Africa has, since the end of apartheid, sought to position itself as 'the' African destination for global SMEs. South Africa has the distinction of being the only sub-Saharan African country able to promote itself as a serious candidate to host major international (or mega-) sport events. Cornelissen (2005) demonstrates how active engagement with the global SME 'market' has been a significant element of post-apartheid South African foreign policy and economic development strategies. While there have been efforts to measure direct impacts of SMEs on South Africa tourism, there are too many other influential variables such as economic turmoil in many of South Africa's primary tourism generating countries. Consequently, it has resulted in the difficulty of comparing the impact of SMEs to SPEs to date.

Method

In examining the effects of the 2010 World Cup and SPEs on South Africa tourism, our analysis is based on collecting and assessing secondary data from wider research. We evaluated the impacts of the 2010 World Cup from multiple stakeholders' reports including, South Africa tourism organisations, the World Tourism Organization, FIFA and the World Economic Forum (WEF) to provide non-biased analysis of the impact of the World Cup on the South Africa tourism industry.

To more effectively achieve comparisons of the World Cup to SPEs, we limited our focus to Durban, a prime tourist destination in South Africa (FIFA, 2010) and one of the three recognised cities with a global presence (along with Cape Town and Johannesburg). Numerical data from three SPEs (the Comrades Marathon, Dusi Canoe Marathon and Midmar Mile) hosted in KwaZulu-Natal Province, where Durban is located, were used to compare the impact on tourism between the 2010 World Cup and SMEs.

While there have been studies measuring the impact of SMEs and SPEs separately, there is little attempt to compare the impacts of SMEs and SPEs on tourism-related development. Therefore, the authors aim to compare the literature on both types of events and then address data on tourism linked to the 2010 World Cup (of football/soccer) examining the type of data produced and measures used, then compare that to data from SPEs to demonstrate the significance of SPEs exceeds that of an SME when measured over time.

Analysis

The impact of 2010 World Cup on South Africa tourism: a multiple aspect approach

Upon South Africa's successful bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, a high expectation to promote and capitalise on the event for South African tourism (SAT) development was generated as the tourism impact of the World Cup could resonate for a long term (Ferreira, 2011). Consequently, the potential impacts and legacy of the FIFA (2010) World Cup were explored in various studies prior to the World Cup; however, they focused on estimates of the possible impact of 2010 World Cup on various industry sectors and general economy rather than tourism specifically.

Maennig and DuPlessis (2007) investigated South African economic perspectives and policy challenges informed by the experience of the 2006 World Cup hosted by Germany. Heinrich and Van Heerden (2008) explored the potential impact of the 2010 World Cup on the South African economy, using a computable general equilibrium model and found various factors, such as infrastructure developments, increased tourism and financing implications. Tourism Enterprise Partnership, a partnership between the departments of environment and tourism and the Business Trust, studied how the World Cup might affect South Africa's emerging small, medium and micro- tourism enterprises.

FIFA declared that the 2010 World Cup was a success as it brought a tourism boom to South Africa between June and July 2010 and provided South Africa with a central place on the international stage (FIFA, 2010). Tourist arrivals between January and September in 2010 increased 16.8% when compared to the same period in 2009. The SAT (2010, p. 12) report advanced key statistics in relation to the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ in the country: according to the study, *South Africa Tourism: Impact of 2010 World Cup*, conducted by the South Africa Tourism Organisation, a total of 309,554 foreign tourists arrived in South Africa with the primary purpose of attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup between June and July 2010 and those tourists spent about R3.64 billion (approximately US\$500 million) during their stay (FIFA, 2010). Africa accounted for 32% of total

foreign tourists, followed by Europe with 24%, Central and South America with 13% and 11% from North America. A total of 59% of arrivals for the World Cup were first time visitors to the country. The average length they stayed was 10.3 nights, with tourists from Australia staying the longest, followed by those from North America and Europe. In addition, a total of 79% of tourists stayed in paid accommodation, with 21% staying with friends and family. The study also revealed that (1) the average person who visited the country during the event spent just over ten nights; (2) out of the places fans visited, Gauteng (Johannesburg and Pretoria), Western Cape (Cape Town) and KwaZulu-Natal (Durban) were the most visited provinces; (3) shopping and enjoying nightlife were the two most common activities which tourists engaged in, apart from watching the 2010 FIFA World Cup; (4) about 5% of the 2010 FIFA World Cup tourists indicated they visited other African countries during their trip to South Africa (South Africa Tourism, 2010). Considering the worry that the global financial crisis might discourage people from travelling to South Africa, it was a truly impressive figure.

