PROMOTING POLITICAL TOLERANCE AMONG YOUTH IN MASVINGO, ZIMBABWE

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management Sciences in Public Administration - Peace Studies in the
Faculty of Management Sciences
at the Durban University of Technology

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis contains my original work submitted for the Master's degree in Public Administration - Peace Studies at the Durban University of Technology. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree at any university.

Rumutsa Phillimon

ABSTRACT

This study aimed at promoting political tolerance via a dialogue initiative in Masvingo, Zimbabwe, where political broadmindedness, tolerance and trust are problematic. This research was underpinned by conflict transformation theory, complemented by intergroup contact theory. It was carried out with 16 participants from Mucheke, who participated in interviews and focus group discussions. The overall aim of this study was to promote political tolerance among youth in Mucheke in Masvingo, Zimbabwe, with the specific objectives being to explore the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence; to identify previous and current attempts in Mucheke to reduce this involvement and their effectiveness; to plan and implement interventions to reduce this involvement; and to evaluate the short-term outcomes of the intervention.

The study established that political competition is the main cause of political violence in Masvingo. and that a dialogue initiative could be an effective strategy that can build relationships between political rivals. The study concluded that attitudes cannot change in a short period of time, a finding that calls for ongoing intervention to promote positive peace.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my late dad, Ruben Rumutsa.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change

FDG: Focus Group Discussion

AT: Action Team

RAU: Research and Advocacy Unit

ISS: Institute for Security Studies

ILO: International Labour Organization

IMF: International Monetary Fund

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

ZAPU: Zimbabwe African People's Union

MPLC: Multiparty Liaison Committee

ZUM: Zimbabwe Unity Movement

GNU: Government of National Unity

CBD: Central Business District

ATR: African Traditional Religion

NPRC: National Peace and Reconciliation Commission

NHRC: National Healing and Reconciliation Commission

TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission

ZANLA   Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZIPRA   Zimbabwe People's Republic Army

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<div align="center">**CHAPTER ONE**</div>

<div align="center">**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**</div>

1.1 Introduction

This study aims to promote political tolerance among youth via dialogue in Mucheke in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. This study is underpinned by conflict transformation theory. The conflict transformation theory is supplemented by the intergroup contact theory. This chapter explores the background of the study and also the context of the study and also establishes the research aims and objectives, gives a summary of the research findings, research design, delimitations, and motivations, the significance of the study, and ends by highlighting the structure of this study.

1.2 Background to the study

Zimbabwe's political environment has been characterised by political violence that has disrupted interpersonal relationships among communities. Political violence in Zimbabwe has been linked and traced from the period of colonialism, while some authors link political violence to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party in 1999 (Mlambo 2014). However, this study finds that the political violence must be traced back from the period when Mashonaland was invaded by Ndebele people.

The experiences of torture, intimidation, displacements, killings, counter-insurgency and destruction of property which happened after the formation of the MDC have linked the political violence occurring thereafter to its formation. LeBas (2016), pinpointed that since 2000, general elections have seen more than 20 000 reported cases of political violence that were in the forms of torture, displacements, killings and intimidation. The political tension leading up to and after the general elections has seen people in Masvingo remain divided and experience broken interpersonal relationships because they view each other as political adversaries. Political violence recurred in the years 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013 and 2018 when elections propagated an element of fear and humiliation among political players in Zimbabwe.

Masvingo as a province has continuously witnessed the aftermath of political violence and its consequences. Youth involvement in political violence is being felt in Masvingo and is leading to many youth seeing their rights being violated during elections and in the post-election period. Different political affiliations have seen Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and MDC youth living in the same community but remaining divided along political lines. In the community, there is a sad scenario where family members fail to attend funerals of their relatives on the basis of political preferences.

High levels of youth unemployment in Masvingo (still pegged at 87%) is another driver of political violence among youth. Fuller (2010), reported that a high level of unemployment is leaving youth vulnerable to greedy politicians who persuade them to perpetrate violence to settle political scores in exchange for money and food handouts. He adds that, divisions based on political affiliation are difficult to stop, since some political party leaders are handing out food and monetary gifts. Alexander and McGregor (2013: 752) gave their verdict by illustrating that recurring political violence is causing political divisions that lead to mistrust and broken interpersonal relationships among community members. According to Sachikonye (2010), there is enough evidence that both MDC and ZANU-PF supporters in one way or the other are the perpetrators of political violence.

The aim of this study was centred on promoting political tolerance, which has been hindered by past prejudice and hostile behaviour between youth across the political divide. The goal of this study is to inspire communities through the development of a new peacebuilding intervention strategy aimed at discouraging them from using violence to settle political scores, through upholding political broadmindedness and diversity through dialogue. Political violence is a growing concern for many peacebuilders, and I find it necessary to join hands with them by embarking on this study which aims at promoting peace in communities through a dialogue initiative.

1.3 Research context

The research was carried out in Masvingo province in Zimbabwe. The community for this research was drawn from Mucheke, an area which is located in Masvingo about 7km from the CBD. The area has approximately 50000 male youth (Zimbabwe Census 2012). Of these 50000 male youth, about 7000 are estimated to be politically active. I selected this area due to my knowledge of the area and, more importantly, my desire for transforming broken relationships in the area. The area has been hard hit by the frequency of political violence, mainly by youth, and calls for intervention strategies aimed at promoting political tolerance among youth with the thrust of achieving peace and development in the area and the country as a whole.

Mucheke is a high-density dormitory town administered by the Masvingo City Council. It is largely dominated by opposition youth who blame the ruling party for their economic misfortunes. The rate of unemployment in youth in the area is pegged at more than 87%, and due to this the people are vulnerable to exploitation by politicians during and just after the elections. Political violence always manifests in the run-up to elections.

Most youth in the area are perceived as MDC sympathisers. Due to efforts by the ruling party to gain popularity, the area is now polarised as the ruling party supporters are making some inroads in the area.

This has seen some activities being seen as partisan and this has hastened partisan conflicts in the area over the years. Chikwanda (2014: 24) asserts that the area is characterised by unhealed trauma which can be traced from decades of systematic structural violence. The area has witnessed maiming of rival political party supporters, deaths and disappearances of party activists and supporters.

1.4 Problem statement

The involvement of youth in political violence as both perpetrators and victims has attracted urgent attention. Since independence, youth have been linked to 95% of politically-related violence which occurred in the form of killings, destruction of property, intimidation, displacements and counter-insurgency. This involvement in political violence is bringing instability to the political arena and affects the credibility of elections in Zimbabwe.

According to LeBas (2006: 435), tense relationships continue to exist in Masvingo because of partisan politics, disunity, and continuous reference to each other as the political archenemy. There is the growing concern of community members failing to attend funerals at their neighbours, and relatives' residences based on political affiliations.

With youth unemployment rate still estimated at 87%, politicians are seizing this opportunity and are exploiting these youth by promising them food and money in return for violent deeds to settle political scores (Fulller 2010). The level of mistrust and broken relationships among youth is very worrisome in that it is hindering reconciliation, trauma healing, community engagement and development.

Sachikonye (2010), notes that there are some initiatives and measures that are in place to curb the political violence syndrome and bring youth together. Such measures include peace campaigns, peace gardens and animal husbandry projects. Due to disunity, lack of cooperation and divisions these measures are failing to bring the expected fruits.

This study proposed, through conflict transformation and intergroup contact theory, to introduce a dialogue initiative to transform post-conflict relationships. It is important to note that dialogue initiative is not the sole solution to political violence involving youth in Masvingo, but can be a good example of one that can be useful. Dialogue is an initiative that brings youth together and harnesses social development.

The intention of this study is to contribute new knowledge in peacebuilding, since the use of dialogue in transforming post-conflict relationships remains an under-researched area.

1.5 The aim of the study

The main aim of this study is to promote political tolerance among youth in Mucheke in Masvingo, Zimbabwe.

1.5.1 The objectives of the study

The specific objectives of the study are:

- To explore the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence in Mucheke.

- To identify previous and current attempts in Mucheke to reduce this involvement and assess its effectiveness.

- Using a participatory action research approach, to plan and implement interventions to reduce this involvement.

- To evaluate the short-term outcomes of the intervention.

1.6 Dialogue

Hoffman (2010: 174) states that dialogue comes in all sizes and has brought people of different age groups together, transmitting heritage stories, dismantling cultural barriers and integrating members. The use of dialogues has a long history in eliminating barriers of hatred and bringing hostile groups together. In Zimbabwe, the use of dialogue has been appreciated in attempts at providing sustainable peace.

The use of action research (AR) is a new component in the use of dialogue in transforming post-conflict relationships, and that is why I preferred the use of dialogue as an intervention strategy in this study. The dialogue was considered by the action team (AT) based on its nature of bringing people together.

1.7 Research methods

This study followed a participation transformative worldview enquiry, and the research design is qualitative (Chapter 5, section 5.3). The research approach is action research. Since the study followed qualitative design to achieve research objectives, I used interviews, focus group discussions (FDGs) and participant observation methods to generate data (Chapter 5, section 5.4.1, 5.4.3 & 5.4.4). This study focused on improving the community's dialogue skills, non-violent skills for solving problems and the generation of new knowledge through a dialogue initiative in promoting political tolerance.

1.8 Study findings

This study reviewed that politics is the main driver of political violence among youth in Mucheke. The study further pinpointed unemployment and poverty as the immediate causes of political violence. The

study also revealed that a dialogue initiative as an intervention strategy for promoting political tolerance is effective as it provided room for debates. Despite the positive contribution to peace in the area, the study revealed that progress of the dialogue was derailed by economic challenges, voter registration, thank you rallies and other party commitments (Chapter 7, section 7.4.1, 7.4.2 & 7.4.3).

1.9 Significance of the study

This study plays an important role in fostering peacebuilding practice in Zimbabwe, since there are few known action research publications on the use of dialogue in promoting political tolerance. The study contributes immensely towards positive peace among youth across the political divide in Zimbabwe. This study addressed the real issues that affected the Mucheke community.

1.10 Delimitations of the study

This study was carried in Mucheke with a small group of 10 participants drawn from Zimbabwe's main political parties, ZANU-PF, and the MDC. The findings of this study may not reflect the views of other people in Masvingo province and Zimbabwe as whole. I managed to carry out only a preliminary evaluation for this study given the limited time which I was given to complete this study. Long-term evaluation falls outside this study because it would have demanded more time and additional financial resources.

1.11 Motivation for the study

The main driving factor for carrying out this study was my intrinsic desire to see harmony in the Mucheke community in Masvingo. The political violence discourses I experienced when I was staying in the Mucheke community also inspired me to carry out this study. The desire to contribute new knowledge in promoting political tolerance through dialogue was also another reason that pushed me to do this study. I was also motivated by the fact that we cannot ignore the consequences of youth involvement in political violence. Lastly, I wished to present the local community with the opportunity to participate in an intervention strategy that will reduce youth involvement in political violence in Mucheke.

1.12 Dissertation structure

This study focuses on promoting political tolerance in Masvingo, Zimbabwe via dialogue. The study comprises eight chapters. The chapters are categorised as follows:

Chapter One: This chapter contains the introduction, background and the context of the study, and an overview of Zimbabwe as a country. Other sections contained in this chapter include study objectives, justification of the study, research problem, study limitations, overview of research design and the structure of the study.

Chapter Two: This chapter explores an historical analysis of the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence. The chapter also explores the literature on current measures that are in place to curb political violence worldwide.

Chapter Three: This chapter explores the empirical literature on political violence involving youth in Zimbabwe. It examines the background, nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence in Zimbabwe. This chapter also includes a section on current measures that are in place to reduce youth involvement in political violence.

Chapter Four: This chapter discusses the theoretical framework that supports this study. It explains the conflict transformation theory that underpins this study and the intergroup contact theory that complements this study.

Chapter Five: This chapter discusses research methods used in this study. It discusses in detail the research methodology, research approach, research design and the data collection methods which were approved by the Durban University of Technology authorities to conduct this research in order to achieve the research objectives. The chapter also explores issues associated with sampling procedures, population, pre-testing, anonymity, data analysis and ethical issues. It also explores the participation transformative worldview which was used as the type of enquiry to support this study.

Chapter Six: This chapter discusses how the dialogue initiative and the action research were carried out. In addition, the chapter further gives a thorough analysis of the series of sessions conducted by the action team. This chapter addresses the four research objectives. Lastly, the chapter looks at the justification for action research in promoting political tolerance in Mucheke.

Chapter Seven: This chapter discusses the preliminary evaluation impacts of the dialogue initiative on the AT members and how it improved interpersonal relationships among the politically-divided supporters in the Mucheke community. Dialogue was conceptualised in this study to transform post-conflict relationships which had been damaged by political violence in Mucheke. Dialogue sessions were carried out with the help of contributions raised by AT members and the FGDs as responsive instruments for obtaining important information from key informants in achieving greater peace.

Chapter Eight: This last chapter gives an overview of the whole study. It presents an overview of the procedures followed and draws the findings obtained from this study based on the thesis' aims and objectives. The chapter discusses the findings to generalise the research conclusion so as to formulate recommendations. This chapter also suggests directions for future research.

1.13 Summary

This chapter gave an overview of the study, the background of the study, research context, research aims and objectives and the research methods. The chapter also discussed the significance, justification, and motivation for carrying this study.

The next chapter focuses on the literature review.

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CHAPTER TWO

YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the role of youth participation in modern politics and the trends of political violence that involve youth across the globe. The chapter also reviews the nature, extent, causes and consequences of political violence involving youth across the world. The chapter also explore some preventative measures that are used worldwide to curb political violence.

2.2 Nature of political violence involving youth

Political violence as it occurs in many parts of the world comes in different forms (Ifeanyichukwu, 2017:74). As discussed above, political violence syndrome has seen more young people being vulnerable and being exploited by party leaders to influence political results through unleashing violence in the form of torture, displacements and damage of property (Ifeanyichukwi, 2017: 74). This section reviews the nature of political violence that involves youth from different parts of the world.

2.2.1 Torture and killings

As one of the tactics youth employ to torment their political opponents, torture has been widely used in this regard as an act of inflicting severe pain, and this act of cruelty is mainly used as a means of punishment, revenge, and forcing confession (Umar 2018: 6). As an act of causing psychological and physical pain, young political thugs have been seen employing this method to instigate fear among political players to influence general elections and internal party elections. According to Umar (2018: 6) torture has been widely used in Nigeria, Ghana and Sub-Saharan Africa where youth have been caught using this tactic as a way of killing competition by oppressing their political opponents. Umar (2018: 6) adds that torture, punitive as it is, plays a big role in instilling fear in the opposition political members that will see other people restraining from participating in political activities. Paalo (2017) suggested that torturing of political competitors causes the political ground to fail to maintain balance, favouring the political party with the most vicious youth.

Adamczyk et al (2019) proclaim capital punishment as one of the evil, extreme and harsh forms of political violence that youth are involved in. The price that comes with the growing number of militia groups across the globe is that capital punishment is on the rise (Bob-Milliar 2014). Birch, Daxecker and Hoglund (2020: 5) raise the point that youth are assigned by their party leadership to employ capital punishment that involves subjecting political opponents to murder. This hostile behaviour is one of the most-used methods of eliminating political opponents. The shift to democratic and plural party systems in Africa saw this form of violence being implemented mainly by youth brigades to silence political

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opponents (Birch et al 2020:5). Torture and killings set the record straight as a quick way of put an end to political competition and is being used because of its effectiveness in dealing with political competition (Daxecker, Amicarelli & Jung 2019: 716). Daxecker et al (2019: 716) goes on to indicate that individuals having a clear picture of what happened to other individuals that belonged to an opposition political party in this case torture and killings act as an incentive to individuals to not support the party that is deemed as the opposition in the region.

Birch and Muchilinski (2017: 385) state that in most parts of Southern Africa, Northern Africa and the Middle East youth involvement in political atrocities such as killings are reaching heightened levels, which is major of concern in these regions. In the case of East Africa, countries such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have been exposed to political violence that arises on the grounds of ethnic background and finds its way into political matters (Birch et al 2017). Ramussen (2018: 177) allude to the fact that ethnicity acts as the underlying cause of capital punishment and has seen individuals of a certain tribe becoming political victims simply because their tribe is aligned to the leader of an opposing political group.

2.2.2 Displacements

According to Umar (2018: 6), youth mobilise into spontaneous and relatively disorganised groups to unleash violence towards vehicles, land and buildings that belong to their political rivals (Umar 2018: 6). In many African states, youth are trying to win political contests for their leaders through displacing members of the opposition political party in the area (Arthur 2015: 297). To achieve this, youth form militia groups that perpetrate violence by damaging opposition members' properties such as homes, farms, and other belongings (Arthur (2015:2019). According to Harish et al (2019) displacements are used by youth groups as a way of getting rid of their political enemies. To intimidate them, youth militia groups accuse their political competitors of being sell-outs and force them to leave the region with their preferred candidate (Harish et al 2019). This has resulted in victims relocating to calmer regions, leaving their ancestral land and properties. Ifeanyichukwu (2017: 75) cited the Bayelsa State in Nigeria as a good example, where there is an exodus of people to more peaceful regions.

2.2.3 Destruction of property

According to Mude (2014: 138), the southern African region has witnessed a high degree of arson, especially towards the time of watershed elections. The political competition that came with the newly formed political parties has seen quite a number of people losing their properties and assets at the hands of youth who are manipulated by political leaders (Mude 2014: 138). Destruction of property is an old tactic that has roots emanating from the liberation struggle era; this tactic was the main strategy that youth

were instructed to use by political figures to remove white farmers (Mungwari 2019). In recent years, many households, mainly those who were well-known figures that sympathised with the opposing political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa, lost their properties at the hands of ruling party youth (Mude 2014: 138). There were high numbers of cases of houses and cars that were burned and destroyed as a way of instigating fear.

Authur (2015: 818) indicates that destruction of property is not only used by youth to cause chaos in the opposition party camp: this strategy is also used to solve both intra- and inter-party conflicts. He adds that destruction of property to solve political matters also saw both ruling and opposition political organisations employing the same strategy to solve its internal woes. Since political violence is now an accepted norm which is characterised by youth mobilised by political party leaders to target the assets of opponents, such as homes, businesses and livestock (Igwe 2021: 101). In most cases, the instigators are leaders within political party structures who assign youth in their party to be violent towards their political counterparts (Igwe 2021: 102).

2.3 Extent of political violence involving youth

Political violence is seen as a serious challenge to mankind (Igwe 2021). There are growing numbers and cases of political violence that involve state security forces and civilians of different age groups. Youth involvement in political violence is worrisome. Youth involvement in political violence poses a serious and continuous threat to the well-being of mankind. The increase in cases of political violence involving young people is worrying and alarming to the extent that, in the past two decades Burkina Faso alone recorded more than 750 000 documented cases of political violence that resulted in murder, torture, rape, damage of property, displacement and closure of schools (Mukunto 2020).

According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2018: 4) Ethiopia and Eritrea to date saw 30 786 fatalities caused by political violence, with the former recording a higher number than the latter. The ISS (2018: 4) went on to posit that Nigeria, between 2014 and 2015, recorded a record number of 8 987 fatalities due to political violence. Apart from deaths in Nigeria, there is also an increasing trend in the number of riots and protests in the country, although these are less deadly. The ISS (2018: 9) mentions that Africa alone witnessed a remarkable number of riots in the past decade, emanating from countries such as Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia, Kenya, and South Africa. It states that in South Africa alone, in the given period between 2015-2018, witnessed more than 1000 events of violent protests with youth taking centre stage (ISS 2018: 9).

Research and Advocate Unity (RAU) (2018: 3) gives an insight into political violence in Southern Africa. The numerical figures obtained by RAU (2018: 3) show the degree and frequency of political violence

in the southern region of Africa. According to RAU (2018: 3) countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe are those mainly affected by political violence in the region. Below is a table that shows political violence trends in the Southern Africa region.

Country	Reports	Percentage
Angola	3001	21.8%
Mozambique	561	4.1%
Namibia	573	4.2%
South Africa	4540	33.0%
Zimbabwe	5075	36.9%

Source: RAU Database

Table 1 showing political violence figures in Southern Africa

As shown by the table above, Zimbabwe remains the country which recorded the highest numbers of incidents of politically-motivated violence, followed by South Africa. This is sufficient proof that there is a political violence syndrome in the region which needs to be addressed.

2.4 Causes of political violence involving youth

In most parts of the world, the major cause of political violence is a political system that is based on competition for power. Political parties use this ugly method to control power by encouraging their youth to unleash violence on their political rivals to avoid political contestation. In this section, the causes of political violence among youth across the globe are grouped into three different categories, which are underlying, immediate, and facilitating causes of political violence.

2.4.1 Underlying causes

The three major underlying causes of political violence are ethnicity, religion and geographical location.

2.4.1.1 Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a social singularity that is revealed in human interface among people of different backgrounds through a political system where culture and language are the main traits (ACCORD 2016: 4). In the case of political violence among youth, language and cultural backgrounds are the most influencing variables of political violence around the globe (Bartusevicius 2020: 7). A political identity based on ethnic groups is a major influencer of political violence among the youth. ACCORD (2016: 4) advocate that ethnicity and cultural diversity shape the country's politics in two different ways. If ethnicity and cultural diversity are managed well, the end results will be of benefit to the country at large, and if the two are managed in

the opposite way they may lead to conflict among citizens of different age groups (ACCORD 2016: 4). As predicted and alluded to by many authors, the ethnicity card can be exploited by ambitious politicians who might recruit youth based on ethnic background to venture into political violence and unleash violence on ethnic-political counterparts (Birch et al 2020: 4).

Social marginalisation due to ethnic background also fuels political violence among the youth (Ramussen 2018: 177). Youth exclusion from civic engagement can be an underlying cause of political violence, because they are left frustrated and as a result, the marginalised ethnic groups will have a hostile attitude towards those who eliminated them from the social functioning of the society (Birch et al 2020: 5). In central and eastern Africa, this claim has been evidenced to be true in countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, which experienced ethnic polarisation, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which still experiences the effects of ethnic polarisation (Ramussen 2018: 177). According to Ifeanyichukwi (2017: 76), the ethnic divide can extend its wings into political affairs which later proceeds to political polarisation and armed political conflict. He further reiterates that failure to find a sustainable solution to the ethnic divide will end up with self-centred politicians playing the ethnic-political card to enrich their political goals. In support of the above notion, many militant, rebel and counter-insurgency groups are formed based on ethnic background in order to benefit ambitious politicians (Ifeanyichukwi 2016: 16).

In Nigeria, the fight for ethnic recognition in politics has led to youth being exploited by some politicians to cause havoc in the political space (Bartusevicius 2020: 6). In Nigeria, ethnicity is regarded as the basic and political salient identity for citizens. Paalo (2017: 3) suggested that youth are used as machinery and apparatus to settle ethnic-political issues and there is further evidence that a group of young people from the main ethnic groups are accused of creating tension with minor ethnic groups. The chances are high that the rising and unsolved ethnic conflict will result in political turmoil that will lead to political divide that later influences political processes such as voter turnout and political participation (Bartusevicius 2020: 6).

2.4.1.2 Religion

Religion is one of the most consistent markers of identity (Abbink 2020: 194). In many countries, religion differentiates and separates certain groups of people from others. Abbink (2020: 195) points out that the phenomenon of political violence is inspired by religion. In Africa, the tension between religions is breaking political relationships based on religious group identity (Hide 2014: 184). Religion in recent decades is seen as one of the main underlying influences on political violence (Hide 2014: 184). The ISS (2018: 3) explains the involvement of religious radical-extremist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Islamic State of Iran and Syria (ISIS) in the political affairs of the Middle East in as an underlying

cause of political violence. Abbink (2020: 195) notes that for a long time, religion has been a common phenomenon in the Northeast of Africa, where most of those of the Islamic persuasion turned to political violence while connected to self-centred politicians' interests. Political violence as a result of Christian radicalisation occurs, but does not having as great an influence as compared to Islamic extremism. Adamczyk et al (2019) cites the ideological self-positioning of Islamic extremism in east Africa, where Islamic groups such as Al Shabab took control and unleashed violence, but were later contained by the governments of Somalia and Kenya.

Strijdom and Tarusarira (2017:3) focus on how religious foundations, beliefs and ideologies can contribute to political violence across the world. According to Strijdom et al (2017: 3) religious ideologies and beliefs can be used as grounds for discrimination in political matters. In many African states, there is strongly-held belief that African Traditional Religion is mainly aligned to the revolutionary parties, since it played big role in the liberation of many states from colonial rule. Some religious organisations, such as modern Christian denominations, are deemed opposite to the African Traditional Religion (ATR). According to Strijdom et al (2017: 3), modern Christian denominations tend to critique the role of ATR in the independence struggle, and some question its beliefs and values, and in return the ATR believers label these denominations agents of regime change.

2.4.1.3 Geographical location

The political contest between rural and urban political actors for political relevance and recognition has seen geographical location as an influencer of political violence among the youth (Gilpin 2019: 78). The political contest in both rural and urban areas has shown the relevance of geographical locations and regions as one of the major underlying causes of political violence (LeBas 2013: 240). In most African countries, the availability of idle youth (due to unemployment) in urban areas saw young people being manipulated by ambitious politicians to cause havoc during election time (Muggah 2018: 9). LeBas (2013: 240) notes that youth in urban areas are easily recruited and used as cheap tools to settle political competitions by causing violence among political actors.

Birch et al (2020: 9) allude to the notion that areas with youth that usually benefit a great deal from the party in government tend to be hostile towards opposition party members. This is more common in rural areas where political parties manipulate the electorate in exchange for food and farming handouts (Birch et al 2020: 9). They later reiterate that this makes some areas recognised and described as strongholds of a certain political party and deemed "no-go areas" for an opposition party, and as a result people in such areas who show interest in the opposing parties by attending rallies and meetings are likely to be victims of political violence. According to Muggah (2018: 9), youth are assigned by their political leaders to

mark their political enemies, and hence political violence figures in such areas are high during election seasons.

2.4.2 Facilitating factors

The two various facilitating causes of political violence that include poor governance and economic factors.

2.4.2.1 Poor governance

Most cases of political violence in Africa emanate from poor governance. The ongoing maladministration in both private and public entities is a major facilitator of political violence among youth (Igwe & Amadi 2021: 105). For example, in South Africa, young people take to the streets to protest against poor service delivery through violent means such as arson on infrastructure and the looting of shops. Young people consider arson as the quickest way of addressing poor government policies and poor service delivery mainly in municipalities. Igwe et al (2021: 103) cited kleptocracy as a facilitating cause of political violence in many states, where opposition political parties mobilise young people to gather in the streets in force the government and public officials to put a stop to such ways of government administration. In doing so, the youth from opposition political parties will end up clashing with youth that sympathise with the political party in government, and if the political party leaders fail to act immediately, there will be bloodshed in the streets that will result in some people losing their lives (Igwe et al 2021: 103).

2.4.2.2 Economic factors

According to Amadi (2017: 29), one of the facilitating causes of political violence, especially among youth, is the state of the country's economu. There is a high risk of political violence in countries that are facing economic turmoil, such as the high unemployment rate in many African states. The availability of young people stranded and economically helpless in the streets makes it easy for ambitious politicians to recruit idle and unemployed youth to be perpetrators of political violence to kill political competition (Amadi et al 2017: 29). Daxecker et al (2017: 714) note that political violence trends are high near to presidential and parliamentary elections, with rare cases of political violence during intra-party elective congresses. Daxecker et al (2017: 714) add that young people (mainly in Africa) are manipulated by greedy politicians and compensated with money, regalia, food, alcohol and drugs to cause violence in the form of torture, kidnapping and rape, and also to act as counter-insurgency groups.

2.4.3 Immediate causes of political violence

Political violence cases are increasing at a fast rate and this is having negative impacts in many parts of the world. The number of cases linked to political violence is worrying. There is a growing number of cases of political violence in pubs and at sporting and social events (Mungwari 2019: 175). Mungwari

(2019: 175) further reiterates that young people go to pubs and accuse their fellows of being "backwards" by supporting a certain political party and this triggers violence as some youth are "bankrupt" in terms of ideas and see violence as the only solution to outscore their fellows. RAU (2018) also accuses young people in pubs who are buying alcohol with the stipend they get from politicians as being culprits of political violence because they are doing so to defend people who feed them.

Political violence has even been seen erupting at sporting events, where it is fuelled in different ways. Mungwari (2019) suggested that sporting events are seen as venues for committing politically-initiated violence, since some young people attend those events with this agenda. The fact that some people attend such events wearing dress codes of their political parties has led young people to accuse each other in the name of politics (Mungwari 2019). He further adds that there is a growing concern regarding young people who sympathise with a team or club that wears similar colours to their party regalia. Even though this is rare in many countries, some young people are becoming politically obsessed, and they take their party regalia to stadiums and at such events, political violence is triggered by youth with the colours of a victorious team who come to celebrate their victory in the opposition box, which is also identified by the colours related to a different political party.

2.5 Consequences of political violence

Political violence has proved to be a serious challenge over the years. Political violence is associated with gross human rights abuses that result from destruction of property, murder, displacements, rape, assaults and intimidation. This section will review some of the challenges that are brought by political violence.

2.5.1 Socio-political costs

Political violence breeds the culture of maintainable political violence and civil unrest in the country (Ifeanyichukwi 2017: 74). Countries and regions where political violence occurs frequently are suffering from socio-political costs. The socio-political costs give the region a bad image, damage and destroy democracy and its institutions, and demoralise civic engagement and political participation. Kanu (2016: 43) articulates that political violence events promote undemocratic activities. The institutions that are pillars of democracy cannot be sustained during political violence and as a result it contributes to electoral misdemeanours and violence that will divert the will of the people (Kanu 2017: 43). Major (2017) lists Uganda, Nigeria, Ethiopia and the DRC as countries where democracy is under threat due to the occurrence of political violence and adds that the prevalence of political violence is one of the main reasons for low voter turnout, mainly in African states.

2.5.2 Psychological costs

The consequences of political violence can be devastating, especially on human development (Ifeanyichukwi (2017: 74). Countries prone to political violence have witnessed damage, not only to private and public property, but have also witnessed gross human injustices resulting in grievous bodily harm. According to Major (2017) political violence has resulted in people losing their lives as in the Rwandan genocide where Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups clashed for political relevance, which left psychological scars, wounds and trauma to the victims. Trauma that resulted from political violence is indirectly expensive to the state because there is a need for government to set up hospitals and rehabilitation centres to cater for the victims of violence (Ifeanyichukwi 2017: 75). As regards ensuring true reconciliation, the government is mandated to put in place a truth and reconciliation commission that will bring true healing to the victims and ensuring trustworthy between the perpetrators and victims which is expensive in nature (Mezieobi, Mezieobi & Anyanwu 2017: 112). Major (2017) pinpoints Gacaca courts as a good example of local courts in Rwanda which dealt with restorative justice in the country. The trends of violence in the Bayelsa State in Nigeria and civil unrest in the DRC are destroying social relationships and the people who were the victims are nursing the idea of revenge (Ifeanyichukwi 2017: 76). Ifeanyichukwi (2017: 76) adds that the idea of violence has left many people excluded from society, which is causing social distress to many individuals.

2.5.3 Socio-economic costs

According to Ifeanyichukwi (2017: 75), political violence misadventures are catastrophic and lead to the decimation of innocent lives, disruption of economic activities and the destruction of properties. Political violence threatens human lives, hinders economic activities and discourages potential investment in the region by both internal and external investors (Major 2017: 12). Ifeanyichukwi (2017: 75) adds that political violence jeopardises economic development. Karimo, Krokeyi and Ekainsai (2017: 27) give reference to how political violence disturbs economic growth and transformation in Bayelsa State in Nigeria. They mention that the perennial crisis in the region has resulted in widespread poverty, lack of economic infrastructure, and dislocation of social values and cohesion. Major (2017: 12) postulates that the ongoing militancy and insurgency is leading to the state being neglected and less prioritised as the economic hub. The situation is plundering the economic environment, which of course leads to a high rate of unemployment mostly among the youth (Major 2017: 12).

2.6 Preventative measures of political violence

Worldwide, there are various preventative measures which were put in place to curb the syndrome of violence in many parts of the world. Deducing from the measures in place, it is clear that the preventative measures are largely top-down and reactive, although there is evidence that bottom-up and preventative

measures are more effective. However, this section will explore some of the preventative measures that have proved useful in curbing political violence.

Obakhedo (2011: 105) explains that in Nigeria there are a number of ways used to curb political violence which include constitutional amendment, electoral reform, pressure from NGOs and political education. Collier and Vicente (2014) mention the role played by the NGO Action Aid in promoting an anti-violence campaign in the lead-up to the 2007 general elections in Nigeria. The campaign was carried out in all six states of Nigeria and was written on T-shirts, caps, stickers and posters. Taylor (2018: 23) states that the anti-violence campaign helped to reduce and resist political violence. Adebayo (2016: 306) applauds the role of civil society organisations in reducing political violence in Ghana, where civil society organisations play a large role in training journalists on best practice for conflict-sensitive reporting (Adebayo 2016: 306).

Birch et al (2017: 4) focus their study on the political violence prevention programme undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme (UNPD). Birch et al (2017: 4) note that the UNDP focuses on technical assistance in elections. This programme allows the UN to provide resources and manpower to assist in election monitoring. Political violence during election time can be mitigated by a large number of election observers, especially in more competitive regions (Taylor 2017: 24). Birch et al (2017: 4) also cited the role of the UNDP in fostering peacebuilding. The UNDP plays a significant role in attitude transformation by carrying out various activities, such as peace pledges, dialogue and mediation, that focus on building trust by providing a platform for dispute resolution (Birch et al 2017: 4).

Malawi and Kenya are two countries that practised effective political violence prevention measures (Patel & Wahman 2015). Prior to the 2017 general elections, Kenya yielded great success in curbing political violence. Taylor (2017: 38) appreciated the simultaneous programmes focusing on preventing election-related violence by civil society organisations and state. The introduction of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission which was created under the National Integration and Cohesion Act of 2008 in Kenya marked the beginning of a new era in dealing with political, ethnic and social discrimination. After the political violence that ravaged the country during the 2007 general elections, the NCIC managed to curb political violence prior to the 2017 general elections (Patel et al 2015). Taylor (2017: 50) explored the work which the Malawi government did in reducing political violence. Malawi introduced a Multiparty Liaison Committee (MPLC) where political parties engage in dialogue and dispute resolution (Taylor 2017: 50). The liaison between the political parties helped to reduce the rate of political violence in the recently-held election (Patel et al 2015: 60).

2.7 Summary

This chapter explored the historical background of political violence that has occurred in some parts of the world. It explored several tactics, such as intimidation of political party members and supporters, death threats, assassinations, destruction of property and rape which were used to settle political scores by different political players. The chapter highlighted that political violence in general is not yet resolved; thus, political parties and actors still prefer use of violence to gain political advantage over their opponents. In addition, this chapter explored the causes and consequences of political violence in some parts of Africa and other areas of the world. The chapter also discussed current ways of reducing political violence which are in place in some African countries.

The next chapter will explore the historical background to political violence in Zimbabwe. It will review the nature, extent, causes and consequences of political violence involving youth in Zimbabwe. It will also give a close look at the current prevention measures used in Zimbabwe to curb political violence caused by youth.

CHAPTER THREE

YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to address objective number one of the study, which requires the discussion of the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence in Zimbabwe. This first part of this chapter focuses on historical background information about actions of political violence, in both pre- and post-election events, that were employed by youth in Zimbabwe before and after independence. This chapter also addresses the political violence background among the youth after independence, examining the political dynamics that caused the recurrence of this violence. It also discusses the political events before independence, focuses on the violent events which happened two decades after independence and finally gives a detailed analysis of occurrences of violence from 2000 to the present day. In this chapter, discussions on the emerging trends are deduced from the background information.

3.2. Violence in Zimbabwe's history

This section gives a deep analysis of the actions and proceedings which gave a starting point, to the development of political violence that has been used by politically-affiliated people to solve problems which have been culturally accepted and institutionalised to taint relationships. The chapter explores how political violence is generated and practically accepted as a "machine gun" in political affairs in the country. The concept of political violence in Zimbabwe has roots that date back to the seizure of Mashonaland by the Ndebele people. This section takes the seizure episode as the beginning of political violence in Zimbabwe.

3.2.1 The Ndebele invasion

This section discusses the use of violence in the period the Ndebele people arrived in Zimbabwe, around 1840. The settlement of the Ndebele people in Zimbabwe is considered as the starting point of violence among the ethnic groups in the country (Garlake & Proctor, 2007: 156). The settling of Ndebele people in Zimbabwe under the stewardship of King Mzilikazi was characterized by violence, the strategy he used to expand his territory, and seizure of crops and livestock (Garlake et al 2007: 156). According to Mlambo (2014) the Ndebele kingdom was oppressive towards the Shona ethnic society; they forced the Shona people to pay levied tax as a tribute to the King Mzilikazi, and continued using force to seize Shonas to supply them with grain, women and raw materials such as iron. This is the idea that tainted relationships between these two ethnic groups.

According to Ranger (1997) clans and households from Shona society who refused to contribute tribute to the Ndebele Kingdom were subjected to thorough and severe punishment in the form of raids which, was the reason why some Shona kingdoms, such as Rozvi state, collapsed. Ndebele people mainly used young people to perpetrate violence because they were deemed energetic and powerful in battle. Young people were ordered to commit acts of violence such as raids as a way of imposing submission of the Shona people to the King of the Ndebeles. Mlambo (2014) deduced that the concept of violence used in the invasion was later applied and "improved" by white settlers, liberation struggle movements and post-independence political movements. The seizure of Shona people by the Ndebeles destroyed relationships based on ethnic, tribal and later on political causes; it is also a matter of interest how use of violence was then used as the primary means of solving conflicts by institutional and nationalistic movements.

It is evident that political violence cannot be understood in isolation. However, even though little was documented to support the idea, the Ndebele invasion of Mashonaland was the starting point of political violence induced by nationalist movements and political parties after independence. After attaining independence, the political turmoil that became common, which even involved the young people, is partially believed to be linked to the invasion of Shona kingdom by the Ndebele people. However, a difference can be noted in the degree and scale of the violence under discussion.

3.2.2 The white settlers' invasion.

After the invasion of Mashonaland by the Ndebele around 1840, there came an episode of colonisation by white settler which is believed to have had a hand in the history of political violence in Zimbabwe. White settlers under the leadership of Cecil John Rhodes already possessed Mashonaland (the land occupied by Shonas) so the next thing was to convince and persuade the British government to allow them to possess Matebeleland (the land that belongs to the Ndebele people). According to Garlake et al (2007: 66), Cecil John Rhodes believed that the idea of taking the whole country by force and violence was not only going to make British capitalists rich, but would bring modernisation, civilisation and progress to Zimbabwe as whole.

The colonial masters of Matebeleland, used brutality during the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893. This is the same strategy they used during the 1896 War of Liberation that is referred to locally as the First Chimurenga, that saw high degrees of violence acts being applied to silence the indigenous people. The Ndebele, together with their captives, see themselves as having been on the receiving end because white settlers used weapons which were more advanced as compared to the weapons used by locals. This led the locals to surrender and submit to the colonial masters (Zvobgo 2016). Prew, Pape, Mutirwa and Barnes (1993) state that when indigenous people resisted colonial practices which they deemed as

divisive and oppressive, the colonial masters imposed laws which were no different to those which the Shona were earlier subjected to by the Ndebele people.

The colonial practices of using force on the indigenous people to achieve their interests and outcomes slowly caused violence to be accepted as a norm in Zimbabwe. Violence being an accepted norm gave indigenous people the courage to engage in a liberation struggle, because they viewed freedom as something that does not come "on a silver platter". The white settlers continued to unleash violence as a way of overcoming indigenous people's resistance. This saw further use of violence, which normalised the use of violence as a mechanism or tool of solving grievances, conflicts and of political issues. The ongoing conflict between the colonialists and indigenous people became the model emulated and executed by political parties after the country gained independence in 1980.

3.2.3 Pre-independence violence

As a way of correcting the mistreatment by white settlers, the native people decided to form liberation movements with the agenda of addressing the colonial imbalances. Mlambo (2014) states that the liberation movements started by forming peaceful movements which were fighting for equal treatment, but after realising that no sign of change was coming, they later on subscribed to the use of violence, an idea which was no longer strange but was common and was slowly becoming permanent in Zimbabwean society. According to Garlake et al (2007: 133), the Zimbabwe National People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, was established in 1962 and was formed after National Democratic Party (NDP), which was also led by Joshua Nkomo, was banned. ZAPU organized the use of peasant resistance across the country and engaged in a guerrilla war against the white minority government which resulted in its banning in 1962.

The banning of ZAPU in 1962 pave an opportunity for the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963 (Zvogbo 2016). Individuals in the leadership of ZAPU who were aligned to the Shona ethnicity utilised the ban as an added advantage to form ZANU, whose top leadership was made up of Shona people (Zvogbo 2016). Although ZANU and ZAPU agreed to fight a common enemy, the two movements were vicious towards each other. Their main difference was the issue of attracting supporters, and this caused the two movements to fire gunshots at each other whenever one of them stepped into the other's operational territory (Mlambo 2014). The clash between the two movements gave imperialists an advantage, since they lacked political broadmindedness and this acted as the seed of future political violence.

From the discussion above, it is noted that the violence demonstrated by ZANU-PF against its political opponents is based on a belief they inherited during the liberation struggle. Violence was promoted after

independence as a means of retaliation for mistreatment they faced in the past, and also as a way to consolidate power. As we can see in modern times, political parties in Zimbabwe use violent tactics in addressing resistance, which were used by the Ndebele people when they raided the Shona people, by the white settlers and also during split of ZAPU in 1963.

3.2.4 Post-independence violence

Zimbabwe is a country that has a long history of political violence which is traced back to the invasion of Mashonaland, the colonisation of Matebeleland by white settlers and the liberation struggle movement period (Mlambo 2014). All these pre-independence events produced the current issue of political violence in the modern era, which resulted in political parties such as ZANU, ZAPU and the MDC using the same strategy of unleashing violence and reacting ruthlessly to outscore their opponents (Mawawa 2016: 1). Sachikonye (2010) and Mlambo (2014) state that the use of violence to kill political competition had already normalised to the extent that all elections held since 1980 have been generally characterised by violence and intimidation from all the political parties in contention.

The race to consolidate power prior to 1980 caused tensions between ZANU and ZAPU to reach boiling point and this included the use of violence to coerce supporters of other political parties to change their mindset towards voting (Kriger 2005: 3). Although unleashing violence was perceived as an effective means by all parties, Masunungure, Dulan and Braton (2016) single out ZANU-PF as the sole beneficiary of the violence, and this is supported by the methodologies that state that ZANU-PF is the most dominant in political-related chaos. After independence ZAPU showed its true colours of violence when some of its disgruntled militant personnel, who were later labelled dissidents by the ZANU government, started to cause chaos in parts of Matebeleland and the Midlands province. In 1983, in reaction to the acts of violence which were in full swing, the governing party introduced an operation called *Gukurahundi* (simply translated as "the first rain of the agricultural season that washes away chaff"). Due to the acts of violence which were in full motion, Gukurahundi resulted in close to 20 000 people losing their lives in Matebeleland and the Midlands parts of the country (CCJP and Legal resources foundation 1997).

Ngwenya (2014) asserts that political violence has been used by the ruling party since the country attained independence to put results in its favour. He points out that ZANU-PF is the most violent party in the country. However, other authors state otherwise: they argue that some other political parties were also involved in skirmishes, such as ZAPU and the dissidents aligned to it who were perpetrating violence in Mashonaland and the Midlands. Thus, for that reason it is justifiable to condemn both parties for unleashing violence to settle political scores. Apart from intimidation, Sachikonye (2010) states that the

two parties were involved in political discourses that blamed each other for seditious, ethnic and named orthodox friends of the British government.

3.3.1 The 1980s violence

Zimbabwe held its first democratic elections in 1980 and the elections were held under the accord of the Lancester House Agreement of 1979. According to Mlambo (2014) the agreement acted as the ceasefire that brought the end of war between the Rhodesian Front (RF) and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces. The first elections of 1980 were grubby, with political violence resulting from abductions, torture, harassment, murder and displacements.

Sachikonye (2010) points out that ZANU-PF was accused of intimidating political rival supporters, mainly those that belong to ZAPU. The intimidation directed to ZAPU supporters by ZANU-PF enablers was met by violent reactions which means that both parties' supporters were also authors of violence. To worsen of the relationship between the two parties, ZANU-PF proclaimed itself the only party that was designated to rule the country. This was further confirmed by the words of Robert Mugabe:

> *"As clear as the day follows night, ZANU-PF will rule Zimbabwe forever. There is noother party other than ours that will rule this country"* (Kadembo 2008: 1).

To challenge the dubious, prejudiced and exaggerated proclamations, opposition parties applied every option available to nullify and dismiss such remarks and they proclaimed that the statement served as a stratagem to coerce people from voting for other political parties. The statement was seen as propaganda and exploitation used by the ruling party; however, in contrast, the opposition parties also applied the same strategy of propaganda to discredit the ruling party. This means that indoctrination was not a norm within ZANU-PF only, but was common in the political space in the country.

Compagnon (1999) postulates that in the first decade after independence, ZANU-PF and ZAPU youth supporters were recruited for house-to-house operations, unleashing violence on the opposition followers and condemning them as snakes and sell-outs. From the above, analysts concluded that use of violence was a game plan to endorse the doctrine that was started by ZAPU and was later on mastered by ZANU-PF, even to this day.

3.3.2 The 1990s violence

The period of 1990-1994 was characterised by a decline in the amount of politically-motivated violence, although there is little documentation to support the notion. The merger of ZANU and ZAPU in the name of the Unity Accord reduced the escalation of intimidation and confrontation among the supporters of

the two parties. The Unity Accord saw the disbanding of ZAPU whilst the ZANU-PF retained its name as a new party, a name that questions the reason for the merger (Kriger 2005: 17). Without doubt, the involvement of youth in engaging in political violence decreased in frequency, mainly because the two major parties that used to encourage their youth supporters to confront each other were united by the same cause.

The expelling from government in 1988 of Edgar Tekere, one of the founding fathers of ZANU-PF, on account of corruption, saw the formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) (Moyo 2013: 219). After Tekere was expelled, he went on to form ZUM. ZUM supporters were subjected to intimidation by ZANU-PF supporters before the 1990 general elections. The newly-formed party was accused of being Western-funded and its leader was accused of being a puppet of the West. ZUM was denied authority to hold political rallies due to restrictive control measures which were put in place by that time; also, its supporters were targeted by the youth from the ruling party.

The evidence of youth involvement in political violence was clear; a feature that endlessly damaged relations among party supporters when the country was approaching election time. Moyo (2013: 219) states that people were warned that voting ZUM was viewed as a request for going back to war, because the party had strong ties to Ian Smith, one-time prime minister of Rhodesia. Youth, mainly from ZANU-PF, who perpetrated violence against opposition political party members were not brought to justice because the party in government benefited from such acts of violence. This is the same strategy inherited by ZANU-PF and its youth which they continuously apply, even today, to gain political support.

After the general elections of 1990 there was post-election instability that led to ZUM supporters being targeted and expelled from their homesteads to discipline them for voting against ZANU-PF (Moyo 2013: 219). The youth of the ruling party were assigned to a witch-hunt for ZUM supporters across the country. As a result of the violence perpetrated by ZANU-PF youth, ZUM leaders encouraged their supporters and youth to retaliate as a way of defending themselves from the evil acts of ZANU-PF, a situation that caused political violence to rise in the land.

From the above, we can deduce that the culture of politically-motivated intimidation against political opponents which we see today does not appear from a vacuum. The culture of violence after independence came into full swing in the 1980s, and was later copied and applied forwards into the next decade. Due to this continuous violence hatred, broken relationships, lack of trust and displacements were the outcomes of such acts.

There is little information supporting the ongoing political violence being the major cause of Muzorewa's ZUM withdrawing from the 1995 general elections. Some authors argue that the main reason that led to the withdrawal was unreasonable oppressive laws, lack of state funding and lack of coverage by state media (Moyo 2013). ZUM boycotting the election served as a huge opportunity for a newly-founded political party, namely the Forum Party of Zimbabwe (FPZ), to contest the elections. This newly formed party was treated no differently from the way ZUM was treated: youth from the ruling party employed violence to disturb the new-born opponent. This treatment has been used by the ruling party to consolidate political ground against its opponents since 1980.

The youth from the governing party perceived terrorising of other political parties' fan base as a way of winning political contests. Makumbe and Compagnon (2000: 153) add that they applied this strategy to instigate fear in their rivals, which they believed was the only way to attain victory, by accusing them of causing conflicts, instability and quarrels in the land. The youth were organised to spread the threat of going back to the liberation struggle if the opposition "stole" power through the ballot. Youth who sympathised with the ruling party were waived prosecution after they unleashed violence on opposing supporters the same immunity as they are enjoying in recent years. The consequences of such evil acts of violence were no different from the ones listed in the above sections, which involve broken communities, trauma, lack of trust, suspicion and hostility.

3.4 Political violence involving youth 2000–2020

This section gives an overview of political violence involving youth in Zimbabwe. This section attempts to address objective one of the study by giving a thorough detailed analysis of the occurrence of political violence in Zimbabwe and in Masvingo in particular. It addresses the question of the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence in Masvingo. This section also gives greater analysis of prevention measures that are put in place by government, civil society organisations and political parties to curb political violence.

3.4.1 Nature of political violence involving youth from 2000–2020

LesBas (2016: 3) states that although the political fraternity allowed the country to hold harmonised elections from 1980, the elections were perceived as neither free nor fair by local, regional and international observers. The political environment was congested with violence emanating from political parties' leaders and supporters. The ruling party has been accused of fomenting political violence to outmanoeuvre the opposition support base (Pasguale & Garcia-Ponce 2015). Berger (2008: 1) volunteers that the period from 2000 to 2008 was marked by political, economic and social turmoil in the country. Without including the massacres of Gukurahundi from 1983–1987, the period under study has been

characterised by gross political violence involving youth since independence came to Zimbabwe in 1980. Kriger (2005) argues that abductions, assaults, property damage, rape and torture were the main forms of political violence that have occurred in the past twenty years.

3.4.1.1 Torture and murder

Research by Ranger (2013) ascertains that both ZANU-PF and the MDC caused division during elections on the basis of "revolutionaries" and "sell-outs". The latter political label was met by force and violence from the youth belonging to ZANU-PF on accusations of bringing colonisation back to the country once liberated by war veterans (Ranger 2013). This is one of the justifications that invited use of torture and murder to influence the 2000 elections. To worsen the situation, the MDC managed to get 57 of 120 contested seats which further worried the ruling party, since they perceived the new party as the strongest opposition party and the greatest threat ZANU-PF had faced since independence. According to Zvogbo (2016) the progress made by the MDC in such short period of time encouraged ZANU-PF youth to unleash this form of violence to dismantle the MDC support base and leadership.