Building a legacy is the ultimate goal of any SME hosting country more than any of the other achievements (FIFA, 2010). Marthinus van Schalkwyk, the South Africa tourism minister, cited by Cohen, said the 2010 World Cup has positioned South Africa as a viable investment market and resulted in improved perceptions abroad that can have a long-lasting impact on the African continent. He added that the World Cup provided South Africa unprecedented international media exposure and left a modern world-class tourist infrastructure (Cohen, 2012).

International exposure and its impact on tourism

South Africa enjoys increased international positive exposure directly because of the World Cup and it continued to receive an increase in arrivals after the World Cup (Cohen, 2012). According to the study, *South Africa Tourism: Impact of 2010 World Cup*, conducted by the South Africa Tourism Organisation, the total awareness of South Africa as a leisure destination increased by 9% globally after the World Cup. It also reported that tourists were extremely satisfied with their experience in the country and would highly recommend the destination to friends and family. The intention to visit South Africa in the short term increased by 35% following the event (SAT, 2010, p. 13). FIFA argued the 2010 World Cup helped improve the negative perceptions South Africa has on safety and security issues and as a value-for-money destination (FIFA, 2010). Notably, approximately 90% of tourists who attended the 2010 FIFA World Cup mentioned that they would consider visiting South Africa again in the future.

The number of international visitors in 2011 increased 3% to 8.34 million, after enjoying the 15% growth during 2010. Tourists from Germany rose to 9.3% to almost 236,000 in 2011, while numbers from the USA grew 1.9% to 287,614. Chinese visitors jumped 24% to 84,883 and from India by 26% to 90,367 in 2011. A slowing UK economy and increased air passenger duty taxes deterred travellers, which, combined with the high level of soccer-specific tourism there, produced a 7.2% decline, to 420,500 in 2011 (Cohen, 2012). South Africa aims to attract 15 million foreign visitors annually and for the tourism industry's contribution to Africa's largest economy to more than double to R499 billion (\$63 billion) by 2020 (Baran, 2010). January-McLean, cited by Baran, said that South Africa plans to evolve into a stronger destination for meetings and conventions building on a successful World Cup. South Africa also would like to host future SMEs, now that the country has proved it is capable (Baran, 2010). These positive numbers certainly suggest a positive tourism legacy from hosting the World Cup.

While the absolute numbers suggest a hopeful future may be traced to the influence of the World Cup, the full economic picture is less rosy than officially presented and economic returns have proved to be vastly uneven concentrating spending further in areas already benefiting the most from international tourist expenditure. Immediately after the 2010 World Cup (December 2010), the numbers dropped to 3.6 billion Rand and 309,000 visitors suggesting that need to monitor arrivals for several years to achieve a fuller picture of whether the 2010 overall numbers are sustainable. The positive data show intention/willingness that will depend on many other factors to be concretised. In fact, the tourism sector is also directly influenced by global milieu such as the Eurozone financial crisis and the Arab Spring. While global projections expected 2012 tourism demand to grow between 3% and 4%, emerging destinations especially in Asia and Pacific and the Middle East were expected to drive much of the growth (SAT, 2012, p. 14), however, the Arab Spring has already impacted much of the Middle East as a destination of choice. A number of these factors are much relevant to SMEs when compared to SPEs as they are more attached to the global context.

Infrastructure: unbalanced supply and consumption

Pillay, Tomlinson, and Bass (2009) argue funding of the 2010 World Cup was invested in three distinctive areas: (1) directly related to the game (such as stadia); (2) some related infrastructure (transport infrastructure and security and medical services); and (3) complement and support for the World Cup and the economy in general (tourism and hospitality infrastructure). Nine cities hosted World Cup matches in South Africa, but of those, Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban were far and away the most popular destination for tourists. Johannesburg is the business hub of South Africa, while Cape Town and Durban remain prime coastal tourist destinations (FIFA, 2010). According to the African Financing Partnership, South Africa spent R38 billion on stadia and infrastructure in preparation for the World Cup. Government officials insisted the investment in new and renovated stadiums would continue to generate revenue after the World Cup resulting in net profits.