Bratton and Masunungure (2008) note that both recruited youth applied the same tactics to challenge their political nemeses. The run-up to the 2008 general elections saw the two tactics of torture and murder being practised mainly by the youth bulge (Cauvin 2000). The European Union Observer Mission leader accused the ZANU-PF leadership of endorsing violence by sanctioning the use of violence, coercion and terrorisation against political opponents which resulted in some political actors being murdered and tortured (LeBas 2016). The ongoing torture and killings were at their highest in 2008, as compared to previous years (Ranger 2013). According to Bratton et al (2008), this election saw schools being closed and some pupils being forced to join the youth brigade to increase its manpower.

3.4.1.2 Intimidation

Although political violence has been common since the birth of independence in Zimbabwe, the introduction of the MDC as viable competitor to the nation's ruling party institutionalised political violence as morally accepted (Bratton et al 2008). The competition that come with the newly introduced party has enabled a new era of political violence where youth were manipulated to cause fear in the political space through threats and intimidation. Bratton et al (2008) assert that threats and intimidation increase due to the indoctrination of youth by people in control of political parties.

The use of intimidation as a form of political violence where youth were involved increased towards the 2013 and 2018 general elections. The increased number of young people with access to smart phones and social media platforms facilitated intimidation of political opponents (Musanga & Manase 2016). According to Musanga et al (2016), involvement of youth in violence before the 2013 and 2018 elections

was different from previous scenarios; in this case, violence was carried more in the form of threats via social media platforms. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp were full of examples of youth siding with the ruling party intimidate those that sympathised with the opposition and vice versa. Musanga et al (2016) described it as war of words, intimidation and threatening of each other which shows the frightening level of polarisation among youth from different political branches. Many young people carry their anger to social media platforms to insult and threaten youth from other political parties (Musanga et al 2016).

3.4.1.3 Destruction of property

The level of prejudice and hostility that continues to grow between the two parties threatened tolerance between ZANU-PF and the MDC. The inclination that to be politically-correct, one should side with either ZANU-PF or the MDC increased partisan political violence (Alexander & McGregor 2013). Zimbabwe Situation (2008) suggests that the main groups of perpetrators of violence in Zimbabwe are ZANU-PF and MDC youth. In Zimbabwe, violence has been used as an enabling tool to promote dictatorship and ruthless government which does not respect citizens' civil liberties, a reason that saw a pool of youth recruited to initiate the idea of a ruling party, whereas other youth are recruited by the opposition to oppose the idea (Suttner 2010).

According to Zvobgo (2016), Robert Mugabe's statements were responsible for fuelling violence in Zimbabwe. Southall (2013) contributes that statements of the president asserted that violence should be applied to people who posed a threat of dissolving ZANU-PF's fan base. The reaction of ZAPU, ZUM and the MDC through the years, had proved it to be unfair to point fingers at ZANU-PF as the only party that initiates the idea of violence, regardless of it demonstrating violent acts.

3.4.1.4 Displacements and disappearance

Pasquale and Garcia-Ponce (2015) articulate how displacements and disappearances of political victims were initiated. They note that this form of political violence find its roots in the Ndebele invasion of Mashonaland, white settlers and the liberation struggle movement. Pasquale et al (2015) see ZANU-PF youth as the sole culprits of this form of violence since they have the power, capacity and backing of government to implement displacements. In most congested areas, some supporters would rather choose to relocate to areas that are politically calm.

Abductions in recent elections were high (Pasquale et al 2015). The youth have mastered the form of eliminating political opponents through abductions. In recent held elections, the number of political actors who disappeared and were abducted without trace was relatively high. Pasquale et al (2015) suggest that the ongoing competition for political stakes in the country has seen both the MDC and

ZANU-PF youth employing dirty tactics to silence their political opponents. Many supporters were abducted during the night and were taken to places they do not know and are still missing today.

3.4.1.5 Counter-insurgency

Political violence across Zimbabwe reached frightening levels after the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The watershed contest between ZANU-PF and the MDC in the constitutional referendum, which saw the infant party snatching a 54% winning margin, was salt in the wound to the ruling party, which had anticipated a landslide victory (Mude 2014). As a result, the ruling party, via its youth brigade, started to use violent tactics in the 2000 parliamentary elections to turn results in their favour. As a way of countering the violence directed towards them, the MDC youth also assembled themselves in groups to overcome the violence unleashed on them and their leaders (Karimo et al 2017: 26). According to Mungwari (2019), before the election date, the country witnessed violent cases from youth which also saw the MDC youth advocating rogue campaigns that gave sufficient evidence that both parties were participating in the violent political discourse. The consequences of such acts of violence were similar, regardless of who committed them, and they amounted to hatred, broken families, lack of trust and trauma to both perpetrators and victims, as discussed earlier in the above sections (Igwe et al 2021: 11).

From the above discussion of political violence involving youth, it can be seen that it is difficult for Zimbabwe, or any country, to find harmony without national healing, rehabilitation and genuine reconciliation. The concept of promoting political tolerance, which will be discussed in the following chapter, aims at transforming post-conflict relationships through national healing and reconciliation among youth political rivals. The idea of political tolerance promotes holistic development and nation building. According to CCJP Publication (2014: 6) it is clear that Zimbabweans have maimed each other for a long period of time. However, there is a resentment that the victims cannot collaborate with their counterparts towards national healing, nation building and promoting genuine reconciliation.

As described by the above researchers and authors, Zimbabwe's politics is deep-rooted, with acts of violence which have manifested since independence. The consequences of using violence to settle political battles continue to cause society chaos and despair. Brutality, terror, intimidation and threats by youth to their rival political party supporters, weigh heavily on both victims and perpetrators of political violence in Mucheke, Masvingo and Zimbabwe as a whole.

3.4.2 Extent of political violence involving youth from 2000-2020

Zimbabwe, after the introduction of the MDC in 1999, saw a rise in politically-motivated violence. The amount of political violence increased due to fresh competition that was brought by the MDC (RAU

2018: 5). Although there is no question that in years 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008 there were more than 100 MDC youth murdered, more than 1000 injured and more than 20 000 displaced due to politically-motivated violence involving youth, it is also important to note that there are some ZANU-PF youth and supporters who were murdered, injured and displaced (Zimbabwe Situation 2008). The situation of political violence did not occur in the above-mentioned years' parliamentary elections only: the 2013 and 2018 general elections succumbed to such evil acts even though the numbers were relatively low (ACCORD 2018).

According to LeBas (2016), Zimbabwe as a country has experienced political violence at a large scale. He supports this statement by alluding to the fact that there is a documentation of cases of political violence which saw 2000 having 2 285 cases, 2002 with 3 155, 2005 having 4 200 and 2008 standing at 9 298 cases of political violence committed by youth. The occurrence of political violence post-2008 saw more than 100 deaths, 18- 000 homes destroyed, 18 000 displacements and more than 10 000 injuries (BBC Monitoring Africa 2015). It is believed that at least three-quarters of these cases were perpetrated by youth supporters from both ZANU-PF and the MDC (LeBas 2016).

RAU (2018: 6) pinpoints Masvingo province as one of the main provinces to record high cases of political violence during the years 2000 to 2020. The province recorded more than 5 000 cases of political violence perpetrated by young people from the MDC and ZANU-PF. The calendar years in which youth participated in politically-motivated violence are 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013 and 2018. In the same period, Masvingo alone also saw a rising number of political violence cases committed by youth (RAU 2018). RAU (2018) asserts that in 2000, Masvingo recorded a figure of 970 cases of politically-motivated violence in the form of killings, rape, assault, destruction of property, intimidation, and displacements.

Bratton (2014) reports an increase of cases in 2002 and 2005 elections from those that were recorded in 2000. The availability of political stakes leading up to the 2008 general elections saw the figure of 970 cases for 2000 being tripled (Clapham 2017). RAU (2018: 7) notes the fall in cases towards the 2013 general election. This was due to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 which helped in building tolerance among political players (RAU 2018: 7). The run-up to the 2018 general elections witnessed a growing degree of political intimidation of opponents through cyber-bullying, with high numbers of youth threatened and labelled by their political counterparts (RAU 2018: 7).

Below shows political violence figures per province across Zimbabwe for the period 2000–2020.

Province	Cases	Percentage
Harare	2310	39.4
Bulawayo	316	5.4
Manicaland	595	10.2
Mashonaland Cent	542	9.2
Mashonaland East	593	10.1
Mashonaland West	557	9.5
Masvingo	309	5.3
Matabeleland North	120	2
Matabeleland South	86	1.5
Midlands	433	7.4

Source: ACLED Database

Table 2 showing political violence in Zimbabwe 2000–2020

As illustrated by the table above, Harare province tops the list of political violence cases for the period 2000–2020. From the above table, it is clear that there are high numbers of cases of politically-motivated violence across provinces. Even though Masvingo does not top the list, there is need for the province to condemn violence and condone peace in the area.

3.4.3 Causes of political violence in Zimbabwe

This section discusses the causes of youth involvement in political violence in the last two decades. This section grouped causes into three categories that is, underlying facilitating and immediate causes.

3.4.3.1 Underlying causes

Zimbabwe political environment see the manifestation of political violence emanating from various underlying causes. On the list of underlying causes include lack of genuine reconciliation, religion and ethnicity background factors.

3.4.3.1.1 Lack of genuine reconciliation

Lack of genuine reconciliation is considered one of the deep underlying causes of youth involvement in political violence. Murambadoro (2015: 32) suggests that after gaining independence from British rule

in 1980, Zimbabwe did not prioritise reconciliation as was done by its neighbour South Africa, where government formulated and implemented policies and practices in all spheres of government to promote forgiveness and truth-telling. The concept of "forgive and forget" introduced by Robert Mugabe failed to yield genuine and true reconciliation because it did not consult the stakeholders: victims, perpetrators, and political party representatives (Murambadoro 2015: 32). The failure by government to address the historical conflicts of the past is still haunting the country: clear evidence is the occurrence of the Gukurahundi atrocities and recurrence of politically-related violence in pre- and post-election periods (RAU 2016: 9). Ngwenya and Harris (2015) postulate that people did not believe the statement of Robert Mugabe on his inauguration as the first democratically-elected president of Zimbabwe, especially those who lost relatives who perished under his tenure. The president's reconciliation concept was mere utterance, which was more on paper and less in practice and this has been clear evidence that the country was sitting on a time bomb where violence could explode at any time (Murambadoro (2015: 32). The failure to put his words into practice served as the core cause of political violence that involved even the youth, because the victims were left bitter and were nursing ideas of revenge (RAU 2016: 7).

3.4.3.1.2 Ethnicity and religion

Zimbabwe as a nation is described as a diverse country, and hence ethnically-sensitive. According to ACCORD (2019), the country is one among other countries in the region that have historical ethnic conflicts, which is summed up with the Gukurahundi genocide that ravaged the country soon after independence. The fact that the country is still haunted by the ethnic conflicts of the past that date back to the 1890s, where Ndebeles seized Mashonaland, and the Gukurahundi genocide, is the main reason why the country is still experiencing an ethnic-political crisis (ACCORD 2019). The lack of true reconciliation pertaining to the Gukurahundi genocide has caused ethnicity to be argued mostly as a major underlying cause of political violence among the youth, since politicians exploit ethnically-marginalized youth, especially from areas with past conflict history, and recruit them to cause threats and violence on the political ground (Steward 2018: 3). Zvogbo (2016) cites Matebeleland and Midlands province as examples of regions where ambitious politicians are using this strategy to easily recruit youth to form violent groups that will help them to settle their political goals.

Religion is also among the underlying causes of political violence among youth in the country, with the various religious denominations giving the politicians and political parties an added advantage in finding loopholes to manipulate religion into venturing into political affairs (Abbink 2020: 142). As a way of gaining relevance, political parties are building ties with religious leaders and this has seen old "main-line" churches such as Zionists, Methodists, and the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Churches manipulated by the ruling party leaders to further their political interests (Chigwata 2016: 72). On the

other hand, the "born-again" churches are going with the wave of change, which makes it a reality that religion is playing an underlying role in political violence. African Traditional Religion (ATR) with its stance on supporting the ideology of revolutionaries, is under attack, mainly from Christian denominations (Chigwata 2016: 72).

3.3.3.2 Facilitating causes

Since the formation of the MDC in Zimbabwe political arena, the country witnessed surging cases of political violence. Scholars have pointed unemployment, introduction of political parties, culture of violence and political ideology as the facilitating factors of political violence.

3.3.3.2.1 Unemployment

Dabesak (2017: 219) suggests that economic factors such as unemployment have a direct hand in involving youth as perpetrators of political violence. He further reiterates that unemployment drives youth to take part in political violence because they are easily recruited into the party systems for political expediency. Politicians have a hidden hand in political violence perpetrated by youth (Okafor 2017: 3). They are taking advantage of the economic status of the youth to recruit them as the tools and apparatus of political violence. Youth are lured into political violence as either hired thugs or mere party members, with participating in political violence coming with gifts and promotion within party structures (Mude 2014). In addition, it might come in the form of a direct contract from political elites to a group of youth who are mandated to cause violence, and this acts as a motivation factor to the extent that youth will end up doing anything possible to secure benefits attached to violence (Dabesak 2017: 219).

3.3.3.2.2 Introduction of new political parties

Chikwanda (2014: 15) suggests that the introduction of the MDC as the strongest opposition party in Zimbabwe marked the main cause of political violence that involves youth in Zimbabwe. The formation of the MDC party 1999 (which further divided into two more political parties, MDC-N and Mavambo) saw an increase in political violence among youth in the form of torture, intimidation, displacements, abductions, killings and threats (Chikwanda 2014: 15). Political violence among youth can be a result of youths' perceptions of the multi-party system (Mukunto 2019: 133). Mukunto adds that some of the youth do not understand the meaning and importance of multi-party politics. Youth are brainwashed to the extent that they view opposition party members as their enemies. Mukunto (2019: 133) cites that in Zimbabwe youth that side with ZANU-PF perceive themselves as aligned to state sovereignty, with the ambition of defending the legacy of the liberation struggle, while perceiving anyone who supports the MDC as a sell-out who subscribes to the ideas of neo-liberal politics advocating for regime change.

3.3.3.2.3 The culture of political violence

According to Moyo (2013) the invasion by the Ndebele kingdom of Mashonaland, the colonisation of Matebeleland by the white settlers, black rebellion against white rule around the 1960s, the violence associated with the liberation struggle and the political violence in the early 1980s justify the allegation that a culture of violence promoted the political violence involving youth which has erupted in Zimbabwe since 2000. Youth are involved in causing disharmony in the political arena, particularly in the period 2000–2008 which caused trails of destruction in social relationships, brutalisation of communities and hate between communities. The experience of ongoing clashes of youth against members of other political parties has been direct and personal for a long time and left violence, intolerance, fear and hatred as a culture in Zimbabwe among political players (Moyo 2013).

Political violence mainly occurs along political identity lines and the historical tensions in the distribution of resources such as land and economic resources along ethnic lines have been simplified and exploited by the youth to entrench social divisions. Catholic Relief Services (2012) notes that the ongoing use of violence has damaged social cohesion and challenged the effectiveness of traditional conflict resolution institutions. However, from the above discussion, the evidence that violence begets violence is very clear. This leads to the institutionalisation of violence, which justifies undertaking this research.

3.3.3.2.4 Political ideology and level of polarisation among citizens

According to Umar (2016: 149), youth engage in political violence simply because they want to defend the political ideology of a certain party they sympathise with. He later contributes that defending political identity results in hatred and destructiveness, which obscure rational and objective thinking and leads to serious polarisation that causes youth to be involved in political rows. Most youth in Masvingo are influenced by party ideologies and propaganda. Youth are brainwashed to the extent that they see other people supporting other political parties as threats. This is the main reason why political violence is difficult to reduce in Zimbabwe as whole.

The level of polarisation within Zimbabwean society is frightening. One of the major causes of youth engagement in political violence is the level of polarisation which destabilises relationships within societies and creates a culture of hate among society's members, friends and neighbours. The fact that victims of violence are left bitter and traumatised by violent experiences takes polarisation to a new level, which if not dealt with will later act as the cause of further violence. Chikwanda (2014: 15) points out that polarisation due to mistrust and lack of cooperation in political, economic and social activities is causing the country to be at risk of political violence. CCJP Masvingo Diocese (2013) notes that

polarisation is promoting prejudiced and hostile politics which encourage use of force to determine an opponent's political fate.

Considering what has been discussed in previous sections, it is in the best interests of this research to examine the idea of promoting political tolerance, which will be shown in upcoming chapters as an intervention strategy to enhance political friendship among youth party supporters. The main aim of this research is to promote political tolerance among youth. It is my wish that following the implementation, young people from my action group will develop a new culture that discourages use of violence to settle political issues.

3.4.3.3 Immediate causes

One of the immediate causes of political violence is centred on the electoral results. Mungwari (2019) suggests that the violence that erupted in 2008 was initiated by the electoral results. There is growing concern regarding the legitimacy of an election that saw a group of people taking to the streets to show their sympathy with the illegalities in vote counting by the electoral body. The violence that erupted on 1 August 2018, saw the MDC supporters taking to the streets to protest against the delay by the electoral commission in announcing the electoral results (Mungwari 2019).

Another immediate cause of political violence in Zimbabwe is associated with social and recreational events. With the history of conflict still haunting the country, social and recreational events are an immediate causes of youth involvement in political violence (Sugden 2015). Youth from different political parties exploit social gatherings, sporting events and political rallies as an opportunity to commit violence. According to Segden (2015), there is a rising number of cases where youth are involved in threatening other political counterparts in social events, rallies and sporting activities. At some rallies, young people are at the forefront of maiming opposing political party members, especially rallies that come with food parcels and farming inputs, and they use these platforms to unleash violence as a way to eliminate some crowd members on account of being "sellouts".

Mungwari (2017) suggests that social events are also manipulated by youth to unleash violence to the extent that they come to apolitical events such as football matches, school development meetings and other community gatherings with political regalia. In rural areas, political violence blows up in those gatherings and events because youth are using such gatherings to label and maim other people wearing regalia of the opposing party (Mungwari (2017). There is also a growing number of fights at pubs and bars that have seen some other areas being politicised. The fact that youth are going to pubs wearing party regalia has seen a number of fights erupting and in most cases the fights are related to political

arguments where young people argue mainly about the state of the economy, political doctrine and party policies.

3.4.4 Consequences of political violence

According to Chikwanda (2014: 15) political violence has caused a lot of problems that amount to thousands being displaced, abductions, torture, rape of women and children, broken families and trauma of victims and perpetrators. The consequences of political violence range from economic to psychological, societal, political and public costs.

3.4.4.1 Economic costs

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (2017: 1) notes that violence by its nature creates significant economic disruption. Political violence is associated with economic losses at both national and individual levels. Countries that are prone to political violence have strained economies due to lack of investors. Investors are peace-sensitive; they make it a priority to invest in peaceful countries. Political violence makes it difficult for a country to attract foreign direct investment and can also cause existing companies to relocate to other countries where peace is prioritised (Chikwanda 2014: 5). This has already happened to Zimbabwe, during the violent land reform programme where the country saw an exodus of white farmers and multi-national companies to neighbouring countries, which resulted in Zimbabwe losing millions of dollars in the form of tax revenue. In addition, the exodus also contributed to high levels of unemployment, especially for those who were working in those entities.

Political violence halts the economic growth of the country and it can lead to the government diverting public and private resources away from productive activities of the economy towards protective and response measures (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2017: 1). This can result in severe welfare losses in the form of productivity, forgone income earnings and distorted expenditures. Political violence in the form of arson and destruction of properties disturbs infrastructure development of the country and hence has a negative impact on economic growth.

According to Day, McKenna and Bowlus (2017: 66), the economic cost posed by political violence on individuals can be either direct or indirect. They classify direct costs as actual expenses paid in monetary form. These expenses are measured in terms of goods and services consumed in the form of replacing damaged property, taxi fares to the hospital and money to purchase drugs. Indirect costs to individual victims have no monetary value, but they are measured and estimated as potential loss (Day et al, 2017: 66). Indirect costs involve opportunity costs rather than actual expenses, for example. time lost when a person was in hospital without being productive at work.

3.4.4.2 Societal costs

Political violence lessens individuals' willingness to corporate in social activities (Sousa 2013: 5). Summerfield (2000) notes that it does not lessen individuals' willingness to engage with society, but it weakens the fundamentals of the society. Political violence weakens the functioning of society by damaging society as a shared location of people, and by damaging culture and identity through killings and displacements of people, destruction of important shrines and instilling a culture of violence (Sousa 2013: 5). Political violence also causes a deterioration in cultural values and norms of society, such as care of others and respect for others.

Political violence diminishes people's ability to be part of the community and contributes to isolation and withdrawal from society. Sousa (2013: 4) mentions that political violence can be the genesis of people's distrust in the government, justice and democracy and hence lessens the willingness to participate in civil activities. He adds that distrust, isolation, and withdrawal of individuals from important activities are the negative impacts of political violence.

Day et al (2017: 7) note that political violence has some societal costs that cannot be measured. These societal costs range from fear experienced by all vulnerable people after others suffer as victims during political violence, undermining of social values, and the guilt felt by people towards the actions of perpetrators. Political violence become a seed for future violence, because violence begets violence.

3.4.4.3 Political costs

The involvement of youth in political violence is increasingly becoming a counterweight to the development of democracy in Africa as it continuously undermines the principles of democracy on the continent (Okafor 2017: 3). Okafor further notes that political violence continues to cause tension and terror to the political fraternity in the continent, thereby discouraging vulnerable electorates from participating in political activities. Involvement of youth in political violence has long-term negative impacts on the future of Zimbabwe at large, since their involvement in political violence is a threat to democratic institutions such as the constitution and electoral commission (Dabesak 2017: 219). Hoglund (2009) gives in-depth analysis of the consequences of political violence by positing that it might result in low pre-election voter registration and subsequently a low turnout that may pose too many questions on the outcomes of elections in terms of legitimacy of results. Still on the issue of legitimacy of results, some other candidates may withdraw their candidacy from contesting in a violence- charged environment – for example, the withdrawal of Morgan Tsvangirai as a presidential candidate before the 27 June 2008 re-run of the presidential election (Zvogbo 2016).

3.4.4.4 Public costs

Political violence is directly associated with public costs to the country and the local authorities. Incidents of political violence demand that the government invest in health infrastructure to nurse the victims (Day et al 2017: 12). The government faces a burden of building new hospitals to accommodate the victims of political violence. Victims of political violence require health personnel to attend to them, which stretches government's expenditure in sourcing new health workers and the retraining of existing health workers. Government and local authorities are forced to divert funds for acquisition of the drugs and health facilities that are needed in nursing the victims.

Apart from building new hospitals, the government must invest in building correctional services and rehabilitation centres to accommodate victims and perpetrators of political violence (Day et al 2017: 12). Since governments have a mandate to ensure the safety of their citizens, they are required to invest a lot of funds in the police department to maintain law and order after political violence events (Dabesak 2017: 219). Government must also allocate resources to the police service so that police personnel will be equipped with necessary means to make it easy for them to respond to political violence. Government must dig deep into its coffers to foster peacebuilding initiatives that aim at building long-term peace to avoid a re-occurrence of violence in the future.

3.4.4.5 Psychological costs

Violence in all its forms is associated with psychological consequences to both victims and perpetrators (Chakaodza 2009). Most of the youth who commit political violence suffer from psychologically dominant emotions such as guilt, self-blame, thirst for revenge, anger towards leaders of their political parties, loneliness, fear of disclosure, depression, lack of interest from families and friends, and suicidal thoughts. These dominant emotions may cause mental health degradation. On the side of victims, trauma is likely to affect them due to the memory of violence events. According Konigstein (2013), traumatised people avoid contributing to the intergroup because they spend much of their time looking for means of revenge. Mukashema and Mullet (2014) note that post-traumatic stress can affect cognitive skills and hence negatively affect problem solving within groups.

3.5 Current measures to reduce political violence in Zimbabwe and their effectiveness

Zimbabwe as a country has embarked on several strategies as a means of reducing political violence. Many researchers invested energy in introducing peacebuilding skills and strategies to mitigate the plague of political violence. The strategies at the forefront in Zimbabwe involve peace campaigns, peace gardens, social activities, traditional courts and also the application of distributive and restorative justice.

These initiatives are carried out by quite a number of stakeholders which include locals, the government, non-governmental organisations, researchers and traditional leaders.

3.5.1 Peace campaigns

Zimbabwe, in its quest to mitigate political violence, has allocated some of its resources to promote peace campaigns and awareness. The country used some state-owned media, such as the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation and its radio outlets, as a way of advocating peace across the country (Moyo 2017). The country also saw some contributions coming from both state-owned newspapers and privately-owned newspapers. Peace campaigns also occupied some of the most viable social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, where citizens and the government are taking centre stage in spreading the message of peace to the nation. The country also witnessed a growing number of activists, mascots and organisations that are advocating for peace.

Although peace campaigns play a critical role in reducing politically-affiliated violence, the strategy is characterised by setbacks such as lack of consistency and collaboration due to the degree of polarisation among citizens. Peace campaigns in Zimbabwe are described as seasonal, because they come into full swing towards election periods, which questions their effectiveness in reducing political violence (Moyo 2013). Some scholars argue that for peace campaigns to yield greater success they must be treated as a process that runs throughout the year, not as an event in the run-up to election season.

3.5.2 Peace gardens, arts and sports activities

As a way of fighting against politically-motivated violence, Zimbabwe has embarked on a number of peace projects, such as peace gardens and sporting activities (Rukuni 2016). Zimbabwe engages in peace gardens (*Mushandirapamwe*) in both rural and urban areas. The role played by these peace gardens is understated in reducing conflicts in societies, as peace gardens are accommodating the bulge of youth to come together and engage in farming and livestock breeding. The concept of peace gardens is playing an important role in maintaining society's relationship among community members. Working together has promoted unity and eradicated political feuds because individuals are engaging in projects which demand community engagement.

According to Mutyebere (2019: 47), young people in Zimbabwe are involved in social sporting activities which sees a high number of football clubs formed to bring youth together as teammates and spectators. There is also a growing number of artists who provide youth with a dialogue platform on how best peace can be achieved in Zimbabwe. These events give the youth a platform for their voices to be heard as they fight for unification at both national and community levels. The platforms provide opportunities for youth to be involved in addressing the threat of potential violence to ensure sustainable peace within the society.

3.5.3 National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC)

According to ACCORD (2019), President Emerson Mnangagwa introduced a NPRC bill on 5 January 2018 to ensure nation-building and peacebuilding. In that year, the commission conducted outreaches in 10 provinces in the country and advocated for peace campaigns before the July 2018 harmonised elections. ACCORD (2019) gives clear functions of the NPRC, beginning with ensuring post-conflict justice, healing and reconciliation; promoting national healing, unity and cohesion; facilitating dialogue among political parties; and taking action on complaints raised by the public.

The NRPC, even though it looked promising, failed to live up to expectations. According to ACCORD (2019), the NPRC failed to investigate previous human rights abuses. The commission also failed to involve the victims, women and other important stakeholders such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa. The NPRC failed to outclass a similar commission, the National Healing and Reconciliation Commission (NHRC), which was formed to bring justice, healing and reconciliation after the Gukurahundi atrocities. The NPRC, just like NHRC, failed to bring social justice after the torture, harassment and intimidation of victims which resulted in social mistrust which is one of the main causes of political violence in the modern era. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008), the failure of the NHRC was due to the lack of holistic and broad healing, truth-telling and reconciliation approaches, which are fundamental pillars of nation-building.

3.5.4 Traditional courts and "Ubuntu"

In the modern era, the significance of traditional courts in mitigating violence is still appreciated. Traditional courts play a crucial role in reducing political violence and gender-related violence (Chigwata 2016: 85). The courts are presided over by chiefs, headmen and village heads and have seen a number of disputes being resolved before they emerge into conflict. Even though the traditional courts do not have the power to adjudicate matters such as rape and murder, they are mandated to resolve cases such as theft, vandalism and assault which may be in the nature of political violence. In cases of violence, the courts apprehend suspects and impose sanctions on the perpetrators for violent offences and transgressing customary laws, which helps to set a precedent in reducing cumulative political violence in the country at large (Chigwata 2016: 85).

The concept of "Ubuntu", which is also referred to as humanism, is one of the traditional strategies that are building and restoring peace in many parts of Zimbabwe. The concept states that "*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*", meaning "a person is a person through others". This concept is restraining individuals and groups from being involved in violence because the concept is built on the principles of communalism and interdependence (Gade 2014). Samkange and Samkange (1980: 39) articulate that Ubuntu is the

attention a person gives to another which involves kindness, courtesy, respect of others and friendship. Ubuntu improves community interdependence and interconnection which promote communalism that eradicates hostility and prejudice (Molefe 2017: 13). It promotes togetherness in the community in the sense that when community member is trouble or under attack, all the members of the community will come together to help see off the perpetrator.

The above strategies have proved to be vital and effective in reducing violence in general. However, both are facing challenges, beginning with demographic locations. These methods are more applicable in rural areas, which raise questions to their relevance in the urban areas. Magwata (2016: 83) argues that traditional leaders are involved in misconduct due to low educational levels that cast into doubt their competence and ability as judicial officials in applying consistent rulings. Rukuni (2015) indicates issues regarding impartiality when traditional courts are adjudicating cases to do with conflict of interests.

3.5.5 Legal controls

In Zimbabwe the police service is doing tremendous work in combating political violence. There is a high number of cases where police have practiced reactive measures and apprehended the perpetrators of political violence among youth in Zimbabwe (Moyo 2013: 16). In recently-held elections, police personnel were deployed across the country to monitor and maintain law and order. However, even if the police and judiciary are appreciated for this impressive work, there is also an growing concern from the political arena that the police are only targeting the members of the opposition as perpetrators and fail to act when opposition supporters suffer as victims (Moyo 2017: 16). Lack of resources, such as vehicles, poses a threat, but given the resources available, the police service is doing extremely well in reducing the occurrence of political violence.

The judiciary, as the law enforcement arm of the government, is accused of playing favourites in providing justice to the victims of political violence (Moyo 2017:16). The judicial system in Zimbabwe is under scrutiny from the general public as it is accused of failing to provide fair justice to the victims of political violence to the extent that some of the perpetrators of political violence from the last decade are still walking free (Moyo 2017:16). According to Gade (2014: 36), there is growing concern that the judicial system is captured by the ruling party, a concern is supported by the high number of its supporters who perpetrated violence in previous elections but are still walking free, and opposition parties are purporting that their members are the victims of a justice system with questionable legitimacy of judgments.

From the above discussion, it is notable that Zimbabwe is hitting the ground running in implementing measures to reduce political violence in the country. However, the above-mentioned measures are failing

to stop the plague of political violence for several reasons. The measures are failing to be holistic, in the sense that they are failing to include role players, which questions the legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of the above strategies. Failure to involve locals as primary stakeholders is another reason why these measures are failing to reduce political violence; the intervention plan should be locally-owned and should involve all stakeholders.

3.6 Summary

This chapter explores the historical background of political violence in Zimbabwe. This chapter also reflects on the recurring trends of political violence which have defined Zimbabwe's elections since 1980, which confirms the need to transform the post-conflict relationship among Zimbabwean youth. This chapter explores several tactics, such as intimidation of political party members and supporters, death threats, assassinations, destruction of property and rape which have been used to settle political scores by political parties. The chapter highlights the fact that political violence in general is not yet resolved, and thus political parties still prefer the use of violence to gain political ground over their opponents. In addition, this chapter explores the causes and consequences of political violence among youth in Zimbabwe. It discusses current means used in Zimbabwe to reduce political violence and their effectiveness.

The next chapter explores the theories that support and guide this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the theories that underpin and guide this study. Conflict transformation is the main theory that frames this study, for promoting a culture of non-violence. As a means of reinforcing this study, this chapter explores Allport's intergroup contact theory (1954) as a contemporary theory in solving social conflicts. These theories were preferred on the basis of their flexibility in facilitating group processes that are relevant in transforming social conflicts and encouraging groups to work together peacefully. This chapter reviews the origin of the theories, key concepts and the role they offer in peacebuilding. The chapter also gives a close look at the theories guiding this study and the theoretical lens they offer in this study regarding transformation of post-conflict relationships through promoting political tolerance.

4.2 Conflict transformation theory

This section explains the conflict transformation theory, the main theory that underpins this study. This study asserts that local actors are mandated to formulate native mechanisms for solving post-conflict relationships, and conflict transformation theory promotes a holistic approach that accentuates support and involvement of locals in post-conflict transformation, rather than relying on external players such as non-governmental organisations and donors in resolving conflicts. Wani Suwirta and Payaye (2013), in support of the relevance of conflict transformation theory posit that the theory emphasises that conflicts are dismantled step by step, through a progression of small and large changes.

The theory of conflict transformation was introduced and popularised in the academic fraternity by Lederach (1997). The theory is now presenting a new foray into the literature of solving social divergence. According to Miall (2014), the theory emerged as a continuous redesigning of existing mechanisms, such as conflict management and conflict resolution, to meet a need for identifying new concepts that are flexible and effective in dealing with emerging social complexities. The theory, according to Galtung (2003: 03), is applicable at all levels where conflict may emerge, which includes interstate, intrastate, interpersonal and intrapersonal levels. Lederach (1997: 14) defined the concept of conflict transformation as:

> *"To envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships".*

As can be deduced from the above definition, conflict transformation theory focuses on creating constructive change with the objective of mitigating violence, a feature which is key in this study, as it strives to promote political tolerance among youths from different political parties. Smith (2012) argues along the same lines, characterising relations as both invisible and visible, and requiring conflict transformation theory to provide a basis for nurturing by peacebuilding role players in developing measures meant to transform conflicts among parties, in this case the ZANU-PF and MDC youth supporters.

Lederach (2003) asserts that conflict transformation reflects the development of change processes that explicitly aim at transforming negative relationship into positive relationship and improving social contact, a notion that is welcomed by this study. The complex political violence in Zimbabwe makes Lederach's transformation theory necessary and substantiates the intervention of promoting political tolerance among youth in this study, the reason being that conflict transformation theory focuses on eliminating fear among affected citizens and calls for a societal cooperation and understanding among conflicting groups through a political tolerance initiative. The conflict transformation theory is focused on ending unnecessary and undesirable conflict elements by creating a positive environment for political understanding. An illustration of the conflict transformation model is shown in the diagram below:

The Big Picture of Conflict Transformation

Inquiry 1: Presenting Situation

Issue
Patterns
History

Inquiry 2: Horizon of Future

Solutions
Relationships
Systems

Personal
Relational
EPISODE EPICENTER
Cultural
Structural

Inquiry 3: Development of Change Processes

Source: Lederach (2004)

Figure 1 Lederach's Big Picture of Conflict Transformation

Lederach's Big Picture of Conflict Transformation illustrated by the above diagram indicates the conflict resolution process of gathering conflicting groups together as the first stage of inquiry for identifying role players and source of the conflict. The conflict and its evolution are reviewed in the first stage of the inquiry that resembles a common process that is carried out in the implementation of promoting a political tolerance intervention strategy in transforming post-conflict relations in Mucheke. The second stage of the inquiry in the diagram deals with similar issues surrounding beliefs and ownership of the conflict transformation course of action. This second inquiry focuses on the relationship patterns that are necessary in resolving ongoing conflict. The third inquiry in the diagram presents the point where development of constructive change takes place. This is the point where experts in the field of peacebuilding are needed to invent constructive approaches. According to Lederach (2008), at this stage the expertise must formulate approaches that target long-term change, rather than those that support short term change. The conflict transformation model is very relevant to Zimbabwe's situation, given that peace practitioners may borrow some ideas in the process of addressing conflicts faced by the country.

4.3 Intergroup contact theory

This section explores intergroup contact theory, which gained recognition across the globe in reducing group prejudice. The theory's historical background can be traced to the work of Allport titled "The nature of prejudice". According to Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner and Christ (2011: 274), intergroup contact theory was originally a modest contact hypothesis introduced by Allport (1954), which recently developed into a theory of dealing with group complexity. In a significant theory for promoting group harmony, Allport (1954) adopted four positive factors for reducing prejudice which are equal status of the group in the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation and the support of authorities, law or custom (Pettigrew et al 2011: 274).

This section reviews briefly the intergroup contact theory as the complementary theory to conflict transformation theory which guides this study. McKeown and Dixon (2017: 1) assert that studies on intergroup contact theory evolved exponentially and that involvement brought positive relations among divided groups and communities through prejudice reduction. According to Peace Direct (2017: 06), intergroup contact theory is applicable in bringing political harmony among youth who have been divided according to party lines in the past twenty years.

Pettigrew (2008) hails intergroup contact theory as one of the most important in social psychology in promoting constructive change between members of different groups in ways that mitigate intergroup hostility and conflict. Pettigrew (2013) adds that intergroup contact theory focuses on promoting civic

engagement and social participation among group members, thus complementing the theory of conflict transformation. Pettigrew (2013) further reiterates the theory as relationship-oriented as it seeks to promote equal status, cooperation and rebuilding positive relationships among intergroup members. This is the reason behind the use of intergroup contact theory together with conflict transformation theory in this study.

4.3.1 Four conditions of intergroup contact theory

Allport, (1954) in his contact theory, suggested four original conditions of optimal contact. These four conditions include equal status, a common goal, no intergroup competition, and institutional support. According to Signal (2017: 751), friendship is promoted only after taking into consideration all of the four set conditions. Eliminating one of the set conditions will compromise the coming together of the groups that are conflicting (Waytz 2019).

Equal status as the first original condition of contact theory suggests that all members of the two groups should have equal status (Allport 1954). Pettgrew and Tropp (2005) contribute that prejudice is likely to be reduced when group members of two groups are at par and members of the contact situation must have an equal hierarchical relationship. Cohen (1982) suggests that both groups should perceive each other as equal in the situation. Conflicting groups should avoid viewing each other as inferior or of being better than the other group. Allport (1954) suggests that any contact in which another group members are treated as subordinates by another group's members would not reduce prejudice, but could promote it. In coming up with an amicable solution for conflicting groups, contact should be promoted on an equal status basis, since equal status promotes positive intergroup attitudes regardless of groups' primary dissimilarities in status.

The second condition alluded to by Allport is of having a common goal. Allport, (1954) in his contact theory, makes it clear that for two groups to attain friendship they should have a common goal. He further reiterates that groups should reply to each other in order to achieve a desired goal and interests. Davidio (2017) explains the applicability of this condition by suggesting that there is nothing that unites enemies like a common goal. He adds that if two groups have a common goal of attaining peace, nothing will hinder them from achieving it despite their differences. Allport (1954) suggests that the common goals condition is the guiding pillar for condition three of cooperation.

The third condition suggested by Allport (1954) is the intergroup cooperation. In this condition, Allport (1954) explains that two groups must work together with each other in an environment that is free from competition. Goal achievement in this scenario must be on cooperation over competition (Allport 1954). Aronson (2002) states that intergroup cooperation improves damaged relationships among groups.

Allport (1954), in the fourth condition, points out the importance of the support of authorities, law or custom. Allport (1954) suggests that the support of authorities, law and custom improves positive intergroup relationships because authorities can provide acceptable norms and guidelines on how group members should conduct themselves when interacting with each other. Allport (1954) states that laws are inevitable in promoting peace because there are no official laws that enforce segregation of groups.

4.3.2 Empirical studies that used intergroup contact theory

Allport's intergroup contact theory has gained popularity around the world and has been adopted into the social fabric and has been recognised in different academic disciplines. Intergroup contact theory has been regarded as a game changer in improving broken relationships in societies and communities.

One recent study that used intergroup contact theory is the work of Kanas, Scheepers and Sterkens (2015). The study focuses on the contact between religious groups in Indonesia and the Philippines. Their study came following the resurgence of religiously-motivated intolerance and violence in the late 1990s between Christians and Muslims. The researchers focused on the most diverse regions of Indonesia and the Philippines. They conclude that even accounting for the effects of self-selection, interreligious friendships increase the positive attitudes towards the religious out-group. Kanas et al (2015) suggest that contacting another group without the shared goal can worsen the situation; hence, there is the need for a common goal that unites the groups to avoid a perceived group threat.

Brophy (1946) is another study that aligns to the work of Allport. Brophy (1966) studied race relationship patterns between blacks and whites who worked in a desegregated merchant marine (word missing). In his study he discovered that the more the white personnel interacted with their black counterpart the less they beleaguered each other. Nickerson (2021) cites Pettigrew and Tropp (2005), who also applied the intergroup contact theory in improving the relationship between white and black officers in Philadephia. Pettigrew et al (2005) found that there was no danger in black and white officers working together.

Gibson (2004) offers an insight into contact theory in South African interracial society. Although the country is attempting to build a non-racial society, parochial norms of interracial prejudice are still common. Gibson (2004) found that interracial contact was the most powerful predictor of attitudes of blacks towards white and vice versa. In drawing conclusions, Gibson (2006) states that intergroup contact facilitated true reconciliation in South Africa after people of different races agreed to work together for a common goal as equals.

4.3.1 Weaknesses of intergroup contact theory

Paolini (2014) represents a school of thought that raises the concern of negative contact in building an intergroup which may exacerbate negative relationships rather than constructing positive relationships. The concept of negative contact was professed by Allport (1954) as wrong kinds of contact that may increase adverse psychological alliances which may endorse an increase in negative stereotypes. According to Allport (1954) this suggests that even though tolerance is linked to contact theory, it is clear that hatred and anger among groups to be integrated can arise if the groups are not properly organised and managed.

4.4 The nexus between conflict transformation and intergroup contact theory in transforming post-conflict relations.

From the above discussions, I can conclude that conflict transformation and intergroup contact theory support the argument of this study that promoting political tolerance has the potential to transform post-conflict relationships. The background analysis of these theories suggests that they are associated with promoting friendship in communities, which makes them applicable in peacebuilding initiatives. Promoting political tolerance is vital in promoting harmonious relationships. The more people support and advocate the idea of promoting political tolerance, the less belligerent they will be and the more they will build harmonious communities that will assure a nonviolent culture in resolving community conflicts.

As discussed in this chapter, Yamamoto, Pettit-Toledo and Sheffield (2016: 5) posit that political tolerance serves as a peacebuilding initiative that is meant to heal physiological wounds and psychological scars caused by political violence among youth in Masvingo and in Zimbabwe in general. The theoretical frameworks of the two theories fix a lens on the politically non-judgmental attitude in regard to group functionality and political support bases in areas that involve leadership, decision making and conflict resolution.

Looking at the existing measures and initiatives in which current political disputes are dealt with, it is no surprise to see that the combination of conflict transformation and intergroup contact theory is welcomed in communities that are surrounded by political propaganda and exploitation. The ideas brought by these two theories push for peaceful transformation of post-conflict relationships that make human affairs both possible and better.

The theoretical framework section in this chapter highlighted the compatibility of the two theories with the principles of peacebuilding and conflict transformation in communities. Yamamoto et al (2016: 5) suggests that the theories acknowledge and appreciate the concept of non-violent culture as the building

block for groups to find their way, which harness public engagement towards peace and the transformation of post-conflict relations.

The compatibility of conflict transformation and intergroup contact theory with the Shona traditional ethos in promoting tolerance and intergroup friendship and in rebuilding constrained relationships among community members provides a good reason for using the two theories. The good fit between Shona values and the two theories ensures easier transformation of post-conflict relations because of the theories' harmonious coexistence and non-violent ways of resolving conflicts that arise in the political arena. The other reason is that the workings of conflict transformation theory, that intermingle well with Allport's intergroup contact theory, call for cooperation, common goals and equal status in deducing prejudice. The latter theory complements conflict transformation in understanding and solving conflicts and promoting peacebuilding.

4.5 Summary

This chapter highlights the relevance and applicability of conflict transformation and intergroup contact theory in this study in promoting non-violent culture. This chapter starts by reviewing conflict transformation theory, its definitions and its evolution over the years. The chapter also reviewed the intergroup contact theory. The chapter also reviews the theories' applicability in promoting non-violent culture, in conflict studies and in promoting peacebuilding in transforming post-conflict transformation through dialogue to promote political tolerance as an intervention strategy.

The next chapter will explain and discuss the research design, methodology and data collection methods used in this study.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH METHODS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research methods used in this study. It discusses in detail the research approach, research design, and the data collection methods which were approved by the Durban University of Technology authorities to conduct this research in order to achieve the research objectives. The chapter also discusses issues associated with sampling procedures, population, pre-testing, anonymity, data analysis and ethical issues.

5.2 Research approach-action research (AR)

Terms such as research approach and design are used differently in different research methods. Some researchers use them interchangeably. Creswell (2014: 3) indicated that research approach is regarded as the plans and the proposal to conduct the study that sums up the span of the procedures and the steps, from the wide-ranging expectations to the in-depth methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. The nature of the research problem is what determines the research approach that is going to be employed by the researcher (Creswell 2014: 3). According to Lincoln, Lynham and Guba (2011), a research approach should be rich in philosophical assumption, starting from the procedures of the inquiry, that is research design, research methods that focus on data collection, analysis, and interpretation. The research approach also gives a clue to the philosophical worldview assumption the researcher will use in planning the study. In this case I used the participation transformative worldview enquiry. According to Mertens (2010), the transformative worldview embraces the research inquiry needs and intertwines them with politics and a political transformation agenda to confront social injustice that occurs at different levels in societies. The transformative worldview approach is suitable for this study, since it focuses on marginalized groups or persons, inequality, injustice, deficit and discrimination. As a means of achieving the objectives of this study, I followed an action research (AR) approach of words in order to bring peace among youth of different political parties in Mucheke.

Since I chose an action research approach, this section will look at its definition, uniqueness, and importance and gives a brief historical background and the challenges associated with the action research. O'Brien (2001: 01), in attempt to explain the term action research, asserts that a series of titles have been attributed to AR with the common ones being participatory research, collaborative inquiry, emancipatory research, action learning, and contextual AR. In his effort to define AR, O'Brien (2001: 02) pointed out that it referred to learning by doing, where a group of people identifies a problem, does something to

resolve it, sees how successful their efforts were and if not satisfied, tries again, a situation which makes the process cyclic.

Ramirez, Krants and Gilmore (1986: 161) define AR as

> *"Some form of problem-solving research involving a close collaboration between academic and managerial staff as it seeks to contribute towards organizational effectiveness and the development of a management theory."*

Taylor (2017: 48) defines AR as follows:

> *"The aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and to further the goals of social science simultaneously."*

Deducing from the above discussed definitions, I understand that AR is predominantly concerned about both the practical and scientific ways of carrying out research, a feature which makes it unique and relevant for this study on promoting political tolerance. The concept of collaboration, learning by doing, problem identification and problem-solving feature strongly in the above definitions and also formed the basis of my study. This study, together with the motivation I received from my supervisor, changed my mind set with regards to AR, which I had earlier viewed with suspicion, underrating its strong impact in changing communities for the better.

O'Brien (2001: 02) distinguishes this type of research from other general professional research practices by stating that in AR the researcher studies the problem systematically and ensures the intervention strategy is informed by theoretical considerations, with the greater part of the researcher's time being spent on refining the methodological apparatuses, on collecting, analysing, and presenting data on an on-going, cyclical basis.

5.2.1 Action research as a tool for peacebuilding

Stringer (2014) asserts that AR is of paramount importance in the field of research, considering the sense that it creates an optimal opportunity for change and learning to take place in communities experiencing aggression. For this reason, I am resorting to this research approach, knowing that carrying out a study alone is not sufficient when the goal is change and transformation. Freire (1970) asserted that AR is dynamic, to the extent that it creates an optimal opportunity for change and learning to take place in both researcher and participants.

As highlighted earlier on, this study is guided by AR principles in working with the people in Mucheke, with the thrust of promoting political tolerance through dialogue. There is a need to highlight AR's historical background and other vital components associated with this brand of investigation. AR has the capacity to react to the developing needs of emerging circumstances, such as post-conflict relationships, as purported in this study. AR is flexible in comparison with other research approaches, with the provision for the use of indigenous languages during the AR exercise making the process accessible and advantageous over other designs.

Action research facilitates peacebuilding because it involves action to bring about desired change (Kaye & Harris 2017). The other reason why AR is preferred in peacebuilding ahead of other types of research is that the main focus here hinges on turning the participants into co-researchers, since there is a general acceptance that societies learn best and more when they do it themselves (Dick 2001). Dick (2001) adds to the uniqueness of AR by highlighting its cyclic component, the participatory aspect, the aspect of dealing with small numbers and the re-strategising aspect after evaluating the outcomes, which feature prominently as discussed in earlier sections. Below is a diagram that shows the cyclic steps of AT.

Plan   ⟶   Act   ⟶   Observe   ⟶   Reflect   ⟶   Re-plan

Source: Dick 2000: 01

Figure 2 Cyclic steps in AR

The diagram directly above was imported into this study by bearing in mind that the planning stage of the cycle was carried out in identifying the problem of political violence which has ravaged Zimbabwe since independence. The action part of the research was carried out during the dialogue initiative, with the reflection exercise being carried out through a preliminary evaluation which informed the AR team of what needed to be done again to make the intervention more successful. The AR component also caters for the social dimension in that the intervention strategy takes place in Mucheke which strives to transform its post-conflict relationships via dialogue.

In addition to the significance and the relevance of AR in transforming post-conflict relationships, I provide with various action researches conducted by different authors in different scenarios. The following table is evidence that AR is a game changer in resolving conflicts, and is the recommended peace builder worldwide.