The sport stadia built or upgraded resulted in an oversupply of high-end sport stadia in South Africa (Peck, 2010). Further, South Africa has experienced a 35% oversupply in luxury hotel rooms since mid-2009 due to overly optimistic expectations of 750,000 additional international tourist arrivals than actually appeared. Moreover, the overestimation of the numbers of soccer fans at host venues also left an oversupply at the lower end of the accommodation market (Peck, 2010).

Travel and tourism (T&T) attractiveness: T&T competitiveness index (TTCI)

One of the key indicators for a country's competitive position as a T&T destination is the TTCI, which is reported by WEF. The TTCI is a comprehensive evaluation of key determinants that makes it attractive to develop the T&T sector. TTCI is measured by three broad categories of variables that comprise of T&T competitiveness including (1) the T&T regulatory framework sub-index; (2) the T&T business environment and infrastructure sub-index; and (3) the T&T human, cultural and natural resources sub-index. The T&T regulatory framework sub-index captures policy-related elements generally under the purview of governments; the T&T business environment and infrastructure sub-index captures elements of the business environment and the infrastructure of each economy; and the T&T human, cultural and natural resources sub-index captures the human, cultural and natural elements of each country's resource endowments (WEF, 2007). The data set

includes both survey data from the WEF's annual Executive Opinion Survey, and quantitative data from publicly available sources, international organisations, T&T institutions and experts (for example, IATA (International Air Transport Association), IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature), the UNWTO (United Nations World Tourism Organization), WTTC (World Travel & Tourism Council), UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)). The Survey is carried out among CEOs and top business leaders in all economies covered by our research; these are the people making the investment decisions in their respective economies. The Survey provides unique data on many qualitative institutional and business environment issues, as well as specific issues related to the T&T industry and the quality of the natural environment.

Table 1 depicts the ranking of South Africa in various sub-categories between 2007 and 2011. It is important to note that South Africa had begun developing or upgrading its infrastructure for the 2010 World Cup and these efforts were reflected in the 2009 report (WEF, 2009). While the infrastructure in South Africa was well developed for the sub-Saharan region, with air transport infrastructure ranked 43rd globally and railroad quality (37th) and road quality (40th) also ranked relatively high, there was little improvement yet apparent from 2007 levels. In terms of straight ranking comparison, South Africa even went slightly backwards as its ranking in Air transport infrastructure and ground transport infrastructure declined (30th to 43rd; 35th to 64th). However, there were some areas of weakness that have clearly hurt the country's overall ranking. Safety and security was the most serious concern as it was ranked at 128th in 2009 compared with 95th in 2007. T&T government expenditure and human resources remained weak as they were ranked at 124th and 112th, which was down from 111th in 2007.

According to the recently released 2011 TTCI report, while the 2010 FIFA World Cup was considered to reinforce South Africa's position as a key international tourist destination, it was not reflected in the TTCI rankings. South Africa's ranking dropped to 66 in 2011 from 61 in 2009. In detail, its two sub-categories (T&T regulatory framework and T&T human, cultural and natural resources remained the same and the T&T business environment and infrastructure was ranked lower (52nd to 62nd) in 2007 compared with 2009. The South African government selected tourism as one of the five priority sectors in its growth plan in 2010 and has been reviewing tourism legislation in an effort to streamline it further. Policy rules and regulations are favourable to the sector's development (ranked 31st); this is an area where the country has improved since the 2009 assessment, with well-protected property rights and few visa requirements for visitors (WEF, 2011). In addition, South Africa is highly recommended for extension of business travel as its eighth place ranking has remained steady. Contrasted with the prediction of Turco et al. (2003) for potential negative consequences on the local community by SMEs, the 2010 World Cup helped improve South Africans' attitude towards foreign visitors to 49th from 59th in 2009.

The trends between 2007 and 2011 do, however, raise a series of concerns. While South Africa consistently ranks high at 14th for its natural resources and 55th for its cultural resources, other key sub-categories for building legacy (which many government and FIFA officials claimed would happen due to the major construction and upgrading of infrastructure) do not show a significant improvement. They include air transport infrastructure (30th, 43rd and 43rd); ground transport infrastructure (35th, 64th and 66th); tourism infrastructure (48th, 46th and 57th); hotel rooms (84th, 91st and 98th); and hotel price index (n/a, 38th and 68th). Most of all, the key areas of weakness bringing down the country's overall ranking in previous reports remains the same or worse after the 2010 World Cup.