Location/country	Research problem	Aim and objectives	Research methods	Outcomes	Period	references
KwaMashu and Umlazi in Durban, South Africa	High levels of Irresponsible, uncaring and violent fathering	The aim was to examine whether the attitudes towards fathering among young men in South Africa could be positively influenced by a carefully designed training programme. Its objectives were: • To explore the experiences of being fathered and the attitudes towards fathering among a sample of young men in Durban. • Based on the exploration, to design and implement a training programme aimed at building more positive attitudes towards their own fathering roles • To evaluate the short an medium-term outcomes of the training programme	• FGDs with 10 participants	• Attitudes changed positively among trainees	One month	Dianzenza & Harris 2022
Mafateng district, Lesotho	High levels of violence on dementia sufferers	Reducing violence against people living with dementia in Lesotho. Research objectives were: • Exploration of the nature, extent, causes and consequences of the problem. • Explore measures in place to reduce this problem • Design an intervention strategy to reduce the problem • Evaluate the short-term outcomes of the intervention programme	• structured interviews • FGDs 8 ATs	People maintained regular contact and there were changes in people's attitudes towards dementia sufferers	18 months	Thafeng & Harris 2022
Zvishavane, Zimbabwe	High spectator violence at PSL soccer matches	The main aim was to reduce the prevalence of spectators' violence in Zimbabwe's premier soccer league. Specific objectives were: • Investigate the nature, causes and consequences of spectator violence in Zimbabwe's PSL. • Use an action research approach involving supporters from one PSL club, to design and implement an intervention programme aimed at reducing spectator violence in the club.	• Interviews • FDGs • Participant observation • 8 AT members	There is potential for supporters' association to encourage their members to be non-violent	One day workshop	Dube & Harris 2021
Harare, Zimbabwe	High use of punitive measures to maintain discipline	The aim was to promote restorative justice to address school discipline issues.	• 12 teachers participated in the project.	• Restorative justice can be a promising way of	8 months	Chiramba & Harris 2020

			• 35 were trained as peer mediators. • 200 participated in peacemaking circles.	addressing school discipline issues. • Peacemaking circles enable teachers to get to know their students. • Peer mediation can solve playground conflicts.		
Masvingo, Zimbabwe	High levels of political conflict	The aim was to transform post-conflict relationships via peace gardens in Masvingo. The objectives were: To explore the causes and effects of election-related violence in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. • To examine the use, effectiveness, and the challenges of using peace gardens in transforming post-conflict relationships. • To design and implement an intervention strategy together with the AT, aimed at transforming post-conflict relationships. • To undertake preliminary evaluation of the outcomes of the initiated intervention strategy.	• 10 AT members	• Peace gardens are effective in promoting peace among citizens	12 months	Rukuni 2019

Table 3 showing examples of action researches

5.3 Research design

In this study, I apply a qualitative research design which is endorsed by the Peacebuilding Programme at the Durban University of Technology (DUT) with the aim of equipping peace graduates with an understanding of building peace and finding sustainable solutions for political violence syndrome in their native countries. This study falls under the explanatory research design, which gave me and my research team the opportunity to explore and design the intervention strategy we used. The whole process gave me an exciting experience as it played an important role in improving my interviewing skills as well as the opportunity to facilitate an action research.

Cresswell (2014: 3) defined research design as *"The plan and the methodology for an investigation that traverses the choice from broad presumptions to detailed techniques for information accumulating and analysis"*. Welman, Kruger and Mitchekk (2005), also contributed that research design focuses on arrangement, collection, and exploration of data for the exploration of the study with the aim of achieving research objectives. The design of this study consists three components, namely the exploratory, action research and evaluation stages of the intervention strategy. The exploratory component of the research helps to answer the first two objectives of this study while the third and fourth objectives are answered under the AR and the evaluation components.

The structure of this study demanded that I follow the steps of qualitative research design. This has enabled an action research plan appropriate for analysing and getting an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study. As such, real emphasis is placed on the formulation of an intervention strategy to the research problem, which strives to promote political tolerance among political rivals via the use of dialogue. Dialogue as an intervention strategy caters for and addresses the action component of this research. Taking note of the requirements and needs of this research, the research design used in this study proved that it was difficult to pre-empt the possible intervention strategies in the design stage until after the exploratory part was carried out.

As suggested by Shannon-Baker (2016), the main purpose of the AR design was to confirm that the evidence attained allowed me to answer the research questions as distinctly as possible. The research design I employed saw endorsement of dialogue. The views of the action team were regarded as critical in the formulation of such intervention strategies. The following possible intervention strategies were envisaged and agreed upon: (i) the establishment of dialogue, where rival political party supporters were working together, (ii) participant observations, focus groups discussions and interviews were used to

generate data for this study, and (iii) the evaluation of the intervention strategy's preliminary outcomes was done together with the action team (AT).

According to Creswell (2014), qualitative research is an orderly and laborious type of research which employs data collection approaches such as review of documents, in-depth interviews, and ethnographic observations. Looking at qualitative research's main benefit, Davies (2007: 132) postulates that it gives emphasis to settings and a sense of social lives and experiences for the sake of theory and inductive-propelled investigation to create theoretical ideas. Deriving from the above benefit, qualitative research is suitable for this study since it involves studying shared patterns of behaviour and actions of people in Mucheke area in their natural setting. This research was carried out within a one year period with the help of an action team. I chose a qualitative action research design because it investigates and explores the understanding and meaning of persons or crowds credited to their communal or human difficulties (Creswell 2014: 43). A qualitative design was favoured in this study since it facilitates two main data collection methods, which are interviews and FGDs, that help in fostering trustworthiness and validity.

According to Mouton (1996: 103), qualitative design acts as a catalyst in generating definite data through an in-depth exploration of a participant's daily experiences, and also tends to uncover the underlying motivations behind the local people with regards to their opinions, attitudes, perceptions and behaviours. Mouton (1996: 103) adds that qualitative design is investigative in nature; hence it strives to form realities and gather new knowledge to regulate whether there are interesting patterns in that newly-generated knowledge. Since this study deals with the post-conflict scenario in a high-density area, the qualitative methodology helped people to share their emotional stories and express their opinions and feelings during focus group discussions and interviews.

5.4 Data collection methods

This section discusses the methods used in collecting data for this study.

In generating data from the participants, I used interviews (see annexures D & D2), participant observation and FGDs (see annexures E & E2) to explore the nature, extent, causes, and consequences of political violence involving youth in Mucheke and how dialogue could be used in promoting political tolerance in Mucheke. In this process of data collection, an interview guide, a FGDs guide and observation guides were used as key instruments in obtaining and generating data.

To gain understanding and experience of the first two research objectives, I conducted in-depth interviews with politically-active youth in Mucheke. The same youth who sat for interviews were also

involved in FGDs as a way of generating data in a discussion platform. Participant Observation was also part of the data collection method since it contributed to the generation of first-hand insights which supplemented data and thereby improved the validity and trustworthiness of my research findings.

5.4.1 The use of interviews in this study

Creswell (2014: 194) notes that an interview is not just an ordinary conversation but it is one with a purpose and, in a research project, it is the researcher who defines that focus to ensure that she/he retains a high degree to control over the topic while granting the participants full scope to determine the nature of their response. Boyce (2015) defines an in-depth interview as a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a relatively small number of informants to explore their perceptions of a particular idea, situation or programme. Harrell (2017) gives his analysis of in-depth interview as a discussion carried out one-on-one between an interviewer and a respondent, either over the telephone or face-to-face, with the purpose of collecting information on a specific set of topics.

In this study the interviews were used as the primary data collection tool (see annexures D and D2). Interviews were of paramount importance in this study since they brought the researcher and participants closer. Through interviews I managed to get the story behind the participants' experiences, feelings, knowledge and opinions. It worked well as a primary method of data collection prior to FDGs, which further investigated the participants' responses. The interviews helped me with detailed data, considering that participants were given sufficient duration to explain their viewpoints and opinions freely. I intended to interview all the 16 key informants, eight from ZANU-PF and the other eight from the MDC youth. The interview platform enabled the participants to share their opinions on potential use of dialogue in building peace in politically damaged communities. Interviews were a guiding step of this exploratory research because they managed to generate participants' life experiences in relation to political violence in their area.

From the information I obtained from the participants, it is fair to say that youth really needed an intervention strategy to facilitate provision of political tolerance to mend their polarised society, which is portrayed as bad and broken due to political violence that is rampant in their community.

5.4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of in-depth interviews

Cresswell (2014) argues that one of the benefits of using in-depth interviews is that they provide some opportunities to provide historical information while still allowing the researcher to have control over the line of questioning. Another benefit of in-depth interviews, as raised by Kvale (1996), is that as the

researcher they gave me a chance to explain and clarify some of my questions and the process of probing further increased the accuracy of the data collected. According to Boyce and Neale (2006), the main advantage of in-depth interviews is that they yield much more detailed information that cannot be provided by other data collection methods, and during the in-depth interview exercise, the respondents were more relaxed and comfortable.

However, one of the main disadvantages of interviews is their proneness to bias. According to Creswell (2009), the researcher can easily influence the research outcome. Patton and Cochra (2002) see in-depth interviews as inherently time-consuming to conduct, transcribe and analyse. Boyce et al (2006) also assert that the results of in-depth interviews are not generalisable because small samples are usually involved.

5.4.3 Participant observation

Participant observation is another useful way of collecting data in research. It is very valuable in social sciences as it gives authentic and unlimited information (Muchengetwa et al 2010: 49). Using this data collection tool, I was involved in observing the knowledge of the people during interview sessions. Participant observation involved the understanding and observation of the reality and physical setting of the supporters of both ZANU-PF and the MDC in Mucheke. There was a need for a checklist of events and items to be observed as those assisted in the guiding of the observation process. The information generated from observation as a research instrument was used in collaboration with data from interviews and FDGs to provide authentication, reliability and trustworthiness.

5.4.4 Focus Group Discussions (FDGs)

Muchengetwa et al (2010: 48) support the use of FGDs as an innovative way of holding in-depth interviews with a number of people at the same time, but there is a need for them to be planned efficiently so that they become effective. According to Morgan (1997: 6), FGDs are a research technique that collect data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher. Morgan (1997: 6) adds that it is the researcher's interest that provides the focus, whereas the data come from the group interaction. Taylor (2019:1) gives his definition of FDGs as a unique type of in-depth interview accomplished in a group, whose meeting presents parameters defined with respect to the composition, size, and interview procedures. Finally, Harrell and Bradley (2009: 14) refer to FDGs as a dynamic group discussion used to gather information. Kvale (2007) gives the structure and recommended size of FDGs and points out that a recommended number of people participating in FDGs ranges from 6-19 participants. Still on the point of size, Rubin and Rubin (1995) propose that any number from 6-12 participants is considered

relevant. Stewart and Shamdaseni (2015: 64) argue that any number which is fewer than 8 participants tend to make discussion dull and boring as does any number that is above 12.

FGDs provide a diverse set of responses based on participants' profiles, which is a useful way of measuring the reaction of participants to the intervention strategy to be introduced. In this case, FDGs provided immediate ideas that may improve dialogue to reduce future political violence by youth. The other benefit of FGDs is that they can confirm insights obtained from other methods, such as interviews and participant observation. This simply means that if the findings derived from previous efforts are questionable, FGDs can either confirm or deny that insight. FDGs are a cost-effective method to get information. They are also less time-consuming as compared to interviews. FGD design allows the moderator to cover multiple topics without going through the time-intensive process of conducting one-on-one interviews to gather information. The ability of FDGs to typically build on top of each other makes them unique in their own way. A person can provide information or experience and then other people can expand the initial concept shared.

As noted above, there are advantages associated with the use of FGDs, but there are also disadvantages that come with the use of them. One of the demerits of using FGDs is that participants taking part in FGDs have less speaking time as compared to interviews, which means that they do not provide much time to an individual to provide the maximum amount of information about the concept under study. This can cause other participants to rush through their perspective because they wish to give others an opportunity. Some participants in the FGDs can dominate the conservation and that lead to other participants agreeing with the dominant voice in fear of being criticised.

In this study, each FGD was composed of eight participants. I conducted two FGDs which were made up of eight ZANU-PF youth and another one had eight MDC youth. The questions used for FGDs are in annexures E and E2.

5.5 Sampling procedure

In this study, I used purposive sampling in getting participants for interviews and FGDs (Dane 2011). The interview sessions gave room for me to use snowballing techniques in tracing key respondents. Snowballing facilitated the identification of key informants and those participants who were cooperative in similar exercises. As a result of its convenience, ease and the availability of participants, I preferred the use of purposive sampling as part of the exploratory design (Dane 2011). My AT was made up of 10

people. I worked with one academic in Peacebuilding, Mr S. Musariri, Pastor N. Majaya of United Pentecostal Ministries and eight youth from both the MDC and ZANU-PF.

5.5.1 How was pre-testing undertaken?

I undertook one mini focus group discussion which comprised eight participants, and three in-depth interviews. The focus group discussion and interviews were carried out as pilot sessions to a fairly small sample size of people. Members that took part in the pilot study project were, however, not chosen in the actual research exercise. This assisted a great deal in perfecting the research instruments and the questions with the aim of achieving the research objectives.

5.6 Data analysis

The qualitative data which was collected in this study was analysed using a thematic analysis. Data analysis simply refers to dissecting the complex whole into its parts and it usually involves reducing it to manageable proportions and then identifying themes and patterns from that data (Mouton 2001: 161). Once the intervention methods had been implemented, the AR team would conduct a preliminary evaluation of the programme. De Vos et al (2011: 450) suggests that an evaluation needs to be done when something new has been created, and in this case, dialogue was conducted. The evaluation of the dialogue was done in the form of a set of insightful questions to determine whether there was a positive change in the community's broken relationships.

Moutin (2001) suggests that data analysis should actually begin in the field and points out that the earlier the researcher starts to ascertain themes, the better. This required that reviewing noted and sorted the data into categories. Since I do not possess transcribing skills and expertise, I obtained the services of a data analyst to transcribe recorded interviews and FGDs.

5.7 Validity and reliability/trustworthiness

Hall and Hall (1996: 44) propose that qualitative researchers are concerned with issues of validity, reliability and whether results can be replicated. Greenstein and Davis (2013: 6) propose validity as truly measuring the idea that we expected to gauge. Davies et al (2014) contribute that reliability has the assumption that another researcher would produce the same results from the previous research, while Wagner, Kawulich and Garner (2012) state that it measures the consistency of the measurement.

The use of data collection instruments, referred to in the field of research as triangulation (Hesse-Biber 2010: 3) were used to enhance and enrich the trustworthiness of the findings of this study. Hesse-Biber (2010:3) gives the perception that the term "triangulation" in research is used to refer to the convergence

of facts from the various research instruments to provide confidence in the information which will be researched. Yeasimi and Rahman (2012: 156) define triangulation as the procedure of confirmation to increase validity and completeness by fusing some points of view. Patton (2002) suggests that triangulation assists the researcher, not only to collect more extensive significant data but, in addition, to cross-check its consistency in order to enhance the trustworthiness of the findings. In this study, it is of paramount importance that triangulation was not only employed for validation, but also for deepening one's understanding of a topic, and is characterised as the blending of information and additional techniques with the goal that asserted perspectives or points of view can light upon a theme (Olsen 2004).

To ensure validity, member checking was used in this research. According to Davie et l (2014), member checking involves taking back the findings to the participants to check whether their contributions during interviews and FGDs were captured well. As a way of ensuring trustworthiness, I remained in the field for a fairly long period of time collecting data. The FGDs and interview guides were pilot tested with a sample of 8 participants before the real research exercise, so that another study would give the same rating and results.

5.8 Anonymity and confidentiality

Muchengetwa et al (2010: 63) provide analysis that research experience should not cause physical or psychological harm to participants or expose them to embarrassment, unusual stress or demeaning treatment to one's reputation. In this study, I was ethically obliged to ensure that data collected from participants is kept in a secure place and that identities of participants remain anonymous. During the course of data collection, photographs or videotape were not taken without participants' consent. The data collected was handled in a professional manner and the use of pseudonyms or codes was preferred in the report writing so as to protect participants' identity. Data collected from the FGDs, interviews, and observations was mainly in soft copies and was stored on my laptop, which was constantly secured with passwords. The data on my flash disc and backup files will be erased completely after the expiry of a five-year period, as per the DUT ethical obligations. Anonymity helped in confirming participant confidentiality and it was observed in both interview sessions and the evaluation process. The dialogue participants were not confidential since everyone knew who they were as they were seen participating in the project, although the data generated from them remained a secret.

The three guiding principles of a research study are respect for societies, generosity, and fairness. Patton and Cochran (2002) state that reverence for societies simply implies that the experience gained during the research process should recognise the rights of participants, including the right to be informed about

the study, the right to make participation decisions, and the right to pull out of the research at any point without prior notification. This study was guided by the principles mentioned above.

Gatekeeper's letters were distributed to the ZANU-PF and MDC leadership seeking permission to work with their support base. Permission letters for doing my investigation were granted before the commencement of my inquiry. I managed to adhere to the important research ethical principles which revolve around voluntary participation, informed consent, confidentiality and the well-being of participants. Participants were given room to decline or to participate in the research and were informed that they were free to withdraw from the research, either on a temporary or a permanent basis, without prior explanations to me.

5.9 Consent and voluntary participation

The research participants were given information (see annexures A & A2) and consent (annexures B & B2) letters which explained the concept of voluntary participation. These letters were translated into local languages to cater for those who were non-English speaking participants. Participants were given room to decline or participate in the research and were also free to withdraw from the research, either on a temporary or a permanent basis, without explanation to me.

5.10 Research context

The research was carried out in Mucheke, Zimbabwe. Mucheke is a high-density dormitory town administered by the Masvingo City Council. Mucheke is largely dominated by Opposition youth who blame the ruling party for their economic misfortunes. The area is located in Masvingo, about 7km from the central business district (CBD). The area has approximately 50000 male youth (Zimbabwe Census 2012). Of these 50000 male youth, about 7000 are estimated to be politically active (Chapter 1, section 1.3). I selected this area due to my knowledge of the area and, more importantly, the desire for transforming broken relationships in the area. The area was hard hit by the frequency of political violence, mainly by youth, and calls for intervention strategies aimed at promoting political tolerance among youth with the thrust of achieving peace and development in the area and the country as a whole.

The rate of unemployment amongst youth in the area is pegged at more than 87% and due to this the people are vulnerable to exploitation by politicians during and just after the elections. Some of the Mucheke residents have developed addictions to drugs and alcohol; and some have a ravenous appetite for money. Most youth in the area are perceived as MDC sympathisers, and due to efforts by the ruling party to gain popularity, the area is now polarised as the ruling party supporters are making some inroads

in the area. This has seen some activities being patronised in a partisan manner and this has hastened partisan conflicts in the area over the years. Chikwanda (2014: 24) asserts that the area is characterised by unhealed trauma which is traced back to decades of systematic structural violence. The area has witnessed maiming of rival political party supporters, deaths and disappearances of party activists and supporters. Participants were recruited and selected from this community for both the FGDs and interviews (Chapter 1, section 1.3).

5.11 Discussion of the data collection process

The process of data collection started in January 2022. Prior to data collection, I distributed letters of information to the participants. I started by conducting interviews on the 27th of January 2022 with the first group of ZANUP-PF youth, which was made up of 10 participants. I then interview the eight MDC youth on the 5th of February 2022. The first FGD was held on the 23rd of February 2022 and involved ZANU-PF youth, and the last FDG was conducted on the 8th of March 2022 with the eight youth from the MDC. Below is a table that shows how the process of data collection was carried out.

Summary of the data collection process

Method	Group	Location	Number	Dates
Interviews	ZANU-PF youth	Boxing Arena, Masvingo	8	27/01/2022
Interviews	MDC Youth	Mucheke Hall	8	05/02/2022
FGDs	ZANU-PF Youth	Boxing Arena, Masvingo	8	23/02/2022
FGDs	MDC Youth	Mucheke Hall	8	08/03/2022

Table 4 showing summary of the data collection process

5.11.1 Selection criteria for participants

In this study, I used purposive sampling in selecting participants. A total number of 16 male participants were drawn from the country's two major political parties, the MDC and ZANU-PF. These 16 youth are the same people who participated in the FGDs and interviews (see Table 4, section 5.11). The action team (AT) was selected from these 16 youth before the establishment and implementation of the intervention strategy. The tables below give the demographic information of the people who participated in the interviews and FDGs.

AGE	POLITICAL PARTY
19	ZANU-PF
20	ZANU-PF
23	ZANU-PF
26	ZANU-PF
28	ZANU-PF
29	ZANU-PF
30	ZANU-PF
30	ZANU-PF

Table 5 Age distribution of participants of interviews and FGD1

From the above table, there was an equal distribution of age of ZANU-PF political party male youth.

AGE	POLITICAL PARTY
19	MDC
20	MDC
20	MDC
23	MDC
25	MDC
28	MDC
31	MDC
33	MDC

Table 6 Age distribution of participants of interviews and FDG 2

The table above indicates the demographic of the participants who participated in FGD 2: all the participants were male youth from the MDC political party. An interview and FGD guide were used to generate data from participants.

5.11.2 Questions used to generate data

The following were the questions used to generate data in this study. The questions were asked in both interviews and FDGs.

1. Can you explain the nature of political violence that involves youth in Masvingo?

2. What are the causes of political violence among youth in Masvingo?

3. What is the extent of political violence that mostly involves youth in Masvingo?

4. What are the negative impacts of political violence in Masvingo?

5. Are there any measures in place dealing with political violence in Mucheke? If yes, name them and explain their effectiveness.

6. Do you think promoting political tolerance through dialogue can reduce political violence among youth in Masvingo?

5.11.3 Focus group discussion (FGD)

To generate data, I conducted 2 FGDs during data collection. These discussions became the introduction to the dialogue initiative which was later bolstered by the information which was collected from the key informants. With the nature and sensitivity of this study, I conducted FGDs separately, the first one consisting of ZANU-PF male youth and the second one representing MDC male youth. The FGDs assisted in collecting important data for this study, articulating a framework and coming up with the dialogue concept which guided this study.

5.11.4 Interviews

Apart from FDGs, I also used interviews in order to complement and enhance the data collection methods. The research participants' demographic data indicate that some meaningful attempt was carried out during the sampling criteria to cater for age and equal political party representation. In the interview sessions, I found out that most victims are still bitter due to the wounds of political violence. They openly shared their experiences and most proved to be in need of psycho-social support as part of the post-conflict reconstruction process. I also noted that there are some victims who feared to disclose information on politics.

5.11 Limitations

Geographically, Mucheke area was the only selected location for this study and only participants from Mucheke were chosen as research participants. Mucheke is the oldest high-density suburb in Masvingo's

urban areas and therefore the results from this research are applicable to Mucheke and comparable areas but cannot be generalised to other areas. The fact that this investigation used an AR methods approach, meant that there was the notable implication that it was both financially- and resource-costly. To counter the effects of limited time and resources on the quality of the results, this research was only confined to Mucheke, where accessibility is relatively high and good. Due to this, the results of the study would not be related to other situations and populations or contexts to which the sample would relate.

5.18 Summary

In this chapter, I addressed the research approach, design, methodologies, and the instruments which I employed in carrying out this study with the thrust of achieving its objectives. This chapter also discussed issues pertaining to sampling procedures, action research, population, pre-testing, anonymity, how voluntary participation was ensured, research context, data analysis, and ethical issues. The chapter also had a deeper look at the concept of action research design, the uniqueness of AR and its importance, a brief historical background and the challenges associated with the use of AR. The next chapter examines how the dialogue intervention was carried out in Mucheke.

CHAPTER SIX

EXPLORING THE PROBLEM AND SEEKING SOLUTIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses how the dialogue initiative and the action research were carried out. In addition, the chapter gives a thorough analysis of the series of sessions conducted by the action team. This chapter addresses the four research objectives and lastly it looks at the justification of the action research for promoting political tolerance in Mucheke.

6.2 Description of the research process

This section offers a detailed analysis of times and dates of dialogue sessions conducted by the AT. The process of exploring the problem and coming up with a viable solution was conducted in Mucheke with the action team for over one month. Below is a table that shows dates and the number of people who attended the dialogue initiative sessions.

Details of the dialogue sessions

Session	Activities	Location	Attendees	Duration	Dates
1st session	• Discussions and paving way forward • Outlining rules to be observed	Mucheke Hall	10	3 hours	01/06/2022
2nd session	• Dialogue training workshop. The peacebuilding academic led this session	Mucheke Hall	10	2 hours	06/06/2022
3rd session	• Peace building workshop which involved interviews and FGDs, led by the peacebuilding academic	Civic Centre	10	3 hours	10/06/2022
4th session	• Preliminary evaluation which involved interviews and FDGs	Mucheke Hall	10	4 hours	25/06/2022

Table 7 showing preliminary sessions of the intervention strategy

6.2.1 Preliminary session and logistical consultations

As the foundation of this study, I started by carrying out consultative and logistical meetings with the action team as a way of mapping tools to design the most relevant and effective intervention to be employed. I carried out a preliminary session on 25th of May 2022. The preliminary session was meant to map out intervention and implementation modalities.

Regarding what I had learnt about action research, I deduced that the intervention strategy was going to be a game changer compared to other alternatives on the ground usually used to address the syndrome of political violence in the area. Due to this, I chose action research to justify the needs and purpose of this study. As suggested by Chikwanda (2014: 20), an intervention strategy in this case is not an immediate end measure to the problem, but addresses community relations and promotes political tolerance in a more holistic approach. With the help of one peacebuilding academic and a church leader, I managed to mobilise the meeting, and the turnout was very impressive. During the meeting, I explained the objective of the study and clarified the myths and fallacies that the research might be viewed as a regime change project. The meeting promised to ensure the safety of all participants (and myself as a facilitator) during the data collection period.

The pre-testing session provided me with new insights which I used later on in my study, especially additions in the FGDs and interview guides. The pre-testing helped me to design a research tool that would not provoke anyone or invoke the feelings of participants during data collection sessions.

The AT was made up of 10 participants purposively selected from the Mucheke community from the two main political parties, the MDC and ZANU-PF. I purposively selected four youth from each political party. To make it 10 participants, I then asked the help of one academic in the field of peacebuilding and one church leader, since Creswell and Vicki (2011: 174) postulated that there is a call for a qualitative investigator to recognise and employ a small number of people who will offer comprehensive data about the vital matters which were cross-examined in this action research study in transforming post-conflict relationships via dialogue.

Signs of fear and panic were observed upon introduction of the study topic to the participants, since it is unusual and uncomfortable for opposition political supporters to come openly to work together with the ruling party supporters. In the first 15-20 minutes of the pilot assessment meeting, there was tension, and participants were unwilling to work together due to their political differences. It took some time to convince the participants. Still, in this process, I managed to explain in detail the aims and objectives of the study and they later on accepted the idea and agreed to participate. Most members were sceptical at

first, due to them being perceived as sell-outs by their political members, and they were also afraid of disclosing party secrets to rivals. From this discussion, it was clear from the participants' reactions that changing an attitude is not an event but a gradual process.

Before commencement of the dialogue, I asked participants to sign their consent forms as a fulfilment of the requirements from the DUT Ethics Committee; these were written and then translated into a native language which they all understood very well. The participants voluntarily agreed to partake in this study, hence fulfilling the DUT ethical requirements. It was made clear that the study was not going to be easy.

6.3 The first session: Establishment of the AT and dialogue (1st of June 2022)

In the preliminary session I managed to create a platform to explain the research methodology and draft our research activities with the AT. In that session, I explained that as either victims or perpetrators of political violence in one way or other, their help with this research would assist us immensely in promoting political tolerance among youth. As a newly formed AT we agreed that there was a need for a dialogue session as way of creating space and opportunity for understanding peoples' opinions.

In the first session which was held on the 1st of June 2022, the AT highlighted the possibility of dialogue in promoting sustainable peace through providing a forum of sessions in which participants could discuss the past and plan for the future. The idea of dialogue was suggested as a platform offering true reconciliation and healing. According to Barge (2016: 72), pain that is not transformed is transferred, meaning that the pain that the AT members had endured would still be passed on to future generations, hence causing intergenerational conflict.

A Dialogue initiative gained the endorsement of the AT as a way of strengthening other existing peacebuilding efforts in local communities in order to deter violence and transform broken relationships. The dialogue approach aims to promote political tolerance by allowing a neutral platform for people of diverse political groups to mingle, work and plan together in ways that would promote their sustainable peace. Based on values of inclusiveness, integrity and diversity, the peace dialogue was intended to strengthen the aptitudes of local communities in conflict management and resolution initiatives.

There was a common agreement that a dialogue initiative had the potential of improving societal relationships. This point was taken after considering that if dialogue was not properly organised could be a source of conflict that would inadvertently reinforce old preconceptions and detachments. The process was not easy, since I was avoiding a scenario where the participants would regard me as the most knowledgeable person in the group, thereby undermining their positions and contributions. As a

facilitator, I was on a par with the AT and this helped to maximise their confidence and contributions, thus resulting in the whole process being a learning space for all of us. We used this first session to formulate the binding agreements which we were expected to observe during the process. The AT agreed to meet only once per week for dialogue sessions, due to other personal commitments. The AT participants also agreed to adjustments to the agreed schedule only if there were unforeseen circumstances which were beyond their control.

The AT went for dialogue instead of other peace intervention strategies for transforming post-conflict relationships. Dialogue was chosen at the expense of other communal projects on the basis of its uniqueness in being effective in small numbers (ACCORD 2015). According to Bohm (2015:7), one of the fundamental principles of dialogue is inclusiveness. Bohm (2015) adds that inclusiveness is the requirement for a dialogue process; this means that every person who is part of the problem should be represented in the dialogue process.

Another reason why dialogue was chosen is its nature of joint ownership. The process is jointly owned by the researcher and the locals. UNDP (2015) asserts that to bring sustainable peace, people must develop a sense of joint ownership of the process and become primary stakeholders. The dialogue process should be an instrument not owned by any one actor (UNDP, 2015: 7). The dialogue initiative was opted by the AT because of joint ownership that assures involvement of people in constructing way forward.

The third and most important reason why the AT team opted for a dialogue is that it is a learning process. Dialogue is not just a process where one comes and sits at the table; it is a platform where people talk, think and communicate with one another. It also gives room for self-reflection, and a spirit of enquiry and personal change. During the dialogue process participants are willing to explore the root causes of conflict rather than looking at the symptoms and consequences.

The fourth and last reason why we went for dialogue is its human nature and long-term perspective. Dialogue enables participants to show empathy, recognise difference and find areas of common ground without debating. Dialogue also fosters a long-term perspective for interaction of people in a respectful and neutral setting. The process can be painstakingly slow and incremental, to the extent that it can go beyond 10 years.

The AT suggested and agreed on ground rules which would guide us throughout the dialogue process. These guiding agreements assisted us immensely in making dialogue sessions safe with the thrust of building community trust and cohesion. The ground rules brought a respectful environment, where the

participants participated freely, with openness. Below are the agreed guiding ground agreements which were put forward by the AT:

- **All members are equal**
- **No political regalia during sessions**
- **No political party slogans**
- **Every member is free to ask questions freely without fear**
- **Respecting every member's opinion regardless of political affiliation**
- **All members to be punctual for all dialogue sessions**
- **No use of phones during sessions**
- **No use of hate speech.**

The above agreed-upon arrangements helped in minimising misunderstandings. The ground rules agreed also helped in levelling the playing field by keeping participants equal to each other. In addition, the guiding ground agreements made the AT more united and easier to manage. The rules agreed also allowed participants to participate passively in our first session, since they were adjusting to the ideas and understanding of the intervention strategy.

6.4 Second Session: dialogue training workshop (6th of June 2022)

The second session was a training workshop for the AT participants on how to conduct a functioning dialogue. This session was held on the 6th of June 2022. This session was led by the peacebuilding academic and the church leader who were part of the AT. The training workshop covered the following topics:

- Managing emotions
- Dealing with denial
- Communication skills
- Managing conflict
- Analysing the problem
- Dealing with personality traits and preferences
- And how to make a dialogue initiative an interaction space for peacebuilding

During the session, participants asked a lot of questions, and they came up with some contributions. The first quote by **MDC 1** reads:

Sekudzidziswa kwataitwa maererano nekudzarisana munharaunda medu zvakanaka ini ndabatsirikanavo zvikuru nekuti ndichanokwanisa kuita zvese zvataurwa pano kudzivirira bope pakati pemhuri yangu.

[From what we just learnt on matters of handling conflicts and promoting dialogue in resolving conflicts, I am also going to use the same strategy to handle family conflicts.]

ZANU-PF 1 concurred by adding that:

Ini ndadzidza kuti kutaurirana sevanhu vanenge vakanganisirana kwakakosha munharaunda medu. Kana tichinge tatadzirana ngatitsvakei anoti yanananisa nekutiyenzanisa ndizvo tikwanise kuregererana munharaunda medu.

[As an individual, I learnt that sessions of this kind are useful and insightful in our community and from today onwards I am going to encourage conflicting people to use such strategy with the help of a neutral party to resolve conflicts in our community.]

Figure 3 showing the AT members after the dialogue training workshop

The participants made good use of this session to exchange ideas on the benefits of conducting dialogue and how effectively they could do this together to protect and maintain peace in their community. From the rest of the session, I observed that were already considering putting politics aside and preparing for reconciliation. The session was a big step towards community building and a big step towards realisation of the study's main objective.

6.5 Third Session: Peacebuilding Workshop (10th of June 2022)

During this session, held on the 10th of June 2022, all the AT members were present, and it was the most important workshop for the study because it addressed the core aim of the research. The workshop was once again facilitated by a Peacebuilding academic. He gave a comprehensive training on peacebuilding, exploring questions like:

- What are the effects of political violence?

- What is peace and peacebuilding?

- What is political tolerance?

- What are negative and positive peace?

- How can dialogue be used to promote political tolerance?

- What is reconciliation?

- How can dialogue foster communication, trust, political tolerance and interdependence?

The participants participated actively in this session. Facilitators used a question-and-answer technique in their presentations, whereby the participants gave answers using their own experiences and also giving practical examples. This session managed to create a bond between the participants themselves and the researcher. The AT became a cooperative group in all aspects of the activities which were carried out during that day. The team showed respect and gave turns to each other in sharing painful experiences.

The AT team testified that dialogue gave them an equal opportunity to confess their past experiences, since they had never had such a safe environment to talk about these before. This session ended by concluding that there is no need for those who suffered as victims to nurse ways of revenge. This call was rigorously repeated by the AT until all members realised that dialogue is an effective way of promoting political tolerance.

6.6 Fourth Session: Evaluative meeting and mapping the way forward (25th of June 2022)

This session evaluated the dialogue initiative in Mucheke, and it was held on the 25th of June 2022. The AT participants pointed out that dialogue and the entire study promoted teamwork across the political divide by transforming relationships previously tainted as a result of political violence. They applauded the intervention strategy as it was unique and directly addressed critical issues in Mucheke.

The participants pointed out that this study was a milestone in healing the community's post-political-violence-induced wounds. From the session's observation, it could be deduced that the AT had gained trust and were willing to work with each other. To confirm this, **ZANU-PF 2** said:

> *Sezvamunoona pano takaungana sechikwata ndakuona umwe neumwe semhuri yangu yandinokwanisa kuudza zvimwe zvinhu zvinechekuita neupenyu hwangu. Chikumbiro changu dai tikaramba takabatana chero Mukoma Philllimon vachinge vaenda.*

> *[Here I view everyone as part and parcel of my family where I feel confident even in sharing some matters to do with my family. I encourage us to continue strong and united even when Brother Phillimon is no longer working with us.]*

The study was carried out observing the ethical code of conduct to ensure that the rights of the participants were protected and respected. It was promised that information that was collected during the dialogue sessions would be made available to the participants. Due to the upholding of ethics, the community embraced the dialogue initiative in their community. Lastly, confidentiality was ensured as there were no names mentioned during the process of data collection.

6.7 Pre-dialogue state of affairs in Mucheke

This section discusses the pre-dialogue situation of the Mucheke community. The community was characterised by broken relationships and a lack of social cohesion. The level of mistrust and intolerance was gruesome and horrible. Due to political conflicts, community engagement remained a myth that was hindering community development and cooperation in communal projects. The AT explored the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence. This section also explored the current measures that are in place in Mucheke to reduce youth involvement in political violence.

6.8 Nature of Political Violence involving youth in Mucheke.

The introduction of the MDC in 1999 spawned the rise of political violence in Mucheke. The MDC offered a serious threat to the ruling party. This witnessed the creation of a political spat between ruling party supporters and opposition party sympathisers. The fact that the MDC party was received well by the Mucheke residents as a real alternative saw loyal ruling party supporters resorting to maiming, killing and intimidation to win the political contest. During interviews one of the victims gave the historical background of political violence by youth in Mucheke. **MDC 2** said:

> *Mazuva atanga bato reMDC waisada kunzwika or kuzivikanwa kuti unopikisana nebato ririkutonga. Mugore ra 2000 vazhinji vaitsigira bato reMDC vakaurayiwa nekupisirwa*

dzimba muno Mumucheke. Muna 2008 kune imwe hama yedu yafamba nebato inopikisa yakangonyangarika ikazowanikwa after 3 days akapondwa musango.

[During the days when the MDC was introduced, people here in Mucheke were afraid to come open. Opposing supporters were not allowed to speak against the ruling party. In 2008, there was our close relative who was abducted for three days and he was later on found lying dead in the bush.]

From the above it can be seen that the area was toxic to the extent that opposition party sympathisers were deprived of being able to speak publicly.

6.9 Extent of political violence involving youth

After the formation of the MDC the country was characterised by cases of political violence. The tension among youth across the political divide was worrying. There was a growing concern of mistrust and broken relationships that made the idea of social cohesion difficult to reach. The number of cases of violence from the year 2000 up to the last general election were relatively high. Below is what **MDC 3** had to say:

Kubva zvatangwa bato reMDC kunototi kufe, kurobwe nekudzinganiswa vanhu muno. Pasarudzo dzoga dzoga tinotoona zvuru zvezvuru zvevanhu zvinourayiwa, kudzinganiswa nekurobwa muno.

[After the formation of the MDC we have witnessed the forms in which political violence involving youth occurs here in Mucheke. We have witnessed killings, displacements and beatings of thousands of political players.]

ZANU-PF 3 added that:

Nharaunda yedu yakutotyisa tahwa nekutyisidzirwa kumabhawa uku nekuda kwezvematongerwe enyika. Ariperi zuva umwemunhu asati akutyisidzira kwai kana mukaresva mutungamiriri wekusarudza muchazviona.

[This community has caused us to live in fear. We are being intimidated daily especially at taverns. Today you hear one saying, "If you do not vote wisely, you shall see the economic consequences".]

6.10 Polarisation of Mucheke

After the introduction of the MDC party, Mucheke became highly polarised. This was because of a group of ZANU-PF youth who were willing to crush any voice that was against the revolutionary mantra. This caused the members of the rival parties to be divided and witnessed labelling of anyone sympathising with the opposition party as unpatriotic, a sellout and regarded as the enemy of the state.

During the FDG of our third session of the dialogue initiative, **MDC 4** said that:

> *Nekuda kwekushaikwa kwemabasa vafanha vazhinji vakushandiswa nema politicians kuti varove vanhu. vechidiki vakatengerwa nemutoriro ne doro ndivo vanoita basa rekurova vanhu kuti vavhotere pavasirikuda. pamwe especially pedyo nema elections vanenge vatova mhondi.*

> *[Due to lack of employment, many youth are being exploited by politicians to settle political scores. Youths are being given drugs and alcohol to carry out full swing torture to force people vote for the party they do not want.]*

The above remarks indicates that youth who are unemployed are willing to do anything so that they stay high. They can be political terrorists just to ensure that the ideals of their masters are realised in exchange for alcohol and drugs.

6.11 Major causes of political conflicts in Mucheke

Responses from the FGDs and interviews suggested that politics is the main driver of political violence. Most of political violence emanates in pre- and post-election periods. Apart from politics, participants also mentioned other causes of conflict, which emanate from high rates of unemployment, cultural egocentrism, ethnic pluralism, criminal justice systems, extractive institutions, weak public institutions, and state fragility.

6.11.1 Politics as a major cause of violence in Mucheke

The political environment in Zimbabwe has been characterised by surges of violence that can be traced from the post-independence era. Every participant identified politics as one of the main causes of conflicts in Mucheke. Participants added that politically-motivated violence normally intensifies towards national elections. Participants gave the following sentiments in support of the above assertion that identifies political violence as the main cause of conflict in the area of study:

ZANU-PF 3

Muno munharaunda yedu mapoliticians akushandisa mukana wekuoma kwezvinhu atora vechidiki vovaendesa kuma base vovapa zvinodhaka vovakurudzira kuita mhirizhonga kune vatsigiri vevamwe mapato. Vechidiki ava vanoshandiswa kuita mhirizhonga yekurova, kuuraya nekunyangarisa vatsigiri vebato rinopikisa.

[Here in Mucheke, politicians take advantage of the vulnerability of unemployed youths during the electoral season as they take youths to bases and supply them with alcohol and drugs. Youth given drugs are then instructed to identify political rivals and they become the spotlight of violence through torture, killings, and disappearances.]

MDC 1

Muno munharaunda yeMucheke matova nebato rinotonzi ndiro rinofanira kusarudzwa zvinova izvo zvava kuita kuti vamwe vane mamwe maonero vaonekwe semhandu kana vatengesi. Saka zvava kuita kuti vamwe vasabuda pachena nepamusaka pekuti vanenge vachida kuchengetedza mhuri dzavo.

[In this community of Mucheke, there is an accepted political norm that a certain party should be voted to the extent that everyone is obliged to vote for it. If anyone has a different political preference, he/she is regarded as a sellout. This has caused lot of people to remain silent so that they will preserve safety of their families.]

ZANU-PF 4

Pasina politics muno dai takatobatanavo asi vanhu havasi willing nekuti ma election akangosvika munhu akutochinja.

[Without political conflicts Mucheke could have been unified, unity is hindered because towards elections polarity starts to manifests.]

MDC 2

Hongu tinawo mamwe matambudziko arimo muno muMucheke asi nyaya dzematongerwo enyika ihonye pahukama hwevanhu.

[Yes, we have other problems in Mucheke but politics is toxic and is damaging community relations.]

MDC 3

Rimwe dambudziko muMucheke nderekuti hatisati tambosarudza local MP. MaMPs iwawa atinosarudzo anobva kunze ndivo vanouya vachikonzeresa nyonganyonga nemhirizhonga vachida kusarudzwa.

[Mucheke is having a challenge of not voting local representatives, and it is those that are not natives that come and cause violence towards elections to gain political support.]

The responses from FGDs highlighted the fact that politics has harmed community development. People are divided and politics has hindered sustainable development and promoted community fragility. The above responses clearly showed that political violence is inevitable in the community. The responses supported the idea that politics and elections have played complementary roles in intensifying political violence.

6.11.2 Political intolerance in Mucheke

The level of intolerance in Mucheke is astonishing. In their responses, participants noted that political ideology since 1980 has been that of perceiving people from the opposition as a nemesis. The slogan phrase "*pasi nemhandu*", which translates as "down with an enemy" has been viewed as the main driver of polarity in the community. In support of this, **ZANU-PF 1** gave the following illustrations:

Vanhu tinototya kufambidzana nevanhu vehukama vanotsigira rimwe bato nekutya kunongodzwa semhandu kana kuti vatengesi.

[Now we are afraid to keep company with our relatives who support another political party simply because we fear to be labelled as sellouts or political enemies.]

This assertion was strengthened by **MDC 3** who later on stressed that:

Muno atichisina kusununguka kutaura kana kuita maslogan nezvebato risiri pachigaro especially nguva dzema elections ndokutsvaga kurohwa ka ikoko.

[here, we are no longer free to speak and do slogans of our parties especially towards elections.]

The above quotes indicated that there is high level of intolerance in Mucheke. The responses clearly showed that people are afraid of interacting with people from other political parties even if they are their relatives.

6.12 Other causes of conflict in Mucheke

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, politics and elections are at the core of violence and conflict in Mucheke. There are, however, other causes which include social and economic factors. Economic challenges encompass high rates of unemployment, high rates of poverty, microeconomic instability, cartel activity and high levels of informality in the economy. Social causes include cultural xenocentrism, ethnic pluralism, criminal justice systems, extractive institutions, weak public institutions, and state fragility.

6.12.1 Unemployment

Globally, youth unemployment has become a problem, with more than 185 million unemployed youth aged 15 to 24 years (ILO, 2013). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2013) Africa as a continent is most affected. The IMF (2013) further reiterates that Zimbabwe as a country is also the most-affected in the Sub-Saharan region. Mudonzvo (2015) states that Zimbabwe has the highest unemployment rate in the world, at 95%. Mudonzvo (2015) further notes that youth unemployment in Zimbabwe is four times higher than that of adults. According to Mudonzvo (2015), unemployment among the youth is an escalating social, economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe, to the extent that it is disrupting national cohesion, economic development, peace and stability.

Mucheke makes up one of the areas with the largest unemployment rate among youth. The unemployed youth find it hard to deal with the cost of living and they engage in daily routine of spending the day at street corners chatting, and smoking dagga/marijuana or any illicit drugs. During night hours, youth patronise beer halls and night clubs. This has made them an easy catch for politicians who recruit them in exchange for a few dollars to buy alcohol and illicit drugs. Youth are instructed to unleash violence on rival political party supporters.

ZANU-PF 3 informed us that:

> *Mapoliticians arimuno ava kutora mukana wekushomeka kwemabasa votora vechidiki vovashandisa kukonzera nyonga-nyonga. Vechidiki ava vanotorwa vopiwa zvinodhaka, chikafu nemari kuti varove vanhu vakune mamwe mapato. Tinokumbirisavo hurumemnde itsvakire vechidiki ava mabasa. Zvingazotonyanya kushata kana sarudzo dzikaitwa nguva ino yatiri yecovid nekutti tose takagara padzimba hameno kwazvichasvika.*

> *[It is those greed politicians that are taking advantage of youth unemployment. They come here and recruit unemployed youth and give them food, drugs and money. They take them to their respective party bases and instruct them to unleash violence on opposition political parties. We plead with our government to provide jobs for our young ones. With*

this Covid-19 pandemic upon us it is going to be worse because almost everyone is now at home because of lockdowns.]

6.12.2 Poverty

Poverty was cited by the most participants as a major threat to peace in Mucheke. They strengthened this notion by stating that there is a high rate of poverty among youth in Mucheke which makes some youth vulnerable in the hands of greedy and ambitious politicians, and they are forced to attend rallies in exchange for food hampers, agricultural inputs and money. To support this, **MDC 1** said:

Mapoliticians iwawa anotoziva kuti muno munenzara, kana nguva dzesarudzo dzasvika vanouya votanga kutipa mapromises vachiti kuchauya chikafu nembeu. Kana zvadaro vanhu vanenge vava kumanikidzwa kuuya kumisangano uye nekuda mbeswa nechikafu vamwe vanomanikidzwa kutoenda kumisangano iyoyi kunyangwe vari vebato rinopikisa.

[These politicians they really know that there is hunger and poverty in our areas. They come and promise us farming inputs and food parcels towards elections. Those who received the farming inputs and food are expected to vote wisely if they vote for another party they will be traced and dealt with accordingly.]

ZANU-PF4 added that:

Imwe mhirizhonga inototanga pakugoverwa zvinhu zvinenge zvauya muzita remusangano zvakaita sembeu nechikafu. Kana uchizivikanwa semunhu webato rinopikisa hauwani.

[Sometimes violence starts to erupt at those rallies were there is ration of food and farming inputs. Opposition party members who attend such rallies are viewed as gate crushers and will be dealt with decisively.]

The above response clearly stated that youth do not have adequate resources to sustain themselves, and that they are manipulated by politicians to commit political violence as a way of removing political competition among candidates. The respondent highlighted the fact that poverty is a major cause of political violence in the area.

6.12.3 Weak and politicised public institutions

There is an ever-growing worry that some public institution are no longer apolitical. There is clear evidence that some victims of political violence who seek justice and health attention in Mucheke are

left unattended because the responsible institutions are not willing to be involved in political issues. Here is what **MDC 4** said pertaining to this point:

> *Muno mava nedambudziko rekuti ukaenda kuchipatara kana kumapurisa uchitaura kuti ndarohwa nekuda kwezvematongerwo enyika, unongonzi hatikwanise kukubatsira.*

> *[In this area we have a challenge that if you go to hospital seeking medical attention or to the police camp reporting about political violence you will not be attended to.]*

The above sentiments clearly indicate that there are weak public institutions in both the justice and health departments. From the respondent's view, it is clear that these institutions are monitored and controlled by a certain political party to further its political interests.

MDC 2 advised that:

> *Rimwe dambudziko ririmuno nderekuti kana varova vanhu vanorambidza zvipatara kurapa vanhu vanenge varoverwa nyaya dzine chekuita nepolitics mapurisa anoita seasisazive basa rawo, hauvaone nguva yekurohwa kwevanhu, kana vakamusunga haatomboraremo apa munhu anenge auraya munhu.*

> *[There is a problem of institution capture in this area, there is a scenario where ZRP and health institutions act partisan. These institutions neglect victims of political violence and perpetrators are walking free and if they apprehend one, he will not even spend one night behind bars.]*

In Mucheke, politics has ruined the integrity of the police and health institutions to the extent that they no longer uphold their duties in a fair manner, but rather cater to the interests of a certain party.

7.12.4 Unresolved past trauma: a culture of impunity

Most research participants submitted that if political friendship is to be realized in Mucheke, there is a need for truth telling, forgiveness and healing. In support of this notation, **ZANU-PF 2** said:

> *Muno munzvimbo medu tichiri nevanhu vakakonzera mhirizhonga vachiri kungofamba madiro dzimwe nguva vachitosangana nevanhu vavakarova, vavakapisira dzimba kana hama dzavakauraya vachiri kutsvaka rubatsiro kumatare edzimhosva asi nanhasi apana chati chaitwa kuti vanhu ava vabatsirike uyezve varipirwe.*

> *[In our community, there is a fact that perpetrators have been going unpunished, mingling everyday with victims who have wounds and strong bitterness caused by physical injuries, loss of*

family and relatives, loss of property and even permanent injuries and are still seeking justice and reparation to be paid.]

ZANU-PF 4 contributed that:

Kana pasati paitwa urongwa hwekuti akakanganisirwa neaakakanganisa vataurirane apana kuregererana kunoitika muno munhauranda.

[As long as there is no dialogue among community members that will bring victims and perpetrators together, let us forget about healing and reconciliation in this area.]

In the FGDs participants highlighted that if the perpetrators of previous violence are not arrested, there is a high probability that the next election season will be characterised political violence. **MDC 1** and **ZANU-PF 4** agreed that:

Vanhu vemuno vatova nechijairira chekuti chero vakarova vanhu panguva dzesarudzo apana zvavanoitwa nekuti chero vakasungwa vanongoburitswa.

[It has become a norm that people beat political rival supporters and after that nothing happens to the perpetrators. This has put political violence on the repeating mode in the next election because the perpetrators are not brought to book.]

According to the above statements, there is great need for addressing the past in order to avoid future political violence in the next elections. Participants agreed that without transitional justice, truth telling, forgiveness, reconciliation, reparations and justice in their community there will be no community cohesion or positive peace.

7.13 Consequences of Political Violence in Mucheke

6.13.1 Lack of development

In most cases, community engagement is realised when there is social cohesion in the area. Political violence leads to slow or no development in the area. According to study participants, political violence causes community functioning and the social fabric to deteriorate by damaging community relationships, culture and identity through terror and displacements and destruction of properties. The participants also highlighted that there is no investment or economic development that can be attracted to area characterised by a state of anarchy. Political violence has caused there to be no development due to terror, destruction of networks, and diminishment of community organisation activities.

ZANU-PF 1:

Mucheke haife yaenda kumberi kana kubudirira nekuda kwekuti ndimo munobikwa violence muno.

[As long as political violence is not reduced, Mucheke will not prosper or develop because it is the epicenter of political violence.]

The statement above clearly indicates that political violence is a stumbling block to community developmental activities and peace is the only means for Mucheke's development.

6.14.2 Mental Health Implications.

The discussions pointed out that political violence occurs mainly during election seasons and causes mental health implications, including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety. FGD responses gave examples of mental health disorders and trauma cases in people who have not recovered from political violence that occurred in previous elections.