Table 1. Change of South Africa TTCI between 2007 and 2011.

Broad category	Sub-index	Items	Rank by year		
			2007 (<i>n</i> = 124)	2009 (<i>n</i> = 133)	2011 (<i>n</i> = 139)
Overall TTCI ranking			62	61	66
T&T regulatory framework	Sub ranking		59	82	82
	Policy rules and regulations		46	36	31
	Environmental sustainability		28	44	48
	Safety and security		95	128	129
	Prioritisation of T&T		51	60	64
		Government prioritisation of the T&T industry	20	18	24
		T&T government expenditure	111	124	134
		Effectiveness of marketing and branding	16	17	26
		T&T fair attendance	35	41	n/a
		Comprehensiveness of annual T&T data	n/a	n/a	85
		Comprehensiveness of annual T&T data	n/a	n/a	46
T&T business environment and infrastructure	Sub ranking		44	52	62
	Air transport infrastructure		30	43	43
	Ground transport infrastructure		35	64	66
	Tourism infrastructure		48	46	57
		Hotel rooms	84	91	98
		Presence of major car rental companies	1	1	1
		ATMs accepting visa cards	41	45	45
	ICT infrastructure		70	80	95
	Price competitiveness in the T&T industry		48	38	37
		Ticket taxes and airport charges	89	70	57
		Hotel price index	n/a	38	63

T&T human, cultural and natural resources	Sub ranking		96	49	49
	Human resources		111	112	128
	Affinity for T&T		n/a	43	43
		Tourism openness	55	85	78
		Attitude of population towards foreign visitors	n/a	59	49
		Extension of business trips recommended	n/a	8	8
		Natural resources	59 ^a	22	14
		Cultural resources	(combined)	45	55

^aNatural resources and Cultural resources were combined into one sub-index in the 2007 study.

Safety and security still remain a serious concern (95th, 128th and 129th). T&T government expenditure (111th, 124th and 134th) and human resource in T&T sector (111th, 112th and 128th) need to be significantly improved as well.

Comparison of the impact of the 2010 WC and SPEs on tourism in Durban

Further criticisms frequently evident in SMEs such as the subversion of democratic practices and public transparency were evident in South Africa in the lead up to the World Cup. In examining the 'covert management' practices in Durban, for example, it is clear that the building Moses Mabhida stadium was part of a larger and secretive plan involving Durban municipal manager Michael Sutcliffe who managed the city's 2010 build-up (Sole, 2010, p. 173). Whatever the actual final economic cost, what remains is the real tragedy of 2010: the displacement of huge quantities of scarce time, money, skills and energy for a project that amounted to little more than 'a month long television show' (Sole, 2010, p. 195). In addition, while a new stadium in Durban was 'nice to have', it was not a FIFA requirement for hosting the matches. The new stadium displaced useful spending elsewhere. More strategic spending might have been used on coastal preparations for ecological changes or on alleviation of poverty or enhancing educational opportunity. Durban's beaches in particular 'are a much more profound symbol of its enduring tourism appeal than a steel arch made in Germany' (Sole, 2010, p. 195).

The Durban beachfront urban renewal has been associated with middle-class and elite opportunities for leisure and tourism rather than promoting more broad social inclusion goals throughout the municipality. Importantly, this is not to say that the new beachfront (or the stadium, which is architecturally world renowned) has been negative, on the contrary, it has greatly enhanced the image of Durban and the space is now widely used in sport/leisure activities over all its length from Moses Mabhida stadium to the area of uShaka Marine World. Many community members have used the space, though few infrastructure investments were made to the areas where they live in the numerous impoverished areas in and around the city. Embracing an almost exclusive neo-liberal, market-orientated approach, the idea among advocates of the FIFA World Cup was to position cities like Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town among a global hierarchy of competitive metropolitan areas (Pillay & Bass, 2008). Yet, evidence from previous such events suggest that the results of hosting do not deliver on the promise of widespread community benefit.