MDC 2 said that:

Varimo vatikutoziva nanhasi varikutopenga kubva pavakauraisa vabereki vavo muna 2008.

[There are some people here with mental disorders since the 2008 election violence facilitated the death of their parents.]

ZANU-PF 3 and **MDC 4** concurred that:

Kune vazvinji vatinotoziva muno vasisachade kunzwa nezvema elections. Kana sarudzo dzatannga vanotoenda zvavo kumusha.

[We have a lot of people who are no longer interested in elections, they prefer to go to their villages when we are approaching an election period.]

The above sentiments indicate that there is nothing which has been done to foster proper reintegration and psycho-social care for both victims and perpetrators. People who are affected by political violence are failing to move on with their lives because their past experiences are still haunting them. Participants state that people fear that the past can repeat itself; therefore, there is a need for counselling and mental healing for those people.

6.15 Current measures in place to reduce youth involvement in political violence and their effectiveness

There are quite a number of measures put in place to minimise youth involvement in political violence. The government and non-governmental organisations have embarked on various peacebuilding training skills courses and violence prevention measures. Some of the notable measures for preventing violence peace campaigns and awareness, animal husbandry projects, peace gardens and sports initiatives. This was confirmed by **MDC 1** and **ZANU-PF 3** who said:

> *Kutaura chokwadi hurumende nema NGO varikumbozama kudziviririra bope remhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika asi varikukundikana. Kumishandira pamwe tinoendako, kunyangwe huku tinopfuya munosezvikwata asi unotoona kuti pakati pedu apana kunzwanana nekuregererana maererano nezvakamboitika kumashure.*

> *[Even though the government and the help of NGOs are putting some measures in place such as peace gardens and animal husbandry projects, we are still a community characterised by what happened in the past. Their efforts amount to nothing since those projects did not facilitate room for reconciliation and as a result are fueling more tension.]*

From the above sentiments, it is clear that the projects such as peace gardens and animal husbandry are failing to bring the residents of the area together. There is a need for a different intervention strategy that offers a platform for reconciliation that will bring victims and perpetrators together.

6.16 Call for Peacebuilding in Mucheke

Both interviews and the FGDs revealed that political violence was the major challenge regarding the promotion of sustainable peace, development and post-conflict reconstruction in Mucheke. Participants appreciated the efforts of the various strategies in place to curb political violence and the presence of other intervention strategies that can assist in promoting sustainable peace. Through interviews and FGDs, participants outlined the need for another peacebuilding mechanism to promote political tolerance. Participants justified this call by noting the persistent outgrowing of fear, divisions, and lack of trust and the lack of political liberalism in the area. In Mucheke, political violence distorted any prospect of sustainable implementation of locally-owned intervention strategies because of the politicisation of the community and institutions. The FGD participants encouraged social cohesion and community engagements as key to fostering unity and community development. They raised the point that polarisation in the area is hindering peace and political liberalism. They called for peacebuilding

strategies to be implemented in the area to transform post-conflict relationships across the political divide. **MDC 2** raised a point which reads:

Muno munharaunda medu munotoda nzira dzekudzivirira mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika.

[Due to the occurrence of violence during election periods, here in Mucheke we really need a peacebuilding strategy that helps to mitigate political violence.]

The main purpose of the above discussion was to come up with a practical intervention strategy that would improve inter-personal relationships, harmony and build sustainable relationships in the community. The study focused on improving political friendships in the community by offering a platform for true healing and reconciliation. It also gave community members an equal opportunity to solve political differences and offer solutions at a community level. The discussion also saw participants pointing out the need for establishing dialogue to promote political broadmindedness in the community. Below is what **MDC 3** articulated pertaining to the dialogue initiative as an intervention strategy:

Zvimwe zvirongwa zvekudzivirira mhirizhonga zvirimo muno muMucheke asi atisi kuona rubatsiro hwazvo sezvo mhirizhonga achiita pega pega patinenge tatarisana nesarudzo.

[Here in Mucheke there are some existing strategies of preventing violence but each day they are losing their essence because violence still occurs mainly towards elections.]

ZANU-PF 1 echoed this:

Muno muMucheke tinomboonavo maNGO anombouya ozama kuita nesu maproject vasingasarudzi kuti uyu ndewebato ripi kana ripi. Dambudziko rinozotangira pakuti vanouya through local representatives ndipo panozotangira dambudziko nekuti vano marepresantatives anozogova zvinhu vachitanga nevanhu vanotsigira mapato avo.

[NGOs injects some resources with the aim of including everyone and not leaving anyone behind. The problem arises when they come through local representatives who then ration those resources and projects in partisan distribution.]

In support of dialogue, **ZANU-PF 4** noted that:

Ikozvino tinomboda pfungwa yenhaurirano pakati pedu isu vanovhota zvisinei nekuti uri webato Maprojects akaita sekuchengeta huku, tsuro nemabindu emushandirapamwe zvirikutadza kuunza runyararo pakati pedu nekuti apana kuregererana nekubudira pachena pakati pedu sevagari veMucheke.

[Now we need a proper dialogue among us regardless of which party you belong to. We hope it will help us with healing and reconciliation since some projects like poultry, rabbits and peace gardens are failing to unite us as Mucheke residents.]

This notion received resounding support from other FGD participants, who went on to give their views. Here are some of them:

MDC 3:

Nhaurirano inoita kuti pave nekuregererana kwakasimba uye unoita tibatirane pamwe kunyangwe pama projects akaita seehuku, tsuro nemabindu.

[Dialogue facilitates reconciliation and encourages unity in projects like poultry, rabbit farming and communal gardens.]

ZANU-PF 2:

Inini ndongoziva hangu kuti muno makudiwa something unique, zvehuku izvi hazvisi sustainable. Kuchengeta huku netsuro kunotidhurira uyezve kunotidyira nguva sezvo tichifanira kusangana zuva nezuva kuti tidzipe chikafu.

[*There is an out-growing need of something unique because projects like poultry are not sustainable because they are expensive financially. Poultry and rabbit projects are time-consuming because you have to meet every day to nurse them*.]

MDC 1:

Nhaurirano inotibatsira kuita look upon our history and reflect. Inotibatsira kutarisa kwatakabva nepatava pakurarama kwedu sevagari venharaunda.

[Dialogue gives us an opportunity to look at our past and reflect. It helps us reflect on our bad history and look at what can be done to correct past history.]

ZANU-PF 4:

Pfungwa yekuti tinofanira kuita nhaurirano ndinoitsigira as an individual. Nhaurirana inotipa gwara rekuti tigadzire ramangwana redu rizere nerunyararo.

[I fully endorse the idea of dialogue as an individual since it give us assurance of sustainable peace in our community.]

MDC 2:

Takatodzidziswavo kuita nhaurirano kunotibatsiravo chero kudzimba kwedu kuti tichengetedze runyararo kana tichinge tatadzirana semhuri.

Learning how to conduct dialogues also helps us, even in our families, to conduct them during family conflicts.]

ZANU-PF 1:

Tinofanira kuikoshesa pfungwa iyoyi yenhaurirano. Ikozvino chero kumachurch takuonavo vanhu vachirwisana saka ikanyotso vandudza inotibatsira kwazvo kugadzira bongozozo rakuwanika kumakereke.

[The idea of dialogue we should embrace it especially in our churches which are plagued with on-going fights every day.

From the above sentiments it can be deduced that community members were calling for dialogue over other violence prevention measures such as poultry, rabbit projects, peace gardens and awareness campaigns. Dialogue was then endorsed and adopted by all the other FGD participants and interviewees as a suitable and sustainable intervention strategy in Mucheke.

6.17 Summary

This chapter explored and discussed the pre-dialogue state of affairs in Mucheke. The discussion emanates from the field work findings. The discussions looked at the nature, extent, possible drivers and effects of political violence in the area. In this chapter, participants highlighted politics as the main cause of political violence in their community though unemployment, poverty and lack of truth and reconciliation were singled out as other causes of political violence in the community. The chapter also discussed the current measure that are used to reduce political confrontations in Mucheke and evaluated their effectiveness. The following chapter will look at the evaluation of the intervention strategy.

EVALUATION OF THE DIALOGUES IN MUCHEKE

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the preliminary evaluation of the impacts of the dialogue initiative on the AT members and how it improved interpersonal relationships among the politically-divided supporters in the Mucheke community. Dialogue was conceptualised in this study to transform post-conflict relationships which had been damaged by political violence in Mucheke in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. Dialogue sessions were carried out with the help of contributions raised by AT members and the FGDs as responsive instruments for obtaining important information from key informants in achieving greater peace.

7.2 Life in Mucheke before the establishment of dialogue

This section discusses the normal lifestyle of Mucheke community before the dialogue initiative in the area. All the information used in this section was obtained from the AT participants during the preliminary evaluation session I conducted at the end of the dialogue initiative, which spanned the period from January 2022 to June 2022.

7.2.1 Lack of trust and suspicion among community members

In the very first meeting we had as an AT, members demonstrated group dynamics that showed hidden elements of political intolerance among the participants, as discussed in Chapter 6. AT members made it clear by pointing out the look of things in their community. Here is what **ZANU-PF 4** said concerning the above discussion:

> *Muno munharaunda medu taita dambudziko rekuti atichatembani, tava kungogara tichifunngirana nenyaya yemhirizhonga yakamboitika yezvematongerwe enyika*

> *[We come to a point that we no longer trust each other in this community because there is a lot of suspicion among community members which is fueled by political violence.]*

Lack of trust and a continuous growing of suspicion among individuals confirms that mending broken relationships with people once oppressed requires a lot of time. Likewise, it also requires a lot of time for the people who participated in the dialogue initiative to develop comprehensive relationships with each other, considering the intolerances of the past.

The situation in Mucheke before the dialogue initiative was introduced could basically be described as tense. There was prejudice and bigotry among youth from different political parties that caused mistrust

among the victims and perpetrators of politically-motivated violence, as highlighted by the AT members below.

MDC 4 said:

> *Muno munharaunda manga mava neruvengo rukurusa nekuda kwevanhu vakaurayirwa nekuroverwa hama dzavo nekuda kwemhirizhonga yezvematongerwo enyika.*

> *[The community was characterised by hatred and hostility, especially those who saw their relatives killed and beaten because of political violence.]*

ZANU-PF 3 added that:

> *Tine mhuri dzatinoziva muno munharaunda dzisingachafambidzani nekuda kwekuti mukoma anoda pato rinotonga munin'ina achidavo rinopikisa.*

> *[There are some families in this community that no longer work together just because of differences in their political affiliations.]*

MDC 2 complemented the above with:

> *There were no relations at all with people who supports a different political party.*

ZANU-PF 4 supported this by noting that:

> *The level of mistrust was heightened among members from ruling party and opposing party.*

These comments gave an overview of how tense the interpersonal relationships in Mucheke were.

7.2.2 Lack of political tolerance

The Mucheke community was characterised by lack of political broadmindedness. **MDC 1** said that:

> *Kubva nyika ino ichisunungurwa kubva kuvachena munhu wese anotsigira bato rinopikisa bato rinotonga aionekwa semuvengi.*

> *[The political environment which was established in this country views anyone who supports the opposition party as the enemy of the state and such kind of people must not be tolerated as they are the agents of regime change.]*

The above comments show that there is a high level of intolerance in the community, which limited interaction of people with different political preferences.

7.3 How the dialogue initiative impacted community lives

This section discusses the preliminary impact of the dialogue initiative on the AT members' lives.

7.3.1 Meeting platform for community members

During dialogue sessions I asked AT members, through interviews, to narrate how the dialogue had improved their lives as community members. The responses given below encouraged them to interact with fellow residents of the community regardless of the party supported.

MDC 4 said that:

> *Nhaurirano yakatibetsera sevechidiki kuti tisangane tiise musoro pamwe tikurukure kunyangwe zvazvo tichitsigira mapato akasiyana siyana.*

> *[Dialogue assisted us immensely in bringing us youth together to discuss political issues even though we come from different political parties.]*

ZANU-PF 2 also added that:

> *Nhaurirano yakatibatsira zvakanyanya kudzosera ushamwari hwanga hwakanganiswa nezvematongerwe enyika zvavakuita kuti tikwanise kudyidzana kumishandira pamwe.*

> *[Dialogue acted as a catalyst in restoring friendship among youth; now we can engage as one in community projects such as peace gardens.]*

The above sentiments expressed the concept that dialogue managed to harmonise youth, a development which had been regarded as out of reach in the community. From the above statements by the AT members, it became clear that when people want to work together, they must agree to meet and talk. Dialogue achieved this successfully by managing to bring the opponents together. This was the most important step towards reconciliation and building sustainable peace in Mucheke.

7.3.2 Promoting tolerance among political rivals

AT members further explored the role played by dialogue by stating that it promoted tolerance in the community. The following is some a remark by **ZANU-PF 1**who highlighted that:

> *Nhaurirano yakatibatsira kuti vanhu vanobva kumapato akasiyana vave neushamwari. Yakatipazve mukana wekuti titaurirane sevanhu vemunhauraunda nechimiro chematongerwe enyika pasina kupokana.*

> *[The dialogue initiative managed to improve our interpersonal relationships and it gave us an opportunity to discuss issues to do with politics without infringements.]*

The above statements expressed the importance of the dialogue initiative in the community. The dialogue sessions managed to bring the participants together, and they had the courage to share their views pertaining to political issues. As mentioned above, the dialogue helped people to interact with each other and helped people to listen to the narratives from both parties, a feature that was noted as crucial in moving towards reconciliation and building peace in general.

7.3.3 A catalyst for social change

The AT participants further appreciated the efforts of the dialogue towards social change. **MDC 4** highlighted that:

> *Nhaurirano yakatidzidzisa kuti shanduko haiuyi kana iwe sadungamunhu usati washanduka. Takatodzidziwo kushandisa nhaurirano kugadzirisana mumhuri dzedu.*

> *[Dialogue initiative taught very well about peace and it challenged us to be the initiators of change. It also taught us to apply such kinds of platforms in dealing with family conflicts.]*

ZANU-PF 1 added that:

> *Dialogue managed to change my life because I managed to reconcile with those I viewed as enemies.*

It is important to note that dialogue encouraged participants to develop mechanisms to reconcile and forgive others, as noted by **ZANU-PF 3**'s statements:

> *Nhaurirano yakatibatsira kuti tikwanise kuregereran chero hazvo zvaiva zvisina kureruka. Munguva dzataisangana kunhaurirano takaonavo cheso kuti zvinoita kuti tikwanise kuregererana kunyangwe zvazvo takambotadzirana.*

> *[Dialogue helped us to forgive each other. We realised that it is possible to forgive each other even though we had been maimed by our political opponents in the past. The dialogue challenged us to forgive one other after the acts of violence that resulted from politics and elections.]*

The above announcements by the AT participants are enough proof that dialogue acted as the catalyst of change in the community because it encouraged members to forgive those who had wronged them before the dialogue initiative.

7.3.4 Community cooperation

AT members further revealed that dialogue encouraged them to cooperate in the community activities, regardless of different political affiliations. The community witnessed high levels of cooperation in

community projects such as gardens, poultry and rabbit husbandry projects. Cooperation managed to eliminate fear and suspicion among community members. Here are the remarks made by **MDC 2** regarding improved community cooperation:

> *Nhaurirano dzataiita dziya dzakatisimbisa kuti tishande pamwe chete sedunhu. Ikozvino takukwanisa kuita mshandirapamwe yemapindu, kuchengeta huku and tsuro muma streets edu.*

> *[Dialogue has pushed us see the community as one, regardless of our political affiliations. It also encouraged us to engage in community projects such as poultry, rabbit husbandry and gardening. Now we participate in those projects as one community.]*

The above assertion clearly states how the dialogue initiative improved community engagement and cooperation among community members.

7.3.5 Promoting the spirit of "Ubuntu"

Dialogue also transformed the Mucheke community positively by eradicating a bad culture of not mourning and assisting at funerals at the homesteads of people from another political party. A culture of not attending and assisting at such funerals had become a habit in the community, a feature that goes against our African values and norms. Here is one of the remarks made by the Pastor concerning the above:

> *Isu pano tafara chose kuona vechidiki vema pato akasiyana siyana vachiuya kuzobata maoko nekubatsira basa panhamo zvaunza mweya mutsva muno Mumucheke wekuchemana kana umwe wawirwa nedambudziko.*

> *[We are very glad to see youth from different political parties coming to mourn and coming and offering emotional support to affected families, which is eradicating the culture which was previously affecting this community of not attending and assisting at funerals.]*

The above statement shows that it is possible for the people to work together for a common good, no matter what party they sympathise with.

7.3.6 Eliminating burdens of hatred

The dialogue initiative was applauded by the participants because it managed to remove the burdens of barriers of hatred between youth across the political divide. Dialogue has enabled youth from ZANU-PF and the MDC to see each other eye to eye, which showed that since the dialogue took place tolerance, trust and togetherness were realised. This is what **MDC 1** had to say about elimination of hatred:

Isu nhaurirano yakatibetsera kuti titarisane pahu youth hwedu kunyangwe umwe achibva kubato rinopikisa. Tava kukwanisa kuita nyaya pasina kukava nevanhu vanemaonero akasiyana needu pane zvematongerwe enyika.

[Dialogue improved my debating skills to the extent that I now debate professionally and I know how to control my temper, how to resolve conflicts.]

Not only did dialogue manage to eliminate barriers of hatred, it also improved tolerance and cemented cohesion between ZANU-PF and MDC sympathisers. The strengths of this peacebuilding initiative lie with the fact that it managed to work with people who are perpetrators and victims of politically-motivated violence.

This section discussed the positive impacts the dialogue initiative had on the residents of Mucheke, while the next section discusses the challenges faced during the dialogue initiative.

7.4 Challenges faced during the dialogue initiative

This section discusses the challenges that were encountered during the dialogue initiative. Although the dialogue initiative managed to transform post-conflict relationships among politically-divided youth, it also had its own challenges. These issues come from economic challenges, and political activities at national and local level that disrupted dialogue meeting sessions and caused disagreements. In addition to the above highlighted problems, some political and national programmes coincided with the dialogue sessions, which resulted in some sessions being postponed to a later date.

7.4.1 Economic challenges

The economic meltdown of Zimbabwe is affecting people in the streets immensely. During the dialogue sessions we ended up abandoning some sessions because AT members were absent after they chose to take in piece jobs. This saw some sessions being postponed, which ended up frustrating some other AT members. There was also a situation where some AT members chose to do their work in the early mornings of agreed session days which resulted in them arriving late at the venues. **MDC 4** said:

Tsvariro varume nekusabata nguva tinenge tambono ngwavha-ngwavha makuseni.

[Apologies, gents, for being late; I woke up early to do my piece job[and] it is unfortunate that I finished it late"

In the midst of such challenges, I was impressed to see the AT members coming up with alternatives, for example by postponing the time and waiting for those who were late to arrive and then starting our sessions. This gave me encouragement that the AT participants were owning this initiative.

7.4.2 Political events which derailed dialogue sessions

During the course of the dialogue initiative, there were some political and national events that derailed our meetings. These events included voter registration, thank you rallies and clean-up campaigns.

7.4.2.1 Voter registration

This one of the developments that stood in our way during dialogue sessions. The fact that some AT members were the assets of political parties was a barrier to our dialogues, since they might be assigned by their parent parties to mobilise for voter registration. This disrupted our set dates for dialogue sessions since some AT members were on party duties. Although voter registration did not halt the dialogue initiative completely, it is fair to say we noticed some hiccups in our dialogue sessions.

7.4.2.2 Thank you rallies

The city entered into a period of holding thank you rallies after the results were announced of recently-concluded by-elections held on the 26th of March in the constituencies and municipalities which MDC legislatures and councillors held before being recalled. Those thank you rallies coincided with our dialogue missions. As a result, we had the challenge of postponing our meetings. Some of the AT members failed to show up on agreed dates of the sessions because they were on party duties, which also forced us to postpone our dates. Here is **ZANU-PF 1** who summed up the prevailing situation by saying:

> *Nema by elections atakabva kuita awa nguva dzacho adzichasangani nekuti pamwe tinenge tamboenda kundoita gadziriro dzerally yekutenda vakativhotera pasarudzo idzi.*

> *[Due to the results of these just ended by-elections, our session times are clashing with party activities since we are busy making preparations for the thank you rallies for those who voted for us.]*

To counter this challenge, the AT members agreed to meet on days that did not coincide with party activities. The desire of AT members to choose a later date that did not coincide with party activities showed the dialogue initiative was positively transforming their lives.

7.5 Achieving study objectives

Despite the challenges experienced during the dialogue initiative, the AT members felt that the objective of promoting political tolerance among youth via dialogue was achieved. This was supported by **MDC 1** and **ZANU-PF 4** who concurred with other AT members by stating that:

> *Pfungwa yekuti tiite nhaurirano kuti tigadzirise kunzwanana panezvematongerwe enyika yakabudirira chose. Takakwanisa kuita nhaurirano, tikakurrukura zvakanaka kwnguva inotopfuura mwedzi tiri vanhu vanobva kumapato akasiyana ezvematongerwe enyika. Pfungwa*

iyi kunyange zvayo yaiva itsva munharaunda, takakwanisa kuwanavo muono mutsva munyaya dzepolitics uye kushandisa dzimwe nzira dzisina ruzha kugadzirisa kukakava pane zvepolitics.

[We are glad to proclaim that we achieved the research objectives of this study because we managed to start this initiative. We managed to have this initiative for a period of more than three months, working with people from opposing parties without having infringements. We were also taught to solve our conflicts peacefully and this development helped us to possess a new way of interpreting political issues.]

The dialogue initiative tallied well with the objectives of this study, which were centred on the establishment of dialogue to bring people from different sides of the political divide to promote tolerance. Dialogue was introduced successfully in Mucheke and managed to bring ten people together from both the MDC and ZANU-PF. Participation in numbers complements the basic concept of action research that guides this study.

7.6 Ethical Considerations

This study was conducted in a manner that met the requirements of the DUT ethical code of conduct to protect the rights of the participants. The study's information and evaluation of the objectives were clearly explained to the action team at the beginning of the dialogue, and also before the evaluation. As always, participants were asked to fill in a consent form and were also allowed to withdraw at any time during the preliminary dialogue and evaluation stage if they wished to do so. Confidentiality was held to the highest level as there was no name mentioned in the narrations.

7.7 Limitations of the evaluation exercise

It is fair to say that the preliminary evaluation coincided with some national and political events, although the timing did not halt the evaluation completely. AT members were not at ease during the evaluation, since the level of suspicion and fear was high, which hindered some contributions during dialogue. There was a growing concern that peacebuilding cannot be done in such a short period of time. Regardless of the success stories mentioned above, political violence syndrome remains a sensitive issue that needs to be dealt with decisively. One of the limitations of this evaluation is that it was done after only one implementation cycle due to limited time and financial resources. It could be more helpful if a long-term evaluation could be done after general elections to assess whether the action team members are now politically tolerant.

7.8 Summary

In this chapter, the preliminary evaluation which was carried out in Mucheke was discussed. The evaluation was facilitated through interviews and some observations. The chapter discussed political and national events that clashed with the preliminary evaluation sessions. Although the study managed to promote tolerance among the politically-divided youth, there was clear evidence that peacebuilding needs sufficient time. In the next chapter I will provide a summary, recommendations and a conclusion for the whole study.

<p style="text-align:center">**CHAPTER EIGHT**</p>

<p style="text-align:center">**SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**</p>

8.1 Introduction

This last chapter of the thesis gives an overview of the whole study. It presents an overview of the procedures followed and draws the findings obtained from this study based on the thesis' aims and objectives. The chapter discusses the findings to generalise the research conclusion and formulate recommendations. This chapter also suggests directions for future research.

8.2 The study objectives

The main aim of this study was to promote political tolerance among youth in Mucheke in Masvingo, Zimbabwe (Chapter 1, section 1.5). The following are the research objectives (Chapter 1, section 1.5.1):

- To explore the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence in Mucheke.
- To identify previous and current attempts in Mucheke to reduce this involvement and assess its effectiveness.
- Using a participatory action research approach, to plan and implement interventions to reduce this involvement.
- To evaluate the short-term outcomes of the intervention.

8.3 Summary of the study findings

This section offers a brief summary of the study and discusses the findings in relationship to the study aim and objectives. The study on the promoting political tolerance among youth in Mucheke was conducted in Mucheke in Masvingo, urban Zimbabwe. This study is supported by the conflict transformation theory and complemented by Allport's intergroup contact theory.

I explored dialogue terminology, its definition, use, effectiveness and challenges in its application in promoting peace worldwide, and then I moved to focus on the Zimbabwean context. The literature revealed that there are several studies that have been carried out worldwide that used dialogue and there is a quite number of such studies that have been conducted in Zimbabwe. However, the literature showed that very few studies have been conducted specifically on the use of dialogue to promote political tolerance, while no scholarly work has provided in-depth reflections on the use of dialogue in promoting political tolerance among political enemies.

I also explored the fact that the use of action research in the discipline of peacebuilding and conflict transformation remains unpopular in Zimbabwe and Africa as whole. There were few scholarly works available for reference during my research journey.

8.3.1 Objective number one: To explore the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence in Mucheke.

The requirements of objective number one were explored in Chapter 6 of the study where the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence in Mucheke were revealed by the AT participants. The study discussed the ways in which political violence occurred in Mucheke. The extent of political violence, with supporting figures, was also explored. The study also explored the main causes of political violence and its consequences.

8.3.2 Objective number two: To identify previous and current attempts in Mucheke to reduce this involvement and assess its effectiveness.

The requirements of the second objective were addressed in Chapter 6, where the use and effectiveness of other measures was discussed. The study revealed that the use of dialogue is also effective in reducing political violence involving youth, and the study found it effective to use dialogue to promote political tolerance among youth from opposite sides of the political divide. The study also appreciated the efforts of other intervention strategies, such as peace gardens, peace awareness and restorative justice, in promoting peace. Without only focusing on the positives, the study also noted the challenges that adversely affected the dialogue initiative, such as political events and national events. From the understanding I gained throughout the dialogue sessions, I noted that even though dialogue sessions were interrupted by the economic challenges, thank you rallies and voter registration mobilisation (Chapter 7, section 7.4.1 & 7.4.2), it still remained effective in tackling political intolerance and building sustainable peace.

8.3.3 Objective number three: Using a participatory action research approach, to plan and implement interventions to reduce this involvement.

The requirements of the third objective were addressed in Chapters 6 and 7, which called for the designing and implementation of the dialogue initiative aimed at promoting political tolerance. The designing of the dialogue initiative was discussed out in Chapter 6 and the implementation was presented in Chapter 7 of the study.

8.3.4 Objective number four: To evaluate the short-term outcomes of the intervention.

The fourth objective's requirements were addressed in Chapter 8, where the preliminary evaluation of the intervention strategy was undertaken to evaluate the impacts dialogue had on the Mucheke

community. The preliminary evaluation indicated that the pre-dialogue environment was tense, characterised by mistrust, beleaguering and intolerance. The post-dialogue environment revealed that the dialogue initiative had impacted the lives of youth in Mucheke positively by providing a platform to meet, which was a dream that was never realised before.

The dialogue acted within a short space of time. The dialogue initiative managed to make meaningful strides in eliminating hatred barriers and promoting tolerance among AT members, hence sharpening their dialogue skills. Although the dialogue initiative impacted positively, the preliminary evaluation suggested that the AT was negatively affected by economic challenges and political events such as "thank you" rallies and a voter registration blitz which derailed the smooth progression of dialogue sessions (Chapter 7, section 7.4.1 & 7.4.2). However, evaluating the sentiments given by the participants, the dialogue initiative was a successful tool in promoting political tolerance among youth in Mucheke.

8.4 Conclusion

This study offered a great opportunity for me to deduce the efficacy of action research in promoting peacebuilding. During the course of this study, I managed to gain experience in facilitating dialogue as an appropriate tool for building peace among people from across the political divide. The youth that took part in dialogue sessions realised that they had become potential peace agents in both their families and the community at large. The fact that youth agreed to work together despite their diverse political affiliations proved beyond measure that sustainable peace can be realised when the locals own dialogue to be their own. I noticed that numbers do not really matter in peacebuilding, and l also recognised that not all participants can change their attitudes overnight. In addition, I realised that there is a need for number of intervention cycles or follow-ups in order to come up with proper action research results.

8.5 Knowledge generation and the implications of the study

I understood that a proper implementation of the intervention strategy, done at local level as suggested in this study, has the maximum potential to promote tolerance among people from across the political divide. The intervention strategy has the capacity of eliminating negative stereotypes and improving how people perceive each other. The knowledge generated from this study can be vital to aspiring peacebuilding academics, non-governmental oganisations and political players in promoting peace, curbing violence and embracing political diversity and social cohesion among community members. The study made a huge contribution to the discipline of peacebulding by focusing on the neglected area of political tolerance towards sustainable peace. The study also contributed immensely on the nature, extent, causes and consequences of youth involvement in political violence. Due to the scarcity of published

action research studies in Zimbabwe, the study provides a foundation for future studies in the field of peace building using action research in this country.

8.6 Preliminary evaluation

The results of the preliminary evaluation revealed that the dialogue initiative provided a meeting platform which had never happened before in the Mucheke community. The dialogue initiative acted as an agent for social change, a tool that eradicated mistrust and built relations among youth in Mucheke. It is noted that the dialogue initiative encountered some hatred barriers. Despite all the positive contributions of the dialogue initiative, the preliminary evaluation showed that the AT was negatively affected by events such as economic challenges, "thank you" rallies and voter registration as well as other political party commitments (Chapter 7, section 7.4.1 & 7.4.2).

8.7 Ending the dialogue sessions

The dialogue initiative followed the guidelines set out by the research objectives (Chapter 1, section 1.5.1). The dialogue initiative ended with the preliminary evaluation exercise. AT participants vowed to continue with the dialogue initiative. AT members also agreed to create another locally-owned second cycle to link peacebuilding with psychological and coping skills in conflict resolution. This idea was largely informed by the nature and extent of conflicts discussed by this study in Mucheke. Taking into account the nature of political violence that led to death and disappearances of some residents, psychological and coping skills topics became more important. The second cycle would also address causes and consequences of political violence in Mucheke. Given that some residents cut in as the AT members, those who did not participate vowed their willingness to participate in the second cycle and take an active role in post-conflict situations. AT members gave the assurance that they were going to continue with the dialogue initiative even after this study was concluded.

8.8 Research reflections

One of the unique characteristics of AR is that it allows a self-introspection exercise of the experience gained during the course of the study, which will be discussed in this section. This exercise of self-introspection served as a period of learning, given that my Honours degree was module-based, supplemented with a mini dissertation that was not action-based. The experience of AR was thrilling in the sense that it encouraged me to mingle practice and theory without losing the theoretical component of the study.

Being involved in the dialogue initiative that consisted of members of rival political parties and bringing them together for such long periods of time served as an exciting experience for me. The coming together was not only exciting, but was an eye-opener in that through the dialogue initiative positive peace is

attainable among youth emanating from different political parties. At the end of the study, I felt encouraged when I realised that young people from ZANU-PF and the MDC, two main political parties in the country, were interacting with each other. This development concurred with the concept of peace and theories such as conflict transformation and intergroup contact theory.

The dialogue initiative proved to be a game changer in the promotion of sustainable pace and assisted immensely in managing conflicts among people from the politically-divided community. Considering the results of this study, I also developed a motive to continue using dialogue beyond this study, after I realised the benefits associated with it in fostering peace. This research helped me deduce the benefits of using action research over desk research.

8.9 Research limitations

This research used a qualitative research approach, which later become costly in terms of time and resources. However, as a way of tackling the issue of time and resources, the study was carried out in Mucheke in Masvingo, urban Zimbabwe. The study also used male youth as the sole participants, based on the assumption that males are more violent than women. As a result, the study cannot generalise regarding situations involving female youth and studies beyond Mucheke, to which the research sample relates.

8.10 Recommendations

From the experience I gained from this study, I put forward the following recommendations to people and organisations that wish to participate in peacebuilding and conflict transformations situations:

- In order to realise sustainable peace in Zimbabwe, I encourage all peacebuilding players to not impose, but to allow the locals to own the intervention strategy that aims at resolving conflicts.
- In structuring the peacebuilding initiatives, there must be avoidance of a win/lose situation by actors involved. The initiative must come with a win/win situation for all actors.
- The last recommendation is that peacebuilding must not be a top-bottom approach for it to realise durable peace. This simply means that the community, as the local actor, must be involved in the designing, implementing and decision-making of the intervention strategy.

8.11 Areas for future study

Deducing from the findings of this study, the following areas are considered for future study:

- Collaborating psychological skills and peacebuilding
- The role of religious leaders and non-governmental organisations in conflict resolution
- The role of peace gardens in transforming post-conflict relationships

8.12 Summary

This chapter gave a detailed summary of the entire study, the findings of the study objectives, and gave an overview of the preliminary evaluation of the intervention strategy. The chapter also presented a discussion of how the research provided new knowledge in peacebuilding. In this chapter I carried out research excursion reflections before giving a conclusion drawn from the findings. I came up with recommendations which were guided by research findings, and finally I identified areas that need to be researched further.

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ANNEXURE A

LETTER OF INFORMATION

Title of the Research Study Promoting political tolerance among youth in Masvingo, Zimbabwe

Principal Investigator/s/researcher: Rumutsa Phillimon, BAdmin

Co-Investigator/s/supervisor/s: Geoffrey Thomas Harris, PhD

Brief Introduction and Purpose of the Study:

Zimbabwe has a long history of political violence, particularly between ZANU-PF and the MDC supporters. The actual violence is often carried out by youth who are encouraged in this by senior party officials and results in human casualties, looting and destruction of private property and damage t public property. The cycle of violence is waiting to repeat itself next time there is an election. I want to try to stop this cycle and the misery it causes in the city of Masvingo.

Greeting:

How are you

Introduce yourself to the participant: I am a Masters student at DUT doing research for my master's degree in Public Administration – Peace Studies.

Invitation to the potential participant: I would like to invite you to participate in the research

What is Research.

Research is defined as a systematic search or enquiry for generalized new knowledge. During the course of my research I will explain acronyms and technical terminology so that you all understand and you are welcome to ask as many questions as you wish so that you all understand my study.

Additionally, you are entitled to discuss my study with your family and friends and are under no obligation to commit at this stage. For this purpose, you are allowed to take a copy of the Letter of Information document t home.

Outline of the Procedures:

This study is part of the requirements for the completion of my master's degree at DUT. This study is entirely funded by DUT therefore you are not expected to pay any financial contribution or to benefit in monetary term from this study. You are only one of the 32 potential participants in Mucheke, Masvingo. You are therefore purposively chosen and requested to voluntarily participate in the study. I will ask you questions related to political violence in Mucheke.

If you choose to be part of the study, I will ask you to do one of the following (in the Mucheke Community Hall annex):

1. Participate in a focus group discussion (FGD) with another participants from your party to discuss your knowledge and opinions about the involvement of youth in election violence

2. Have an individual interview with me for about 30 minutes

I may ask your permission to record the discussions or interviews on a voice recorder. If so, I will be the only person who ever listens to them.

Risks or Discomforts to the Participant: This is very low risk study and there are no discomforts to you expected.

Explain to the participant the reasons he/she may be withdraw from the Study:

You should participate voluntarily. You have the right to withdraw from the enquiry at any time and for any reason without any adverse effects.

Benefits: There will be no benefits for participating in the study but group discussion participants will have morning or afternoon tea provided.

Remuneration: There is no remuneration for you and no form of inducement will be offered for participation in this study. But, morning or afternoon tea will be provided to the focus group participants.

Costs of the Study: Participants will not be asked to cover any costs of my study.

Confidentiality: Anonymity and confidentiality will be guaranteed through the use of acronyms. Access to data will be limited to study personal and information collected will be locked in a safe place and destroyed after five years. You will be told about the concepts of Anonymity and confidentiality that will be applied to this study and if participants would like to be named, then they will be named as agreed.

Results: (Explain how the researcher plans to disseminate the results of the research. Explain if any significant new findings developed during the course of the research how it will be conveyed to the participant.)

Research-related Injury:

Should there be any study related injury, the psychologist skills will assist the researcher in remediating to the situation.

Storage of all electronic and hard copies including tape recordings:

All written and audio data will safely be kept by the researcher for a period of five years as stipulated by the university rules. Thereafter, the written data will be shredded and the audio data will be deleted and destroyed.

Persons to contact in the Event of Any Problems or Queries: Please contact the me the Phillimon Rumutsa (researcher) on 0027710416965, my supervisor Professor Geoffrey Thomas Harris on 031 373 5609 or the Institutional Research Ethics Administrator on 031 373 2375. Complaints can be reported to

the Director: Research and Postgraduate Support Dr L Linganiso on 031 373 2577 or researchdirector@dut.ac.za.

ANNEXURE A2

TSAMBA YEKUZIVISA NEZVETSVAKURUDZO

Musoro wetsvakurudzo: Kukurudzira kunzwisisana pakati pezera revechidiki maererano nezvematongerwo enyika muMucheke Masvingo, Zimbabwe.

mutsvakiridzi: (Rumutsa Phillimon, Masters of Management Sciences in Public Administration-Peace Studies))

Mutaririri: (Geoffrey Thomas Harris, Professor, ICON, Peace Studies)

Nhanganyaya nedingindira retsvakurudzo:

Zimbabwe inyika ine nhoroondo yemhirizhingo inechekuita nezvematongerwe enyika kunyanya panguva yakatarisana nesarudzo. Naizvozvo tsvakurudzo ino inoda kugadzira ukama nekuwirirana kwemapoka evechidiki kuumba runyarararo munharaunda dzakasiyana-siyana.

Kwaziso:

Mhoroi, makadii

Kuzvizivisa kuvabatsiri:

Ini ndiri kuita masters paDurban University of Technology ndichiita tsvakurudzo yemasters degree in Public Administration – Peace Studies.

Kukokwa kuva mubatsiri:

Ndinokumbiravo rubatsiro rwenyu mukuita tsvakurudzo yangu.

Chii chinonzi tsvakurudzo

Tsvakurudzo kutsvaka ruzivo rutsva. Mumazuva ekutsvakurudza ndichakutsanangurirai mitemo yezve tsvakurudzo dzepa Durban University of Technology kuti mose munzwisiseuyezve makasununguka kubvunza mibvunzo inechekuita netsvakurudzo iyi.

Mitemo ichatevedzerwa pakuita tsvakurudzo:

Tsvakurudzo iyi inodikanwa pazvidzidzwa zvangu zve masters. Tsvakurudzo iyi inobhadharwa ne DUT naizvozvo vabatsiri havafaniri kubhadhara mari mukuita tsvakurudzo iyi. Uri umwe wevamwe makumi matatu nepiri vachange vachibatsira mutsvakurudzo iyi mumucheke, Masvingo. Naizvozvo uchasarudzwa kubatsira mutsvakurudzo iyi nekubvunzwa mibvunzo inechekuita nemhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika.

Kana wasarudza kuva mubatsiri unotarisirwa ku: If you choose to be part of the study you will:

1. Kubvunzwa mibvunzo
2. Kuita nhaurirano muzvipoka zvevanhu vasere kutsanangura nezvemhirizhonga iyi uyezve kutsvaka nekugadzira nzira yekudzimura mhirizhonga iyi.
3. Unogona kuva nhengo yeboka richazo simbaradza nzira yekudzivirira mhirizhonga yatsanangurwa pamusoro.

Tsaona dzingangowira vabatsiri mutsvakurudzo:

Tsvakurudzo iyi haina zvinokuvadza.

Tsanangura kubatsiri kuti anemvumo yekurega kubatsira kana achinzwa sekudaro.

Unemvumo yekubatsira pasina kumanikidzwa. Unekodzero yekurega kubatsira kana uchinzwa sekudaro.

Rubetsoro: semubatsiri hapana chaunopiwa pakubatsira patsvakurudzo iyi.

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Rubatsiro rwemarri: Hakuna rubatsiro rwemari rwuchapiwa mubatsiri. Asi chikafu chakaita sezvekusvusvura zvichapiwa kuva batsiri.

Mari inodikwa patsvakurudzo: Vabatsiri havafaniri kubatsira nerubatsiro rwemari patsvakurudzo iyi.

Zvakavanzika : Mhinduro dzichapiwa dzichachengetedzwa panzvimbo yakanaka yozoparadzwa panopfuura makore mashanu**.**

Zvichabuda mutsvakurudzo: Vabatsiri vachaziviswa nezvabuda mutsvakurudzo.

Kukuvara kungangoitika pakuva yetsvakurudzo: kana pane kukuvara kwaitika, mutsvakiridzi anotsvaka rubatsiro rwana murapi kurapa mubatsiri wetsakurudzo.

Kuchengetedza kwenhaurirano

Mhinduro dzichapiwa dzichachengetedzwa panzvimbo yakanaka yozoparadzwa panopfuura makore mashanu**.**

Vanhu vekubata kana pachinge paita kusanzwisisana: bata ini mutsvakiridzi Phillimon Rumutsa pa 0027 710 416 965, mutariri wangu **Muzvinafundo** Geoffrey Thomas Harris pa 031 373 5609 kana the Institutional Research Ethics Administrator pa031 373 2375. Zvichemo svitsai kuna Dr L Linganiso pa 031 373 2577 kana researchdirector@dut.ac.za.

ANNEXURE B

CONSENT

Full Title of the Study: Promoting political tolerance among youth in Masvingo, Zimbabwe.

Names of Researcher/s: Phillimon Rumutsa

Statement of Agreement to Participate in the Research Study:

- I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, Phillimon Rumutsa, about the nature, conduct, benefits and risks of this study - Research Ethics Clearance Number:

- I have also received, read and understood the above written information (Participant Letter of Information) regarding the study.
- I am aware that the results of the study, including personal details regarding my sex, age, date of birth, initials and diagnosis will be anonymously processed into a study report.
- In view of the requirements of research, I agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a computerised system by the researcher.
- I may, at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation in the study.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare myself prepared to participate in the study.
- I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research which may relate to my participation will be made available to me.

_____   _____   _____   _____

Full Name of Participant   **Date**   **Time**   **Signature   /**
                                      Right

Thumbprint

I, Phillimon Rumutsa herewith confirm that the above participant has been fully informed about the nature, conduct and risks of the above study.

_____   _____   _____

Full Name of Researcher   **Date**   **Signature**

_____   _____   _____

Full Name of Witness (If applicable)   **Date**   **Signature**

_____   _____   _____

Full Name of Legal Guardian (If applicable) Date   **Signature**

ANNEXURE B2

MASHOKO OKUBVUMA KUPINDA MUCHIRONGWA CHECHIDZIDZIDZWA.

Ndinobvuma kuti mudzidzi uyu, Phillimon Rumutsa akanditsanangurira mamiriro akaita tsvakurudzo yake, zvachichandibatsira kana ndikabatidza pachidzidzwa ichi - Research Ethics Clearance Number: _____ ,

- Ndakagamuchira nokuverenga tsamba yaitsanangura nezvechidzizwa ichi ndikainzwisisa (tsamba yekubvuma kupinda mutsvakurudzo iyi).

- Ndinonzwisisa kuti zvichabuda mutsvakurudzo ino zvinoenderana neni sedungamunhu, zera rangu, zuva rokuzvarwa, zita rangu kana kuti ndiri mukadzi /murume hazvizotaridzwi muchinyorwa chomudzidzi pachinopera

- Ndinotendera nekubvumira kuti zvichabuda mutsvakurudzo ino zviiswe mumichina yemazuva ano zvihwerengedzwe nemunyori wetsvakurudzo ino.

- Ndinokwanisa kubuda mutsvakurudzo ino chero pandadira ndisina kuzivisa.

- mibvunzo yandaida yose ndisati ndabvuma kupinda mutsvakurudzo iyi, ndikazozvibvumira pachangu kupinda mutsvakurudzo iyi.

- Ndinonzwisisa kuti tsvakurudzo ichabuda muzvinzverwa izvi ndichayiziviswa.

_____   _____ _____   _____

Zita remubatsiri   **zuva**   **Nguva**   **ruoko**

Ini Phillimon Rumutsa ndinobvuma kuti mubatsiri aziviswa nezve tsvakurudzo, nzira dzekubatsira nadzo mutsvakurudzo uye zvingangonetsa mutsvakurudzo.

Phillimon Rumutsa.   20 Chikumi 2020

Munyori   **Zuva**   **Ruoko**

_____   _____   _____

ANNEXURE C

328 Anton Lembede

10 Timshel Citylife

Durban

 4000

South Africa

20 May 2020

The Mayor

The Town Clerk

 Masvingo City Council

 P O Box 17

 Masvingo

 Zimbabwe

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN MUCHEKE, MASVINGO.

My name is Phillimon Rumutsa. I am currently registered for a Masters in Peacebuilding at the Durban University of Technology. I would like to interact with youth in your area in a study that

I am conducting. Below are the details of my study so that you have a clear understanding of what it is about.

The title of my study is **"Promoting political tolerance among youth in Mucheke, Masvingo Zimbabwe."**

Political violence among youth is a major concern internationally, nationally and within our communities. I want to find out the <u>nature, extent,</u> causes and consequences of political violence among youth in your area and together with the youth develop, implement and evaluate a programme to reduce violence in your community. Participation is voluntary and no harm will befall participants during and after the study has been carried out.

For this study, I am guided by the code of ethics of Durban University of Technology to ensure confidentiality of information provided to me by the participant. I do hope that I will be granted access to work with the youth in your area. Should you have any problems or queries then please contact me (+27 710 416 965) or my supervisor Professor G.T. Harris (+2731 201 4027) or to the Director of Research Dr Linda Lingisano on +2731 373 2900.

At the conclusion of my research, I will make copies of my findings available to the Council and will be happy to give a verbal presentation.

Thank you in anticipation.

Sincerely,

Phillimon Rumutsa

ANNEXURE D

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Title: Promoting political tolerance among youth in Mucheke, Masvingo Zimbabwe.

Durban University of Technology

Phillimon Rumutsa

I will start by introducing myself and my research team, and explain the objective of the interview, welcome the participants and thank them for attending. I will emphasize on confidentiality and seek their consent to tape record the session assuring them that the tapes will only be used for the study purpose after which; they will be discarded. We will jointly set boundaries or guiding rules.

1. Can you explain the forms of political violence that involve youth in Mucheke?

2. What are the causes of political violence among youth in Mucheke?

3. What is the extent of political violence that mostly involve youth in Mucheke?

4. What are the negative impacts of political violence in Mucheke?

5. Are there any measures in place dealing with political violence in Mucheke? If yes name them and explain their effectiveness.

6. Do you think promoting political tolerance can reduce political violence among youth in Mucheke?

ANNEXURE D2

GWARA REKUBVUNZA MIBVUNZO

Musoro: "Kukurudzira kunzwisisana pakati pezera revechidiki maererano nezvematongerwo enyika muMucheke Masvingo, Zimbabwe."

Durban University of Technology

Phillimon Rumutsa

Ndichatanga nekuzvizivisa kuvabatsiri vangu, ndotsanangura chinangwa chemibvunzo, ndogamuchira vabatsiri pamwe chete nekuvatenda. Ndichatsigisa vabatsiri zvikurusei nekuchengetedzwa kwehumbovo hwavachapa uye ndichakumbira mvumo yavo kuti nditsikise zvese zvichaitika panguva yemibvunzo uye yerondedzero muzvikwata, zvese zvatsikiswa zvichangoshandiswa kubatsira mutsvakurudzo chete. Ini nevabatsiri tichatsvaka nzira nehurongwa hwekufambisa zvikamu zvese..

1. Titsanangurire nzira dzinoitika nadzo mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika pakati pevechidiki muMucheke?

2. Ndezvipi zvinokonzera mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika muMucheke?

3. Ndezvipi zvinoratidza kuti mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika pakati pevechidiki muMucheke?

4. Ndehupi huyipi hunokonzerwa nemhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika muMucheke?

5. Ndedzipi nzira dziri kushandiswa parizvino kudzivirira mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika muMucheke? Kana dziripo dzidome uyezve tsanangura kudzivirira kwadziri kuita mhirizhonga iyi.

6. Kukurudzira kunzisisana maererano nezvematongerwo enyika kunokwanisa here kudzivirira mhirizhonga inokonzerwa nezvematongerwe enyika pakati pevechidiki muMucheke?

ANNEXURE E

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

Title: promoting political tolerance among youth Masvingo, Zimbabwe.

Durban University of Technology

Phillimon Rumutsa

I will start by introducing myself and my research team, and explain the objective of the interview, welcome the participants and thank them for attending. I will emphasize on confidentiality and seek their consent to tape record the session assuring them that the tapes will only be used for the study purpose after which; they will be discarded. We will jointly set boundaries or guiding rules.

1. Can you explain the forms of political violence that involve youth in Mucheke?

2. What are the causes of political violence among youth in Mucheke?

3. What is the extent of political violence that mostly involve youth in Mucheke?

4. What are the negative impacts of political violence in Mucheke?

5. Are there any measures in place dealing with political violence in Mucheke? If yes name them and explain their effectiveness.

6. Do you think promoting political tolerance can reduce political violence among youth in Mucheke?

ANNEXURE E2

GWARA REKUBATA NARO ZVIKWATA

Musoro: "Kukurudzira kunzwisisana pakati pezera revechidiki maererano nezvematongerwo enyika muMucheke Masvingo, Zimbabwe."

Durban University of Technology

Phillimon Rumutsa

Ndichatanga nekuzvizivisa kuvabatsiri vangu, ndotsanangura chinangwa chemibvunzo, ndogamuchira vabatsiri pamwe chete nekuvatenda. Ndichatsigisa vabatsiri zvikurusei nekuchengetedzwa kwehumbovo hwavachapa uye ndichakumbira mvumo yavo kuti nditsikise zvese zvichaitika panguva yemibvunzo uye yerondedzero muzvikwata, zvese zvatsikiswa zvichangoshandiswa kubatsira mutsvakurudzo chete. Ini nevabatsiri tichatsvaka nzira nehurongwa hwekufambisa zvikamu zvese.

1. Titsanangurire nzira dzinoitika nadzo mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika pakati pevechidiki muMucheke?

2. Ndezvipi zvinokonzera mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika muMucheke?

3. Ndezvipi zvinoratidza kuti mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika pakati pevechidiki muMucheke?

4. Ndehupi huyipi hunokonzerwa nemhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika muMucheke?

5. Ndedzipi nzira dziri kushandiswa parizvino kudzivirira mhirizhonga yezvematongerwe enyika muMucheke? Kana dziripo dzidome uyezve tsanangura kudzivirira kwadziri kuita mhirizhonga iyi.

6. Kukurudzira kunzisisana maererano nezvematongerwo enyika kunokwanisa here kudzivirira mhirizhonga inokonzerwa nezvematongerwe enyika pakati pevechidiki muMucheke?