In the Eastern Cape, R250 million was allocated for the upgrading of the 2010 sport stadiums in Nelson Mandela Bay, East London and Mthatha. Without the World Cup, some of this money would have been spent in the rural areas, where there is an enormous need for infrastructure (Giampiccoli & Nauright, 2010). On the other hand, the 'spirit of the 2010 World Cup' did lead to renewed allocations for rural sport facilities in KwaZulu-Natal: an additional R128.9 million over the Medium Term Expenditure Framework was allocated to sport and recreation programmes and to finance the construction of sport facilities in unprivileged areas (Atkinson, 2009). The fact that the rural hinterlands of the 'big 3' cities may have some flow on benefits does little to address areas of lesser impact or where the World Cup made little impact such as the entire Northern Cape Province which hosted no matches (Giampiccoli & Nauright, 2010).

A brief numerical data overview to compare the impact between a mega-event (FIFA World Cup™) and small local sport events (Comrades Marathon, Dusi Canoe Marathon and Midmar Mile) within the KwaZulu-Natal Province where Durban is located provides

Table 2. Revenue by three SPEs in KwaZulu-Natal Province.

	Total impacts ^a			
	Midmar Mile ^b	Comrades Marathon ^c	Dusi Canoe Marathon ^d	Total
2008	R32,833,733.00	R76,209,076.00	R9,479,417.60	R118,522,226.60
2009	R42,956,157.00	R118,744,282.90	R2,587,461.00	R164,287,900.90
2010	R24,984,876.00	R145,633,619.00	R2,331,578.00	R172,950,073.00
2011	R29,249,648.00	R198,251,393.00	R4,696,333.00	R232,197,374.00
2012	R35,854,363.00	n/a ^e	R4,421,050.00	R40,275,413.00
	Grand total for five years of small local events			R728,232,987.50

^aIn South African Rand.

^bTotal estimated amount spent (low estimate).

^cEstimated economic impact – total spend (at least).

^dEstimated total impact (at least) – for 2008 total average spend (at least).

^eNot yet available at the time of writing.

insight into differential impacts of SMEs and SPEs. The numerical comparison of the economic impact of these three localised events and the World Cup (without considering the different level of expenses involved, which is much greater for an SME) shows that in a five-year period the three local events approximately equalled the impact of a single SME event, the FIFA World Cup. Of the 309,554 foreign tourists coming to South Africa, 83,819 visited the KwaZulu-Natal Province (SAT, 2010, p. 17). If we multiply the number of visitors to KwaZulu-Natal Province by the foreign tourist's average spending (R11,800) (SAT, 2010, p. 13), the result indicates that approximately R989,064,200 was spent in total by foreign tourists expressly present in the KwaZulu-Natal Province for the World Cup. It is possible to discern (see Table 2) that in a five-year time period, these three events generate approximately the same economic impact indicated for the same province. It is worth mentioning these three events have been present in the province for many years (Comrades Marathon since 1921, Dusi Canoe Marathon since 1951 and Midmar Mile since 1973) and supposedly will continue for many years ahead, making these events much more sustainable, less expensive and with vastly greater long-term economic impact within the province.

Conclusion and suggestions

The purpose of this study is to understand the difference between the two types of SPEs, related tourism impacts, and how they affect host communities. A basic difference between the two types of events is that SMEs are one-off, limited term events, usually with a global mediated following whose impact is often limited to a three- to five-year build-up phase, a two- to six-week event, and then follow-up attempts to leverage legacies (Schulz, 2010). SPEs on the other hand usually have a year-round cycle of pre-event planning, event operations and post-event reflection leading to pre-event planning for the following year's event. Thus, the cycle for SPEs is much more consistent and sustainable, particularly if locally or regionally controlled (cf. Ritchie, 2004). By contrast, SMEs are controlled by transnational sporting federations able to dictate requirements for hosting 'their' events and able to extract wealth from the host nation that otherwise might remain within the country or region. The fact that SMEs require much greater investment are a once-off event and have international or global relevance makes their process more political compared to SPEs normally less visible and requiring fewer resources. SMEs

accelerate capital investment and engender high potential opportunity costs, while smaller local events generate a marginal level of tourist activity that can be accommodated through existing resources (Walo, Bull, & Breen, 1996). Control of high-end infrastructure created for SMEs are frequently in the hands of global capital enterprises – hotel chains, sporting facilities and event management companies, including major sporting organisations such as FIFA and the IOC.

It is clear that the South African government and business leaders have focused on SMEs in promoting enhanced tourism and investment opportunities they believe can be leveraged through the hosting of such events. As Durban prepares an Olympic bid, it is clear that the concerns raised here merit close scrutiny and informed public debate, particularly as nations began to question more closely the links between SMEs and economic crises such as the 2011–2012 collapse of the Greek economy, signs of which already appeared in the lead up to the Athens 2004 Summer OGs (Georgakis & Nauright, 2012). Consistent with Barney, Wenn, and Martyn (2002), the 2010 FIFA World Cup provided great opportunities to advertise products to a global audience, leverage export business opportunities, generate new investment and boost citizen morale and pride. South Africa's successful bid and FIFA and media acclaim of the 2010 World Cup raised high expectations by South Africans to shift to the next level by leveraging this once-in-a-life-time opportunity. The findings from the various reports and figures from South Africa and FIFA show that the 2010 FIFA World Cup was a short-term success as it brought a brief tourism boom to South Africa between June and July 2010 and question marks remain now that the SME show has left the continent and will not return in the near future. There is plenty of scope for a new sports development plan focused on SPEs, that can also be part of tourism development strategies, given that none of the major SMEs, other than perhaps cricket, are currently likely to come to South Africa before the 2030s (unless Durban becomes an unlikely victor in its bid to host the Olympics in 2020 or 2024).

South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup poses a unique opportunity to assess the impact of a mega sport event on tourism in a developing country, particularly an African one. South Africa invested in new and renovated stadiums expecting to continue to generate revenue after the event. However, the sport stadia and luxurious hotel rooms resulted in an oversupply within South Africa. Contrary to the hope that the 2010 World Cup could have benefited South Africa more widely, related tourism benefit has intensified only in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and the major game parks and beaches near these centres. Government agencies have done little to promote rural tourism or to spread the tourism benefits more widely.

Cornelissen (2009) argued that the greatest tourism benefit from hosting the World Cup would be improvement in the country's international image instead of pointing to numbers of tourists or jobs created. While South Africa and FIFA claims the success of re-creating South Africa's image as a tourism destination on the world stage, it is difficult to be optimistic. Based on the TPCI and other measures, South Africa has not achieved the desired new image yet. Its overall competitiveness as a tourism destination remains similar to where it was before the World Cup.

Preuss (2007) argues that long-term economic growth can only be reached if an SME changes the host city or nation's tourism spaces and supporting facilities for future use, such as the upgrading of the necessary infrastructure (airports, roads, railway stations and public transport) and tourism superstructure (hotels, museums, promenades, waterfronts and restaurants). 'Legacy planning' focusing on investing heavily in supporting infrastructure rather than excessive stadiums, has not been observed. Key areas of legacy-building

attributes including transportation infrastructure, tourism and travel sector human resources, and government expenditure on tourism have not yet improved to levels needed to be globally competitive after the extensive spending and efforts for the 2010 World Cup. As Cornelissen, Bob, and Swart (2011) argue, there is a lack of consensus on the meaning of 'legacy' and consequently an assessment of legacy impacts. They suggested including event impacts in relation to the context in which they occur, and integrating systematic triple bottom-line principles into mega-event planning, design and evaluation. We propose SME strategies are not surprising, as they have originated from and managed within specific hegemonic neo-liberal global frameworks and discourses to assist specific political, economic and cultural interests of global elites, and South Africa has bought into this system though not as an equal partner.

The comparison of spending by visitors between the 2010 World Cup and local sport events in Durban suggests another road is possible to follow. The three events evaluated have been present in the province for decades and likely will continue for many years ahead as awareness of them beyond regional and national boundaries continues to grow. These events are more sustainable, less expensive and have much greater economic impact within the region in the long term. They are also less vulnerable to global economic crises as they attract a niche market of recurring participants and spectators drawn both locally and globally. Year-to-year fluctuations have much less long-term effects on tourism numbers or economic development. Plus, a much larger share of the wealth can remain in South Africa.

As Matheson and Baade (2004) argue, developing countries require more capital investment in order to prepare for SMEs, therefore the risks and opportunity costs are much more apparent and, historically, the actual net economic impact of hosting mega sport events has been largely negative compared to initial estimates and predictions by those promoting the events. They warn that if developing countries fail to plan adequately, hosting events of this nature could become a more debilitating investment for them than for industrialised countries. As a result, South Africa needs a thorough and transparent assessment of the result of the World Cup and to implement sustainable legacy planning so as not to become the victim of a high cost, one time mega sport event. Additionally, the entire sports tourism and recurring events sector needs to be examined more fully by comparison and to play an equally significant role in future economic and tourism development planning.

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